This conclusion is supported by examining three different databases: CIA Vaughn Index, Propublica's list of DOJ OLC Missing Memos, and the ACLU Torture FOIA index.

This legal compliance problem is more relevant now that the Obama Administration is using CIA operational units to engage in paramilitary operations worldwide. We have no demonstrated legal compliance program to properly oversee American combat operations.

DOJ OLC legal documents can be connected with internal State Department memos pre-dating those DOJ OLC memos.

These media intercepts, retransmitted to DOJ OLC and State Department employees, link the White House policies to the alleged illegal prisoner abuses.

Legal protections for the President and his legal advisors include a "deliberative shield," which shields during the FOIA process legal memoranda which are deliberative, or pre-decisional.

Arguably, this shield collapses when the "deliberations" are after an executive decision.

The purpose of this blog content is to outline for TPM readers a method to examine open source information related to legal decisions. This can help identify who was involved with the supposed deliberations before a DOJ OLC memo was signed.

Here is a sample comparison between the Vaughn Index, the DOJ OLC memos, and the Information from the State Department.

Sample 1

1. Vaughn Index Information, CIA Vaughn Index

Withheld document date: 7/26/2004

Agencies involved with redacted memo: NSC: With State, DoD, DoJ, CIA

Vaughn Index summary: Four page document with, handwritten notes concerning a meeting with a four page attachment, plus a fax cover sheet and a routing cover sheet

2. Government memos

Here are some sample documents from the ACLU database that overlap with the above Vaugn index date:

Congressional: Asking for views on DOJ OLC memo:

Letter requesting Dept's views re OLC memos on application of treaties to Al Qaeda/Taliban detainees (1/22/2002) and interrogation standards (8/1/2002), including whether Dept was involved in their preparation and whether Dept agrees with conclusion re suspension of Geneva Convention and analysis of Torture Convention.

3. DOJ OLC Memos

Here are some sample DOJ OLC memos from August 1st:

First Second Third Fourth 

DOJ OLC memo summary (partial): Agencies requested opinion on whether conduct was torture. Specific intent to commit torture, and inflict pain. (4th memo: "RE: Standards of Conduct For Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. ßß 2340-2340A."

Sample 2:

This one is interesting because it links the Vaughn Index with a specific subject line from a non-DOJ document, a Department of State email. "OLC" is the subject line, which references the embedded word-document.

1. Vaughn

Redacted Document from Vaughn File, CIA Vaughn Index

DOJ OLC Memo:  7/14/2004

2. Disclosed Email 

July 12th   DOS email Memo referencing "OLC, protected persons."

Sample 3:

We can also go one step further on these disclosed emails, and understand the connection between the disclosed names on the emails, and other events which tend to mirror the subject, timing, and content of the still classified DOJ OLC memos.

Sample name trace:

Joshua Dorosin is listed on the Memo, who is later linked with DOS emails in October 2004 related to "ghost detainees." [UN working group on disappearances/inquiry on ghost detainees] Later relates to A-HRC-13-42, UN report on secret detention, Jan 26, 2010.

Meaning of FBIS

Once Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) is connected with a foreign media report about alleged US breaches of international law, DoD Judge Advocate Generals would be hard pressed to explain why they did not have access to these similar media reports collected through US intelligence collection and transcription services.

Once FBIS is connected with the emails sent before July 2004, this would logically extend the circle of the DOJ OLC discussions to include DoD Judge Advocate Generals.

Legal experts will have to present evidence and argument to the court to review whether the "deliberative shield" applies to alleged unlawful activity after a media report related to a Presidential decision; and when those emails disclose a connection between non-DOJ personnel in State with a DOJ tasking.

Sample 4:

Using the disclosed memos, and the timing of the emails sent related to the Vaughn Index for the redacted CIA documents, we should be able to form some hypothetical questions related to content, subjects, and other administrative actions.

One expected action would be US government employee concern and communications. Speculating, we should be able to find JAG inputs because they should have received also the FBIS information related to the foreign media reports of alleged US-White House connection with unlawful interrogation.

Here is a sample media trace using this hypothesis, which shows that the method used to formulate questions - that of independently linking the Vaughn index with the timing of (a) DOJ OLC memos and (b) DOJ-State emails is consistent with publicly available media reports on the same subject.

WaPo: "The dissents include three classified memos written in the spring of 2003 by senior military lawyers in the Air Force, Marine Corps and Army, and a classified memo by the Navy's top civilian lawyer, Alberto J. Mora, say government officials who have read them.

WaPo: "Two officials said the memos were written by Air Force Maj. Gen. Jack L. Rives, Marine Brig. Gen. Kevin M. Sandkuhler and Army Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Romig. 

Sample 5:

This sample comparison shows how the timing of memos relates to the Supreme Court; and expressly mentions in the documents the connection between the Vaugn index, DOJ OLC memos, and the Supreme Court.

1. CIA Vaughn Index: Vaughn Index reference: 7/16/2004,

"DOJ State Five page letter concerning an OLC draft memo"

2. DOJ OLC memos -- There were two memos from July 2004

One relates to the CIA, and involves the White House (via Propublica):

OLC 85, which is a nine-page memorandum, with highlighting, dated July 16, 2004, from the Assistant Attorney General in OLC to the Attorney General, evaluating the implications of a recent Supreme Court decision for certain foreign intelligence activities.

Analysis: Detailed Discussion of Database Comparisons

There is an interesting relationship between the dates of documents contained in the Vaughn Index, and the timing of still classified DOJ OLC memos.

We're sharing with TPM readers a method to find who was likely involved with the DOJ OLC memo reviews; and the subject of those deliberations.

We're building off what is not fully known about the CIA documents contained in the Vaughn index; and attempting to fill ifn the gaps with other publicly available information related to the DOJ OLC memos, and other emails sent near the dates contained in the Vaughn index.

Of particular interest are the US government attorney memos crafted before the DOJ OLC memo was issued.

ACLU Torture Index Search

Each still-classified DOJ OLC memo has an approximate date when it was issued. This date establishes a benchmark for a window to search in documents.

Using the ACLU Torture Index, we can look for a specific set of documents before the DOJ OLC memo was written. The search tool [ACLU Torture FOIA index ] contains the option to search between specific dates.

One State Department document in the ACLU database includes "OLC" in the subject line. The names on that email are important because they trace to other documents containing the same names and subjects similar to the apparent DOJ OLC memo-subject.

Search Options on ACLU Website

This means we're mixing DOS documents with DOJ terminology:

1. Document Source: Search within State Department Memos;
2. Enter "OLC" as a key word,
3. Date Selection: between June 15th, 2004; and July 31, 2004.

DOJ OLC Claimed "Deliberative Shield" Collapses re Torture Memos 

Discussion on Email Content with Legal Shields

Let's consider the meaning of some of the email content, and how it relates to some of the shields applicable to some US government document.

Legal protections for the President and his legal advisors include a "deliberative shield," which shields during the FOIA process legal memoranda which are deliberative, or pre-decisional.

Within that forwarded email is a specific reference on President Clinton's signing of various legal standards. However, in theory, the "decision" - about which standard applied to the POWs - was known, and not something that was being "deliberated".

The forwarded email includes specific legal counsel names. Within the email are specific legal standards. Everyone on that listed email is arguably connected with an internal discussion about allegations of war crimes.

One sample name trace on the State Department email is David Cummings. His name is listed on an internal State Department email which included a reprint of a London, UK news article characterizing US POW treatment in Iraq as "torture".

Rather, we contend that the Department of State and DOJ OLC legal counsel were not "deliberating" on a bonafide legal question, but a legal problem: Alleged evidence of torture which connected the White House to that policy.

White House Connected to Torture Allegations Before DOJ OLC Memo Issued

We argue that the goal of the DOJ OLC memo in July 2004 - a few weeks after the DOJ OLC and DOS legal counsel were informed of the UK legal characterization - was to shift the attention from war crimes to whether or not the offending content was or wasn't "torture." The two are not the same.

Geneva prohibits all abuse. The Torture Conventions prohibit severe abuse.

The burden is on the government to explain why the DOJ OLC-State Department discussions are "deliberative" - connected with a decision - when the lawyers knew of should have known these were post-decision legal reviews related to allegations of treaty violations. Arguably, that is not a bonafide "deliberation," has nothing to do with a new decision, and falls outside the FOIA protections.

It may be true that there was a legal question about whether the US treatment was or wasn't illegal. But that prior treatment cannot forever create a barrier to all post-treatment discussions about that alleged illegal activity, nor forever enjoy absolute shield to public review.

Otherwise, the President is allowed to "classify" evidence of his war crimes. That defies reason. Arguably, the only reason to destroy CIA video tapes -- that should have been "OK" because the interrogations were "lawful" per DOJ OLC -- was that the legal counsel didn't do their job.

Why? Because their task wasn't putting the law over the White House, but putting the White House above the law. However, our Constitution does not bend that way. Nor do We the People. 

Legal Counsel Knew Pre-DOJ OLC Memo Communications Linked White House With War Crimes

Here is one UK legal analysts interpretation linking the White House, legal experts, memoranda, and the non-authorized POW treatment:

"The documents from the White House authorized specific interrogation techniques by US forces abroad that amount to torture."

That statement is contained in a London newspaper, intercepted via FBIS, and subsequently sent through the emails (you've reviewed above) to US government personnel.

Then the DOJ OLC memo was written. Years later, the court discloses the timing of the redacted documents as they relate to the CIA videotape destruction.

However, once the US government is connected with a FBIS-sourced document, that raises questions about whether the US officials did or did not properly act, especially when their names are on the emails containing that FBIS-sourced news report. Legal counsel have duties to retain evidence related to war crimes. This requirement springs from Nuremberg precedents, US-run courts after WWII. They are US judicial precedents which US government legal counsel knew or should have known

This creates a problem for the Untied States: Foreign personnel presumably had access to documents linking the White House with specific authorizations.  DOJ OLC and the White House counsel should have conducted some sort of review.

Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)

This news review is not a random DOJ OLC legal counsel comment. Rather, if you look at the bottom of the email, you'll see the initials, "FBIS" which standards for "Foreign Broadcast Information Service." This evidence creates a solid connection between the US government's official collection of open media intelligence with legal discussions inside the Department of State and Justice.

The news article pre-dated the disclosed deliberation; and the conduct was after the original decision. Here is some important information in that FBIS intercept, forwarded via email, which legal counsel should have read or known:

Clinton's singing the International Torture Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The single email containing the FBIS intercepts connects DOJ OLC, State, and the White House with legal assessments about Administration policies; and the timing is before a key date in the Vaughn index, and related to what appear to be non-sensical DOJ OLC legal memoranda.

Post-Decisional Discussions

Here is the timeline which emerges: One that is legal counsel's disclosed discussions about public information connecting the White House policies and decisions to unlawful interrogations.

To recap:  

1. The decision to sign the treaty occurred first (President Clinton); then
2. There was POW abuse; then
3. The deviation known (Media report collected with FBIS); and then
4. DOJ OLC and DOS deliberated that characterization; and then
5. A DOJ OLC memo was crafted after the deviation was reported in the media, and after the Department of State provided their inputs to DOJ OLC.

There was no bonafide deliberation "on the eve of a decision."

The issue isn't whether there was a bonafide deliberation before a final decision; but whether, after the misconduct, legal counsel can explain why they did not fully implement a program to ensure the misconduct ended and preserve the CIA videotapes.

It appears from the above emails, memos, and records that US government lawyers didn't do their job, despite knowing the Nuremberg precedents. This is a mess the American government has not adequately confronted, but one the American public is required to face: The experts in the law appear to have perverted the law not to protect the Constitution, but someone ignoring the Constitution.

We the People cannot permit a legal profession to operate that way, especially when it claims it can self-govern. No, it has become a political animal, not one which -- as it should -- put its loyalty to the Constitution above the President.

Supposedly, after Nixon and Watergate, FISA was crafted to fix this. Yet, this Congress turned a blind eye to these abuses. We the People are not beholden to Congress; Congress is beholden to We the People, as the Framers intended.l

Something isn't working as it should. The mess above allegedly connected with the American legal community defies the intent of the Framers.

Conclusion 

Some DOJ OLC documents connected with CIA interrogations and abuses have not been fully disclosed.  Redaction indexes point to specific dates which overlap with other documents mentioning DOJ OLC.  These relevant documents are not isolated to DOJ.

The timing of those memos follows high profile legal discussions memorialized in other documents. Still classified CIA and DOJ OLC memos followed public events and disclosed DOJ OLC-State Department discussions.

One example is the connection between a July 2004 DOJ OLC memo and June 2004 State Department documents. The subject line establishes within the State Department memo a connection with "OLC'.

