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thoughts on Georgia-Russia conflict
The US agreement with Poland on missile interceptors that Rice is going to sign seems particularly ill-timed. It accomplishes the worst of both worlds--it is clearly a provocation to the Russians. But it does nothing to address the current situation in the Caucasus.
If Russia, this time, withdraws from its current position, where will it stop?
Will troops remain in South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia? If so, what then from the US and from the West?
Over the weekend Bush has already, with his likely usual degree of effectiveness, told the Russians to get out of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. That seems to me the sort of public remark that probably was--and should not have been--offered without anything like the sort of careful, thought-through answers to the "what next" questions this Administration is notorious for not engaging in.
Georgia's actions in South Ossetia--and it pains me to say this as someone who knows and counts as friends quite a few Georgians as a result of our stay there last year--should cause a reconsideration of whether it is a good idea for NATO to let Georgia into the alliance in accordance with the current accession timelines.
Saakashvili is reckless. He is a hothead. In his passion for reclaiming Abhkazia and South Ossetia he is very much reflecting the passions of the people he represents. There is a good morsel of illusion that is tied up with Georgian national pride when it comes to Abkhazia.
I don't think it is just fine for Russia to take these territories by force. What leverage does the West have with Russia that it is prepared to use in the cause of getting the Russians out of Abkhazia and/or South Ossetia? So far it has been confronting tanks with words and we know how that can go. I have yet to see even an unrealistic, let alone a realistic, plan or even idea for how Georgia might be able to bring Abkhazia into its orbit, even as a semi-autonomous territory.
The Georgian government has no influence there over the day-to-day affairs of its people, and has not had any for many years now. The people living in Abkhazia now overwhelmingly do not want to become a part of the rest of Georgia. It is difficult to see why they would want to and how or why that might change any time soon. The real question is what degree of autonomy will the people living there now have vis-a-vis the Russians going forward, it seems to me.
South Ossetia is more complicated because of its far greater proximity to Tbilisi. The current locus of criminality, drug and terrorist transit in and through Ossetia--<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/16/opinion/16bronner.html?ex=1219550400&en=2200af2b236ff15b&ei=5070&emc=eta1">reported on by Michael Bronner in the August 15 NYT</a>--also needs to be factored into that situation.
To the extent the US and the West believe that Georgian accession to NATO would permit ultra-nationalist Georgian leaders like Saakasvhvili to try to use the West as part of its Abkhazia fantasy and South Ossetia aspirations, NATO should think long and hard before leaving itself susceptible to such a possibility.
Letting Georgia into NATO entails a defensive military commitment should the former be attacked. For those who have no pro-Russian or pro-Georgian bias it is exceedingly difficult in many of these border flareups with the Russians over the past 15 years to determine which side instigated many of these various attacks. Georgia, if part of NATO, can be expected to play up Russia's, and play down its own, responsibility for future border flareups, which strike me as likely, no matter where the Russian withdrawal stops.
Abkhazia is a distraction for Georgia now. It is effectively gone. It is very much in Georgia's interests for it to move on and focus on the many things it needs to do to continue building its society. The people I know who were in Georgia in the 1990s and were back last year say the country, for all its challenges and problems, has made enormous strides forward in many areas, in infrastructure improvements and much-reduced levels of governmental corruption, for example.
It's just as convenient for Georgian politicians to play the nationalist card vis-a-vis the Russians in Abkhazia as it is for politicians in any republic whose people are frustrated with the too-slow pace of positive change. That doesn't mean it serves Georgia well at this point. And certainly the West should not let itself get pulled into fighting that lost cause, or facilitating or enabling Georgian-initiated confrontation with the Russians.
As I said, South Ossetia is a different and, it seems to me, a more complicated matter for both the Georgians and the West.
UIAMS. Obviously the situation is highly fluid. As I write, there are early reports that Russia is beginning to withdraw, as it said it would do beginning today. We'll see.
Comments (9)
Ill-timed missile agreement or, perhaps, a well-timed foreign incursion by Russia?
August 18, 2008 1:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
I've heard all sorts of theories floating around about the timing of this situation.
I'm guessing you've heard speculation about Cheney and/or the McCain campaign dropping hints out to Saakashvili thru minions that now might not be a bad time to mix it up with the Russsians. Could raise the fear factor in the US and gives McCain another outlet for bellicosity that, in their view, might provide an opportunity to make some national security hay against Obama. And all without having to do anything beyond mouth some words.
McCain is Saakashvili's kinda guy (and vice versa)--full of fury and hyper-nationalistic fervor that translates easily into a knee-jerk militaristic reaction to just about any tense situation.
August 18, 2008 1:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
Russian troops were stationed in South Ossetia before hostilities broke out, and will remain there afterwards. The Ossetians do not have the numbers or equipment to hold their own against the Georgians.
