The much discussed bailout may be passed tomorrow.  The bailout "debate" has been too short and too shallow.  As a result, I have more fears than hopes for the success of the bailout.
Fear No. 1 Weapons of Mass Destruction.  The actual problem has not been sufficiently identified.  Apparently the credit markets are beginning to dry up.  Consumers continue to receive credit card solicitations, but the commercial paper market reportedly has contracted.  
The cause, according to the Bush administration, is too many mortgages are in default.  The mortgage defaults have caused other financial instruments vaguely identified as "derivatives" to decline in value.  Apparently Paulson intends to spend $700 billion to purchase such "derivatives".  But not one news story I have seen accurately identifies the "derivatives" to be purchased, the identity of the issuer of such "derivatives" the financial institutions holding such "derivates" or the number and value of such "derivatives" held by each financial institution.  
Congress is about to appropriate $700 billion to purchase securities that it cannot identify any more accurately than the weapons of mass destruction it authorized a war to find.
The so-called debate on the Paulson has never gotten beyond an exchange of metaphors.  Surely we can hope that our Congress can shed more light on the greatest financial crisis of our time.
Fear No. 2  The purpose of the bailout is to conceal a massive securities fraud.  The bailout plan is so vague as to the relationship between the underlying mortgage pools and the "derivatives" that the vagueness surely is intentional.  The first question that I ask is whether all or some the financial institutions that issued the "derivatives" effectively sold the underlying mortgages many times over.  If the issuers did that, then fraud is almost surely involved. And both the administration and Congress owe the taxpayers a candid explanation of why they find it necessary and appropriate to spend $700 billion to conceal fraud.  
If the "derivatives" to purchased are nothing more than fraudulently issued securities, the "derivatives" are almost surely worthless and we taxpayers have no hope of getting our $700 billion back.  We need to know that before Congress appropriates the money.
Moreover, if the "derivatives" are nothing more than fraudulently issued securities, the Bush administration and Congress probably do not know the actual scope of the fraud and just how much money will be needed to buy up fraudulently issued derivatives.
The fact that none of the issuers of the "derivatives" to be purchased has appeared before Congress to testify under oath to catalog and explain the "derivatives" raises suspicion that the "derivatives" have been fraudulently issued.
Fear No. 3  The Bush administration does not understand the crisis well enough to formulate and implement a solution.  This crisis seems to be overwhelming the Bush administration.  Paulson has engaged in a wide range of bailouts and interventions that seem to be symptoms of an underlying problem.  Paulson's bailouts and interventions appear to have been ineffective.  The Bush administration either will not or cannot define the underlying problem and take appropriate steps to address it.  I have the impression that Bush is merely hoping to throw enough money at the crisis to keep the crisis at bay for the remainder of his term.John McCain's statement in last night's that the bailout "is not beginning of the end, but the end of the beginning" of the crisis speaks volumes.  
When the next President takes office,  Bush can then say, "I didn't let the crisis blowup on my watch."  
Despite the apparent problems, Congress has not called upon representative of the financial industry to testify as to the scope and cause of the crisis.
$700 billion is too much to pay if we cannot be reasonably sure that the administration understands the problem and has formulated an effective solution.