[In which our fearless correspondent tries to explain why a financial crisis occurred in 2007-8 and what we might do to prevent things like this happening again (if we want to). Also, a few thoughts on why we might not want to prevent things like this from happening again, and why that's an important part of the story.]
1. Incentives
New Nobel winner Paul Krugman gets a nod (I took a look at what he'd been doing lately since I had little idea and he'd just won the Nobel Prize for it) for
this. (Pages 3-4 is the part I think I understand). It's a neat way of explaining how accounting regulations encourage institutions with a lot of debt to keep risky assets on their balance sheets (and how if those assets depreciate, the margin-call selloff reduces both quantity demanded and, effectively, net demand for the assets themselves (the institutions losing equity now would demand less at -any given price-).
The point is, this sort of incentive existed at every level of the market. Where there wasn't enough incentive already, through home mortgage interest deductions, government sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae, and low interest rates, the government provided all kinds of encouragement to borrowers to borrow more and lenders to lend more. The Community Reinvestment Act (originally a civil rights anti-redlining law) was amended in the 90's to essentially require some subprime lending by FDIC-regulated entities.
Of course, the cheerleading for subprime mortgages among Congressmen ended with the boom in residential housing. Barney Frank and others were shocked (Shocked!) to discover that gambling was going on.
2. Gambling
Because it was. Everybody who was so shocked in Senate hearings to hear that Lehman was leveraged 30 to 1 had been eagerly legislating to encourage citizens without any knowledge of the markets at all to adopt nearly infinite leverage without any diversification. (Zero down, negative amortization).
Now, I'm not crusading against leverage or speculation. Both are perfectly reasonable activities in a healthy market.
Housing wasn't a healthy market though; it was a market high on an ever expanding cocktail of performance enhancing policies. And once the market price internalized all of them, growth slowed unless something else was added. And God help us if one of these things got taken away:
1. Home mortgage interest deduction.
2. Low interest rates.
3. Accounting regulations encouraging leveraged financial institutions to hold structured financial instruments derived from an ever expanding base of mortgages (inducing the institutions to offer attractive terms to mortgage originators).
4. Lax borrowing standards.
5. Progressively looser repayment terms.
6. Continual financing of the U.S. deficit on current account by foreign central banks and sovereign wealth funds.
7. The implicit government guarantee to the GSE's (Fannie and Freddie) debt, reducing their borrowing costs and rates on certain mortgages, by extension.
8. Substantial speculative demand (as opposed to speculative activity - this means an effectively permanent stock held -off- the market) for housing stock by professionals in the United States.
9. Sufficiently positive economic growth to avoid substantial job losses and deterioration in the creditworthiness of borrowers.
I give this nonexhaustive list not to suggest that we should have seen this coming (many did), but to show just how complicit all the players had to be, from Congress to Lehman to Countrywide to Joe Six Pack. They all got something for nothing on the condition that they kept fiddling while Rome burned. So for several years, they madly fiddled away.
Note that 4, 5, 8, and 9 have -all- gone the way of the dodo. Number 6 is at least potentially on the endangered species list, although the numbers aren't clear yet.
3. Ponzi Finance
A banking professor used to explain financial cycles as follows. Businesses start out borrowing money to do things, and make money. As times get tougher, they start borrowing to roll over debt. This is fine, it's sometimes necessary to delay repayment even in a healthy business. Then they start borrowing to pay interest on the debt. That's bad, and an indication that there's a crash coming, because debt starts to grow exponentially. He referred to the last stage as "Ponzi Finance".
Getting rid of all that debt can be done in two ways.
First, people go bust, lenders aren't paid, shops empty out and unemployment lines form. Very ugly, but also temporary.
Second, people get protected, lenders keep loans on their books, businesses stay running, and excess cash is used to slowly pay down the debt (or at least service it). This is not as ugly, but it can last forever.
The first situation is the United States in 1981-1982. Very nasty recession, followed by, ahem, morning in America.
The second situation is Japan in 1990-2008.
It is probably obvious by now where I'm going with this; you can make a decent case that from a policymaking point of view with a time horizon of more than "the next news cycle", a recession isn't a bad thing. Not that anyone in Washington now has a time horizon any longer than that. Even supposedly clear eyed "policy" people, like Paulson and Bernanke, seem infatuated with day to day fluctuations in markets.
4. The Case Against Alan Greenspan
It has become ordinary in the past few years in certain circles to blame the Federal Reserve for a lot of the problems we're currently having (or -were- having, when we were having different problems).
The case goes like this:
The Federal Reserve, since 1987, has engaged in a massive money printing operation, keeping short term interest rates low in order to stimulate borrowing with the goal of [Keeping Republicans in power/inflating away entitlement benefits/weakening the dollar/generating debt to sell to China to support the dollar/No, really, I did just mention two precisely opposite justifications/just google "FED AND CONSPIRACY" already].
Interest rates have remained at historic lows for the entire period since 1987, causing investment in progressively less justified enterprises and encouraging speculation and leverage rather than profitable investment. Low interest rates also caused the bubble in housing prices.
Since the housing boom ended in 2007, the Federal Reserve has attempted to use its old medicine on a progressively more massive scale, continuing to expand money in order to prop up the house of cards it created.
Given how I started this section, presumably it is obvious that that's all nonsense.
First of all, the statement underlying the whole concept doesn't happen to be true. Rates controlled by the FRB have been low relative to the high-inflation period from 1970-1987, but are comparable with the previous era of low inflation midcentury.