This has been the status quo for the region for over a decade. I don't see how the US needs to react to this.
As someone else once said,
"think very seriously about making formal NATO promises to countries who can’t protect themselves and like to pick fights with Russia."
1.) The Ossetians like the Russians far more than the Georgians. If you want proof, I'll dig up some articles that I don't have handy at this moment.
2.) The Ossetians are incapable of defending themselves from Georgia.
3.) If you combine points 1.) and 2.), you can see that any Ossetian state will essentially be a Russian client. Is this bad? It's certainly no worse than the Ossetian's current situation.
The likely scenario is that South Ossetia will be incorporated into Russia's federal republic of North Ossetia/Alania. This violates Georgia's "border integrity," but you know what? Georgia never really had that territory in any real sense of the word.
Abkhazia will tomorrow turn into what South Ossetia was yesterday: namely they will maintain de facto independence, though still a formal Georgian territory, with the support of Russia peacekeepers (or "troops," depending on how much you dislike Russia).
August 18, 2008 4:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
Is that your blog you linked me to?
August 19, 2008 10:05 AM | Reply | Permalink
Supplementing with a few additional thoughts.
Analytically it seems to me there are two distinct aspects to Russia's military deployments which point in different directions in terms of a US, Western, and global (UN) response (and also help to explain the divergent responses that are being urged).
The first was the Russian incursion of additional troops into South Ossetia and Abkhazia in response to the Georgian attack in South Ossetia. The Georgian attack was reckless and does not deserve a sympathetic response from others.
The Russian decision to launch its incursion past South Ossetia and Abkhazia, by contrast, was unjustified on any reckoning and needed to be responded to firmly but without unnecessary provocation. The agreement with Poland, signed at this time, and McCain's assertion that Georgia should be admitted now to NATO--when the question of Georgian accession to NATO on the current timelines should be revisited--were both needlessly and unwisely provocative.
But I think there was yet a third way in which the Administration and/or McCain responses were needlessly provocative--and this will not be popular here.
In taking military action of any sort off the table, McCain also acted provocatively, at a time when it was unclear whether Russia was going to continue expanding its incursion farther into Georgia proper last weekend. This was not helpful in encouraging the Russians to engage in as full a withdrawal as may be forthcoming.
Nor should possible military action of any sort have been put on the table deliberately (as opposed to as a response to a media question) and explicitly--that also would have been unnecessarily provocative.
On this matter, silence would have been golden. Leave the Russians with some uncertainty on that point.
There are many complications with actually deploying NATO forces so we should certainly hope that it does not come to that. Most important would be a shared understanding on aims, notably how far to insist the Russians withdraw the additional forces?
Out of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is what Bush said? What then, if that does not appear to be in the offing? Count me as skeptical to say the least that Russia will withdraw the additional forces from the two territories in response to any combination of likely diplomatic, economic and other non-military sanctions when a military option has explicitly been taken off the table. The US cannot risk war with Russia over a Georgian agenda to regain effective control over the territories--at least we would be nuts to do so.
Or, more modestly but also controversially, would the aim of a NATO deployment be to get the Russians to pull their forces only out of Georgia proper (but not out of the two territories)? Likewise, if that is not forthcoming, what then?
It seems to me those would be the two coherent choices on aims.
With any defensive NATO deployment there would be a serious risk of Georgian or Russian irregulars attempting to provoke an expansion of the conflict and the stakes. Coming up with workable rules of engagement would be a huge challenge. The situation there seems more like a guerilla than a conventional war in the sense that it's difficult if not impossible to know which, among more than 2, sides many of the civilians are on.
August 21, 2008 11:01 AM | Reply | Permalink
Further thoughts in response to this update, on Russia recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia, among other developments.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/georgia;_ylt=Aot8URfWjNVo_u9qNGo0Quys0NUE
The utter lack of US leadership in response to this situation is what most strikes me. The West's "response" is incoherent. This is yet another example of Republican foreign policy ineptitude.
We have Bush and Rice criticizing the Russians' latest actions. Same with the Europeans. The implication is that the Russians will have to suffer consequences. What are those?
Now would be a good time for Rice and/or Bush himself to convey privately to the Russians that if they withdraw the additional troops to the breakaway territories the "consequences" the US will urge will be considerably milder than if they remain in Georgia proper.
That is the sensible line to draw, I believe. It would serve the Georgians right for losing further ground in the breakaway territories for playing fast and loose in South Ossetia. Their only strategy has been to try to get NATO and the West to take on that fight and that isn't something the West should do.
OTOH, permitting a continuing Russian troop presence in Georgia proper (the part of Georgia that the Georgian government actually has some say in governing at the moment) shows a lack of clarity and firmness on the part of the West in particular.
I tend to believe Russia's conduct in this recent case is more likely a one-off incident than any indication of a resurgence in Russian territorial expansion aims. But I think that a firm response and a clear signal from the West that continuing troop presence in Georgia proper is unacceptable can help increase the likelihood that that is the case.