The DOJ OLC legal counsel appear to have known or should have known before drafting a DOJ OLC memo in July 2004 that there were open media reports captured through FBIS; and that there were credible legal conclusions that the White House was connected with unlawful policies and interrogations.

Named White House, DoJ OLC Counsel Should Have Been Aware of Nuremberg Legal Requirements

State, DOJ OLC, White House, and CIA legal counsel had the information showing there were credible legal conclusions that the US was connected with unlawful activity.

The timing of the DOJ OLC-State Department memos show DOJ OLC legal counsel knew or should have known there were credible characterizations by legal experts in the United Kingdom about (a) the US actions in Iraq; (b) the White House policies and oversight of those interrogations; and (c) the legal conclusions that the methods violated legal standards.

CIA Evidence Destruction Despite Alleged Link Between White House and Unlawful Activity

Legal counsel knew or should have known there were credible assessments about the US policies, actions, and interrogations; and that the United States legal profession should have ensured there was a robust plan in place to investigate, ensure compliance, and properly safeguard evidence.

However, the destruction of the CIA videotapes raises doubts whether US legal personnel properly acted, especially legal counsel connected directly and indirectly with the White House.

However, rather than ensure after the FBIS report that the CIA videos were protected, it appears those discussing the emails and press reports (before the DOJ OLC memo was written in July 2004) failed to act, despite allegedly knowing or should have known there was a requirement to retain evidence of possible war crimes.

It appears the personnel listed on the DOJ OLC and State Department emails knew or should have known there would be questions about which legal standards applied; and how the known treatment of the POWS under US care did or did not violate known legal standards applicable to the United States combat operations after 9-11; and the connection they knew the White House had with those unlawful policies and interrogations.

Recommendation

More time will be needed to examine the connection between still-classified DOJ OLC memos and other disclosed documents pre-dating that memo.

There needs to be a better discussion of (a) the dates of documents listed on the Vaughn Index; (b) the timing of DOJ OLC memos near those dates; and (c) the connection between these disclosed documents with disclosed legal counsel discussions; and (d) the timing of media reports captured through FBIS. 

Questions for TPM Follow-up

Where is there a summary file showing which emails were sent before each non-disclosed DOJ OLC memo;

What public information exists about specific DOJ OLC memos: (a) Who received the emails; (b) which reports were sent attached with that input to DOJ OLC; and (c) what are other publicly disclosed subjects and emails containing the same legal counsel names.

What legal notifications should have occurred once named legal counsel received that report related to alleged war crimes;

Did legal counsel connected with that disclosed email properly explain why CIA videotapes and other evidence was or was not adequately retained?

Suggestion

Use a data-tagging system which will compare (a) Vaughn Index dates; (b) DOJ OLC memos; (c) ACLU-house memos; and (d) names of personnel listed on the emails.

You'll see a relationship between the media disclosures, the comments sent between DOJ and State on those media reports, and subsequent DOJ OLC memos.

Sample:

This information from the Vaugn index tells us that there was a draft DOJ OLC memo in circulation April 2004. Presumably, DOJ OLC would have soon issued a DOJ OLC memo.

Vaughn: 4/16/2004 State DOJ One page document concerning an OLC draft memo

The emails tend to highlight what would have been DOJ OLC-interest areas, including references to the ACLU: 25 March 2004;  Army IG objectives [ Sample emails  (May 10th, 2005 responses to questions ) after the IG interviews.]

Near March 2004, one month before the above Vaughn index reference-date, there were emails sent about the ICRC, presumably sent before the State Department comments on the OLC draft memo.

March 2004 emails about ICRC concerns.

March 2004 Memo from military person assigned to state re Afghan detainees.

April 4th correspondence from DOS re detainees. Page 2 of that disclosure is a May 4th Memo, "USG position on ICRC access to detainees held under Afghan government control."

Using this approach, we contend that the timing of the still classified DOJ OLC memos after March 2004 relates first to the ICRC access; then to what the US government should or should not do about the ICRC reports.

Final Comments

The email messages help illuminate the content within the still classified Vaughn Index. The FBIS-disclosed information within the sent emails suggests the DOJ OLC memos were subsequently crafted to fix a problem: The White House had been connected with war crimes.

However, the apparent problem for the legal profession is the failure of legal counsel to digest the provided information and timely present a coherent plan that would properly retain the CIA videotapes.

It appears legal counsel connected with DOJ OLC, the White House, and the CIA were well aware of the FBIS information, and that the legal issues connected the White House with serious breaches of international law.  Rather than preserve evidence, we contend the DOJ OLC took a two prong approach: First, redefine the standards; and then turn a blind eye to destruction of evidence that would link the White House counsel with that unlawful policy which breached Geneva.

Deliberative shields should not apply. Rather, legal counsel connected with the White House, DOJ, CIA, and DoD should be forced to answer charges that they brazenly facilitated a cover-up, and marginalized named DoD Judge Advocates for their attempt to fully enforce the Conventions against the President, their commander in Chief.

Our task going forward must be to examine the validity of these claims, understand what broke, review what Congress is or isn't doing, and develop a coherent plan of oversight that will more timely detect these issues.

Without timely correction, future generations will be forced to endure longer overseas combat without adequate oversight. We should not leave to others the task of understanding of what went wrong in Afghanistan and Iraq; then wonder why foreign nationals refuse to cooperate with this abuse.

Lessons Relevant to United States Citizens Going Forward from 2010

The document traces above are important: They show how still-classified information can be understood using open sources and government information; and help develop an understanding of whether US government legal compliance programs are or are not working.

We've seen the results of secret legal memos: Reckless US government policies and programs continue at home and in combat overseas, even when that reckless conduct produces lackluster if not incompetent results on the battlefield.

American Government Culture of Abuse Flourishing After 9-11 Should End in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the US

The US government's approach to the law since 2001 has been reckless. US combatant commanders have adjusted their approaches within interacting with civilans in Iraq and Afghanistan.

This is not enough. The US public at home deserves a similar adjustment from the US government.

Rather, what appears to be good enough for Iraqi and Afghanistan citizens, does not appear to be something the US government will give to its own citizens: Genuine respect within the full legal protections of the law, and within the lanes of the FISA-Geneva requirements, not to mention the Constitution, Bill of Rights, and protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.

These requiremente should fall within judiical review, not hiding under the umbreall of "trust us." That doesn't work for Afghanistan, Iraq, or the United States. Congress demanded change for civilians overseas. It's outrageous a similar call for American citizens does not similarly resonate in the form of modernized Administration policies within the Constitutional framework.

Congress gives excuses to turn a blind eye to FISA violations. Even if the United States were defeated overseas, the US government does not appear to be using the losses in Afghanistan or Iraq as a catalyst to adjust how the US government continues to abuse American citizens during interviews, field stops, intelligence gathering, and other unlawful intrusions which breach the Constitution.

However, the States are not empowered to aggressively challenge culture of law enforcement and intelligence community abuses nurtured after 9-11. Until these lessons from abroad are applied at home, even an end to combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq will not fully ensure the American public is free of this abuse when interacting with American law enforcement, intelligence personnel, and others connected with the Department of Defense.

It is unlawful for American citizens to discuss violently overthrowing the US government or even considering the possible benefits of that. However, American citizens are not restrained in their power to lawfully discuss new methods of governance which will build on the lessons after 9-11, and properly restrain a government that does abuse power in secret. The US government's documents can be used to properly mobilize a civilian population to lawfully press for change and improvement.

There's a parallel in how law enforcement completes reports similar to those available through wikileaks

Here's one mentioning "possible surveillance," which on the streets of America could mean simply moving across a public access way.

According to Cryptome, Webster allegedly responded to publicly posted information himself saying, "I was certainly surprised to see that somebody went to the trouble of compiling some sort of clumsy pseudo-dossier on me. . ."

We don't know if the person whose comments are posted on Cryptome are from the same person who supposedly provided information to the Army; nor do we know whether the quote can be attributed to the same person whose profile has been (possibly) linked with Webster.

Background

After Webster supposedly provided confirmation to the media, others on the internet attempted to review his online postings.

Curiously, there was (apparently) a general review of his comments, without an obvious attempt to review his detailed comments, subjects, or other disclosed information.

The following information is not intended to be accurate, merely posted for sake of discussions.

Alleged Postings on Digital Gangster

First, one of the profiles reportedly linked with Webster is [Tarrant042 ], which is the same profile on Adrian Lamo's myflick.com account.

If the Timothy Webster-Tarrant042 connection is valid, then there may be some potential misrepresentation issues.

Digital Gangster appears to have the following post, allegedly linked to Webster through the Tarrant042 connection:

Digitalganster.com -- Occupation: "I torch rainforests for agricultural multinational corporations."

The disclosed information about Webster links him with "Cyber Counterintelligence, Network Operations".   

However, it's unclear why someone allegedly linked with an army email address would in 2010 still allow information posted about "torching" rain forests; or why they would be stocking shelves at "Target" despite an ongoing interest in national security, FISA, and other things related to 9-11.

Tarrant042 Digital Gangster Profile: "I work nights stocking the shelves at Target."  "I have three house plants and a cat."

It seems more reasonable to believe that the poster is not stocking shelves at Target at night. 

Part II: The Alleged Political Postings linked to Webster

The profile on Digital Gangers includes the following detail about interests, "Anime and Archery and Conservative Politics"

However, the postings on Raw Story appear to be liberal-interest topics related to 9-11 and FISA.

Alleged Raw Story Connection

Some researchers into Webster believe that "Tarrant042" and the "Tarrant" on RawStory are the same people.

FISA, 9-11

Here is where there is a connection between Webster, FISA, and the disclosed gmail account: 

"Obama Administration sides with Saudis on 9-11 Suit," May 31, 2009 -

Alleged Timothy Webster Comment on Raw Story:

"If you really want to go back and forth about FISA, please feel free to email me at tarrant@gmail.com -- I'd be happy to have a little discussion with you."

Webster allegedly represented himself as a stocker at Target; yet posted information about FISA, including an gmail account.

We would like to know what legal background Webster has; and what information he may have received from the Army while working in counter intelligence.

It seems odd that someone representing themselves as a stocker at Target would have specific information about the FISA debate; and invite people to email him directly.

Geneva

Another interesting posting on Raw Story was the following related to prisoner treatment,

"Red Cross Report: Medical Officers 'Participated in Torture," April 2009.

Alleged response to Webster:

"Tarrant, I second that...I never served, but I am ashamed to be a part of this country, as this was done in my country's name."

Follow Up: 

His full name matches the date of birth and approximate age disclosed in the open media.

Specifically, Timothy Webster's full name - first, middle, last - as disclosed on Cryptome [Timothy Douglas Webster] matches someone who was born in 1979, approximately the same age - 30 - as that disclosed in the media.

Here is the identifying information for that profile:

Birthdate: Dec 10th, 1979

Mother's Maiden Name: Stone

Birth County: Orange County, CA

The name "Webster" and "Stone" intersect with many names, however one marriage stood out because the marriage is one year before Webster was born, 1978.

The marriage may or may not be the same as Timothy D. Webster's parents. However, the timing, middle initial name of the father, and location in California suggest a match:

Mother: Jean E. Stone, born about 1954.

Father: Geoffrey D. Webster, born about 1954

Age at marriage of father and mother: 24

Marriage: Aug 28, 1978

Location: Ventura, CA

Questions: 

Why is Timothy Webster's alleged profile reporting himself as a stocker at Target; why the comments about "torching" rainforests?

Is the name "Geoffrey D. Webster" Timothy's father; and is it the same person who is the Vice President at AT&T international ventures, and working with China Telecom?

Is there a telecommunications-connection in Timothy Webster's family background that would raise doubts about his supposedly working at Target?

What role, if any, did Timothy Webster play in monitoring public discussions about FISA violations?

Information Gaps 

We do not have enough information about his online posts to make any comments about why he supposedly was using an army email account, still linked with an online profile. Here is the email Webster allegedly allowed to be posted, and allegedly was not updated to reflect his new working situation at Target: 

timothy.d.webster@us.army.mil

Here is the account supposedly linked with Timothy Webster

http://www.flickr.com/people/33960754@N06/

We believe Webster's interest lies with the intelligence community, and he does not have a greater interest in Anime:

Digital Gangster, Intel Communities: "This site contains user submitted content, comments and opinions"

We believe Timothy Webster was involved with CPU testing, connected with Digital Gangster

Conclusion

American counterintelligence agents are interested in information disclosures related to 9-11, FISA, and Geneva.

It appears Timothy Webster's counter intelligence activities continue in the online world, allegedly masquerading as an activist.  It appears his postings about FISA could be construed to collect information about activists, especially when there are invitations to use email to discuss FISA issues.

