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Afghanistan - a riddle wrapped in an emigma


A suicide car bomb killing at least 12 people was intended for the Indian embassy in Kabul, according to the New York Times (10/8/09).  The previous day the same paper published an analysis by Peter Baker and Eric Schmitt that says the Afghan war debate now leans to a focus on a campaign against Al Qaeda in Pakistan.  It is not known whether this view is accepted by the Obama war cabinet.

The central question hinges on the nature of the current relationship between the Taliban and Al Queda.  Therein is the question.  The predictability of the future of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan has to be settled by the President.   Recent successes with surgical strikes against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan may make it less central to U.S. strategy.  The administration pointed out to the Times in an anonymous interview that there are fewer than 100 Al Qaeda fighters left in Afghanistan.  Another anonymous official characterizes the strategy as one of viewing the Taliban, militants local to Afghanistan and jihadist Al Qaeda as very different.  President Obama has reiterated that his goal is to protect the United States and to prevent the jihadists from getting safe haven.  Mark Knoller reported on Twitter that "a WH official says Obama received a 'comprehensive intelligence and counterterrorism assessment' on political & diplomatic situation in Pakistan."

President Obama requested an early look at General McChrystal's troop request from Defense Secretary Gates, according to McClatchy Wednesday.  The President wanted to see it before the top military officials reviewed it so that it would not be leaked to reporters as was McChrystal's Afghanistan assessment. This may suggest friction between the military and the commander in chief.  And there has certainly been friction between General McChrystal and his superiors because of his public stances, and because of the leak. 

Similarly Pakistan's army has objected publicly to the conditions in the $1.5 billion U.S. (Kerry-Lugar) aid package still to be signed by the President, McClatchy reported.  This pits the military "against the fragile civilian government of the Pakistan Peoples Party, which has championed the U.S. assistance deal," as well as the opposition in parliament.  The bill has a number of requirements including, "monitoring and certification of Pakistan's action against terrorism. . . requires the country to work to prevent nuclear proliferation and to show that its military isn't interfering in Pakistani politics."  This objection, according to McClatchy caught the administration by surprise and comes at a time just prior to a planned offensive towards militants in the border region of Waziristan.  Pakistan's Foreign minister on a trip to Washington played down concerns over the bill, while acknowledging that the language could have been more sensitive to Pakistan's sovereignty.  Marc Ambinder posted this on Twitter:"RT @nickschifrin: Is the Pakistani military statement of doubt about the Kerry-Lugar bill in #Pakistan a game changer?" It was linked to a related BBC News story explaining more about the nature of the Pakistani military's objections.

Finally, many of us remember Charlie Wilson's War.  Huffingington Post reports that Wilson now thinks that we ought to consider a new strategy regarding the war in Afghanistan.  "I'd probably shut it down, rather than lose a lot of soldiers and treasure," noting the President's "very tough situation."  See the Scranton Times-Tribune

References:
"Gross: Massive Fraud in Afghanistan Election," is by Nasrine Gross at Juan Cole's Informed Comment (10/7/09).
"Robert Kaplan on the Regional Dimensions of Afghanistan," is from Steve Clemons' The Washington Note (10/7/09).
"Guest Post by Michael Cohen: The Trouble with Counter-Insurgency," is from Steve Clemons' The Washington Note (4/1/09).
"Battle of Books rages in Afghan debate," is from The Wall Street Journal at  Memeorandum (10/7/09).  Regards Lessons in Disaster and A Better War.
" 'Code Pink' rethinks its call for Afghanistan pullout," is from the Christian Science Monitor at  Memeorandum (10/7/09).

31 Comments

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Good to see my Carol G. Great essay. Correct issue.

Makes me mad with an anti war ideology. I wish to go 'which side are you on'.

I WANT OUT.

WE THE PEOPLE HERE DONT WANT NO WAR.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P4p6tfoankk

Is this toooooooooooo simplistic?

Probably.

But I will stick with Bobby Darin on this one.

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Thanks for your kind words about the writing quality. I, too am sick to death of the war(s). Bush had a chance at righteous self defense in Afghanistan; now it is too late. The train left the station for Iraq. I can't say that I feel bad that the Iraqis are coming to a grudging peace and a taste of budding democracy, but, God the cost was high. Maybe being a peace prize winner will give the president a push in the direction we want.
Peace to you, my friend.

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Good to see you again, Carol, it's been a while.

EXCELLENT post.

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Thanks, Lis. I get caught up in other stuff. And sometimes I feel shy about posting something when it is mundane.

