This paragraph should be indented, because it is a quote from the National Post:

"He said the case could not be heard in a federal court because Arar was an inadmissible alien and as such never entered U.S. jurisdiction."

It doesn't matter that he was an alien; the issue was that, while being "redirected" he was under the Control of US Authorities. The fact that he was never in the United States does not change the fact that the US officials directed him elsewhere.

BOUMEDIENE shows us it doesn't matter where the US authorities are located; or whether the US control occurs. The issue is only that someone -- alien, US citizens, or other -- was interacting with US-connected officials, persons, authorities, or orders.

BOUMEDIENE is different from Arar because BOUMEDIENE is about Habeas; while Arar is about rendition. However, this language about BOUMEDIENE shows the two issues are related. Here, CCR shows us that the Court denied the Habeas petition:

"Judge Kollar-Kotelly granted the government's motion to dismiss the habeas corpus petition and dismissed the cases with prejudice for lack of subject matter and as a matter of jurisdiction."

A case can be (incorrectly) dismissed for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction."

Because the Supreme Court reviewed the Habeas decision in re BOUMEDIENE, it means the jurisdictions -- subject matter, personal, territorial -- were resolved. This tends to lean in the favor of the same with Arar.

Comparing BOUMEDIENE in re Habeas -- where prisoners were outside the United States, but under control of US officials -- it's baffling to see how the court in re Arar could conclude that jurisdiction did not apply.

The "subject" of the Arar isn't an immigration issue, but a war crimes issue, with international jurisdiction.

There does not appear to be any excuse for the US Courts to have not established jurisdiction, especially in light of the rendition-related abuses which violate the Geneva Conventions.

But let's pretend you don't like the Geneva Conventions, and want something from the US Code. 1343

(1) To recover damages for injury to his person or property, or because of the deprivation of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, by any act done in furtherance of any conspiracy mentioned in section 1985 of Title 42

Going back to BOUMEDIENE, the court established that the prisoners of war had rights protected by the Constitution. In the case of Arar, through the US Constitution, the United States officials had the duty to ensure there was no abuse, kidnapping, torture, or other mistreatment; and the US Constitution established also the link between the US Constitution and the Geneva Conventions barring abuse. Whether he was or wasn't going to be tortured is irrelevant. The first act was the kidnapping, which US officials were instrumental in supporting once he was detained; whether he was or wasn't sent to Syria by way of Jordan is irrelevant on issues of conspiracy.

Conspiracy attaches all the actors -- along the entire chain -- to the events, objectives, outcomes, and other results.

Once the United States signed the Geneva Conventions, it agreed to be subject to lawsuit for failure to enforce those provisions. That the Congress doesn't understand this, or hasn't agreed by passing legislation "approving a lawsuit" isn't a basis to dismiss the suit; but evidence the the United States government is reckless in ensuring all provisions of the Geneva conventions are enforced.

Here is the real issue with respect to Arar: The United States, as a signatory to Geneva, has a legal obligation to ensure all civilians are free from abuse:

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."

The lesson of Nuremberg is that in the chain of civilian-prisoner custody, the question -- still unclear in re Arar and rendition -- is whether civilian, US government, contractors, and other US-connected agents knew, or should have known the transfer of civilians outside the United States would amount to a war crime.

The question turns on:

A. Were there actors working behind the scenes, as in the case of France and Nazi Germany, to achieve a treaty violation and war crime through rendition;

B. Were the civil officers and law enforcement personnel instrumental in carrying out a key Presidential program designed to violate the laws of war through some ruse about "not in our jurisdiction so it must be legal"-argument.

What we do know:

1. Legal counsel indirectly with the President have done financial attestations on the Boeing subsidiary;

2. There were communications related to concerns that rendition-related issues had been disclosed;

3. There were allegations that publicly disclosed information allegedly related to war crimes were breaches of "confidential or classified" information, as a pretext to have that publicly-available evidence suppressed.

This President, outside legal counsel, and others complicit with the alleged war crimes in the rendition program have a problem:

1. The facts about rendition are known;

2. After Rasul and Hamdan the President and others substantially changed the position of prisoners to respond to the Court, and transferred them to Guantananmo;

3. There are known flight schedules, and images of US-connected aircraft transporting personnel;

4. There are affidavits reporting the transfer, kidnapping, abuse, and detention of persons in the rendition program;

5. The rendition program has not been adequately denied;

6. Outside legal counsel have commented on the rendition issues; but have changed their comments from one of "this is what was going on," to "we can neither confirm nor deny", indicating someone told them to change their public statements;

7. Foreign investigators have produced evidence from CIA agents substantially establishing the rendition program details;

8. We have an affidavit from Australia asserting there were reports at Guantanamo of prisoners being moved through US naval vessels as part of the rendition program.

Oh, wait, but let's pretend you don't like any of the above, and say that Arar was an alien. That doesn't solve your problem:

"The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."

Despite this language, we can only wonder why it took seven [7] years for the Supreme Court and President and Congress to accept that 1350 applies to alients under US control in wartime conditions, where Geneva applies to the US as a detaining power. [Geneva applies to the US regardless the status of the POW, prisoner, or detainee.]

In re Arar the question turns on whether the claims fell outside this narrow provision; but it doesn't address the reasons for denying jurisdiction.

US personnel are making excuses not to confront the rendition-related war crimes issues. This Arar court opinion isn't a solution or resolution; but more evidence for the war crimes tribunals that the US government -- executive, legislature, and judiciary -- are foolishly failing to enforce their war crimes-enforcement requirements under Geneva barring kidnapping for abuse under the rendition program.

use the Alien Tort Claims Act. or take it to the Supreme Court and see how they interpret Bivens.

CCR has just filed suit in 4 district courts on behalf of detainees who were mistreated by contractors. They are using the jurisdictional courts of the defendants residences.

The detainees:
Mohammed Al-Taee
Wissam Al-Quraishi
Saadoon Al-Ogaidi
Suhail Al-Shimari

Arar could try the same approach I suppose.

The absurdity of this -- the US appears to look as if it is taking the "US cannot be guilty of crimes/torts"-approach, merely on assertion, but not because of a bonafide legal defense.

Gates invokes Lewis Carroll: "the fact the government has 'said it thrice' does not make an allegation true."

The US president is complicit with war crimes; and the Congress is in collusion with those war crimes. The investigators says the Bush Administration has committed war crimes:

"The US general [Taguba] who led the Army's investigation of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal says the Bush administration "has committed war crimes"

MajGen Antonio M. Taguba:

”There is no longer any doubt as to whether the current administration has committed war crimes” [Scott Shanes, “BiPartisan Group to Speak Out on Detainees” NYT, June 5th, 2008.]

This is a war crimes tribunal preparation plan. It is not designed to be factually accurate; merely use illustrative quotes, evidence, or other information to show how the unfolding alleged war crimes-related information may be couched to assist the public in understanding what is happening, and how the information relates to other issues.