Out of court inconsistent statements can be used to impeach a witness. It remains unclear whether Webster, allegedly acting as an informant, had an ongoing relationship with Army CID or the intelligence community, enabling him to use an Army email account; or whether anyone in the US law enforcement community authorized alleged misrepresentations or statements about "torching" agriculture.

It's unclear whether Webster, in private conversations or emails, disclosed during conversations about FISA his past or ongoing connection to the intelligence community, army, or counter intelligence.

Recommendations

We would like to know how much Timothy Webster, allegedly posting as "Tarrant" or "Tarrant042" was paid to provide the US government with information about his online or private communications with those monitoring FISA and Geneva violations.

We would encourage the media to understand Webster's family background, and possible indirect connections with the telecom industry through his father.

The US Government has an arrogant approach toward information: After it violates FISA to access information, it refuses to be held accountable; but when someone else has access to information, the US government wants to talk about the law.

Why a double standard on the law; and what way of life are the troops fighting for?

Why didn't the US government have a similar love of the law when the original FISA violations occurred? The US government doesn't like it when others have evidence of other reckless US government activity during combat operations.

The enemy has this information. The US government is upset the American public can review the same information the enemy has: The information might generate some independent, public, and informed oversight of the US government re Afghanistan.

Stale Information

The information disclosed is more than five years old. Why, in 2010, is the US concerned about "current" combat operations? It appears, despite the five years, the US continues to use the same procedures that should have been changed.

It doesn't make sense for the US government in 2010 to complain about having to "change" procedures because of the disclosure. If the enemy opened their eyes in 2005, why wouldn't they still keep their eyes open after the "necessary" changes after 2010? The better question is: Why, despite the operations in 2005, did it take the US government five more years to adjust their tactics so the enemy could not predict them in 2010?

Rather, if the US government is arguing - despite the combat defeats in Afghanistan - that the enemy would "know" something through wikileaks, then we have a bigger problem:

The (apparent) failure of the US government to comprehend that the enemy in 2005 was monitoring US troops without using electronic records; but despite the enemy's visual monitoring, the US government continued to use the same procedures.

Who is really wondering why we have a problem with elusive victory in Afghanistan?

Double Standard on Prosecuting Improper Data Access

Curiously, the US government would like to prosecute those who have disclosed information to wikileaks. Yet, when it comes to the US government's accountability for improperly accessing phone information using the telecoms in violation of FISA, the US government isn't all that impressed with the law.

And the troops are (supposedly) fighting for what way of life, and what disrespect for which laws?

Once the information was published, it is in the public domain. Here, the US government has failed to ensure that the entire world has not accessed the information.

FISA Violations Given a Yawn, Why Now Concerned About Information Protection

The US government doesn't like it when it looses control of information. Either it will ignore the accusation; or it will blame those who now know of the details behind the continued US military mismanagement in Afghanistan. It's been ten (10) years fighting people living in caves. The US government cannot win on the battlefield. It's only option is to blame wikileaks for telling us information reserved for the enemy: The US leadership is incompetent.

Wikileaks information, when properly couched, paints a bleak picture for the US commanders and Congressional staff oversight: The electronic information doesn't adequately provide insight into the ongoing reasons for battlefield setbacks.

There's not much use in protecting information that doesn't generate victory. The enemy knows we've lost. The only option the US government has is to hide what the enemy knows for the American public: Our information systems are vast overwhelming, but meaningless to ensure victory. Quite a legacy for American law enforcement databases when it comes to their confusion about fighting in Afghanistan, er . . .on the streets of the United States.

Public inquiry will continue on the disclosed information. Indeed, it would be reckless to not ask questions about the information because we must presume that the enemy has access to this information.

The DoD approach is non-sensical: Attempting to dissuade informed US citizens from reviewing information supposedly only available to the enemy. Is the US government afraid American citizens might learn something that the enemy already knows?

As with the FISA violations and other reports of misconduct related to DOJ OPR reckless legal memoranda, once the genie is out of the bottle, the US government needs to be challenged: What other actions has DOJ OLC "legalized" that should not be occurring in Afghanistan; and how have these procedures been duplicated in the United States?

DoD Has A Double Standard on Protecting Informants

Wikileaks disclosed some information, which included identifying information about Afghans. In response, DoD working with the FBI claims they are attempting to protect their sources.

These assurances are somewhat meaningless:

NYT: "If the information [disclosed on wikileaks] identifies Afghans who provided information to allied troops or otherwise associate with the troops, the military notifies its headquarters in Kabul, which in turn is taking undisclosed steps to safeguard those people."

Military personnel should not naïvely believe the US government will do something more for Afghans it refuses to fully provide to American citizens.

Hypothetical: FISA Violation Disclosures on Wikileaks

One lawful reason for a prosecutor to refuse to prosecute is a history of lack of enforcement. US prosecutors need to explain why they are attempting to prosecute some disclosures of information, but not all improper accesses of information via FISA violations.

Is it the policy of the US government to prosecute only people who disclose information about FISA violations; but not correct the original mismanagement or oversight problems which turned a blind eye to the illegal activity and FISA violations?

Inadequate US Government Procedures When Recording HUMINT

There's a fundamental question:

Why, when the original report is taken, does the US government include that identifying information?  The identifying information will be used by others to follow-up on that information.

However, the US government cannot guarantee that the records it has will be later properly used; or that other personnel cannot disclosed important information. The burden is on the US government to protect that information; once disclosed, that information may be lawfully used during court proceedings against the US government.

A better question: Why, when the original report was taken, didn't the US government exclude all identifying information, and not contain it on any record?

The cat is out of the bag. The US government collects information. Then the US public should be able to see the same level of detail related to which informants have provided the US government with details how to violate FISA and not answer for the criminal breaches of the privacy laws.

The issue with wikileaks-housed information isn't that the information was disclosed by someone in the US government; but that the US government - which has confidential information about informants - cannot protect that information before it becomes something that can be compromised.

Some of that identifying information includes commercial cell phone numbers in Pakistan. The problem for the US government is the credibility problem in pretending that they are taking "undisclosed steps" to protect or safeguard anyone.

US law enforcement regularly discloses to criminal enterprises the names and identifying information about American citizens. Law enforcement has, on occasion, little regard for those who provide information about suspected terrorist activity. Lurking in the shadows are the suspected terrorists - some falsely accused - seeking the right moment to intimidate those communicating concerns to law enforcement.

Even if the FBI agents were to sign their name to a 302, once that informant's name is placed on the 302, there is nothing - other than the law -- stopping someone from disclosing that form to adversaries of the US government. The law was of no concern to the US government with FISA violations. There's little persuasive for foreign nationals to believe the US government will care about the laws "protecting" informants.

Is the President going to approve another meaningless law from Congress - like FISA - and not enforce it when Afghans seek assistance from the US government? If only the US citizens had the same assurances supposedly "guaranteed" to the Afghans.

This US government ignores the "guarantees" enshrined in our own Constitution, and treats the "guarantees" in the Bill of Rights as discretionary. The Afghan informants should have taken heed when they learned of how the US government lawyers have contempt for FISA and the US constitution. Just read the DOJ OLC memos and the email notes on Justice Consolidated Office Network (JCON).

Once that information is disclosed, it makes no sense to believe that the FBI will do anything meaningful to gather evidence, especially when it is the FBI which supposedly conducts an investigation and discloses the name of the confidential informant to the investigation target.

Informants to law enforcement have no air-tight promise or assurance of confidentiality: That confidentiality may be made or asserted; but there is no guarantee that the US government will forever protect that information, especially when conducting a national security investigation or proceedings before a magistrate..

It Is not unusual for informants or others cooperating with the US government to have their identities disclosed to investigation targets.

Although against policy, it is a risk that informants face: Despite their best efforts to report information related to criminal activity or misconduct, their careers could be jeopardized because they have naively believed their "report of misconduct" might be received and privately investigated.

Once the report is received, the investigation target is provided details about the complaint. Management does attempt to back-engineer the complaint to identify the potential whistleblower or informant.

Although there are "Whistleblower protections," US government leadership does make an effort to identify which US government personnel, contractors, civilians, or others have provided information to Congress.

It is not uncommon for US government leadership to blacklist, demote, or punish government employees. This conduct can be difficult to prove, but it is not uncommon for management to retaliate when there are reports of misconduct, mismanagement, or other fraud to the inspector general.

The US government's "assurances" to those whose names have been disclosed in the wikileaks information are worthless. Rather, the US government is more likely to write those people off, especially those who have failed to provide continuing political support to what is a reckless and flawed US military misadventure.

"Undisclosed steps" sounds more like a sweeping promise to do something vague, without a real commitment by the US government to put energy into protecting US citizens, much less Afghans.

Disingenuous Concerns with Information, Legal Requirements

We do not believe that US government is serious when it says that it will do anything of value to protect sources. Rather, the US government needs to explain why it regularly cannot explain why the identities of informants and cooperating witnesses are not protected when conducting investigations into US government misconduct, fraud, or other public corruption cases.

The burden is on the US government to make the case that it can adequately gather information lawfully; and protect those who have provided intelligence or leads. Sadly, the US government's reckless approach to protecting the identities of US citizens does not bode well for Afghans worried about what might happen to them.

The US government does not adequately protect the information about US citizens. There is no reason to believe the US will do much for Afghans. Indeed, the US government needs to explain why it is willing to do something for Afghans that it is not willing to do for all Americans: Ensure those cooperating with law enforcement and the US government are adequately protected.

Conclusion

The American government has a disingenuous concern about disclosures on wikileaks. If there was a genuine concern with "the law," then the US government should have displayed that concern and stayed within the FISA requirements. It refused. 

Consequently, the US government has the burden to explain why the legal requirements of FISA took a back seat to hiding information the public should have access: Details about the information technology systems that have not timely ensured victory in Afghanistan.

Congressional oversight has failed. The public needs these detailed records to independently review what the US government refuses to publicly account: Why, despite a brazen attitude toward FISA requirements, is the US government suddenly worried about the law when it comes to information.

The enemy knows what's on wikileaks. The US government should explain why the American public cannot review something the Pentagon says it plans to use against us. Shouldn't the US government care more about the American public being fully informed and prepared?

This is interesting because there are other reports about the content on wikileaks suggesting that the Taliban and others were firing many ground-to-air missiles at American planes.

This blog goes into some history about the named Congressman, speculates on the purpose of his visit, and discusses some of the other public information about the ground-fired missiles.

The Wikileaks information points to CODEL, which means "Congressional Delegation." Strikingly, there's no obvious open media linking then-Congressman Sodrel (R-IN) with a public trip to Kandahar.

Interestingly, Vice President Cheney and President Bush campaigned for Sodrel.

We believe the limited open media reporting about this specific Congressional delegation is linked, in part, to some security concerns. There had been some reports of kidnappings.

Speculation on the Purpose of Visit

We believe the Congressional Delegation was visiting the US-run prisoner camp at Kandahar, and was reviewing information about the treatment of the prisoners.

Wikileaks, in part, reveals some of the DoD orders related to prisoner releases before the CODEL visit to Kandahar:

Release of 86 prisoners, May 1st, 2005, released within 7 days. Here is the FoxNews coverage. Ten (10) days later on May 10th, another release. Then another on the 20th. And release of two.  Then fifty-three.

We could speculate on whether Sodrel or his staff had any concerns about these releases; or whether they wanted to review something else at the prisons. Perhaps Sodrel and others learned of the releases in May, and decided to visit the prison in June.

Ground-Fired Missiles

In a few short weeks after 9-11, the open media reported SecDef Rumsfeld's concerns about shoulder-fired missiles. Joint Chief of Staff General Meyers raised the prospect that the missiles could be used against American forces.

Some speculated that the Chinese may have retrofitted or reverse engineered the American missiles, and provided some support.

It is unknown whether the missiles fired at American aircraft were American made, residual missiles from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, or technologically supported by third parties.

Curiously, multiple Chinese website discussions includes specific weapon systems mentioned within the wikileaks disclosures, including a specific type of sniper sighting system likely used during a mentioned ground training exercise.

Wikileaks discloses the details of this sighting system. Here is the connection between the wikileaks information and the Chinese discussion:

SIMRAD could refer to either the sniper training or the communications system. The 2005 message refers to task force Bayonet which, in 2007, included 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat team, part of the Army based in Vicenza, Italy. 

The sniper sight, as indirectly referenced on wikileaks, includes the option for night vision and laser sighting.

SIMRAD would likely have been used with an M3, and a 1,000m high explosive dual purpose round (HEDP). If the Chinese language references are the same, then it is possible the Chinese were discussing a night sight used with the 3-T: KN205F.