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The problem with being Afghanistan is the same problem with being in Iraq and was the same for Vietnam.

The majority of the people either do not want us there at all or really don not care one way or the other about the Taliban and/or Al Queda. So with out the support of the locals we have a very difficult time and the Taliban will have pretty much free reign. Just like the Viet-Kong did.

In other words....we loose.


C

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You have it right when you say that the majority of people do not want us there (occupying their country). The locals do not support what feels like foreign occupation to them. At least the Taliban and Viet Cong are KNOWN adversaries or oppressors to their fellow countrymen and women. Go figure.
And the locals loose, too. Our mistake is unwittingly getting involved with internal civil wars, in my humble opinion. And Iraq was the first country the U.S. ever invaded, unprovoked. And Vietnam had a bit of that, also though it was not as blatant.
There is a substantive difference between an insurgency and the quest of violent jihad as practiced by al Qaeda. We absolutely must very vigorously defend against that.
Thanks for your comment.

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It is probably incorrect to claim that the majority of Afghans don't want us there. Ahmed Rashid is a Pakistani journalist who has lived and worked in Pakistan and Afghanistan and is a long time expert on the Taliban. On NPR, he reports that most Afghans don't want us to leave. Conversely, they almost universally hate and fear the Taliban. Their problem with our presence is not who we are but the fact that the crossfire kills and injures civilians. They would welcome our presence unambivalently if we provided the security they needed until their own indigenous security forces could replace us.

The main reason we need to remain engaged in Afghanistan until we can safely be replaced is the catastrophe that would ensue if the Taliban assumed uncontested domination of Afghanistan. This would provide a safe haven for Pakistani insurgents, including Al Qaeda, to flee to and establish a presence. In turn, this would threaten stability in Pakistan, a nation with nuclear weapons coveted by the terrorists. Our goal, therefore, is not a military victory, but the maintenance of reasonable stability as a temporizing measure.

Finally, although the overarching concern is the threat of Al Qaeda, indirectly linked to a threat of total domination of Afghanistan by the Taliban, we shouldn't completely ignore a moral obligation we would betray if we left prematurely. The Afghan people haven't forgotten the brief respite from Taliban oppression we bestowed on them with our successful 2001 campaign. They haven't forgotten that at last, girls could go to school, everyone could listen to music, and men could walk the streets without fear of death or injury because their beards weren't proper.

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Fred you make a good and reasoned argument. I do remember what Taliban rule was like. Where we differ is how to go about achieving "the maintenance of reasonable stability as a temporizing measure." And I could make a reasoned moral argument for either staying or going. What tips the balance for me was the election. How can we deal with the level of corruption over the long term? You and I would both agree that it is a mess, huh? No wonder President Obama is taking such a long time to decide. Thanks, Fred.

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I have three years on the ground in Afghanistan in the villages in three different provinces--Zabul, Bamian and Kapisa. Afghanistan is a very complicated. My experiences are obviusly anecdotal, but they are consistent.

The majority of the people despise the Taliban. They are however becoming increasingly frustrated with poor security and its impact on their lives. They blame the Taliban for instigating much of the fighting and the government for its ineffective response.

They do not want to return to Taliban rule, but if they lose hope that the new government can deliver some modest security and development gains they will settle for local truces. This is not peace. It is merely a lack of fighting.

I have been in villages that we and the government took back from the Taliban. At first the locals were very concerned we would soon leave and expose them to Taliban revenge. Once they realized that we and the Afghan Army were staying they opened up about the reign of terror the Taliban imposed and were eager to cooperate.

The failed election is a serious setback, and might eventually lead to a more serious crisis but I think it is far too early to give up on the Afghans over this. To condemn a people at this point to massive civil war and Taliban thuggery and terror strikes me as inexcuable.

War is an awful thing and the Afghans are suffering for it. Howver most also feel that they would suffer more if we left and let the situation collapse. After thirty plus years of war they are desperate for peace and normality...not "peace" and a return to the Taliban. They know this is their last chance for a century or more to "get it right." If the rest of the World abandons them now, they will not be back for generations.

I can understand how some Americans who have been ignoring this war for nine years now are shocked and frustrated and might just like to turn their backs on this because they don't think they have a stake in it, but I frankly think it is a rather naive aproach. Were we to leave and Afghanistan descend into some verison of Taliban government many of these same folks would be wringing their hands in coffee shops across America over the plight of Afgan women and starving Afghan children. Of course, tehir hand wringing would change nothing.