Presentation Format

We recommend the war crimes prosecutors and legal counsel closely work with multi-media to display the information. As a point of departure for conversation on the presentations, we suggest a seven-screen format, with the ability to showcase key information in parallel. As opposed to relying on a simple slide-by-slide presentation, there should be seven screens, each with information that closely connects with the other screens.

What may work is a seven-screen format; with a central screen showing the current area of interest. Most people digesting this information will get lost. It will be helpful if there is a timeline of Presidential plans to show how key decisions, actions, and other events fit into the larger war crimes.

Screen 1: Timeline and Schedule

Screen 1 would constantly highlight how a specific topic, event, line of evidence, or key finding fits into the overall plan. Where there were multiple events connected with a single line of evidence, this chart could highlight which events were connected with a line of evidence presented on the central screen 7.

Screen 2: War Crimes Precedents, Nuremberg Outlines

One way to help the audience will be to show, by way of analogy, how the lines of evidence compare with the Nuremberg indictments and War Crimes evidence from WWII. During the early phases of the investigation, people will need to see how their information fits into the larger picture. One way to organize this discrete information is to use the Nuremberg outlines as a template; then hang evidence from this Administration alone a parallel column. As the investigation unfolds, people will see how evidence is stacking up against the Nuremberg evidence.

Screen 3: References from Key Federalist Documents. Highlighted with different colors, and with a zoom feature to rapidly expand and focus on key language from the specific document.

The Federalist Papers are important to showcase because they will show the legal theories the President’s lawyers were using. This does not mean they necessarily viewed it as binding or precedent; the Federalist papers merely highlight how some information is the fruit of faulty legal analysis.

Screen 4:US official statements (propaganda)

The DoD emails and McClellan’s What Happened partially show how the President used propaganda to mobilize the nation for illegal warfare, and induce compliance with his prisoner transportation system and information warfare.

Screen 5: The evidence (reality)

It will be important to compare the President’s statements with what the lines of evidence shows; and give the public an understanding how the evidence proves the President and others knew they were lying, and that they were involved with deception to thwart war crimes investigations.

Screen 6: Supported charges, indictments (jury instruction/elements checklist)

As the evidence surfaces, the public will need to see how this evidence stacks up against the jury instructions for the proposed charges. Given the enormity of the abuses and expansive illegal conduct, the public will need to see that the evidence is linked with something probative.

Screen 7 (Central Screen): Active video and presentation screen for areas of interest, key points

We recommend the war crimes prosecutors present in a central screen the current information, pictures of key personnel, and highlights of key documents. This screen will be the most active. The important point will be to update information on the other six screens; and to point out how those updates relate to the newly presented information on Screen 7.

Applying Seven [7] Screen format To Prisoner Transportation and Information Warfare Activities Under the Laws of war

This presentation plan will help showcase the evidence establishing a bridge between Guantanamo, information warfare, prisoner abuse, CIA black sites, and the rendition program.

Key evidence includes the June 2008-disclosed Senate Armed Services Committee twenty-five (25) tabs “SASC25” on prisoner abuse. Of immediate concern is the common language disclosed on the presentations to Addington and Rizzo; and the extent this mirrors language White House counsel made on issues of rendition, interrogation, and power treatment. The common language suggests the OVP and CIA General Counsel well disseminated the briefing materials from Guantanamo.

The conspiracy charges are supported through the transportation system. Once POWs were transferred through rendition to other countries, this links other international actors to these alleged war crimes. The error is to believe the United States, in transferring a prisoner, washes its hands of responsibility. No, the problem is one of coordination, planning, and alleged conspiracy with the larger war crimes.

These war crimes tribunals were discussed in late 2001, foreseeable, and behind legal counsel concerns about prisoner access to war crimes evidence. The JAGs raised concerns of civil and criminal litigation at the POW working group meetings; the SAS25 documents show the prisoner counsel would likely ask for information, and the Military Commissions Act expressly grants funds to any US person brought before any international tribunal. Despite these lines of evidence establishing a war crimes tribunal was foreseen, the President cannot explain why evidence was not retained as required under the laws of war. Key DoD planners and IT experts working on “data preservation” are linked with the military analysts.

We judge the objective of the “retention plan” had little to do with complying with the foreseeable Brady requirements or war crimes evidence retention standards, but with the opposite as was the case with Enron: A calculated move by those connected with CIFA to destroy war crimes evidence. This destruction is striking because it was argued the prisoners would never see a court; and inadmissible evidence would be used to convict. This shows calculations by legal counsel, not inadvertent procedural errors.

There is a curious contrast. On one hand we’re asked to believe the courts would have a role:

Addington’s position was, “We think what we’re doing is right – why should we stop it?” . . . “If the courts tell us we’re wrong, we’ll stop then.”

As Reported by Tim Golden, NYT, “Administration officials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals” NYT October 24, 2004.

However, the record shows the President and legal counsel had no plan to permit the court any role. One objective of moving prisoners was to expressly deny the prisoners any standing, and prevent the court from making an adverse ruling.

The quote above about Addington says less about respect for the courts, than about finding a way to exclusive the courts, and ensuring nobody has a chance to tell the President or legal counsel they were wrong.

There is other evidence there was no 100% conviction the courts would be excluded. Rather, Yoo did make reference on December 28, 2001, that the following argument might prevail:

”While not part of the sovereign territory of the United States, it is within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court.”

Here is Golden’s full citation:

On Dec. 28, 2001, after officials settled on Guantanamo Bay, Mr. Philbin and Mr. Yoo told the Pentagon in a memorandum that it could make a "very strong" claim that prisoners there would be outside the purview of American courts. But the memorandum cautioned that a reasonable argument could also be made that Guantanamo " while not part of the sovereign territory of the United States, is within the territorial jurisdiction of a federal court."

TIM GOLDEN ; Jack Begg, contributing, “After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law,” New York Times, October 24, 2004

The above quote shows there was not certitude, but a known risk that the goal of excluding the courts might fail; and, foreseeably, they would have to retain data at the White House for this litigation. The White House retention efforts belie this inference: The approach to retaining data was arguably reckless. Key information was destroyed, lost, or written over (apparently) before all the testing was complete on that software product/procedure/plan used to transfer the email from one format to another. The White House cannot adequately explain why the transfer occurred before the original data was secured; and why data was transferred from one format to another, without ensuring the method was accurate, reliable, or would comply with the data retention requirements.

Organizing Structure: Nuremberg War Crimes indictments and Federalist 23

Nuremberg and Federalist 23 are points of departure to couch the Bush Adminstration’s war crimes evidence and legal theories. These two structures are not intended to comprehensively couch all data, but to show how history may provide a useful framework to organize the expansive war crimes evidence.

These two frameworks will help organize the analysis and discussion about the timelines, decisions, evidence, plans, approaches and legal standards. Federalist 23 is a way to understand some of the lawyers’ pretest and decisions. We’ve seen there were foreseeable chances of litigation; but the way the government handled evidence suggests they did not meet their legal requirements when there was a foreseeable risk of a subpoena.