Here are the Chinese references with this unique feature:

[ Simrad KN205F 图 ]

The 3-T is mentioned here:

[  铁拳3-T 600"型具有一体式激光测距机和计算机化的瞄准具 ]

If you type that information [in brackets] into a search engine, you'll see some of the Chinese-language discussions related to that laser sighting system which works with the Simrad sniper sight.

The other version is the Simrad IS2000 laser gun sight, which can be used at night with infra-red goggles.

What's interesting is that the Simrad has technology features which allow it to be used a night, at the same time that enemy forces could use a ground-to-air missile.

Conclusions

The wikileaks information provides information about a Congressional Delegation visit. We have no information on whether Congressman Sodrel did or did not participate in the visit or attend Kandahar or any Afghan prison.

The timing of the visit is interesting because it was near when an American plan came under attack from what was believed a shoulder-fired missile.

The wikileaks disclosures about shoulder-fired missiles tends to be consistent with the concerns SecDef and CJCS raised in 2001.

The wikileaks information provides factual information about the motivation behind DHS procurement programs to develop countermeasures for ground-based missile attacks on commercial airliners with "Manpacs".

The sniper sighting system could be used by American forces to pinpoint enemy forces armed with ground-to-air missiles; provide real-time targeting data used by Predator; and provide GPS-update information to JDAMs used to target ground forces armed with ground-to-air missiles.

Judgments/Opinions

The Congressman visited Kandahar to review the ongoing US prison operation facilities, but was not the direct target of the ground-to-air missile.

Congress had access to the detailed DoD reports of hand/ground-based missiles, the attempts on American planes, and the real reasons for aircraft losses. This information provided to Congress in secret likely helped bolster support for DHS procurement programs designed to protect civilian and commercial planes from hand-held, ground based missiles.

However, there are drawbacks to keeping information secret. The real, ongoing threat from ground-to-air missiles, if disclosed, could have bolstered American citizen support for increased funding for missile-countermeasures.

It's unclear why the US government, facing what appears to be broader technological support from China, did not disclose the US concerns about possible Chinese assistance to the Tabiban. Although the US government has interests in not provoking China re Taiwan, it remains to be understood what other diplomatic, technological, and security considerations drove the US government after 2001 to downplay the ground-based threat information now available on wikileaks.

Recommendations

Part I: The Congressional Visit (CODEL) to Kandahar, on or about Jun 1st 2005

TPM readers are encouraged to contact the Congressional Committees related to Homeland Security, Intelligence, and Defense:

After the 2005 visit to Kandahar, what were the conclusions about the prisoner treatment operations?

Who in DoD cooperated with Congressional-Executive pressure on the media not to publish details about the CODEL to Kandahar?

Which Congressional staffers were able to induce who in the media not to report on the Congressional trip to Kandahar in June 2005?

Did anyone on the Committee staffs review the published standard operating procedures; what steps were later taken to independently review the DoD and Army IG reports into ongoing prisoner operations?

Why did it take so long after 2005 for the public to get accurate information through Congress on Geneva compliance issues by US forces and CIA contractors at Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, Kndahar, and CIA black sites?

What access did the Congressional staff with any internal audit reports, or other documentation on ICRC reviews?

Part II: The Missile System Issues

TPM readers are encouraged to contact Vernon Loeb at the Washington Post to learn more about what he knew about the ground-to-air missile systems in Afghanistan; and what reasons, if any, he was given by DoD for not disclosing information he may have learned.

As preparation for your discussion with Loeb, read his WaPo Article, "Bursts of Brilliance," December 15, 2002.

Here are some questions you may wish to openly discuss with others:

How long has Loeb or others known about the ground-to-air missile firing issue in Afghanistan?

Was he ever told by anyone in DoD, DHS, or the FBI to not comment on or report ni the media details about the ground-to-air missile issues in Afghanistan?

Was he ever issued a national security letter (NSL) for receiving information about the ground-to-air missile issues in Afghanistan?

Part III: Data Integrity Issues

One area for TPM readers to explore are whether Chinese or other nationals have hacked into American information systems to learn when specific equipment was being re-ordered.

You may want to review the training procedures referenced on wikileaks. [Database Training: Stamis (Standard Army Management Information Systems, PEO-reporting). ] This will lead you to the conversations available on the classified internet. [ SiprNet is a classified internet system attached, in part, to CJTF-76. ]

 Question: Is the information system compromised; and do the procurement offices include the specifications to address the potential security problems?

Also consider the COMSEC issues related to acquiring a manual to operate the system. One interesting question surfaced, which the NSA analysts should be able to locate. Here is the question:

COMSEC procedures for DA PAM 710-2-1, procedures on ammunition management.

Here's a sample problematic message raising a potential question of interest to the media:

"Does anybody out there have a copy of 710-2-1 that I can have? I tried downloading of the net but It will not let me print. I need one that I can print."

Consider this: Why is someone that should have access to Army Knowledge Online (AKO), and presumably able to access Adobe, have a "printing" problem?" That doesn't make sense. The person shouldn't be asking for a manual to be sent to them; they should be asking for assistance to have their printer reconfigured.

We recommend TPM readers consult the FBI records in the Justice Consolidated Office Network (JCON) to determine who at the FBI, if anyone, had investigated who was printing a copy of the COMSEC procedures used for the referenced DA PAM.

Ask DoD IG who did the COMSEC audit of the supply system. The referenced procedures are:

Technical Bulletin 380-41, Procedures for Safeguarding, Accounting, and Supply Control of COMSEC

Ask them to comment on two different systems; and explain which other systems they prefer to track potential munitions equipment which could be retrofitted by foreign nationals:

System 1: FEDLOG 

System 2: VIPER, Program Unit Identification Code (UIC) In accordance with (IAW) Army Regulation (AR) 735-5, maintained in accordance with (IAW) DA Pam 710-2-1.

 

Who signed the standard operating procedure (SOP) for safeguarding the equipment, supplies, and spares related to any back-up equipment which could be used by the enemy to support ground-based ground-to-air missiles?

What is the status of any internal control investigation into reviewing whether parts, equipment, or other things provided to the Afghan Security Forces might have been modified or directly used to support ground-to-air missiles in Afghanistan?

Which supply and/or munitions clerk was not properly reporting to SAMS-1?

What patterns or gaps have the American commanders found in intelligence provided related to weapon systems used by the enemy vs those available through allied supply channels; were the analyst results formatted as predictive or historical only?

How do the supply problems and possibility of reverse engineering compare with original assessments to SOCE IO [See FM 3-13]; have these assessments been properly coordinated between the Army and appropriate aerospace-support units working with Predator, JDAM or GPS-connected munitions?

What information did the Monthly SOCE Targeting Coordination Group (TCG) include related to ground-to-air missiles?

Part IV: DOD procurement: Office of Secretary of Defense

Here are some questions TPM readers may want to address with Members of Congress, their staff, and others assigned to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees:

NSA collects signals intelligence, presumably those of ground-to-air missiles. NSA had enough time to ignore and violate FISA. Surely, they had time to consider the electronic signatures used by enemy forces using ground-to-air missiles in Afghanistan.

What is the plan to include electronic jamming of any retrofitted or reverse engineered surface-to-air missile; and act as a effective electronic counter-measure to what enemy ground forces might be using against allied aircraft?

What is the status of any Predator housing system which would integrate an air-to-ground option to attack suspected enemy armed with the electronic signature matching that of the retrofitted or reverse engineered Stingers?

Why is Congress saying it's "OK" for the NSA to use all means to fight the enemy - including violate FISA - but we still don't have a clear picture of what was required to effectively mitigate the ground-to-air missile option used by enemies of NATO?

What is the plan to provide real-time updates from NSA to commercial aircraft so they can use the most current information about ground-to-air missiles which have been reverse engineered?

Is there a plan to consider incorporating real-time updates into commercial flight jamming systems so that when a ground-to-air missile is launched, NSA can - in real time - provide this information worldwide to all allied aircraft, both military and commercial for effective electronic counter measures (ECM)?

What's the plan of NSA to house on commercial airlines electronic monitoring equipment to capture what could be stray ground-to-air missile electronic signatures?

What's the plan to capture night-vision electronic signature data captured by sniper scopes and provide this information real-time to commercial and military aircraft for ECM; and for offensive munitions targeting purposes?

Wikileaks disclosure of DoD order for talking points for detainee abuse, Koran desecration in Afghanistan, June 2005. 

By 2005, Guantanamo issued guidance (dated Jun 14, 2005) related to proper care of the Koran.

2 of 3 shows the 2004 interview of military intelligence where "fear up" interrogation method includes desecration of the Koran.

It was the policy of the United States, as documented in the interrogation files and procedures, to desecrate the Koran as an interrogation technique.

2004 Talking points about Abu Ghraib, falsely asserting that it was an "aberration."

2 of 3 shows the 2004 interview of military intelligence where "fear up" interrogation method includes desecration of the Koran.  

DoD Mar 2003 talking points on enemy prisoners of war (EPW). 

Similar to the 2003 investigation at Guantanamo on similar Koran mistreatment.

Koran desecration

9 of 24 (para 4.) shows sample talking points related to Guantanamo.

Legal counsel inputs via email on talking points about deaths at Bagram.

Sample email showing Knight-Ridder request for information on a detainee death from Public Affairs Office.

The public has no reason to believe the misconduct was an aberration when interrogation methods -- and continuing US government policy under the DOJ OLC memo "protection" -- expressly include destroying or desecrating the Koran during interrogation.

The following goes into some detail what's above, and provides summary points for discussion on TPM. These judgments are well supported by contrasting the ACLU FOIA information with the new information on wikileaks:

1. DoD reproduced different talking points for essentially the same incidents at different locations because of the US government's leadership problem, and underlying strategy to ignore Geneva at multiple locations after the same 9-11 incident and AUMF.

2. Leadership and command failure explains why there no central authority in the US government to ensure the abuses at one (1) facility ceased at all facilities; and why all Geneva requirements were not fully enforced. Rather, Geneva violations during interrogations were implemented as an American interrogation policy.

3. In June 2005, Guantanamo issued guidance on proper POW treatment, but these Geneva standards were not fully implemented in Afghanistan because of this failure of leadership, control, and robust legal compliance requirements on legal counsel and executive leadership after Nuremberg.

4. The US government provided deliberately wrong and incomplete information to the public on questions related to Geneva compliance. Each incident, disclosure and round of public questions required a new set of talking points; but each round was treated as an isolated set of questions to marginalize and derail oversight.

5. There was no coherent policy in the US government to fully comply with Geneva Conventions. Rather, when questions surfaced, the US government improperly left a false impression that the conduct was isolated.

6. The DoD responses on the ACLU website -- related to all years, locations, facilities, and agencies -- show that the US government treated each facility as if it were a separate operating entity, with their own timeline to respond to questions, provide standard operating procedures, and (possibly appear to) comply with Geneva requirements.

7. Rather than taking a government-wide approach to fully complying with Geneva, the US government left it up to each agency, operating location, and facility to glacially respond to requests for information on Geneva. This does not adequately demonstrate there was a proper chain of command, nor a timely decision - as should have happened after the passage of the AUMF - to ensure there was a coherent US policy to fully comply with Geneva regardless the prisoner location, theater, or detention authority.

8. An incoherent US government approach to prisoner treatment and Geneva compliance spans all theaters, facilities, agencies, and commands. This US-focused problem should make it clear why the US continues to have a problem in Afghanistan: The incoherent US government approach to problems isn't working to either mobilize the Afghan civilian population, nor coherently turn over governance responsibilities to the Afghan people.

Wired: U.S. spy agencies, the State Department and the White House had a collective panic attack Friday over a new Washington Post exposé on the intelligence-industrial complex.

With all this confusion, lack of clarity, how is the public and Congress sure that the programs are effectively being monitored?

What will ensure that eras of illegal abuses will not be repeated?

Federalist 20: Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.

The rules to ensure that expansion of power within the intelligence community is accountable, and not given -- is it appears -- a rubber stamp.

Why haven't the leadership within the intelligence community ensured that the lessons from the systems management schools were timely applied to how the intelligence information is organized and programs are managed;

What's getting in the way of the leadership to ensure there are adequate, useful audit reports to prevent a bureaucracy to get this out of control, especially in a system where there should be even during wartime checks and balances?

Federalist 7: The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies.

Federalist 64: It was wise, therefore, in the convention to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a system for the management of them.

Federalist 64: The convention have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.

What will ensure their districts' programs and jobs are protected;

Why are other Congressional districts getting protection, while another district cannot be sure of protection for key employees.

The other recounted that for his initial briefing, he was escorted into a tiny, dark room, seated at a small table and told he couldn't take notes. Program after program began flashing on a screen, he said, until he yelled ''Stop!" in frustration.

