Russia: The Putintate and American Behaviors Egging It On
In the past 45 days, as if on cue, five indispensable pillars of the Bush Administration's politico-military footprint in Eurasia have erupted with internal unrest or complication. It is like someone pushing pressure points in US muscle and influence in the region.
Iraqs Kurds and Americas bases jab a stick in the Turkish craw. Indias communists obstruct a nuclear cooperation treaty with the US. Pakistans perpetual military President Musharraf responds to protestors of his administration with armed raids and jailed lawyers. Georgias President follows Musharrafs lead, crushing street protests with security forces. And Afghans have been seeing Taliban ghosts who shoot real rounds and burn stuff down.
Now Vladimir Putin has ordered radioactive fuel rods to the Iranians.
Maybe it is mere symmetry, but Eurasia is within the Russian Federations declared sphere of influence, and experts have consistently emphasized Putin's spoilier role:
--Anne Applebaum
--Michael McFaul and James M. Goldgeier
However, other analysts and think tanks emphasize Russia's inability to do anything to carry out a counter-superpower agenda, lacking resources and organization to do so. Always, Russia's potential is the topic. Yet in that there is a dangerous arrogance toward Russia's rise in the world.
The arrogance was perhaps unconscious for many who sought to 'teach' Russia to be a constitutional democratic republic, and for those idiotic missionaries who daily offended Russians who have been finding their religiously spiritual roots. That the Putin regime's state interference with spiritual life (an historic error in Russia) and personality cult hinders that search is deepened by interlopers who did not duly respect the Russian peoples' virtues recommending self-determination.
Where analysts err who underestimate Putin's creative and resourceful uses of power abroad is that they see only a spoiler. Putin intends to extend his limited power through multipliers in other powers and trends. He is too deliberate to remain in power through the Prime Minster's Office just for the limelight. His work is not done. Hence my example of the concerted events in Eurasia.
Ultimately I believe that the West underestimates Putin's anger and determination not to meaninglessly hurt, but to defeat the West for its attitudes toward Russia. I believe he wants to reverse the perceived result of the Cold War.
It became an axiom of WWII's roots that the allies underestimated German humiliation via allied punishments after WWI. Why is this not discussed more about Russia in terms of allied declarations of victory and subsequently assumed control by aid, the purse and counsel?
The next US leadership should publicly summit with Russia on the dimensions of Rekyavik to jointly denounce the Cold War's ill-effects and take specific mutual actions to identify and correct them. While it may be too late, it would disarm much rancor and anti-Western hate in Russia to do this. It can be done without condoning the current course of Russia, which I believe is based on some unresolved ill-effects of the Cold War.
In this status quo of lingering ailments of the Cold War, Vladimir Putin may not only be checking the US, but preparing to bring it low, then oust and replace it internationally. Russian purchases of large stakes in Western entities abroad are ongoing. With Russian money will come influence. And I've already written about Putin's extension of state power through the Russian Orthodox Church.
Another recurring error our political and industrial leaders have made in working hand in hand to compete for Russian resources and markets is disregarding that Russia will imitate their conduct, fair and unfair. It is as though the short-term profit crowd does not think their children will have to live on the planet with the angry children of the people they finesse today. Look at the intense youth movements in Russia following Putin. It hearkens back to other youth movements in Europe that engaged in programming and indoctrination. It is a bad sign.
Vladimir Putin may be a despot with all of the temptations and compromises that come with it, but he is a smart man in alliance with advisers who do see what US interests have been up to since treating the fall of the Berlin Wall as a Carte Blanche to guide the East. I think analysts underestimate the depth of Putin's anger and Russians' anger at this snubbing that comes across in the Western attitude and its premises.
It would take much away from nationalist movements whose energy depends on charges of Western exploitation, hypocrisy and decadence for the U.S. to cease exploiting, hypocritical acts and decadent pursuits that damage social life at home and abroad. How? Drop unfair competition and insist on the same abroad. Draw down the unethical moves and measure the same abroad.
When other national leaders look at the political and social diseases Americans tolerate in their own society or in their treatment of others abroad, then see them coming to 'teach' democracy without cleaning up their own house, they tend to grab their wallets, spoil the message at home, and unsnap their holsters. It is exactly what Americans would do in the reverse.