Most likely, DOJ OLC memoranda re classified because they show the legal counsel misread the legal precedents, and largely supported illegal war crimes. The goal of keeping this memoranda secret is to hide the reliance DOJ OLC has on the Federalist papers; to mask the extent which the Framers language was perverted; and hide information and thwart disclosure of information that should be available through the crime-fraud exception.

It is our view the DOJ OLC memoranda misread Federalist 23, and incorrectly assumed when Hamilton said, “government” Hamilton meant the President. This is not what Hamilton intended. Hamilton was not talking about power for either the President, Judiciary, or the Congress; but about power for a central government. Hamilton’s Federalist 23 was written to argue for a central United States government, one that would solve the problems of the Articles of Confederation. Hamilton was not hoping to centralize power under a President, but under a central government with separate judicial, executive, and legislative centers of power.

Hamilton in Federalist 23 did not focus on the President, but the United States government:

”The United States should command whatever resources were judge by them requisite to the common defense and general welfare”

Judge Vaughn Walker reminds us that general welfare means complying with the warrant requirement through the FISA. FISA permits the President to conduct warrantless surveillance. Hamilton did not say the President’s actions were above the law; but the opposite: The United States government – including Congress, the Judiciary, and Executive – must use law to manage.

Let’s consider some of the key comments in Federalist 23, and show how they’ve been perverted to argue for something Hamilton did not intend.

Hamilton meant by “government” the central United States government, as distinguished from the Articles of Confederation. Hamilton wanted this United States (federal) government to have the central power to pass uniform rules, which did not exist under the Articles of Confederation:

Hamilton, Federalist 23: “The government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them.”

“Them” is plural, not the singular of the President. Hamilton did not mean a single Executive, but the many people of the United States, central, federal government.

Let’s consider the above quote in the context of the Unitary theory of Government/Unitary Executive. Recall, when Conyers asked about this theory, Addington used a different term, telling us: Addington views “the government” as “the President,” something Hamilton would not agree.

Hamilton reminds us of the US government’s role – at the federal level – of passing laws to manage. This does not mean the President, one person of the US government, can ignore those laws. Hamilton was arguing for a central government. Again, to restate the quote:

Hamilton: “The government of the union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them.

The President, on his own, may not lawfully write a rule that says the laws can be violated or ignored. Congress must explain why, despite delegating to the President some powers to write rules, why the Congress has, in this case, revoked that delegation and punish the President for not following the rules the President, through Congress, was given authority to write.

Hamilton warns us, that failing to do this will be a chance of failure for the new government after the Articles of Confederation, and laws must be passed to give the leadership tools to successfully manage:

Not to confer in each case a degree of power commensurate to the end would be to violate the most obvious rules of prudence and propriety and improvidently to trust the great interests of the nation to hands that are disabled from managing them with vigor and success.

Not the above quote says, “Hands” meaning Hamilton was not referring to a single person – the President – but to all people in the United States government.

Judge Vaughn Walker with his ruling on FISA, reminds us that management is through rules, laws, and the enforcement of those guidelines. However, this President turns Hamilton’s argument on its head, arguing the opposite: The President, on his assertion alone, can ignore the very tools to effectively and successfully manage. Judge Walker rejects this premise, and we are implicitly reminded Hamilton’s Federalist 23 -- not this President or his legal counsel -- is on more stable ground when it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution. For purposes of war crimes adjudication: The question is whether legal counsel was reckless in disregarding the laws of war and rights of others.

The results of this mismanagement have been the reckless responses to 9-11, the 9-11 attacks, the bungled Katrina responses, and the disastrous post-war reconstruction planning and security planning for Iraq. Thos who say they are not bound to rules of prudence are asking us to believe that they are guided by folly.

Let’s consider the narrow issue of Geneva, war crimes, Arar, and the President’s prisoner transportation program. Geneva is binding through the oath of office. Hamilton reminds us the power to regulate these things is not one for the President, but one that the United States government is empowered to manage:

Hamilton, Federalist 23: "The result from all this is that the union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets; and to raise revenue which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy in the customary and ordinary modes practices in other governments.”

Hamilton wasn’t saying the President has total control over the military; he was saying the Untied States government should have the power to organize a federal military, as opposed to the states that organized a local militia under the Articles of Confederation.

This United States government after WWII, learned (some of) the lessons of Pearl Harbor, created the NSA; and it was the United States government, not the President, that funded, created rules for, and controlled how the NSA would conduct electronic surveillance. The NSA is a US-government-connected entity; it is not a tool of the President, but one that all three branches must jointly manage by ensuring the NSA, as a weapon of warfare through intelligence, is managed effectively under the law.

Judge Walker’s opinion is consistent with Hamilton’s intent: IT is the creature of law, bound by law, and one that Congress through FISA created rules which the President must follow. This President not only ignored FISA, but ignored the Constitutional warrant requirement because he and his legal counsel do not respect Hamilton’s views of government in Federalist 23; but they would rather twist Federalist 23 into something that only applies to the President. Today’s legal counsel would have us believe that Federalist 23 is a broad sweeping delegation of power to the President, but they fail to discuss the Articles of Confederation, or the Article I Section 8 powers delegated only to Congress.

Hamilton expressly mentions many people, meaning he could not be referring only to a “unitary” executive; or a single President [added text, for emphasis]

Federalist 23: “It was presumed that a sense of their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith would be found sufficient pledges for punctual performance of the duty of the members [plural] of the federal head.”

This relates, in part to the Habeas case: Force must be appropriate. Hamilton writes the states had a relationship with the federal government:

”solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them”

The obligations are one governed by law, as is the case with the FISA-NSA coordination with state telecoms.

Central Government Authority v.s. U.S. Government Power

One of the problems with how this President’s legal counsel has interpreted Federalist 23 is how the key phrases on power and authority were twisted. Look at this language in re authority, keeping mind we’re talking about a new central, federal government, as opposed to the state-based system under the Articles of Confederation. In this quote, notice the word “no limits” which applies to the Federal Government as a whole, not to a specific person or branch:

Hamilton: “Unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be admitted as a necessary consequence that there can be no limits of that authority which is to provide for the defense and protection of the community in any matter essential to its efficiency.”

When the legal counsel working for the Bush Administration looked at Federalist 23, they saw, “Authority” and twisted to mean not “US federal government authority” but to (incorrectly mean) “US Presidential authority.” This phrase, “no limits to that authority” does not mean the President has no limitations; but that the US government, as opposed to the State-based system under the Articles of Confederation, cannot have any constraint in how it used federal authority, as distinguished from power. Federal authority implicitly means the authority is lawful. However, what Addington, Yoo, Gonzalez, and others did was twist “authority” to mean “power”; and claim (incorrectly) that the President had no legal constraint.

As the Supreme Court said, the use of power must be appropriate. In the case of the Administration, Judge Walker reminds us that appropriate use of federal power must conform with the FISA requirements. Hamilton did not argue for an expansive assertion of Presidential power to trump the law; but for the law to guide the government to prudently conduct federal-level governance.