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Thanks for commenting, 70%, whoever you are and whatever you did "on the ground" in Afghanistan, and especially in Zabul, although it would be interesting to know if you were more like a sniper in a recon platoon or more like a USAID civilian with the PRT in Qalat, or more like a moron from Mars, claiming "we and the Afghan Army were staying" in villages where we don't stay.

Zabul has always been a land of grand adventures for wild and crazy Kakars like Sher Shah Suri, who killed a tiger with his bare hands in faraway Hindustan, but required a sword to kill a lion, and likewise his descendants in Zabul killed Russians with Russian SAM's which we provided, but for us it's bare hands and IED's unless the Russians get suddenly stupid and provide the Kakars with American SAM's, instead of quietly watching us go down, no matter how many empty promises are made by Americans "on the ground and their stinking con-man of a President.


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I was with PRTs mostly.

Zabul is extremely complicated (like every place else in AFG) even though it is mostly Pashtun. There are a few Hazara in the far north, but I had minimal contact with them. Zabul probably has about a 5% literacy rate. It is along the dividing line between the Ghilzai and the Durani and politically torn between Ghazni and Khandahar. The leaders of Ghazni sometimes have more control of Shah Joy district than the Governor in Qalat does. Likewise, folks in Mizan and Jaldak look to Khandahar as much as they do to Qalat.

I wouldn't short change the guys in the infantry units regarding their understanding of the country. Many spend months in very small posts in one or two valleys and develop very intimate understanding of the area they work in. Some places like Korengal Valley are hell holes where we accomplish nothing and should cut our loses and leave, but in most very difficult places like Deh Chopan in Zabul there is some hope if we can empower the Afghans--locals and government leaders.

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I don't short-change anybody who served under the American flag in a shit-hole like Zabul, but I also don't attribute "intimate understanding" to guys from an astronomically different culture who spend a few months on a fire-base with occasional excursions into xenophobic villages, and without anything approaching fluency in the local dialect.

There must be some very good news from Deh Chopan that I can't find, if that's your poster-village for "empowering" our friends, if any, in Zabul. But as long as the local and touring jihadis are firing AK-47's instead of SAM's I suppose we can keep a few guys "on the ground" instead of under it.

Out here in sunny California the Central Valley is dotted with little colonies of Afghan "agriculturalists," some of whom have worked patiently in the fields for forty years and sent most of their meager paychecks home to distant relations decade after decade, even before the goddamned Russians destabilized their god-forsaken country and began the nightmare where we now prattle about "empowering" war-lords and drug-lords and all the rest of what passes for a government in Kabul and Zabul.

But from Stockton to Fresno, I never met an Afghan who thought a bunch of infidels with guns could fix Afghanistan.

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I meant "villages in Deh Chopan," and momentarily unfocused from all this nonsense.

Misery on misery, and Afghanistan was always miserable enough!

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Actually, I think we agree more than you might think. I the end only the Afghans can fix the place. If the Pakistani Army and ISI were to root out their Taliban and stop harboring the Afghan TB, Afghanistan could take care of itself. Until that happens and until they are a bit stronger they don't have a chance without some help.

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Great to have a person with some experience over there. You and Richard agree that the Afghans hate the damn Taliban. Interesting.

I would think there would be a multitude of tribal and sectarian chauvinism that would prevent any peace, no matter how long we stay there.

ARE THE TALIBAN OUR ENEMY 70? I mean I do not like governments that relish in hitting women with sticks...remember it was the vision of this type of conduct that they used to fill our heads with the war propaganda in the first place.

I would bet that 70% of our population does not even know the difference between the Taliban and al Qaeda.

At any rate, fine commentary coming from someone who has been 'on the ground'.

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Great post Carol. You lay out the fact that there are no easy choices in determining what the future holds in Afghanistan, as well as the opportunity that was lost if only we had stayed the course with sensible strategy and diplomacy - especially vice Pakistan - when we first engaged post 9/11.

What is frustrating when we get to this point of quagmire, however, is the way in which the discussion always skews politically toward the chickenhawks. For so long as they hold firm in the insistence that we need more troops and more resources than we have at present, they will always prevail in the political arena. After all, when the end comes - as it did on the roof of the Embassy in Saigon - they can still thump their chest and claim glory would have been theirs if only the government would have supported them. Meanwhile, they consider not the soldiers who are lost and wounded and the treasure that is lost while they play games meant to avoid the difficult choices that REAL leaders are expected to make.

I can't pretend to know just what the correct way is to exit this murky swamp that Bush and the neo-cons left us in in Afghanistan. But I respect Obama's apparent insistence that he have a map in hand before stumbling further into this byzantine quagmire in which we find ourselves.