The Geneva Conventions govern how the United States treats civilians during combat operations. These rules relate to, among other things, repatriating, civilian protections, and required government planning (Legal citations at end).

Because of combat-related decisions and policies, the US government has denied a class of US citizens access to transportation systems. The stranded Americans are stranded because of the US government's decision, and its refusal to provide a suitable alternative method meeting the US government's requirements.

These repatriation issues -- affecting stranded American civilians -- may implicate subsequent alleged war crimes attached to DOJ OLC legal counsel. Until these stranded Americans are repatriated, DOJ OLC and the White House cannot lawfully ignore any Geneva obligation related to evidence retention, prisoner treatment, or civilian protection.

The US government has suggested - but not supplied or organized - that stranded American citizens board a boat. One problem is that the stranded Americans cannot find a boat to board from remote regions, nor one that will deliver them to the United States. They're stuck.

Geneva does not permit this sort of discrimination when the detaining power could use another method of properly transporting these civilians to their home. If they were returning service personnel, the United States government would find a way to bring them home.

Geneva requires timely US government assistance, planning, and help to civilians affected by combat. It makes no difference that the medical assistance is for civilians close to a combat zone, or whether that assistance is to civilians affected because of the combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, or elsewhere.

Which GM-15 working in the Department of Defense is wasting time making excuses to not put together a plan to repatriate our fellow citizens?

Geneva Rules Applicable to US on Providing for Civilians During Combat

The US government has denied them access to the United States. Now, in contravention to Geneva obligations on the United States, the American citizens are being detained against their will in a place that they do not wish to be. This status of a civilian is governed by the Geneva Conventions as it relates to the treatment of civilians affected by combat operations.

Geneva requires that civilians enjoy protections; and that military personnel detained enjoy protections afforded to similarly situated personnel. The US government has not explained why it provides assistance to once class of American citizens but not another.

The protections and assistance the US government is obliged to provide is higher on civilians, especially when those civilians are farther from conditions that would interfere with the US government's legal obligations.

The detention is because of a change in rules related to national security; and connected with combat-related operations.

It is not permissible for the US government to create one set of detention and holding system for one class of prisoners; but not make a similar or alternate system available for American civilians. Both the prisoners at Guantanamo and the stranded American civilians are being treated differently; and the US government has refused to provide alternatives to American civilians otherwise available to prisoners under US detention at Guantanamo.

Combat-related Citizen Movement

Supposedly the United States is involved in combat operations in Afghanistan to, in part, bring a sense of order and stability to a troubled land. Daily, millions are spent on ordinance to attack foreign enemies on the ground. This money could be used to repatriate American citizens stranded because of the ongoing combat operations and perpetual state of Emergency.

The US Congress has been convinced that some prisoner movement is required: TO move personnel out of the combat zone, to take them to a safe area, or otherwise move these prisoners to more reasonable detention facilities. The same standard of care the US government affords the POWs must be made available to similarly affected American citizens.

Options Available to Other Americans Citizens Affected by Combat

I would like to know why some American citizens are being treated differently than similarly situated American military personnel. Any stranded or downed pilot can rest assured there will be a massive effort to find them, return them to America, and let them continue their work.

However, when it comes to other American citizens similarly stranded, and unable to fully coordinate all travel arrangements, the US government refuses to act.

This is not acceptable. Both classes of citizen - whether military or civilian - are subject to the  same nexus of conditions affecting the United States' legal obligations. The US government cannot reasonably argue that it owes a higher duty of care to military personnel, when it is the death of civilians at 9-11 that prompted the military action. That standard of care the US government owes to civilians does not fall during combat, but increases. This duty of care was foreseeable, just as the US government foreseeably knew or should have known that it had special Geneva obligations to care for POWs detained at the black sites, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo.

Rendition

The United States government has well shown it can use Boeing scheduling companies to render alleged "unlawful combatants" from Afghanistan, and move them - without permission - through the airspace of NATO allies, then land them in a remote island.

The same could be done for American citizens stranded overseas, but the US government refuses to do for American citizens what it will supposedly do on behalf of American citizens:" Move non-Americans.

That double standard is not acceptable.  Geneva obliges the US government to make available to civilians special protections that the US government has demonstrated it can make available to prisoners moved around the globe: Safe passage.

Government Required to Provide Suitable Alternatives

There needs to be an ongoing program to, when Americans are denied boarding overseas, an alternate communication and transportation system which will replace the one that the United States government has determined is not adequate.  It is not the job of the prisoner to create a safe detention system, nor instruct the jailers how to raise funds to move prisoners along the nation's transportation system. This duty falls on the backs of those in the criminal justice system, connected with government, and charged with the legal obligation to safely move personnel.

This burden cannot legally fall on the backs of the civilians affected by the US decision to engage in combat operations; and the US government should not have started combat operations unless it was willing to fully embrace all Geneva obligations connected with protecting American citizens affected by combat-related governmental decisions, policies, programs, activities, and national security requirements.

When the government says that a transportation system does not meet the US government specifications, then it is the job of the US government to create, find, and make available a transportation system that will address the US government's requirements. When the government fails to properly address a legal obligation falling on the back of the government, it is not the obligation of the affected civilians to do the job of government.

Rather, it is the job of the government to understand why the legal obligations have not been met, and develop a timely resolution to bring the program into compliance with the US Geneva obligations. It is not the job of the American civilians to privately fund what remain legal obligations of the United States for civilians during combat-connected national security decisions, policies, programs, and boarding denials.

DoD Program Office: Geneva Obligations for American Civilians

The GM-15 assigned to this problem needs to wake-up, and get to work. I expect there to be within thirty (30) days a rough outline of a plan for the President detailing the following:

The number of known Americans stranded overseas because of their inability to board commercial aircraft;

The reasons for their being denied boarding to return to the United States;

The status of their relatives in the United States;

The desired final destination the American citizens have when returning to the United States;

The proposed intermediate points non-American commercial plans could be used to funnel these stranded American citizens; and

The types of commercial or contract merchant shipping available to transport American citizens from overseas to an intermediate point off the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts.

DOJ OLC Legal Memoranda

DOJ OLC has a legal obligation to the White House to provide a coherent DOJ OLC memo on the US government's legal obligations under Geneva to stranded American civilians who have been affected by a change in US government policy or decision; and the US government's legal obligations to those affected civilians when those civilians are not afforded an alternate transportation system suitable to the US government's transportation and security requirements.

This DOJ OLC memo needs to be publicly available on the DOJ website and should address the following legal questions within that memo:

What Geneva obligations for American citizen-travelers did the US government incur once the AUMF was passed by Congress;

What legal precedents are there from Nuremberg mandating US government duties of care for civilians affected by governmental operations, decisions, or adjustments during national security situations

What rules within the FAA, DOJ, DoD need to be re-examined that create conditions denying American citizens timely access to transportation systems, as required by the Geneva Conventions

What legal obligations did the Nazis ignore during WWII as they relate to the care, detention, transportation, and repatriation of civilians affected by combat-related policies, decisions, programs, or other national decisions?

What legal language presented at Nuremberg was instrumental in finding that the Nazis had not adequately cared for civilians affected by the German government's decision to destroy, incapacitate, or block access to?

What Geneva obligations have been incurred because of the US detention of POWs at Guantanamo; and how do the Supreme Court's recognition of these obligations incur a similar obligation on the US government to afford similar assistance to a different class of detainees: American citizens stranded overseas.

Is it the view of DOJ OLC that the President can make rules affecting how US citizens are required to travel; but that there is no legal requirement for the President to create a suitable alternative under Geneva precedents to properly repatriate American citizens affected by combat-related decisions or national security policies?

What is the DOJ OLC view on the Nazi treatment of Polish civilians during the initial days of WWII; and how does this treatment square with legal obligations the US government has to similarly care for American civilians directly affected by similar combat-related decisions, policies, programs, and procedures?

How does DOJ OLC justify creating legal memoranda to "legalize" rendition, prisoner abuse, and the mistreatment of prisoners away from a combat zone; but the same DOJ OLC will not "legalize" the transportation of American citizens, nor ensure that they are properly treated while detained against their will in a foreign country, unable to return to their desired final destination in the United States?

The Germans during WWII developed some hideous procedures when dealing with civilians.

The Nazis:

Ref: These civilian detentions were the final link in "a chain of terror and repression which involved the SS and the Gestapo and which resulted in the apprehension of victims and their confinement without trial, often without charges, generally with no indication of the length of their detention."

At Nuremberg, prosecutors concluded the civilians suffered from want:

Nuremberg: :"For military reasons it is necessary to requisition billets, foodstuffs, and fodder from the Czech population. As a result, the latter suffer from want."

Stranded Americans are similarly in an ambiguous cituation. They want to go home, but the US government is not helping them.

Accordingly, the US government has an obligation to disclose through the FOIA process the following:

Copies of emails, records, or other discussion memos related to why one class of prisoner should be held under Geneva-connected conditions; but those same protections cannot be afforded to American civilians;

The plan of the US government to perpetually delay, not address, or ignore the Geneva obligations the USG has to American civilians overseas'

The method the US government has to apply the lessons of Auschwitz, and ensure the American citizens detained overseas are not mistreated, are properly cared for, and that the US government is timely developing a plan to improve the situation of these affected American civilians;

The names of which countries the US government plans to house, detain, or use as an intermediate stop-over point to transport American civilians from overseas to the United States;

The methods the US government is using to work with the ICRC to provide detained Americans assistance, information, and other protections the Geneva Conventions impose on the United States;

The plan of the US government, as the ICRC requires the USG to provide of prisoners, to determine the status and medical requirements of American citizens affected by the US decision, policy, program, and plan to deny these citizens access to suitable government-furnished alternatives;

The explanation why some classes of American citizens not being afforded timely assistance; but another class of prisoner or detainee is allegedly given preferential treatment in the Boeing-connected scheduling system;

An explanation why - in secret - the US government has been able to move hundreds of prisoners from foreign combat zones - in violation of Geneva - and this scheduling has been completed without any substantial opposition from Congress; but similar flight planning cannot be done for a handful of stranded Americans; and

The reasons for inaction appear to be excuses. Either the number of Americans is "so small" that the supposed planning would be too excessive, but easily solved; or the numbers are "too large" making the planning beyond what any GM-15 should be reasonably expected to timely accomplish, prompting the question: Why did this problem have to get so big before the US government considered it's Geneva obligations to affected US civilians.

Options Criteria

As a starting point for this repatriation effort, the President deserves a timely plan which would include:

A. The required cost to provide a minimal level of assistance to these stranded Americans;

B. Details of which provisions afforded to the President - because of the connection with his wartime powers - for funding available to repatriate American citizens; and

C. The costs to provide minimal levels of assistance to include: Showers, storage locations for personal goods, phone calls, mail service, clothing, and others personal items.

The President needs the following:

An explanation why the scheduling function connected with Boeing to allegedly support rendition cannot be modified to timely repatriate these American citizens, to include the full costs of reconfiguring the plans for civilian use.

An explanation of how a commercial plane could be modified to accommodate in-flight security personnel so that the American citizens can be safely returned to the United States, and still ensure that the supposed "threats" posed by them - supposedly justifying their boarding denial - can be addressed, allowing them to board the aircraft.

The public needs to understand

Which countries have refused to assist the United States government; and why US military personnel have not been timely dispatched to free these Americans and safely return them to the United States;

Where the President plans to move these American citizens so that they can be safely boarded on intermediate planes which will transfer them to transportation systems connected with ports or commercial shipping systems;

The plans of the President to ensure that these stranded Americans are timely returned to a safe location, and can be swiftly moved to their homes.

Questions about the proposed options:

Which islands in the Caribbean does the President plan to work with to receive these Americans, where will the stay, and what is the plan to house the Americans on these islands pending their boarding on a floating vessel for arrival at a US port?

What assistance does the President need from Canada or Mexico to receive planes, and permit a transfer of these American citizens to a Canadian or Mexican port to safely and timely bring them to a port for repatriation?

Why are the security procedures to render non-Americans "good enough" to board them on commercial contract planes; but a similar plan cannot be considered to move American citizens out of countries they no longer wish to reside?

What method will be used to move the stranded American citizens to non-US planes, safety move them to an intermediate city near a port, and transfer them to an approved ship?

Conclusion

The United States has Geneva obligations which require the US government to properly care for civilians affected by American combat polices, programs, decisions, and plans. These stranded Americans are not where they want to be, but the US government has provided no suitable alternative transportation system that will meet the US government's requirements.

The United States government after WWII well showed that it can return American military personnel from combat operations. Today, the US government routinely transfers non-Americans for rendition purposes.