The above brief discussion of Federalist 23 gives you some insight into how the Bush Administration twisted the Framers’ intent and words to mean things the Vaughn Court rejected; and shows us how the Federalist Papers, as originally written, can give some insight into what legal “reasoning” occurred to twist the Constitution into something unrecognizable.

This President’s legacy is not for him to assert. It is for history to write. One approach to understanding what happened is to have a war crimes tribunal, and a legal forum that will centrally do what the Congress refuses to do: In one place, review evidence, and establish a just resolution. This President’ legacy can be undone. It is up to history to decided, not for the President to impose.

[See: Question of Bush Legacy Lingers His Farewell Visits to European Capitals, NYT June 14th, 2008, Seven lee Myers]

During the Nixon impeachment proceedings, some of the Members of Congress are reported to have secretly been providing Nixon with the status of the Congressional investigation. Current war crimes planning is largely decentralized, not quickly assembled, and occurring in multiple countries. The NSA is presumed to be monitoring these efforts. The objective of this monitoring isn’t to help, but to thwart accountability.

The contractors working for the NSA analyzing these plans will have to decide at what point their data collection amounts to obstruction of justice; and assists other efforts to thwart enforcement of the laws of war. War crimes prosecutors will be asking for the analysis of this document you are now reading. It is being sent deliberately as a Trojan horse, and it will be tracked through the NSA system to pinpoint who along the analysis pipeline access to the information, what decisions were made, and whether or not Geneva obligations were fully complied. The document will act as a tracer, giving war crimes prosecutors and court officers a method to trace a specific known document, and monitor whether the legal obligations under Geneva were reasonably complied; or, despite knowing Geneva, there were active plans to thwart this planning. As with the DoD emails on information warfare, you may presume the war crimes prosecutors will want to explore how the President and his legal counsel worked with contractors to craft media messages; and how this planning was mitigated through intimidation, propaganda, and attacks on the prosecutors. If the information in this disclosed file is missing, the war crimes prosecutors will know there was tampering; if the file is not complete, the prosecutors will know there were redactions; and if the file is ignored, the public will have to ask what else is getting “ignored”, and where the real analysis is occurring.

Unlike the Nixon impeachment planning, all world powers have a role and will make a choice: Whether they will choose between the rule of law, connected with Judge Walker, FISA, Geneva, and the US Constitution; or between the forces of extremism working for the President, Al Qaeda or the American legal community that has substantially not enforced the laws of war or Constitution since 2001.

Map: President’s Information Warfare, Prisoner Transportation Network

This is a notional map showing the key nodes within the Prisoner Transportation network. This map is a world map, and shows the world-connections.

Once the AUMF was authorized, the President’s post Sept 2001 must be viewed in a Geneva-related effort; and something that should have fallen under the laws of war.

World Map: European black sites; air routes for rendition, Guantanamo, United States (FISA violations) sample back sites in Eastern Europe Naval Vessels in Indian Ocean CIFA-JTTF activities around the country

Arar shows the court got it wrong: The court did not correctly review the rendition events in the context of the larger information warfare/prisoner transportation network, but as a single, isolated case. It should have looked at Arar in the context of the larger prisoner network and anything afforded to any prisoner at Guantanamo – as one detention enter connected with the US plans -- should have been provided to Arar in Jordan and Syria – also connected to the US plans.

The problem is the names on the selective prosecution subpoena – from Congressman Conyers – match the names in the DoD email. This is one of the bridges between information warfare and the legal retaliation connecting the President.

The Plame interview transcripts are part of the Iraq WMD retaliation, as are the POW abuses. The nexus emerges: Information warfare, prisoner transportation, and Presidential war crimes. Retaliation against Valarie Wilson was to thwart discussion on war crimes evidence and illegal warfare, absent an imminent threat; the DoD emails connect the POW abuse to the President and CIFA; and the US Attorney firings include the same names in the selective prosecutions. It’s an error to look at each case individually; the correct approach is to look at this as a larger information warfare/prisoner transportation network which violated Geneva and FISA, in defiance of Hamilton and Nuremberg.

Some of you are probably thinking, “This seems pretty far fetched. Connecting Hamilton with information warfare doctrine of 2008.” There’s language in Federalist 23 showing how the legal counsel made this leap. Notice the role of the Federal Government: It was the center of information, but the President viewed this as his being the center of all information, and keeping the Congress, media, and Judiciary out. That’s tyranny.

Information in the eyes of Hamilton was centralized because of the problem with the Articles of Confederation. But this did not mean all information was centralized under the President. The center is not the President, but the US government, which includes the Judiciary, Legislature, and Executive Branches:

Hamilton, Federalist 23: “Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public defense as that body to which guardianship of the public safe is confided; which, as the center of information, will best understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten; as the representative of the WHOLE [caps in original]; will feel itself most deeply interested in the preservation of every part.”

Hamilton wasn’t arguing for state secrets, hidden evidence, or centralized planning under a President; but centralized, federal government management in the interests of the entire United States. The Bush Administration lawyers claimed the Congress and Judiciary had no role; and the President had the only role. Hamilton didn’t focus on the President, but on the Federal government as distinguished from the states under the Articles of Confederation.

It is a misreading of Federalist 23 to say that Hamilton said the President should have all power; or that the President’s authority was unlimited. No, the issue was the Federal government, not the same as the Executive Branch. The correct approach is to recall that FISA and Geneva must be respected; and that the Geneva-related bans on all abuse apply to all activities connected with the Untied States government. It is irrelevant that Arar was sent to Jordan or Syria; the only way he got there was because someone knew to send him there. We argue those who were instrumental in deciding his travel destination were well operating under the perverted notion of Federalist 23; and wanted to insulate the President from the foreseeable war crimes claims.

The problem is that by moving prisoners to another country, the President hasn’t solve a problem, but raised more questions; What was the arrangement between Jordan and Syria and the Untied states; and how are these countries jointly conspiring to support war crimes, POW abuse, and Geneva violations. It makes little different that Jordan is an ally of the United States with Israel; or that Syria is a target of the Vice President’s propaganda. War crimes tribunals have no boundaries.

The United States does not control the evidence in Jordan or Syria. The Iranians have a vested interest in working with China and Russia to secure evidence of American war crimes. Any US led-effort to attack Iran to destroy Iranian-secured war crimes evidence obtained from Syria or Jordan could be construed as a subsequent war crime and an act of war against Iran and her allies for perpetuity, until the United States cooperates fully in providing this evidence to the war crimes tribunal. All NSA contractors, military personnel, and others involved with these attacks in Iran to destroy this Iranian-secured war crimes evidence could be prosecuted under the laws of war. You need to be very specific with your commanders: what connection, if any, does this facility have with a bonafide, imminent threat to the Untied States; or are there other objectives in destroying this target, linked with destroying war crimes evidence the US government want’s to hide from war crimes tribunals. Find out what you are really targeting. If you’re not sure, you have a problem.