By handling the matter privately instead of publicly this reduces the risk of an escalation dynamic that could make it difficult for one or both sides to enable their cooler heads to prevail.
Occupying part of Georgia proper represents an unwarranted and unjustified response to Georgian actions in South Ossetia. If there are no consequences to speak of, this could represent a temptation to the Russians elsewhere.
And I think that once this situation settles down the track towards admitting Georgia to NATO should be revisited. This is because the Georgians as well as the Russians have been given to testing one another's limits in the breakaway territories and NATO should not get pulled into the apparent Georgian agenda to recapture effective control over them via force.
Georgia's recent behavior in this respect is analogous to the guy (Georgia) whose interest in a girl (the breakaway territories) has so far been rebuffed. What he should do is either move on (Georgia letting it go, which would be very difficult for their political leaders given widespread public sentiments on the matter) or make himself more attractive (focus instead on building up the country from within so that, from a South Ossetian or Abkhaz perspective, there might be some reason to want to come back into the Georgian orbit. As of now there is little or none.)
His behavior of late has instead consisted of trying to win the girl's affection by kidnapping her from her home. Not likely to work.
August 26, 2008 11:04 AM | Reply | Permalink
Today we have an escalation of rhetoric from Bush, unlikely to be effective in my estimation in promoting Russian withdrawal of its forces from the non-breakaway territories of Georgia, which it seems to me is the next step in need of addressing.
I am left to wonder if internally the Bush Administration has a clear understanding of what it would consider a successful resolution of this matter. That involves having a clear sense, among other things, of how far they mean to insist the Russians withdraw their forces. I would not be in the least surprised if there is no such clear internal understanding.
If the private request is to withdraw the troops only out of the non-breakaway part of Georgia this would raise the Georgians' hackles, which this Administration seems determined not to do.
OTOH, if it is only acceptable to this Administration if Russia withdraws the additional forces out of the breakaway territories as well, it raises the issue of whether the US would press for more severe consequences, or to keep them in place longer or indefinitely, if Russia does not do so. These matters require some careful, measured thought.
Much easier for this group to not decide, let yet another situation fester instead of handling it, and just punt it to the next Administration while picking up cheap political points along the way.
We know this Administration does not solve problems. It just piles one on top of another.
Bush simply appears not to believe in diplomacy, in picking up the phone and talking to his counterparts on the other side, perhaps along lines of what I suggested yesterday. Or maybe he simply knows he is not good at that. Just doesn't do persuasion any more than he does nuance.
August 27, 2008 11:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
The Washington Post has a lead editorial on the conflict, titled "Russia's Delusion"
It is over the top. Clearly they are ready for another Cold War. I imagine the backroom conversation involving Krauthammer and the person who wrote the editorial.
The reason the US and the West should be trying to get the Russians out of the non-breakaway parts of Georgia is not because we need a new Cold War. It's because Georgia's territorial integrity deserves to be respected and at the moment clearly is not being respected, whatever one things about the breakaway republics, who should govern them, whether they should be recognized, etc.
Let me try an analogy. Imagine an area that bordered both the US and Mexico that was effectively governing itself, where the majority preferred to have a good relationship with the US and did not want to be part of Mexico's orbit. Mexico, with considerable legal justification, claims the area as part of Mexico proper. It sends forces into the territory to try to establish effective physical control over the area. The US, which has an internationally sanctioned "peacekeeping" role, sends additional forces into the area and not only pushes the Mexican forces out of the territory but moves into Mexico proper and maintains a presence there.
This isn't a sphere of influence, Cold War-redux issue although many seem to be maintaining it is. The US would be simply wrong to maintain a continued troop presence in Mexico proper. The rest of the world would be right in insisting we not do that. There is no sphere-of-influence justification for keeping those forces in Mexico proper.
So the US, the West, and as much of the rest of the world as we have any ability whatsoever to persuade at this point should seek a behind-the-scenes diplomatic resolution which has Russia pull all its forces out of the non-breakaway parts of Georgia. That's the first order of business, not because we need a new Cold War because that's the last damned thing we need now. But because of respect for an internationally agreed-upon concept of territorial integrity.
Then let whoever wants to argue it out, in the UN and the Security Council, on the question of whether the breakaway areas should be recognized as independent or not. Right now, from both a US interests and US values perspective, that is a secondary issue. Russian occupation of the non-breakaway parts of Georgia is not a secondary issue. It is the principle issue at the moment that needs a firm world (preferably), but if not, at least a Western, response.
August 28, 2008 11:29 AM | Reply | Permalink
Recommended reading: Dmitri V. Trenin's provocative, short 2007 book Getting Russia Right.
September 12, 2008 11:41 AM | Reply | Permalink
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