Fed Funds Rate :
Inflation
Second, as I belabored the last time I bored everyone with a really long description of something, a bubble in housing can't be created by low interest rates. Low interest rates just inflate asset values generally (if money is cheaper, people will spend more of it). They don't, and can't, cause overinvestment in any particular industry/asset class.
5. Change We Can Believe In
Oddly enough, for all the "mistakes" made by the Federal Reserve and the Treasury in the last year, they've both basically done the right thing. The Fed has expanded its balance sheet, replacing private leverage with cash money to prevent a damaging and potentially depression-inducing deflation. The Treasury has lopped some heads and twisted some arms, and thrown public money at the problem when it felt it had to. One can quibble (goodness knows I have) with the process or the individual choices made, but that isn't the point.
Good policy isn't being right, that's too much to ask of a democratic system; it's not being so disastrously wrong you ruin it for everybody.
Blaming "derivatives" or "financial innovation" swings from the wrong end of the bat. Good regulation doesn't foreclose innovation; good regulation -includes- it. The failure of regulation isn't the existence of $40 Trillion in notional credit default swaps. The failure of regulation is the fear that made them hard to trade. Regulation of financial markets should be about counterparty risk. People shouldn't fear intermediaries, but they -should- fear the parties they're ultimately investing in. That's what investment is.
Giving counterparties (folks involved in a Lehman Bros.-written tri-party repo or CDS contract) and trustors (people investing in Lehman custodial accounts) of financial intermediaries first claim in the BK of an intermediary would be a start. Limiting their leverage is probably worth the effort, as would be limiting the trading they do on their own account. They can always start a hedge fund for that.
The financial sector in the United States has been a growth industry for some time, and there's nothing wrong with that. If our business is being the world's MBA's and accountants, well, it's a living. And the dollar's continuing, if shakier, status as the world's reserve currency gives American firms a certain competitive advantage (as do relatively open financial markets). Still, the problem of regulation remains.
The point of this post is that regulation is usually thought about all wrong. Regulation isn't supposed to prevent banks from failing. Regulation should prevent bank failures from being disastrous. Regulation shouldn't limit what products are offered; new ideas are always good (even if they fail, and even if they put the person who had them out of business). And regulation should always be as limited (and simple) as possible... unintended consequences like encouraging Lehman to hold risky assets are always out there to snare the unwary.
Preface: This post was started as a comment made on another blog. At Orlando's suggestion (with a cosign from Miguel and TheraP) I am making it into it's own post. For those of you are unaware of my journey of enlightenment here at TPM, please read an earlier post of mine that may help in your determination of how much credence to give my thoughts.
I absolutely do not understand the brouhaha over Rick Warren giving the invocation at the inauguration.
This is not a slap in the face to anyone, and those who think it is would be well served to adjust their attitudes.
We are all Americans. Obama has said over and over that he wanted to be the President for all of the people of the United States, not the President of the Democratic Party. The Christians in this country are not going to go away, nor is the gay and Lesbian population, but attitudes on both sides can be changed. If this is not true, then we might as well give up now, we're screwed.
What is the point of going to all the trouble to elect a man who gives us such hope that this can be a different country, if all you really wanted was someone who was going to keep the polarization going, just from the left this time?
Somehow, some way, we have to come to a place where we start building some trust between the factions. If Obama can't do it, it can't be done. But we have to give him time to do it, in HIS way. We elected him to be him, not someone else. If people thought he was pretending to be someone he isn't to get elected, they are going to be disappointed.
Attitudes don't change overnight. As people get to know one another, fear dissipates. We've made a lot of progress in race relations. Obama is trying to introduce people to each other. He is attempting to show that people from different persuasions, different walks of life, different attitudes, can come together, work together, begin to have empathy for each other. They may never completely embrace each other, but they can come to a place where they can peacefully co-exist.
Some Christians say they will NEVER accept the normalization of gay practices. Well, not too long ago the Mormon Church did not allow blacks to hold the Priesthood. They do now. As more thinking Christians accept the idea that people don't CHOSE to be gay, hearts will soften.
I can see it already. My niece, a very conservative Christian, saw Obama speak at the Aids Forum at Saddleback Church, Rick Warren's church. She was so impressed with him that she not only voted for him, but changed affiliation, became a precinct captain and did everything she could to get him elected. She got past her feelings about gays and abortion to do it. I'm sure there are many others who did the same thing.
Orlando said (in a post at dagblog):
I agree whole-heartedly.
As far as Christian leaders go, Rick Warren is not such a bad guy. I would submit that he is doing a lot of soul searching during this process. I believe he is basically a man of honor who is doing the best he can to reconcile his religion and his understanding of the world, as I am.
He has made a gazillion dollars with his 40 days of Purpose/Purpose Driven Life books and accompanying materials. He promptly used some of that money to pay back the church he founded every penny of the money they ever paid him in salary and donates 90% of the proceeds in charitable works.It would not surprise me a bit if Obama is attempting to get him to soften his stance a bit in hopes that a new dialog will emerge between the people who listen to what he says and the gay community.
But every single time people from either side refuse to budge, refuse to try to see the other side's point of view, refuse to try to find some common ground on which to begin to repair the damage, we get further from the time when we can put all this ugliness behind us.
Give him a chance to make this work. Trust him. I believe he has a plan, a big picture. Let him unfold it. Quit 2nd guessing every move he makes. Quit keeping score. Be patient. We can do this.