One of the problems with these war crimes issues has been insufficient frameworks. Taking a broad view of (some of) the war crimes issues – POW abuse, illegal warfare, rendition, evidence destruction, conspiracy – we can see the President is largely arguing that rendition is a separate class of activities, unrelated to Guantanamo.

It is our view that the President’s legal arguments are designed to remove evidence that would otherwise well illustrate the complete legal nexus. There is illusory ambiguity on the laws. Geneva is clear. Ambiguity ahs been feigned to make it appear the President has discretion; and that the court has no role. This is incorrect. It was well discussed the legal conclusions/memoranda may go the other way: The POW working group meeting minutes raised the risks; and the Yoo memo saying litigation was foreseeable; and the SASC25 documents raising the prospect of civil litigation.

Evidence White House Staff, Congress Discussed War Crimes-Connected Information Warfare Operations

We argue US Attorney firings are not personnel matters, but war crimes-connected efforts to tamper with an independent judiciary and law enforcement system, raising substantial doubts whether the US would, as required, enforce the laws of war through effective prosecution of war crimes.

The Grand Jury is looking at US Attorney firings. Under the above legal theory – that this is a common information warfare/prisoner transfer system – the larger war crimes nexus includes DoJ perjury, DoJ election manipulation, and the President’s role in information warfare, as documented on the DoD emails. There is an important quote which substantially shows there is a complex web of communications touching many people:

”The fact that the white House and Justice Department had been discussion the subject was well known to a number of other senior officials at the department, including others who were involved with preparing the departments’ testimony to Congress.” From: “Former Justice Dept. Official Defends Actions New York Times, March 18, 2007

Going back to Hamilton’s Federalist 23, once we read “testimony to Congress” this means this is a cross-governmental coordination; and the communications are not solely hold within a single branch of government. They cannot be shielded by executive privilege. Rather, because the information is allegedly related to war crimes, all communications cannot be shielded because they are within the crime-fraud exception to privilege claims.

The above quote, from a former White House counsel, relates to the US Attorney firings. However, under the nexus of war crimes, prisoner transportation, and information warfare, the quote takes on a new meaning:

- How did the DOJ prosecutions and US Attorney firings fit in with the information warfare;
- What other communications, as disclosed in the above quote, would logically have been required to fully support the rendition, POW abuse, and prisoner transportation systems.

Under the Geneva umbrella, as opposed to the “State secret” claim, the above communications mean that the war crimes tribunal must get access to the rendition-related notes. They can’t be shielded as a “covert” activity; but as an activity which many knew, or should have know, were violations of the laws of war: Moving people with the objective to support their abuse. If things were fine, the US would not have cared whether the ICRC did or didn’t have access. Rather, the POW investigations show that the ICRC was denied access to prisoners for things outside Geneva Article 143-permitted exceptions; these delays were not temporary; and the conditions and excuses for the lack of ICRC access were not related to an isolated situation, but spanning many months.

War Crimes Tribunals: Consolidating Grand Jury Evidence

The Grand Juries reviewing the above events and actions are somewhat limited: they have a time-limit. Unlike a war crimes tribunal, without any statute of limitation, grand juries are generally called to look at a specific, isolated situation. War crimes tribunals would consolidate all the grand jury evidence, and publicly present that information for prosecution. This does not mean grand juries have no role in war crimes prosecutions; but that under this President, the prosecutors are presumed to have been threatened if they dare prosecute the President and others for war crimes. Indeed, the Attorney General explicitly said he would not enforce the law when actions were consistent with DOJ OLC memos; Never mind that the DOJ OLC memo was consistent with a perversion of the Constitution, Federalist 23, or the Geneva Conventions.

We need to consider something that, on the surface, doesn’t appear to be connected with Geneva, the President’s information warfare, or the prisoner transportation system: That of the US Attorney firing, and the Gonzalez testimony on FISA.

Schlozman is alleged to have made some inconsistent statements about what happened. William Jordan, Schlozman’s attorney, said Schlozman “had not been informed that he was the a target of any criminal investigation.” Gonzalez legal counsel, George J. Terwillinger, said essentially the same thing: That Gonzalez was not under investigation. Terwillinger said the grand jury

referral was “unrelated” to Gonzalez, but when asked about the NSA perjury before the Senate, “I’m not going to get into other things.”

From: ERIC LICHTBLAU, “Grand Jury Said to Look At Dismissals Of Attorneys” NYT, June 17, 2008

It is our contention the AG’s connection is not some “other” thing, but part of the same nexus of alleged illegal activity: FISA violations, POW abuse, illegal Presidential orders, perverse legal opinions, US attorney relations. It’s part of the information warfare, prisoner transportation system.

Terwillinger is an interesting person from the perspective of his comments about the Constitution, Geneva, and prisoner of war. Relying on the Curtis-Wright opinion, Terwillinger said the Constitution does not apply to “external affairs”.

From: “A Nation Challenged, The Government’s case – Support for Bush Anti-Terrorism

Terwillinger also is the one who said in a Federalist Society National Security White Paper,

Terwillinger: ”These powers ought to exist without limitation”

From: WILLIAM GLABERSON, “A NATION CHALLENGED: THE GOVERNMENT'S CASE - Support for Bush's Antiterror Plan” New York Times, December 5, 2001.

Let’s summarize what’s going on, and try to frame them in the context of our seven-screens for the war crimes tribunal. You’ll see how a confusing set of facts can be quickly organized into something the public and war crimes tribunal can quickly understand: there is an organized, centrally managed plan connected with the President and legal counsel:

1. Screen 1 (Timeline) : Gonzalez is connected with the Department of Justice as Attorney General;
2. Screen 4 (Propaganda) : His lawyer is connected with language that tends to contradict what the Supreme Court says about the Constitution in connection with POWs;
3. Screen 3 (Federalist Papers) : We’ve reviewed Hamilton’s Federalist 23 to find language substantially undermining this theory of “unitary executive” or “unitary government”
4. Screen 5: (Evidence) The Attorney General was liked through POW abuse through the Bybee Memo, other discussions
5. Screen 1 (Timeline) : The DOJ OPR was thwarted from investigating NSA-related misconduct in the Department of Justice
6. Screen 2 (Propaganda) : Gonzalez is alleged to have committed perjury, and might be connected, in some way, with the Grand Jury looking into Schlozman
7. Screen 2 (Propaganda) ; Screen 1 (Timeline): Gonzalez legal counsel has written on Constitutional issues which contradict Supreme Court, Constitution and Hamilton
8. Screen 1 (Timeline) ; Screen 5 (evidence); Screen 6 (Indictments) : We have a Presidential prisoner transportation system that connects the President, National Security Counsel, Department of Justice, CIA, NSA, and contractors to Guantanamo, Black sites, Navy vessels, Rendition, and POW abuse.
9. Screen 6 (elements) : Questions about perjury before the Senate on what the President was doing under FISA
10. Screen 2: (Nuremberg Outline), Screen 5 (evidence) : Judge Walker ruling against the government
11. Screen 2 (Nuremberg Outline) : Nuremberg precedents outlining how civilians can be adjudicated for war crimes

The above nexus creates an interesting picture. Claims that there is “no limitation” on Presidential power are false and a misreading of Federalist 23, and what Judge Vaughn Walker said; the issue is the there is no limitation on United States Federal Government authority to exercise powers appropriate for a central government, as opposed to a state-based cooperative under the Articles of Confederation.