There is no reasonable explanation why a GM-15 working with contractors in the national security, intelligence, justice, and transportation sectors cannot develop a viable plan within 30 days for the President to regularly transport American civilians affected by the ongoing combat-related decisions, policies, programs, and plans.

The American citizens stranded overseas deserve better treatment. They are American citizens. It is because of the supposed abuse against American citizens that this government will justify conducting foreign combat operations. Those same Americans deserve the same respect and dignity from the same US government.

The time to finalize a plan and return these American citizens is at hand. It should not require a lawsuit to bring this problem to light. The President has the options and resources to address these issues.  There are no reasonable excuses why the United States government will not facilitate a plan to resolve this situation.

The US government changed the rules. The passengers are stranded. They are American citizens. It's time the US government takes care of their own, but not make excuses to leave them stranded. This problem is one the US government has created. The stranded Americans need confidence there is a plan in place to timely resolve the mess the US government helped create.

Because the United States government changed the rules, the government should bear the costs of providing the stranded Americans alternate transportation, including any costs associated with using military personnel, floating vessels, or other intermediate housing centers.

Each of the options below requires additional assistance for the stranded Americans. The American citizens will, while waiting for pick-up along this alternate system, require extra out of pocket expenses they would not incur had they been able to return to the United States. The United States government should provide - for free - these additional items to include: Food, blankets, telephone, medical, and other incidental expenses.

These options must be subject to DoD and DOJ IG audits, with timely Congressional Committee access to the facilities, plans, and other records related to this plan implementation.

Citizens will only be required to pay for the cost of ½ of a round-trip ticket; and be re-imbursed for any lost wages, or other losses incurred because of the Untied States' government's decision to deny them boarding.  As an incentive to the GM-15 to quickly implement this plan, any expenses incurred beyond their original planned stay will be born by the United States government. Congress shall agree to earmark funds from the DoD accounts that would otherwise be designated for civilian relief.

Recommendation

DoD working with the Justice Department and Customs should develop a legal memoranda outlining the viability of each plan, and discuss legal obligations under each plan to include costs for the US government per Geneva.

Option 1: Coordinate the movement of the American citizens to the nearest transportation hub (via donkey, train, carriage, goat) and move them on non-American commercial planes. Land the American citizens in either Europe, Canada, or Mexico. Charter a boat to take them to a Caribbean Island or one in the Pacific. Process them at this island. Move them from the Island to either the West or East coasts for return to their home.

Option 2: Use the Boeing scheduling system to return the stranded Americans using the rendition aircraft.

Option 3: Move all the stranded passengers to Europe, charter a boat to regularly move the passengers from the ports in Europe to an agreed to floating port off the US West Coast.

Option 4: Use the existing DoD transportation system to move stranded American citizens.

Option 5: Designate specific planes for stranded Americans, and place heightened security on the plane to ensure no hostile takeover. If needed, assign one air Marshall for each of the stranded passengers, and return them to the United States to a single airport for expedited screening and in-processing.

Legal Citations

The Geneva conventions help to lessen the ravages of war, especially against civilians. Inaction in addressing any of these legal principles creates a lower standard of care for American civilians than is required for other Geneva-protected classes. That distinction is not permitted under the laws of war, and possibly subsequent war crime.

The 4th Geneva Conventions (GCIV) are "Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in time of war," Aug 12, 1949.

[ICRC], "It provides that when the civilian population of a territory under the control of a Party to the conflict, other than an occupied territory, is not adequately provided for, relief actions of a humanitarian and impartial character, conducted without any adverse distinction, must be undertaken, subject to the agreement of the Parties concerned in such relief action"

Arguably, the above means that when American civilians, of the United States under Control of the United States government, are located outside the United States, they must be provided for; and that relief actions must be taken.

When there are relief efforts to recover American military personnel and POWs, then it would be an adverse distinction for the US government to refuse to provide similar assistance, transporation, or safe passage to similarly stranded American civilians.

Arguably, it is an adverse distinction to provide only assistance or recovery aid to military personnel affected by the US government actions; but deny similarly stranded American civilians of similar assistance or repatriation.

Some prisoners at Guantanamo have been repatriated. The US government must explain why American civilians -- stranded, and also affected by the same combat operations and policies -- are not also being repatriated before combat operations end.

Stranded Americans as Refugees

This wording is interesting:

Persons who, before the outbreak of hostilities, were considered as stateless persons or refugees under the relevant international agreements or under the legislation of the State of refuge or State of residence are protected persons within the meaning of the Fourth Convention.

Arguably, by denying the American civilians safepassage to the United States, these American citizens no longer full protections of the United States and could be "stateless".

Guarantee of Judicial Hearing

All persons affected by the conflict -- including stranded Americans overseas are guaranteed a judicial hearing:

Finally, the guarantees of judicial procedure (see Chapter III, point 6, page 31) also form part of the fundamental guarantees accorded to all persons affected by an armed conflict.

Once the United States extends judicial procedure to POWs at Guantanamo, but denies similar, speedy resolution to stranded Americans, arguably the United States -- to remedy this distinction -- should repatriate the American civilians, not leave them to wander overseas.

Rather, the conventions limit who these stranded American civilians can be transferred:

In order to remove any possibility for the States parties to the Convention to evade their obligations, it is prohibited to transfer protected persons to a Power which is not a party to the Convention.

To best ensure this Geneva requirement is fully met, the United States government should take action to ensure these stranded Americans are returned to a party of the conflict: The United States.

Arguably, by leaving the United States citizens in Yemen or other nations "not a party to the Convention", the US is not fully enforcing Geneva.

Here is the language which invokes special legal protections for American civilians, as compared to similar personnel the US has transported via rendition:

ICRC: As far as possible, interned members of the same family must be housed in the same premises and given separate accommodation from other internees; they must also be granted all necessary facilities for leading a proper family life.

The absurdity is the US government moves POWs from Afghanistan to Guantanamo, provides them assistance, but does not provide similar travel arrangements or housing for others also affected by the warfare decisions: American civilians. Rather than making arrangements to transfer the American civilians from overseas to Guantanamo -- and provide for "similar" accomodations as those provided for POWs -- why not return them to their homes?

Obligation of US Govt to Repatriate

As a party to this conflict, the United States has an obligation to work with other nations to repatriate American civilians:

ICRC: In addition, the Parties to the conflict will endeavour, during the hostilities, to conclude agreements for release, repatriation, return to places of residence or hospitalization in a neutral country of certain classes of internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers with infants and young children, the wounded and sick and internees who have been detained for a long time. [IV, 132]

Even if the US government does not immediately act, the public has an interest in knowing the status of any agreements, plans, or other negotiations to repatriate these stranded American civilians.

The conditions related to their inability to travel are within the control of the US government, not exclusively connected with where they are stranded:

Art. 132. Each interned person shall be released by the Detaining Power as soon as the reasons which necessitated his internment no longer exist.

There are no conditions which justify leaving the Americans stranded; and the reasons for leaving them stranded are artificial, and could be resolved with changes in procedures. The conditions "necessitating" their current status are not connected to factors outside the US government control, and could be removed with a change in US government policy and procedures.

When we "conclude an agreement" it means that the discussion ends, and that there is a definite start-date for that agreement to be implemented:

Article 132: The Parties to the conflict shall, moreover, endeavour during the course of hostilities, to conclude agreements for the release, the repatriation, the return to places of residence or the accommodation in a neutral country of certain classes of internees, in particular children, pregnant women and mothers with infants and young children, wounded and sick, and internees who have been detained for a long time.

Ultimately, the stranded Americans are covered by Geneva because eventually they will have to return home:

Internment must cease as soon as possible after the close of hostilities and, at the end of hostilities or occupation, the States must try to ensure the return of all internees to their last place of residence or facilitate their repatriation. The spirit of this provision is of far-reaching consequence, benefiting not only internees but, in a general way, all persons displaced by the events of war. [IV, 133; IV, 134]

The public has an interest in knowing the status of the US government's plan to implement -- when the "war on terror" ends -- the agreements to return all Americans displaced by the American government's policies, procedures, rules, and transportation decisions connected with these combat operations.

The known requirements are looming. The planning should immediately start. There is no reasonable argument to delay this planning, nor avoid searching now for other stranded Americans also affected by the US government's travel restrictions:

Article 133: By agreement between the Detaining Power and the Powers concerned, committees may be set up after the close of hostilities, or of the occupation of territories, to search for dispersed internees.

The public needs to know why this plan is not being implemented now; and why some transportation plans are being implemented for some classes of prisoners or civilians, but not all classes including stranded American civilians. This planning does not have to start later after the end of the hostilities, but should start now because the requirement is known and not speculative.

Arguably, by creating rules affecting US citizens overseas, the US government is instrumental in these stranded Americans status: Being unable to leave.  Civilians have the right, under the Conventions, to return to the place where they started their journey or complete their journey:

Art. 134. The High Contracting Parties shall endeavour, upon the close of hostilities or occupation, to ensure the return of all internees to their last place of residence, or to facilitate their repatriation.

.The conventions expressly address the costs:

Art. 135. The Detaining Power shall bear the expense of returning released internees to the places where they were residing when interned, or, if it took them into custody while they were in transit or on the high seas, the cost of completing their journey or of their return to their point of departure.

And this shows there is a foreseeable budget requirement in the out-years, affecting the PPBS:

Article 36: All costs in connection therewith, from the point of exit in the territory of the Detaining Power, shall be borne by the country of destination, or, in the case of accommodation in a neutral country, by the Power whose nationals are benefited.

 There is no excuse for a delay in planning for, and repatriating these American civilians stranded because of a change in US policies, procedures, rules, or plans affecting their required travel: Returning home.

Article 35: If any such person is refused permission to leave the territory, he shall be entitled to have refusal reconsidered, as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board designated by the Detaining Power for that purpose.

The US government and public have an interest in publicly knowing the reasons the specific stranded Americans cannot board the planes:

Article 35: Upon request, representatives of the Protecting Power shall, unless reasons of security prevent it, or the persons concerned object, be furnished with the reasons for refusal of any request for permission to leave the territory and be given, as expeditiously as possible, the names of all persons who have been denied permission to leave.

The American public through the FOIA process has an interest in knowing whether the US government officials have or have not, as permitted, been provided the specific reasons for the denied boarding; and the status of US government actions to resolve these issues and provide other methods to repatriate these stranded Americans.

The public also has an interest in knowing whether the US government officials are pressing foreign powers to work with the US government to provide for these stranded Americans; if not, what plans there are to correct this deficiency.

There are specific rules related to which Power or State has legal responsibility to take care of the stranded Americans once they are transferred:

Article 45: Nevertheless, if that Power fails to carry out the provisions of the present Convention in any important respect, the Power by which the protected persons were transferred shall, upon being so notified by the Protecting Power, take effective measures to correct the situation or shall request the return of the protected persons.

The public has a right to know whether the US government has any plan to request the return of the stranded Americans; or whether the US government plans to continue to enforce rules which interfere with the safe, timely return of US citizens to their home.

There have been some reports that some US citizens, denied boarding, were encouraged to travel to other countries.

Article 45: In no circumstances shall a protected person be transferred to a country where he or she may have reason to fear persecution for his or her political opinions or religious beliefs.

Once US citizens are denied boarding overseas, the US government must take timely action to ensure that those stranded Americans are not transferred to other countries that might persecute them for their political opinions or religious beliefs.

The US government needs to explain why one class of persons affected by the war -- POWs -- can receive assitance; but stranded Americans are not getting similar help:

Art. 98. All internees shall receive regular allowances, sufficient to enable them to purchase goods and articles, such as tobacco, toilet requisites, etc. Such allowances may take the form of credits or purchase coupons.

The American civilians, stranded overseas, have the same requirements POWs have: Access to incidental goods, toiletries. POWs and straned Americans are both affected by the US government policies, procedures, plans, and rules. Why is the US government providing assistance to POWs but not American civilians?

Their situation should not be worsened:

Article 127: When making decisions regarding the transfer of internees, the Detaining Power shall take their interests into account and, in particular, shall not do anything to increase the difficulties of repatriating them or returning them to their own homes.

Arguably, by refusing to provide alternate transportation systems -- to meet the US government transportation requirements --  the US government has increased the difficulties of repatriating these stranded American civilians. The US government cannot credibly provide greater assistance to POWs, but ignore the plight of their own citizens, stranded because of the US government policies.

If foreign powers are not going to provide assistance to the United States, and the US government will not assist these stranded Americans, what's the point of our combat operations in Afghanistan or Iraq?