If Obama follows through here with the consideration of ALL his advisors' inputs and a precise objective in mind, he will be showing the kind of leadership I would expect of a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize - even as it most assuredly will earn him the disdain of the chickenhawks.

Cue the neocons and their GOP supporters, who have yet to be humbled by their many costly mistakes and failures in launching their New American Century. They are certain they can get this done right this time, if only Obama will continue providing troops and resources to forever forestall their inevitable failure to win peace by making war.

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good comment, especially re the psychological tricks of the chickenhawks, which does need a psychological explanation, since obviously explanations which appeal to human reason or human decency are inadequate.
I consider the human mind to have entered pathological realms when the likes of Saxby Chambliss can prevail over Max Cleland on "patriotism" and "national security" grounds.

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Here's an article worth looking at

Unintended Consequences in Nuclear Pakistan

url: http://www.truthdig.com/report/item/20091009_unintended_consequences_in_nuclear_pakistan/

If you think about it, we pushed the Taliban and Al Queda out of Afganistan into the tribal, no-man's land, region at the border with Pakistan. They've had a number of years to incubate and have taken charge of the western portion of Pakistan enforcing their ideology of Islam on the unsuspecting public in the region. Just this past summer there was heavy fighting between Taliban and Al Queda forces against the Pakistani army within 60 to 70 miles from Islamabad, the capital. Also, the call of the Taliban is reaching out to the hearts and minds of the military and there is a distinct problem keeping the troops from deserting and joining the Taliban. Our problem with Al Queda and the Taliban is now Pakistan's problem. And they have the bomb ... something we really don't want either the Taliban or Al Queda getting their hands on.

Hence the title of the article.

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The compelling comment above by "70%", while anecdotal, is consistent with other reports indicating that most Afghans welcome our attempt to free them from Taliban oppression, and that increased security is a paramount consideration.

The article linked to by Beetlejuice is one I found unpersuasive - it substituted hyperbole and dogmatic assertions for evidence. I do agree, however, that our Pakistan/Afghanistan policies must be coordinated, and I expect the coming decisions on Afghanistan troop levels will take that into account. We are already calibrating the level of response to Pakistan insurgents, and in fact, events in the past year have tended to vindicate rather than refute the wisdom of much of our strategy of carefully targeted drone attacks, while leaving military operations to the Pakistani military. The enemy will always try to formulate a counter-strategy, but at this point they seem to be losing. One reason is the increasing unpopularity of Al Qaeda/Taliban style terrorism among muslims, in Pakistan and elsewhere, due to its murderous toll suffered by muslims themselves.

This does not relieve us of the need to avoid provoking anti-western sentiment through excesive "collateral damage", but we already seem to have learned that lesson, and I doubt that we will sabotage our efforts in either Pakistan or Afghanistan by reckless disregard for the consequences of our actions. We are not, fortunately in my view, about to disengage in either effort, but we will always to need to adapt on a continuing basis to changes in the tactics and whereabouts of the terrorist enemies.

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I agree there is plenty of wiggle room in the article, however, one cannot ignore the fact that we've push the problem from Afghanistan into Pakistan and there's more to loose there. Agreed the Taliban uses death as the means of prompting their agenda, however, local populations are not able to resist and the Pakistani government has pretty much abandoned them. It pretty much looks as if the US decided in order to save Afghanistan, they had to sacrifice Pakistan and thus the unintended consequences. The only problem with the strategy is Pakistan has nukes. That makes the sacrifice more dire than the Taliban running free and unfettered in Afghanistan.

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I haven't seen evidence that we've decided to "sacrifice Pakistan", but rather the opposite - we're attempting a coordinated strategy to squeeze the insurgents in both countries, so that they can't easily find sanctuary simply by moving. A goal of that strategy is to make Pakistan more secure rather than less so. The quotations cited in the comment below by NobleCommentDecider appear to substantiate that premise.

There are problems related to conflicts within Pakistan, including the strong wish among most members of the civilian government to rein in the insurgents, in conflict with ambivalence within the ISI, which opposes some Taliban elements and supports others. None of this, I believe, will change the conclusion within the Administration that a total Taliban domination of Afghanistan would destabilize both countries, and that, among other reasons, will forestall any attempts to disengage prematurely.