When Gonzalez is connected with language, “these powers ought to exist without limitation,” he’s talking about something different than what Judge Vaughn walker is talking about.

Schlozman, Partisanship, Information Warfare

Let’s reconsider the Nuremberg template and the schedule. Look at the documents showing how the Nazis seized control of the state, and how the Germans planned the war of aggression. The Nazis took specific action to intimidate the opposition, dilute their political opposition, and execute illegal warfare unopposed.

Arguably, Schlozman, in light of the Nuremberg model, is part of the power consolidation arm. There is information that Schlozman wanted to hide politically-driven hiring decisions; but he appears to have made some inconsistent statements under oath, driving, in part, what appears to be the Grand Jury review:

Schlozman: “These individuals, Senator, were not hired because they were Republican.” [ERIC LIPTON, Panel Asks Official About Politics in Hiring, NYT, June 6, 2007]
Schlozman is reported to encouraged others to “remove references to their conservative background from their resumes so that would not be held against them” [ERIC LIPTON, “Panel Asks Official About Politics in Hiring, NYT,” June 6, 2007]
Schlozman said it did not occur to him that the indictments could affect the campaign

NYT: “The Justice Departments’ guidelines tell prosecutors not to bring vote fraud investigations right before an election. . . . He also claimed, laughably, that he did not know Acorn was a liberal-leaning group.”
-- From: “It's Subpoena Time” NYT, (No Author listed) June 8, 2007

When confronted with this rule, Schlozman said, “He was aware of the rule, but he said he had been given approval by the head of the Justice Department Election Crimes section to move ahead.”
“From: ERIC LIPTON: “Panel Asks Official About Politics in Hiring,” NYT,- June 6, 2007.

Later, the NYT reports, Schlozman

”Originally told a Senate Committee last June that while he was acting Untied Sates attorney in Kansas City, a Justice Department supervisor ‘directed’ him to bring an indictment in a voter fraud case against a liberal group. Days later in a letter to clarify his remarks, he said the decision to bring the indictment was his.”

From: ERIC LICHTBLAU, “Grand Jury Said to Look At Dismissals Of Attorneys” NYT- June 17, 2008

Let’s review the above information through the some of the seven screen:

Screen 1 (Propaganda) : Witness inconsistent statements
Screen 2 (Nuremberg: Consolidation of power) Direction to change information to mask political connections
Screen 3: (Federalist 23) Legal standards ignored, but under supposed direction
Screen 5 (Evidence) : Claims acting under orders, recanted

The point of the above isn’t to narrowly look at the Schlozman case, but to show how these lines of evidence, when compared with the Nuremberg indictments, might be best framed as something related to how the Nazis seized control of the German state, consolidated power, and hid evidence of illegal activity. Whether Schlozman is or isn’t connected with a larger conspiracy; or involved with war crimes isn’t the point. The issue is how the Schlozman-related evidence might be couched in terms of Federalist 23-perversion, information warfare, and efforts to thwart enforcement actions related to the President prisoner transportation system.

Attorney General Gonzalez

You remember Alberto Gonzalez, sometimes called “Frodo”. He was the Attorney General before resigning. Whether he was fired like Rove remains to be understood.

For purpose of the war crimes investigation, Gonzalez legal counsel made a slip. Terwillinger said the Grand Jury referral was “unrelated to Gonzalez but

When asked about NSA perjury before the Senate, “I’m not going to get into other things”

The problem, under the Nuremberg-Federalist Model of information warfare/prisoner transportation, NSA isn’t something else, but part of the same problem.

Looking at our seven screens, in light of this disclosure:

Screen 1: Timeline of NSA-related issues Gonzalez raised at the senate hearing
Screen 2: Nuremberg-related issues of alleged evidence destruction, obstruction
Screen 3: Legal justifications, under the perverse Federalist 23-view, in justifying actions outside what FISA or Geneva permit; and what Judge Vaughn Walker struck down
Screen 4: Claims that Gonzalez is not under investigation, but failing to consider that the Grand Jury may be reviewing evidence; an FBI criminal investigation is not the same as a Grand Jury review
Screen 5: Gonzalez testimony, contrasted with the disclosed Judge Vaughn legal conclusions; juxtaposed with DOJ OLC legal memoranda in re FISA
Screen 6: Elements of perjury, conspiracy, and others things possibly of interest to the Grand Jury in re former AG.

Rendition: Presidential Prisoner Transportation Systems

Rendition is correctly seen as a separate leg of the same elephant: Illegal Presidential orders, information collection, and prisoner transportation.

It is incorrect to narrowly couch the Guantanamo legal issues as distinct, and separate from Rendition, FISA violations, or illegal POW abuse. The error is to pretend that one case is separate from others. The ideal approach is to consolidate the cases under a tribunal because this would ensure the evidence from one situation cross flows openly into others for a big picture approach.

The Arar Court incorrectly failed to consider the Geneva implications attached with this Presidential program. The United States, as a detaining power, has war crimes obligations regardless the status of the prisoner. Regardless what excuses may have been created to pretend the Taliban or Al Qaeda were or were not protected by Geneva, the United States remained, as a detaining power, obliged to fully ensure the prisoners under their control were fully respected.

The correct view is to look at Guantanamo not as a separate location, with unique legal rules; but as merely one hub of the President’s Prisoner transportation system. The full prisoner transportation pipeline includes Guantanamo, combat-theater detention centers in Iraq and Afghanistan, rendition flights, the CIA black sites, and the Naval detention facilities.

Sample White House Counsel Statements

The seven screen format can be useful in showcasing a timeline after 9-11; reviewing the workloads of staff counsel before an dafter the attacks; and review what efforts, if any, legal counsel made to ensure they were complying with all treaty and legal obligations.

- Did legal counsel ignore written views of JAGs
- How do the SASC25 documents support or refute allegations the JAGs were ignored

Counsel is reported to have said, “All of a sudden, the curtain was lifted on his credibility frightening world.”

- Did counsel adequately review the Addington-Rizzo trip reports
- Why does White House counsels comments about prisoner interrogations substantially match key words on the summary information from the Addington-Rizzo trip to Guantanamo?
- What does the use of common words, phrases and jargon in the SASC25 information, and in the DoD emails on Guantanamo say about the CIFA-McClellan connection through Feith to information warfare and propaganda

Former White House counsel said after 9-11, they had to

“respond to terrorism issues and thrown into intense, 15-hour workdays, filled with competing urgencies and intermittent new alerts.”

From: TIM GOLDEN ; Jack Begg, “After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law,” NYT, October 24, 2004.