Finally, if one's adversary is well trained enough, it can kill you with a ploughshare as well as with a sword. It is time to deal with Russia with respect, toughness and self-correction. To neglect any of these elements is a plan to fail.





Putin might make the same mistake we made, thinking for a while there that we could make Russia go away. It didn't, and neither will we. We may decrease in power and influence, but it will be mostly of our own doing, as it was for Russia.
Most countries are defined by their land, their internal communcations such as roads and rivers, and obstacles such as mountains and deserts. They are mostly not arbitrary constructs like Iraq. What would defeat mean, with the Atlantic and Pacific separating us? So if Putin actually hopes to defeat (in which contest?) the West he is dreaming.
I'd bet he's not that stupid. What he wants is influence, and while he may not be able to positively reduce ours (we can do that without his help) he can actively increase his. Iran is a caase in point, of course.
The reason so many Russians wanted to emigrate here was not because of our public policies but because of how living here differed from there. Let's keep life here something to strive for, maintaining our principles and being trustworthy in foreign policy.
A major difference is that Russia had a surveillance state and we did not. Another was the encouragement to speak publicly. Of course economic opportunity, with few oligarchs and many small entrepreneurs. Those are what we should concentrate on. We can't really pressure Putin as long as he is delivering what Russians want.
Decreasing oil demand would be a strong tactic.
December 20, 2007 5:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
Your point that reduced oil dependence in the US will help check the Russian regime and Iran, for example, is true. There is risk there, too. And this is something I had not considered enough about the speed with which the US decreases fossil fuel dependence, including the sort of pressures that will put on Russia. When a centrally controlled power with WMD galore is under pressure of losing the wealth that their populations became accustomed to, the temptation to expand geographically -- to conquest rises. And that ups the risk of escalating warfare. However, in the Eastern Orthodox Church, some have predicted Russia would adjust to such a situation by returning to its spiritual roots rather than try to impose hardships on others to stay wealthy.
This is one reason why the intense nationalism concerns me: to keep the Russian people onboard for any conquest to relieve economic losses and avert unrest, the Russian regime would probably get mean at home and abroad. That is, unless it moderates over time. Tomorrow's leaders from the youth movements do not seem oriented toward mellowing. Let's hope it is only youth.
Ethnic Russians are headed for minority status demographically, and so Putin is paying people to have kids. I wonder if he's paying ethnic Russians more. (Like other mutt leaders bolstering purebread national pride in European history, Putin himself is from the Tver region that has some Finnish blood running in it). Putin's also tightened foreign access to adoption of Russian babies and children. It would be interesting to see if he has cut access to adoption of muslim babies and children, or if he's left that category of persons open for the highest bidder abroad.
In any case, the surveillance state is picking up here, Tom. Go to the DNI.gov website and read Deputy Director Kerr's posted speech to a November GEOINT intelligence symposium and his contemporaneous comments to committees on the Hill. Amazing and unnecessary ideas.
Re: emigres...Many Russian emigres tend to emphasize freedom and better opportunity as reasons for moving here, but they dislike the coldness of American life, being so individual, socio-politically fractured and self-centered. Russian emigres I've met speak with more historical experience in their national life, having learned of and outlasted many systems and ideologies as a people. They seem less impressed with political ideology, but are susceptible to mass movements with a centralizing nucleus of hope in "princes and sons of men" and sometimes in history, in God only. So they're cynical about the politics wherever they go, including the US. That's why they have so many jokes about what they can't control. There's some wisdom in that, however, it is against the right-all-wrongs nature of progressive and conservative Americans (differing they say, in methods and ID'ing one another's methods as wrongs to be righted).
On Putin, as I said, he's not one to do things without a precise goal. He has much more in mind. He's already nationalized key industries touching on Russia's strongest resources. What does he want to do with the money?
I think his strategy and his tactics definitely look for openings created by the US government's own errors abroad and at home. That is part of projecting his limited power through trends and other powers to have a multiplier effect. The uncanny timing of the recent paranoid use of federal troops (Pakistan / Georgia) most likely had been inspired by provocative information (perhaps false) coordinated to elicit the strong-arm responses of US aligned regimes.
Russia assumes as fact that every Orange-looking protest or public movement in Eurasia is Western financed and controlled. What is it about that principle that the suspicious regime is suspicious of what it does itself as a matter of routine.
