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The best column ever written about the war in Afghanistan



Are you confused by the war in Afghanistan?

Counterintuitively this may prove your clarity of thought and propensity toward wisdom

The very best piece that I have read about the war in AF-PAK yet comes from London's Sunday Times. It's author, Mathew Parris has written a masterpiece. Without further ado I'll give you these choice lines:
As I stared unfocused at my notes the acronyms swam forward, their small-print meanings swam away, and I saw only acronyms.

And in the meaninglessness I suddenly saw meaning. It is this. The entire operation is up its own bottom, lost in committees, strategies and initiatives. Forget what these monstrous letters stand for. Grasp, instead, the essential incoherence.

AFPAK, ANCOP, ANDS, ANP, ANSF, APPS, ASNF, AAQ/FF, APP, CARD, CDC, CISCA, CISTICA, CJTF, CN, CNPA (ANP), COMISAF, CPCC, CSOFC, CSTC, ECC, EUPOL, FDD, FTD, GPI, HIG, HIGHK, ICPT, IDLG, IGLC, INFO-OPS, IRCTA, ISAF, IU, MCN, NDCS, NDS, OCCC, OEF, OMLET, OPDIESEL, PC, PRT, SITC, UNODC, UNPOL, TB . . .

You'll see lots of As there, sometimes standing for Afghanistan, but usually Assistance. The Fs are usually Force. Any contradiction between assistance and force is helpfully blurred by the reduction to acronyms. The infestation of Cs generally denotes Committee, Control or Command. The many Ds and Ns often stand for Drugs, National or Narcotics. Take the CJTF, which is the Criminal Justice Task Force, to be distinguished from the ANP (the Afghan National Police), partially overseen but not exactly trained by EUPOL (European Union Police something-or-other), who are not the same thing as bilateral police assistance, and who are assisted by the ASNF (the Afghan Special Narcotics Force), probably answerable to the MCN (Ministry of Counter-Narcotics) with help from the IU (Intelligence Unit), to be distinguished from SITC (the Special Intelligence and Counter Terrorism body) and operating according to the NDCS (National Drugs Control Strategy), a subset of the ANDS (Afghan National Development Strategy). If it weren't so tragic, this would be a comic novel by Evelyn Waugh.

Acronyms are not the only refuge. Others lullaby their brains to sleep swathed in the acrylic blankets of a new language now suffocating the ministries, missions and shirt-sleeved development-wallahs in shiny white Toyota 4x4s: a hideous hybrid of NGO-speak, Whitehall-chic, political pap and military jargon . . .

"Across the piece", "agent for change", "alternative livelihoods", "asymmetric means of operation", "capability milestones", "civilian surge", "conditionality", "demand- reduction", "drivers of radicalisation", "fixed-wing assets", "fledgeling capabilities", "injectors of risk", "kinetic situation", "licit livelihoods", "light footprint", "lily pads", "messaging campaign", "partnering- and-mentoring", "capacity-building", "strategic review", "reconciliation and reintegration", "rolling out a top-down approach", "shake -- clear -- hold -- build", "upskilling".

It's so, so important not to understand the meaning but to hear the noise. For the curious, however, "reconciliation and reintegration" means talking to the Taleban, "lily pads" means teaching by example, and an "injector of risk" is a penalty. A "kinetic situation" is a fight.

Language says so much. The acronyms and the buzz-phrases tell you of a crazy-paving of assistance and command, with aid money leaking through the cracks in billions. It tells of baffled expatriates and aid workers -- well-meaning, clever men and women -- in flight from reality. It tells of an international effort chasing its own tail.

Read it all. In my opinion it contains the "Zen" of great political analysis: direct pointing.



6 Comments

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Otherwise known as a cluster fuck.

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Deanie Mills posted what I consider an excellent piece on the Afghanistan effort. It's long but worth reading. In that thread, I commented that the success of the effort will require us to see it as a combined Afghanistan/Pakistan undertaking, rather than one involving either nation alone. President Obama appears cognizant of that need, and to date, there are some encouraging signs of progress, as well as evidence the struggle will be arduous and dangerous. Many other readers posted insightful comments in the thread; the link is
http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/talk/blogs/deanie_mills/2009/07/obamas-afghanistan-its-not-wha.php#comment-3517772

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The complexity (or chaos) can also indicate just a really hard problem. Unfortunate that we can't choose our issues, in a technological age, but all states can affect all other states.

This is like complaining about complex tax codes. Simplicity is only possible in simple societies. Combine the complexity of American politics and technology with the social complexity of Afghanistan and Pakistan and it would be a miracle like a windstorm assembling a 767 to have a clear path.

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Tom,
I really think the British have a much better idea of what can and cannot be done in Afghanistan.

I think there is zero chance of success.

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Dave - That same warning was issued when we prepared to undertake an Afghanistan campaign after 9/11 - we were told it was destined to fail and that we would be bogged down interminably by Taliban fighters eager for martyrdom in their wish to destroy the American military.

Our success was rapid and decisive, with few casualties. Where we failed was in our unwillingness to consolidate that success with the economic aid and continued presence needed to sustain the Afghan government and avoid the growth of corruption within it. That failure was attributable mainly to diversion of resources to Iraq.

Given the initial success, and the reality that insurgencies of the kind we fight are never eliminated, but can be contained, there is no reason to believe we can't succeed again - this time maintaining the gains by an ample use of resources.

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Fred,
A British general once said that wars in Afghanistan only really begin after you "win" them.

Probably the USA can maintain a presence in Afghanistan as long as it is willing or able to allocate resources to the task. However, history shows us that the longer the USA remains the deeper will be the Afghan dislike of that presence and the more persistent their resistance to it.

I don't think many Americans see what is most obvious: that 9-11 was merely the bait with which Osama bin Laden set a trap to lure the USA into Afghanistan and ultimately Pakistan. Of course the bait was irresistible.

Iraq was only an unexpected windfall for Al Qaeda. The situation that the USA finds itself now is the situation that Bin Laden originally intended for us.

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