- What effort did counsel take to get backup support
- If legal workload were heavy, why weren’t reserve military JAGs brought into the White House to provide assistance to the White House counsel’s office

Looking at our seven screens:

Screen 1 (Timelines) : Are the OMB manning data consistent with White House counsel representation on legal counsel staffing shortages
Screen 2 (Nuremberg) : What review did White House counsel make, if any, of Nuremberg requirements on the United States as a detaining power
Screen 3 (Federalist 23) : what is the explanation for having, in advance of 9-11, a draft Patriot Act; but no plans to respond to that attack; and no adequate plans about Iraq, despite the time to prepare. How did someone, before an event, have a plan ready; but despite the long hours, the legal counsel still had not coordinated on a lawful plan to invade Iraq?
Screen 4 (Propaganda) : Are the Outside counsel’s statements about rendition, prisoner abuse, and interrogations consistent with the data from the ACLU FOIAs, SASC25, and the DoD emails?
Screen 5 (Evidence) : Where are the interrogation notes, and POW files; and the video tapers of the classified briefings on interrogations?
Screen 6 (Discrediting witness before war crimes tribunal) : To what extent can former White House counsel be implicated in false statement to Congress, misleading information through the media to Congress, or propaganda to insulate staff counsel from war crimes investigations in re POW abuse?

Sample Legal Propaganda

One of the interesting things about the legal counsel public statements are their flip flops on whether they were or were not concerned about a particular legal issue.

The problem is the lawyers were not advocating on behalf of Geneva nor the Constitution, but putting the partisan Agenda before their legal obligations to the country.

Consider the reported statement of Addington: “We’ll go as far as we can, until the court stop us.” In truth, there was no plan to permit the court to review; yet, in the back of their minds, the evidence shows, they were concerned this could be litigated. Yet, we’re asked to believe nobody imagined the CIA tapes would be needed. Addington and Rizzo do not appear to have a credible story why the CIA tapes were not retained given their attendance at the Guantanamo briefing on prisoner treatment.

Contrast These Two Disconnected Themes

A. Addington: Illusion of a court concern B. FISA: No plan to give the court a role C. JAG, SASC25: Documented concerns with future litigation

When we look at the above inconsistencies, we’ll get some new perspective on the following SASC25-related evidence:

”When field trips to Guantanamo Bay were arranged for administration lawyers, the invitation were sometimes relayed at the last minute to the State Department and National Security Council in the hope that lawyers there would not be able to go on shot notice.”

Then, when we look at the White House comments on the Guantanamo Briefings, we get this perspective, substantially matching language of former White House counsel commenting on the Prisoner interrogations:

”It was basically as sales job. What we are doing down there is valuable, its producing results.”

There’s another way to contrast the lines of evidence. SASC25 would have us believe that there were two tracks, one where prisoners were abused, but the evidence was not admitted for prosecution; and a second track where there would be prosecutions without training prisoners with abuse.

In truth, they planned to use inadmissible evidence:

”Information from coercive interrogations was to be admissible

- Was the idea of a dual track, another sales job?
- Was the intent to use all evidence, even if inadmissible?
- If they didn’t care where they got the information, why detain prisoners in Guantanamo, as opposed to black sites, naval ships, or other locations?
- What changed from the dual track to the single track: Using all information, planning to use it in court, planning to bring charges; but then no plan to charge or release prisoners where there was no evidence
- When did someone ask, “What’s going to happen when the public, court, and world community discovers these case files are worthless and do not justify detention”?
- What was the plan after forms at Guantanamo, when they were “completed” did not have enough information: “Not enough evidence” to “complete the forms”; how can anyone credibly argue that they reasonably “believed” the prisoners “were involved”—based on what, the fact that they were a prisoner?!? [See Tim Golden, “Administration Officials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals, Oct 25, 2004, NYT.]

Going back to our seven screens:

Screen 1 (Timeline) : Decision points on the timeline for where to detain prisoners; Haynes and Yoo squash games at the Potomac Officer’s Athletic Club
Screen 2 (Nuremberg) : Rules against abusing prisoners
Screen 3 (Federalist 23) : DOJ OLC memoranda conferring President power to abuse prisoners; President showing restraint; yet Teguba’s conclusion the Administration directed war crimes
Screen 4 (Propaganda) : Statements after Hamdan on moving prisoners; why some prisoners were held at one location, but not others
Screen 5 (evidence) : Photographs, videos, investigation reports, affidavits, interrogation notes, prisoner affidavits, secure video links, DoD emails discussing DOJ points of contact
Screen 6 (Charges) : War crimes indictments, obstruction, and conspiracy along the president’s prisoner transportation system

Rationalizing Hiding War Crimes Evidence

Let’s consider some excuses and misdirection in light of Federalist 23, and the crime-fraud exception.

White House: “There is a long legal history supporting the principle that the president should have candid advise from his advisers.”

Let’s suppose we consider Yoo’s 2001 memoranda, where he raised just after 9-11, the possibility there could be unfavorable court rulings. We have to conclude the President was making the decisions: When the President claims he wants candid advice, it’s only the President who is making the decision. By implication, anything the President says, “I will not reveal that document” is connected with the President. It matters less that the President hemmed and hawed; the issue is that despite a full consideration of the possibility that there could be lawsuits, the President made a decision not to ensure the Prisoners were fully respected.

The President may have made a written decision that the POWs “should” be treated fairly; but the record does not support he aggressively ensured that these legal requirements were fully enforced. Hence, MajGen Teguba’s concern that there is no doubt the President directed war crimes.

Reynolds

Reynolds is one legal standard to gauge whether information should or should not be disclosed. If the information is substantially connected to national security, in theory, the information should be shielded. However, there are exceptions, which the President and legal counsel fail to address. This does not look good under the issues of comity. The President and DOJ OLC legal counsel are not showing they are interested in redacting information that should be redacted; only in unilaterally declaring that the information cannot be disclosed. However, they fail to address the crime-fraud exceptions which would trump the President’s claim to a shield.

Back to Reynolds: Without a judicial review, nor access to the information, it’s impossible to gauge whether the claim of national security is real; or whether, as it appears, is dubious. The real intention appears to be to hide war crimes evidence. Indeed, if the goal was to hide “candid” advise, and ensure “open dialog,” the President needs to show that despite the balanced legal input, eh made the appropriate decision.

In our view, the President is tuck in a trap once he argues that he needs to keep the information confidential: He’s openly admitting that he had a fully-informed legal decision; and despite the best legal minds, this President got it wrong. On top of that, not only were there POW abuses and FISA violations, but the President agreed with the most perverse interpretation of Federalist 23, and implement policies that would substantially abuse that perversion.

Despite all this, the record does not suggest legal counsel timely resigned; or that they sufficiently independently removed themselves. Despite departing, the record suggests legal counsel continue to engage in information warfare; did attend DoD military analysts meetings; and were substantially supporting the DoD-managed information warfare against American civilians.

Legal counsel’s problem is that the claims in the affidavits do not appear to be bonafide state secrets. The legal counsel appear to have fabricated a ruse of a “presidential program” to isolate a legal problem, and narrowly look at rendition to sidestep the question of whether rendition was or was no part of a larger Presidential prisoner transportation system.