Repatriation Required Before DOJ OLC (Illegally, again) Denounces Geneva Obligations

The United States cannot ignore any of the Geneva obligations nor denounce them until the stranded American citizens have been repatriated:

Article 158: However, a denunciation of which notification has been made at a time when the denouncing Power is involved in a conflict shall not take effect until peace has been concluded, and until after operations connected with the release, repatriation and re-establishment of the persons protected by the present Convention have been terminated.

By refusing to address the repatriation requirements of stranded Americans, DOJ OLC cannot legally ignore any of their Geneva obligations connected with the 2001 AUMF. One duty, as adjudicated at Nuremberg, is their legal obligation to enforce Geneva. (See Alstoetter)

Geneva obligations include the obligation of legal counsel to preserve evidence, enforce Geneva, and ensure the US government complies with requirements to retain evidence related to prisoner mistreatment..

DOJ OLC legal counsel knew or should have known this denunciation requirement; its relationship to the US government obligations to repatriate stranded American civilians.

American government legal counsel must be able to explain why they refuse to acknowledge the repatriation requirement after DOJ OLC ignored specific Geneva obligations related to investigation and protection of all POWs.

Until repatriated, denunciation is not lawful, and all Geneva obligations remain in effect. The longer the US government and DOJ OLC slow-roll repatriation of American civilians, the deeper the DOJ OLC legal counsel dig themselves into a legal problem: Their continued failure to ensure Geneva obligations on the US government are fully enforced despite their known -- or should have known -- legal obligation per Nuremberg precedents.

Sample Alleged War Crimes DOJ OLC Has Failed To End

It is unlawful for the US government to remove combatants from a combat zone. Rendition could be construed to be a subsequent war crime.

It is also illegal to put a price on the eney's head or call for their open assassination. These policies incite civlians to take up arms, and give up their civilian protections.

DOJ OLC legal counsel have a mess to clean up: The other unlawful war crimes the US government has not timely ended.

This is an US Embassy assessment of one key Icelandic leaders, Albert Jonsson {pronounced: YOHN-sohn}:

Assessment [4 of 6]: "For instance, he [Jonsson] protested privately when explanations of alleged use of Icelandic airspace by CIA-operated planes were three weeks late in arriving and, in his view, inadequate, but he worked with US diplomats to downplay the issue publicly."

Icelandic officials were, in part, concerned that the overflights might implicate their treaty obligations as a NATO ally to investigate allegations connected with torture.

The Icelandic Government questions to the US on these overflights are curious: Normally, the US develops a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with a local government, especially for a NATO ally, see 4 of 30 participating in Afghanistan. However, the CIA overflights generated additional questions outside what the MOU should have resolved.

This disclosure in the US Embassy Assessment is of interest to war crimes prosecutors. Despite DOJ argument in Federal Court that rendition could not be litigated, rendition is not absolutely immune to litigation, examination, FOIA, or other review. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a failure to deny can be admissible as an exception to the rules of evidence involving hearsay.

The disclosure opens the door to additional FOIAs. Despite protections granted for diplomatic communications, this US embassy assessment of Icelandic official mentions rendition. This disclosure could fall outside protections afforded to diplomatic communications because it is an 'inadvertent disclosure exception.'

Part I: Analysis

Veracity of Claims Related to Rendition

The Icelandic official's investigation shows there were substantive allegations related to rendition, which demanded an explanation; however, the CIA did not timely or adequately provide responses to a NATO ally.

The untimely responses indicate a lack of interest in the United States to develop, document, or possibly safeguard other lines of evidence: Communications, research notes, and additional staff time sheets connected with a real legal issue - Alleged unlawful rendition, prisoner abuse, and torture enforceable through not only the Convention Against Torture (CAT) but also the Geneva obligations of the US as a detaining power.  

This reluctance relates to limiting comments about government operations that can be monitored. Rather, if there was nothing to the issue, a simple response should have resolved the question and ended the anticipated staffing requirement at CIA HQ to respond to the questions about rendition.

These issues, if connected with illegal activity, can fall outside all protections normally afforded to attorney-client communications, especially when counsel knows or should know the legal advice was used to intimidate witnesses, or circumvent US government treaty obligations.

Disclosed Inconsistent Public, Private Actions

Tellingly, the public actions are inconsistent with the private communications. The Icelandic official publicly downplayed something they privately protested: The CIA used Icelandic airspace without adequate governmental coordination. 

Normally, one does not privately protest something unless there is a substantial issue, especially when there is a public effort to downplay what was privately raised.  This inconsistency suggests the rendition details connecting the CIA with Iceland are more likely true than not. This does not mean that the issue - or the allegation - is true, only that there is a credible allegation requiring (a) government investigation, (b) a response from the other nation, and (c) a resolution. 

This investigation burden fell on Iceland, and Jonsson questioned whether the US responses were adequate to the Icelandic obligation to Iceland.

Public Official Competence, Duties

Indeed, if it had been disclosed that there was "no issue," but Jonsson had earlier "protested privately" it would raise questions about his suitability as a diplomat. However, Jonsson is not unfamiliar with Icelandic-US diplomatic and national security requirements:

Assessment: "Likable, smart, and tenacious, Albert Jonsson has been Iceland's top unelected foreign policy maker for nearly 15 years thanks to his close personal and professional relationship with political heavyweight David Oddsson."

There were allegations that the CIA operating planes in Icelandic airspace. If there was no problem, it doesn't make sense that:

1. Time: The explanations were late. If the issue was genuinely absurd, there would be no response, no question about a late response, no concern for the quality of the response, and no original formal, private request for information. This suggests the situation was real, serious, and surprising between NATO allies.
2. Concern: Jonsson was concerned about late explanations.  Despite the untimely response, Johnsson should not have been concerned about late answers to something that was unlikely to be true.  Rather, Jonsson's concern shows he had enough information to know (a) this was a substantive situation; and (b) it was reasonable to expect a timely response.
3. Information: Jonsson concluded the American explanations were inadequate. If there was no substance to the allegations or unreasonable questions about rendition, Jonsson wouldn't have enough information to know that the responses were or were not inadequate. This suggests Jonsson had enough information to know that the situation was real, and that the responses were inadequate.
   

Part II: Legal Documents Subject to Discovery

The Icelandic official worked openly with the US to downplay an issue because there was substance to the allegations; and that issue was a matter of public comment or interest.

Public Disclosure of Multi-Government Communications

Diplomatic communications are privileged from disclosure. People attempting to gather information cannot easily ask for - nor receive - sensitive diplomatic assessments.

However, things change when those documents become public. Once disclosed they are not absolutely immune to examination and could fall under one of the exceptions related to inadvertent disclosures.

Although the CIA will likely invoke the FOIA exception related to national security and diplomatic communications, it cannot be argued that the information - now disclosed - is absolutely privileged. Rather, once disclosed, that information is subject to public comment, interest, and examination.

Rendition: Possible War Crimes Investigation of US Govt Officials

International tribunals or investigators examining rendition could introduce this information as evidence the US government failed to timely deny an important legal issue.

It remains unclear whether US-Icelandic government communications related to these questions on rendition - and the failure to deny the allegations - could be admissible before an international tribunal.

FOIA

It was not expected that the information would be disclosed. However, regardless how it was disclosed, the information without the summary - including the references to the CIA operation - could support subsequent FOIA requests.

The public has an interest to review (1) the information connected with this disclosed CIA response to Iceland; (2) the related CIA message traffic connected with rendition; (3) the records related to the attached CIA logistics support offices in Europe; and (4) other CIA internal memos and communications related to responding to this Icelandic request for information.

The content of the internal CIA discussions - when preparing the response to Iceland - may be protected under the diplomatic communication. However, some information that could be subject to FOIA could include the email headers of CIA staff emails generated to respond to the Icelandic government concern.

Conclusions

Rendition

The United States CIA conducted extensive air operations involving Icelandic airspace. When the Icelandic government learned of this operation and its possible connection with rendition, they realized they had not been timely provided details. They requested, but did not timely receive, adequate information from the United States.

Witness Intimidation, Poor Information Protection

Government officials have an obligation to protect information. Once that information is disclosed, it is reckless for government officials, contractors, or security personnel to change the question from "information protection" to whether third parties have received information that should have been protected.

The US government's legal strategy is to shift attention from (a) whether someone has or hasn't suppressed evidence of American government criminal activity; to (b) whether the disclosure of (improper) activity was authorized.

There could be an organized effort within the US government to intimidate American citizens to keep quiet about unlawful activity connected with rendition. It's unclear whether this witness intimidation is a deliberate strategy or could be proven. Additional FOIA requests could shed light on these witness intimidation allegations.

Evidence Discovery

Two different legal questions arise: First, whether rendition can be subject to legal review; and whether the information connected with that activity can be admissible to court. Once documents are inadvertently disclosed, prosecutors and plaintiffs might have a stronger legal foundation to make a credible claim in court.

The disclosed failure to deny is important. There was no obvious action related to a complete denial. The United States, rather than denying the allegations, provided an inadequate explanation. Also, the Icelandic government official was concerned enough to follow-up with the request, privately agreeing to publicly downplay - not deny - an allegation.

The timing and substance of the communications contradicts claims that the issue has no substance. Rather, the delayed US response was incomplete because the original allegation had merit, required a US response, and the US failed to timely or completely deny the substance of the allegations. 

The inadvertent disclosure opens the door to additional discovery. The Icelandic official knew the substance of the allegation had merit; and outweighed the form, timing, and details of the explanation or response. US officials, when they responded, knew the issue was real and required an explanation, not a denial, and delayed the incomplete response.

Further Weakens DOJ OLC State Secrets Claims

The disclosures undermine DOJ OLC legal positions before civil courts to shield some state secrets connected with rendition.  DOJ OLC cannot reasonably expect the court to shield rendition-connected information once that information is publicly available.

The disclosed interaction between US personnel and officials from a foreign power creates a legal door for prosecutors to examine documents connected with the alleged illegal rendition activity.

The content within this TPM blog provides TPM readers with some information about how a specific email can be useful in auditing FBI compliance {see: FBI Manual of Administrative Operations and Procedure (MAOP); and FBI Manual of Investigative Operations and Guidelines (MIOG)}.

Ref: See 2 of 22: 07-cv-00656 --- OIG-Improper Use -PA-NSL- Part 8 --- Section 2 (849734).pdf [PDF, 400.90 KB]

However, the redaction incorrectly included specific words from the email. Note that the "contents" of the email includes - but has not redacted - the introductory words. The entire email should have been redacted, but was not. Some of the important content in the "sent email" is included within the public disclosure.

Email Disclosure Errors Useful for Forensic Analysis

The following text-disclosures (2 of 22, record 315 N) point to specific content within an email sent between DOJ resources, and are housed within JCON.

1: "To download the message on this link"

2: "And"

3: "Enjoy"

Translated Text 

As an option, DOJ OPR and IG can search through JCON to find this searchable text, which is the text-translation of the above content from the redacted email:

Tn HnwnlnaH t"h<= mpssanp rrn fini a 1 ini? 

Inadvertent Disclosure: FBI Agent Disclosures about Methods

The memo also discloses the FBI agent ("SA" or "special agent") used a "secure computer and network". The FBI has implicitly disclosed its method, which can be useful in studying the truthfulness of statements to DOJ IG and OPR:

A. The agent clicked on the link in the email using a secure computer;

B.  The FBI agent did not review the link before clicking on it;

C. There was no external review or audit of the link before visiting the site; and

D. The external site should have a record on a specific date and time that a finite number of DOJ-connected personnel used the FBI resources to connect to an external link;

The FBI agent has created a problem for himself: They've provided specific content - in a now public document - providing the information for DOJ OPR or IG to trace the FBI agent's actions; and compare the externally-controlled information to that provided to supervisory agents, intelligence oversight, or DOJ IG.

Researchers can trace the email within the Justice records (JCON) using the disclosed words and find the links; then contact that site to verify the FBI agent did, in fact, use a secure connection on the date provided.

Of interest and another fatal disclosure contrary to their interests is the following information, identifying when the FBI agent supposedly did something:

December 5. 2005 at 12:27pm

That the email states there were two links, making the job of DOJ IG easier: They need only compare the IP-hit-logs for the two different sites; and look for an overlapping pattern of IP-hits.

If true, then the IP log at both (2) external sites should include that information:

A. The date-time the IP clocked from the email into that website; and

B. Subsequent visits to that link by others near the time that the original link was clicked.

Evidence of Two External Links Connected with the FBI Agent

The email states that the FBI agents received an email with "two links" and later states that the agent accessed "both of the above listed sites".

Of interest will be whether the FBI agent clicked on the link from a non-official IP address; and whether the website connection log shows other links around the time the FBI agent would have forwarded the email to others; or provided information to DOJ OPR on the "error".

DOJ OPR has enough information within this email to audit whether the FBI agents timely acted; and who else was involved with the review of the website before the DOJ OPR and Intelligence Oversight Board were involved.