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The point I am making is we pushed the problem onto another country thus doubling the problem rather than containing it. Now the task is that much harder and there's more sympathy for the Taliban and Al Queda now in the region in some quarters that wasn't there before. One would think that during the strategic planning phase before we entered Afghanistan they would have made sure if they had both the Taliban and Al Queda on the run, it should have been towards Iran, not Pakistan. Those nukes should have been constantly on the minds of those planners. Last thing anyone needs is Al Queda getting their hands on a nuke especially since we haven't the slightest clue where the bombs are stored and were the trigger devices are (both are in separate locations). Winning the hearts and minds of the Afgan people won't be much of a reward if the Taliban topples the government in Pakistan and Al Queda gets their hands on a nuke. We can win the hearts and minds later.

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re: consistent with other reports

Here's one of those which Carol provided in her notes that I noted with much interest:

'Code Pink' rethinks its call for Afghanistan pullout/In Afghanistan, the US women's activist group finds that their Afghan counterparts want US troop presence – as well as more reconstruction.

And I do admit I am prejudiced in the direction of wanting to know what Afghan women think (more specifically: what they think when they are away from their male relatives.)

That's not in any way to suggest that I am all for the U.S. army rescuing all the oppressed women in the world, just that I am interested. (Just like I wish I could know what the women think when I see a photo of a street demonstration or riots in an Islamic country and there's not a single woman in the picture. You can't help but wonder if you're getting the full "picture" of what's going on. Matter of fact, I think the smartest Islamic political groups are the ones who have female "arms" that they encourage to appear in public.) And since we are already stuck there, it might behoove to know more about this than in any other country. If only for the reason that right now, the situation is that women there are most of the ones raising the next generation.

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Its more like Pakistan wrapped in an enigma. The Obama administration is finally ending the blank check to the nuclear-secrets spreading, terrorist haven and terror supporting Pakistani military/ISI, and they don't like it. If you look at the BBC article linked in Carol Gee post tell me which one of the conditions causing complaints by the Pakistani military should not have been implemented and enforced 8 years ago.

BBC: ...The army's objections seem to be directed at three paragraphs in the bill that outline conditions with respect to military aid to Pakistan.

These state that:

* Pakistan has to continue to co-operate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials.
* Islamabad has to provide information from or access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks.
* Pakistan has to prove that it has strengthened counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering laws
* Pakistan must prove its security establishment is not subverting the political or judicial processes.

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many of us remember Charlie Wilson's War. Huffingington Post reports that Wilson now thinks that we ought to consider a new strategy regarding the war in Afghanistan

To be honest with ya, Carol, I'd be far more interested in what Gus Avrakotos thinks, but unfortunately he's no longer with us. (And the real life Gus probably wasn't anything like the wise man of the movie character, anyways, sigh.) :-)

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It isn't exactly rocket science to channel the departed spirit of Gus Avrakotos, who would say...

"I wish I had another stupid Congressman like Charlie Wilson to help me kill Russians, which was the only real interest I ever had in Afghanistan, or anywhere else."

That's the "wise man" from the movie where artappraiser was too obtuse to notice the thug Avrakotos express exactly the same obsession.

"I kill Russians."

"Let's kill some Russians."

And so on.

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Discussion about our presence in Afghanistan is informative and healthy...Pro or con. Many comments appear to be opinionated bs. I guess that is what forums are for. Would you like to hear it from an expert?
http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/09252009/watch.html

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Chuck - The first individual admitted he was not a military expert, and the second predicted that the situation would "end in ambiguity". (The first predicted that Obama had absolutely no choice politically but to accede to the 40,000 troop increase request from General McChrystal, so we will find out soon how skillful he is at predicting).

I do, however, agree with Bearden's prediction of ambiguity. One can view this as unfortunate, but it is equally important to realize that an ambiguous resolution in Pakistan/Afghanistan - i.e., a continued insurgency, but one sufficiently suppressed to permit a reasonable civilian social existence, and prevent complete destabilization, will be vital to our security interests, particularly given the presence of nuclear weapons in Pakistan. The only unambiguous outcome that seems remotely likely would be catastrophic, so we will probably have to settle for ambiguity.

I'll go out on a limb and tentatively predict that Obama will not grant the 40,000 troop request. He will probably plan to maintain current troop levels relatively close to current levels, with a possibility of a modest increase and a much smaller possibility of a modest reduction. Being a realist rather than an ideologue, he will not plan any prompt disengagement from Afghanistan, but I'm sure he will hope to disengage as soon as circumstances permit, with an eye toward a 3-5 year timeframe.

For some expert opinion from a native of the region, the following commentary by Ahmed Rashid is informative -

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/04/AR2009090402277.html

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Thanks en masse to the above comment writers for your reasoned dialogue. I learned a great deal that I did not know. It was a joy to follow, after I was away from my computer for much of the day yesterday.

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