9-11 Mythology

There’s a subtle argument floating around as to why they used illegal methods. One camp suggests the President wanted to be able to go to the public and say, after another attack, “We did all we could.” This assumes even with tyranny, and defying the Constitution, that the US would fail.

The goal wasn’t to prevent an attack; but to have a argument to appeal to the public, “Please continue to support the GOP even through we botched it during 9-11, and a second time.”

We’ve also seen the same mythology from McConnell. The NSA director essentially argued, “If we have a debate in a democracy about FISA, Americans are going to die.” In the view of McConnell, we’re not fighting for democracy, but something else. What?

There’s been no accountability against the President for his failure to protect us during 9-11. He blamed the intelligence community. The President wasn’t fired.

Before 9-11, there was a Patriot Act plan, ready to go; after 9-11, the US freely chose to go to war, but had no adequate plans for Iraq. Doesn’t that seem odd?

Nuremberg and Federalist 23 Do Not Support Classification of War Crimes During Presidential Combat-Support Activities

The Nuremberg indictments and Federalist 23 offer useful frameworks to couch the evidence connected with the Presidents prisoner transportation-information warfare plans and programs. It is incorrect to argue the CIA rendition is a bonafide state secret; or that the United states, when it handed prisoners to other countries, washed its hands of any responsibility.

The United States, in working in concert with the President’s prisoner transportation system, did illegally support the movement of prisoners from the United States, a signatory to the Geneva Conventions, and did knowingly transfer those prisoners to states which the United States knew or should have known would not respect the prisoner’s rights under Geneva. This does not mean that once the United States transfers the prisoners through the pipeline in a covert program to another power that the United States washes its hands. Rather, the President and others when they argue that rendition is a “state secret” implicitly agree that the President and United States are connected with this program: Moving people to detention centers.

False Affidavits To Hade War Crimes Evidence Connected With Rendition

It is our position the Untied States officials filed false and misleading affidavits with the court when stating that the rendition program was classified as a state secret for purely or substantially national security reasons. No, the activity, as a subset of the larger Presidential transportation system, is illegal, not lawfully shielded by privilege, and cannot be lawfully classified as a state secret. The program is not narrowly a single program, but part of a larger war crimes effort linked to the President, legal counsel, and his key advisors.

The court failed to consider the larger nexus connected with Arar’s movement and abuse: It was activity designed to thwart Geneva, not comply with the laws of war, and pretend that it was something other than what it was: A program to move prisoners without regard to their Geneva-protected rights. Geneva violations have universal jurisdiction, and the court incorrectly failed to consider the war crimes implications. Nuremberg establishes that court officials (judges) may be adjudicated with war crimes when they fail (as appears the case now in re Arar) to enforce the laws of war, enforce Geneva protected rights, and ensure a detaining power substantially complies with its legal obligations under the Conventions.

Using Above Framework, Slides To Understand Arar

It is irrelevant where Arar was, or what his status. The duty of Geneva compliance is not conditioned upon Arar’s location or arbitrary designation, but upon the United States as a power that must comply with the Geneva Conventions. The United States alone did interrupt Arar’s travel, and made arrangements for his movement to Jordan. Arguably, the Untied States was reckless in not ensuring Arar was safeguarded after his movement to Jordan and Syria. We content the President’s prisoner transportation system made arrangements with Syria through Jordan or others to support the President’s illegal POW abuse. What is striking is the President and others in the SASC25 documents are linked with a two-track prisoner system; but the results of their actions show even when abused, prisoners were still going to be subjected to trial.

We contend the government has illegally classified evidence related to Rendition. The classification guidelines do not permit classification of data that is evidence of illegal activity. Springing from Federalist 23, it is our view the President determined that he alone could decide whether he or others would or wouldn’t follow the law; and on a case by case basis arbitrarily decided that a given prisoner should or should not be moved to Guantanamo, CIA black sites, NAVAL installations, or other detention centers.

It is not lawful for the President or others to hide evidence related to this prisoner transportation system. The activity is not a lawful state secret, nor a covert action that is recognized as lawful under the laws of war. The President may not lawfully classify illegal war crimes as a “state secret” or “covert activity” on the pretext that it must remain hidden on national security grounds. This would impermissibly permit the President to classify anything that is illegal or embarrassing, as the classification guidelines prohibit.

Federalist 23 was likely used to justify saying, “Those classification guidelines to not apply in this situation.” Even if there was a standard or practice that might have signaled to the President that the activity was illegal, the President and legal counsel appear to have largely self-delegated themselves an immunity-pardon power to act without regard to the United States treaty obligations.

Even if some information was classified, the crime-fraud exceptions to the privilege rules do not shield the information. This means someone, despite directing illegal activity, did not fully appreciate that the crime-fraud exception would pierce this shield. We content the white House Administration documents – which the FOIA Courts said are not part of the White House – are important war crimes evidence. The SASC25 documents show war crimes litigation was foreseeable, and the White House Administration records of when White House emails were created, stored, retained, or archived should be preserved, kept under seal, and provided to war crimes tribunals.

The larger nexus of Rendition is the coordination required to organize movement of prisoners; then managing the data from those interrogations. These planning, scheduling, and legal counsel discussions required extensive coordination, memoranda, and evidence. The Nazi railway system used in the Holocaust similarly used extensive bookkeeping, records, scheduling, and personnel management systems.

There is evidence the President and Office of Vice President are connected. The DoD emails show discussions with military analysts and key White House staff. The same people listed as being involved with the Wecht Grand Jury tampering match the names on the DoD emails. The DoD emails show the President and Vice Residentially-connected staff as receiving information, attending meetings, and conducting views of the information. The SASC25 documents show Addington and CIA General Counsel Rizzo attending Guantanamo, but not asking questions because they knew what was going on with the larger prisoner transportation management system, and were not surprised.

It was foreseen there would be civil litigation. The President and others, with this foreseeable litigation and a legal duty to retain this evidence. However, this requirement is inconsistent with the plan to block the courts from reviewing information or hearing cases. It is false for anyone to believe the President or others did not imagine litigation or that there was a surprise. Their surprise has been the tenacity of others to press their claims despite extensive GOP efforts to thwart judicial review of the war crimes.

There’s a curious contrast: On one hand we’re asked to believe the President had a two-track or two-tired approach to interrogations: One that would abuse prisoners, and isolate those prisoners from courts; and another that would permit the courts to review prisoner evidence from non-abusive interrogations. It is a misreading to believe the Untied States simply planned to hide any prisoners for purposes of shielding them from litigation (which they did); rather, the overriding goal was to prosecute civilians even if they were prosecuted using tainted evidence from abuse. There was no real plan to have a two-tiered system; nor a plan to ensure abused prisoners were not subject to trial. Rather, in light of Federalist 23, the goal was to find a way, despite the abuse, to prosecute using evidence that was not admissible. This requires calculation on behalf of the President’s legal advisors, and is not eviden