The above is important because if the IP numbers do not match the secure system; or the FBI agent(s) used other messaging systems to access the website, then DOJ IG should be able to publicly discuss how they audited the non-official-equipment FBI agents were using to access the secure FBI systems.

Quon has bearing on the administrative review of law enforcement emails [emphasis modified from orignal case]:

Supreme Court: A "reasonable employee would be aware that sound management principles might require the audit of messages to determine whether the pager was being appropriately used."

The above email shows there has been questionable conduct; that conduct was reviewed. However, what we don't know is how the DOJ IG or OPR review would, in light of the above analysis, expand reQuon. 

The disclosed report containing the impartially redacted email focuses on the use of the FBI agent's equipment. We don't have specific information on how others within the Bureau or at Justice accessed the site.

Questions:

A. Did the FBI agent(s) use non-authorized equipment to access the secure website; 

B. Were personal pagers or personal communication equipment  used in any capacity to review any of the information sent from the FBI agent to any other person involved with the DOJ review of the access to the website?

Potentially, DOJ IG and OPR may have already discovered personal emails, and stumbled upon important information which the public should know about: 

1. While the FBI agents in 2005 were supposedly "too busy" to secure warrants, did they have enough time to use non-official communication systems to participate in non-official business while at work
2. To what extent has the Congress and public been mislead about the "nature of the threat" - and the supposed time required to monitor that threat using unlawful methods in violation of FISA: but FBI agents, in fact, had time to engage in non-official business during duty hours because they were not as busy as the public and Congress have led to believe
3. To what extent has the FBI and others at Justice hidden behind a veil of secrecy to mask their real objective in securing national security warrants: To keep information from the courts on patterns of FBI agent misconduct or procedural non-compliance because they are recklessly ignoring reasonable standards of conduct during wartime;
4. To what extent do the above procedural violations relate to reckless US governance in Afghanistan and Iraq; and undermine confidence in FBI-connected criminal investigations related to violations of the laws of war;
5. What other "inappropriate personal information" did DOJ IG or OPR stumble upon during this investigation into NSLs when reviewing emails sent to or from FBI agents?

Records

The agent's conduct was subject to an investigation. TPM readers are encouraged to note on page 9 of 22, the following, pointing to other FBI records that are presumably contained within JCON, and also sent via email:

(U) The FBI is required to maintain for three years records of administrative violations, for possible review by the Counsel to the IOB, together with a copy of the opinion concerning the basis for the determination that IOB notification was not required.

Analysis

The publicly-disclosed information about an FBI agent's conduct has disclosed important information about an email sent to the FBI. The information disclosed is admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence because it is an "inadvertent disclosure".

Even through we're well passed the three (3) year window for the FBI to maintain the record, the issue is the retention of FBI records outside exclusive FBI control.  Even if the FBI has destroyed the email records and the JCON records are gone, the attention turns to whether DOJ IG and OPR:

1. Adequately reviewed the content of the above email when making their conclusions about the FBI's compliance with IOB notification procedures;
2. Independently used the IP-connected information when reviewing the FBI's procedural compliance assertions. 

The public, DOJ IG, and other interested researches can use the disclosed-text as part of a subsequent FOIA; and gather information about other DOJ personnel who received, reviewed, or commented on this email.

DOJ IG has the legal authority to issue a subpoena to the external site related to the alleged misconduct of the FBI agent. DOJ IG could ask for all identifying information connected with the FBI agent's conduct, to include:

A. The time the site registered a hit from a DOJ-connected IP

B. The content also reviewed on the external site

C. Other IP numbers related to looking at specific content

D. The timing of other visits in relation to the first visit.

The above information can be compared to the previous disclosures the FBI agent provided to the intelligence oversight board, SAC, DOJ IG, DOJ OPR, or other investigating officials at Justice.

Conclusion

The email disclosure is one example of how publicly available information can be used to understand the FBI compliance with the procedures they are required to follow.

If the FBI agents are not willing to fully comply with their legal requirements, it should not be confusing to American leadership why some Americans question the rigidity and utility of rules non-applicable to DOJ personnel.

Conversely, if FBI agents are allowed to proceed during a national security investigation without full regard to their legal obligations, they should not be confused why American citizens object to being held to a compliance standard the Department of Justice will not hold their own.

It is confusing why, during supposed national security investigations, some rules are rigidly enforced against American citizens when NSLs are issued to examine their credit reports, email records, or other documentation; yet, those charged with conducting investigations are not held to the same compliance standard arbitrarily applied to the investigation target.

"There are, in my mind, dozens of U.S. persons who are in different parts of the world, and they are very concerning to us," Brennan stated, "not just because of the passport they hold, but because they understand our operational environment here, they bring with them certain skills, whether it be language skills or familiarity with potential targets, and they are very worrisome, and we are determined to take away their ability to assist with terrorist attacks,"

Philosophical Questions for TPM Debate

Why is it wrong for a passenger to continue to discuss information TSA workers have openly disclosed to the passenger standing in line?

Why aren't TSA workers advised against agreeing to participate in security-related conversations?

Why are there not timely punishments against TSA-connected employees, security personnel, or intelligence officers who fail to timely report information?

Why aren't DHS personnel dismissing the claims related to untimely reports; or situations where DHS personnel have not timely acted on a supposed "security concern"?

How easy is it for someone -- on the back of a false accusation by a DHS-connected contractor -- to be placed on a DHS watch list or a US government assassination list?

"If an American person or citizen is in a Yemen or in a Pakistan or in Somalia or another place, and they are trying to carry out attacks against U.S. interests, they also will face the full brunt of a U.S. response," Brennan continued. "What we need to do is to apply the appropriate tool and the appropriate response."

Sample Reforms for TPM Readers to Debate

That the accusation's source -- or original accuser -- is adequately screened to review whether they have a personal motivation to provide false information;

That the investigations into Americans supposedly "familiar" or possessing "specialized" knowledge be carefully examined:

1. Did the American citizen demonstrate an imminent intention to apply non-public information in a hostile manner;

2. Is the information that is "sensitive" really non-public;

3. Is the "skill" really one that is novel, or could anyone speak in a certain way to create the impression they have a specialized skill; and

4. Is there a real intention to apply real skills adversely against the United States;

5. Is there public information showing that the US government will take adverse action against government contractors, security personnel or law enforcement for providing false information to the intelligence databases?

US, state, and local officials, contractors, and security personnel do use the convenient excuse of "possibly" related to terrorism to conduct expansive interviews against American citizens, but those accused have no reasonable connection with terrorism, nor an imminent intention to apply that information or skill against the United States.

Using the current public information about this supposed "assassination" list, anyone indirectly connected with any "possible" sensitive infomration might be subject to increased scrutiny. If that is the case, then why is that same attention not placed on the primary holders of that information; and why are there no primary efforts on reviewing whether the US government personnel have inappropriately disclosed information?

PART II: Assassination Legal Issues re Geneva

One legal issue is the illegality of assassination, a breach of the laws of war. American military, intelligence, and other security personnel - in light of the abuses after 9-11, and the public discussions of Geneva-related crimes - should reasonably have notice that assassination could be construed as a war crime.

Inconsistencies related to Rendition

We need to know why the United States government, in the wake of arguing for rendition, is doing the opposite: Not seizing the Americans allegedly linked with actions "warranting their assassination,"; but using deadly force that intelligence and security personnel know or should know breach Geneva.

The public needs to understand why, in the wake of the "concern about abuses at Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib," that the US government will not bring these "identified" Americans to court, but would consider assassinating them.

The public has an interest in knowing what issues, concerns, or outrage is driving a specific class of identified Americans to supposedly take up arms, go overseas, plan violence, but the US government - despite this "knowledge" - can't seem to find them to render them, but can find them to assassinate them.

Unlawful Methods, Justification to Circumvent Needed Judicial Review During Wartime

You can be sure that any DOJ staff attorney accused of improper conduct would demand a judicial hearing. However, once the accusations shift from DOJ to American citizens, the memos no longer focus on judicial review but justifying deadly force.

DOJ Staff counsel have the burden to prove that the targeted American was engaged in imminent hostilities; that the violation of Geneva was required; and that there was no other option to peacefully resolve the issue; and that there was sufficient evience linking that American with specific, non-speculative acts of violence.

However, if DOJ OLC is going to go to those measures to prove to themselves that the use of force was justified, why not provide this information to the public and court during a judicial review?

What is the fear of brining these Americans before a Judicial tribunal: Is there some legitimate concern the US government has to use unlawful force inside a combat zone against one of their own; will refuse to render or rely on the judicial system; but would vaguely suggest that Americans "because of their knowledge" could be of concern.

Oversight Needed: The Lessons of NSLs Applied to Assassination Reviews

The NSL process has proven abysmal. The FOIAs responses show the FBI agents abused these.  

Given the brazen - arguably planned - war crimes related to assassinating American citizens, we need not look further that the NSL or FISA process to understand the real issue: This is another Executive-level decision - with Legislative consent - to bypass the courts during wartime despite the precedent of Youngstown demonstrating the opposite: That even the President during wartime is not above the law.

By extension, with the reckless approach to NSL oversight, the public should have every reasonable assurance that there are adequate safeguards and oversight within Congress and the Executive branch.

Any delegation of authority to any Executive to direct, authorize, or cooperate with any plan, ruse, device, or scheme to assassinate American citizens must be subject to judicial review, especially during wartime.

Congress has no sound legal principle or lawful authority to blindly defer to the President decision on this program to target American citizens for assassination. Nor can Congress be obliged to the other branch. 

Leaders have the difficult responsibility to act, not hide their head in the sand. The oath of office was written and designed to bind Members of Congress to investigate and Confront the President through legislative inquiry.

DOJ OLC Memos

Likely, DOJ OLC would have opined on the "legality or illegality of assassinating American citizens" and "Presidential Authority to assassination American citizens suspected of planning attacks on American citizens, property, or interests abroad."

We encourage TPM readers to press DOJ OLC through the FOIA process for these DOJ OLC memos.

Non-American Evidence Sources

Also, consider the likely intelligence available through non-American sources on these planned, considered, or contemplated breaches of Geneva.   Here is one sample of UK-connected intelligence showing the United States government did engaged in abuse against detained prisoners.

We encourage TPM readers to seek foreign sources of evidence of the planned assassinations, the planning, or operational plans related to using deadly force against specific civilians.

At issue is whether the US government - outside a court - can develop the evidence to prove that the targeted American citizen was linked with sufficient evidence for the President to conclude that assassination of that civilian was required.

Legal Challenges Confronting US Government Over Assassination of American Citizens

Legal scholars, FOIA requestors, and TPM readers are encouraged to discuss the following issues:

1. Why, despite the "lessons" of Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo, and Bagram (ICAO: OAIX), are US government officials openly discussing the "benefit" of committing war crimes through assassination?

2. Where are the DOJ OLC memos related to this activity?

3. What judicial review of this planning, legal opinion, and other discussions will be made in light of Nuremberg Precedents (Alstoetter) which found Judicial Officers could be prosecuted for refusing to enforce Geneva?

4. Why is the US government reluctant to "render" American citizens; is there something that makes "rending foreigners" more appealing; and that it is "easier" to assassinate American citizens rather than bring them before judicial review?

5. What flaws exist within the Judicial system that makes judicial review of a Presidential program to assassinate American citizens above comparison to Youngstown; and what is the plan of DOJ OPR to review these legal perception problems within DOJ OLC?

6. Where are the Executive-Legislative memos on this topic; and when do Congressional staff counsel plan to disclose to the public this evidence of alleged war crimes planning and cooperation between the Congress and Executive?

Conclusion

It's too easy to make a broad assertion about what American citizens "might" be doing. It is especially alarming to learn that American citizens can be accused of possibly being connected with terrorism based on their skills.

It is not acceptable that American citizens can be quickly -- and falsely -- accused of "possibly" connected with "possible" terrorism planning. It is more disturbing that those making the accusations often have superior information, but have successfully deflected attention from their misconduct to a scapegoat.

It is shameful for the US government this easily and quickly based on spurious information to quickly target any American. Until that American citizen is subject to "appropriate" responses, we need to understand the other unknown or unreported measures short of assassination.

With this much power and authority to make accusations and place any American on an "assassination" list, we should reasonably expect there to be adequate restraints on the use and misuse of that power. Until there is an adequate oversight mechanism in place, the US government after 9-11 has well demonstrated it will kill first, and cover up the inconvenient questions and answers later.

What a shameful legacy of the Founders. In the wake of that non-speculative legacy of abuse, American citizens and leaders should not be surprised why foreign fighters take up arms against an occupying Army.