December 21, 2007 7:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
No shit about surveillance here. Perhaps you've noticed us complaining?
As to pressure, I see no value in enabling Russia's oil wealth, but if prices decline a little it only means they start spending internally. In fact that is already happening, since they usewd to sell military hardware for foregin exchange (and still do) but they're making more for their own army now that they can afford it. And the more toys you have the more temptation to use them.
So we can't pressure Russia if they don't need us for anything. I do not htink the ambitions of Putin extend to any kind of threat to us, either militarily or economically. Our best defense is to be honest and humane in our foreign endeavors, and win the respect contest. Current policies are guaranteed to lose it.
December 21, 2007 8:41 AM | Reply | Permalink
Your point that reduced oil dependence in the US will help check the Russian regime is true to some extent. However, as US ingenuity in energy alternatives picks up, Russia will find other markets even as other markets increase their appetite for fossil fuels and increased transport due to new commerce.
If the US supplants fossil fuels in those markets by offering a better alt-energy system(s), then that will pressure Russia more.
There is risk there that I should have give more thought to in the past. The risk is that Russia under pressure, with a falling population, falling GNP with a population accustomed to a higher standard of living, may see geographic expansion to capture territory with ethnic Russian populations in them to avert a Muslim majority from taking the Kremlin and putting minarets over it.
This is one reason why the intense nationalism concerns me: to keep the Russian people onboard for any conquest to relieve economic losses and avert unrest, the Russian regime would probably get mean at home and abroad. That is, unless it moderates over time. Tomorrow's leaders from the youth movements do not seem oriented toward mellowing. Let's hope it is only youth.
There is a prophecy spoken by a Russian Orthodox saint, St. Seraphim of Sarov, whose burial place the Soviets had plopped down a huge nuclear weapons testing and defense facility. St. Seraphim predicted that Russia would be great one day again, but that its greatness would be in spiritual riches not as an imperial force with lots of wealth, butter and weapons.
Ethnic Russians are headed for minority status demographically, and so Putin is paying people to have kids. I wonder if he's paying ethnic Russians more. (Like other mutt leaders bolstering pure bred national pride in European history, Putin's family lineage hails from the Tver region that has some Finnish blood running in it).
Putin's also tightened foreign access to adoption of Russian babies and children. It would be interesting to see if he has cut access to adoption of Muslim babies and children, or if he's left that category of persons open for the highest bidder abroad.
Re: émigrés...Many Russian émigrés tend to emphasize freedom and better opportunity as reasons for moving here, but they dislike the coldness of American life, being so individual, socio-politically fractured and self-centered (i.e. neighbors frequently don't know each other well). As an example, in many parts of Russia and the Ukraine, if someone isn't heard from in a day or two, their neighbors or friends will check on them to see how they are.
Russian émigrés I've met speak with more historical experience in their national life, having learned of and outlasted many systems and ideologies as a people with an heritage. They seem less impressed with political ideology, annoyed by American missionaries, however, are susceptible to mass movements with a centralizing nucleus of hope in a leader. Pushing them too hard can result in a response, as with anyone else. Read Putin's responses to the TIME interviewer in its Person of the Year piece.
Russians tend to be cynical about the politics wherever they go, including the US. That's why they have so many jokes about what they can't control. There's some wisdom in that, however, it is against the right-all-wrongs nature of progressive and conservative Americans (differing they say, in methods and ID'ing one another's methods as wrongs to be righted).
Putin's strategies and his tactics definitely look for openings created by the US government's own errors abroad and at home. That is part of projecting his limited power through trends and other powers to have a multiplier effect. The uncanny timing of the recent paranoid use of federal troops (Pakistan / Georgia) most likely had been inspired by provocative information about the nature of the crowds (perhaps false) coordinated to elicit the strong-arm responses of US aligned regimes.
Russia assumes as fact that every Orange-looking protest or public movement in Eurasia is Western financed and controlled. What is it about that principle that the suspicious regime is suspicious of what it does itself as a matter of routine?
December 21, 2007 12:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
The US relationship with Russia on criminal justice issues is an example of how the nations work together to try to stop corruption infecting both of their countries. For instance, the governments have worked to stop the abusive mail-order bride industry that often ends up in victimization of Russian women and girls by socially disfigured folks over here.
December 21, 2007 1:01 PM | Reply | Permalink