Congressman Waxman released a draft report and emails connected with Abramoff, the White House, and outside counsel. A close reading of the emails shows an interesting pattern: The communications mirror what Scott McClellan disclosed, and how the US Attorney firing emails coordinated plans to remove prosecutors. This framework largely mirrors the DoD information warfare guidance: Offices to include, timelines, and coordination sheets.

Interestingly, the Abrmaoff emails show outside counsel's organizational structure mirrors that of the White House and the DoD propaganda planning. Similarly, the DoD information warfare organization mirrors the White House.

They key problem for the President is the contention in re Abramoff: Someone inside the White House, DoJ, GOP, or US Attorney's knew something, but failed to act to end that jury tampering. There were multiple interviews. They continued. Something didn't happen that should have: An order to stop, and a decision to investigate. It does not appear this happened because the President would have had to direct the tampering with concurrence of outside counsel, White House staff, DoJ legal counsel, the US Attorney, FBI, and the GOP political arms. This required coordination lends itself to exhaustive discovery.

Once the President is linked with McClellan, DoD emails, US Attorney firing decisions, and GOP emails discussing Wecht Jury tampering, the question becomes: What should the President have done; and did he do it. Secretary of State Powell reported to the President POW abuse, but the President did not respond.

These are valuable lessons when reviewing the White House and DoJ database for emails related to the Wecht Jury tampering. The Abramoff emails show some interesting patterns.

Editorials

The White House staff shares with DoJ Staff their views on editorials. This would appear to explain, in part, why the US Attorney and White House were not on the same page on the Wecht Jury tampering until the White House apparently had time to coordinate a response: Which talking points to use; and which staff would comment; and which staff would reply with no comment.

Coordinated Public Comment Decisions

The White House refused to comment; but the US Attorneys made statements not within their attorney standards of conduct. This mistake is important: It gives insight into timelines, what emails would have had to been exchanged to ensure the US Attorney said one thing; but the White House refused to comment. This decision does not happen by accident.

Key Offices Linked With US Attorney Firings

The Abramoff emails, McClellan, DoD emails, and the US Attorney firings also show important coordination with key White House offices: Legal counsel, political, and public affairs. This lesson suggests a line of inquiry into key interactions on the White House discussion of Wecht Jury tampering: When the conversations started, which editorials the White House and DOJ Staff were exchanging on the Wecht case; and how the GOP political views were considered before the President made any decisions.

Outside Counsel Comments to White House, DOJ on Wecht

Another line of inquiry includes which outside counsel provided the White House with the first notion to approach the Wecht Jury after trial. Outside counsel was on the list of Guantanamo visitors. Counsel knew prosecutions were imporant signals: A failed prosecution would be a black eye for the President, GOP, republican agenda, and the legal objectives of outside counsel hoping to retroactively justify FISA violations, POW abuse, and other illegal conduct. We've learned through the DoD emails the President and DoD counsel wanted prosecutions at Guantanamo. The same pressure appears to have motivated the jury tampering in re Wecht.

We saw outside counsel lobbying in the Abramoff emails, urging action. Outside counsel may or may  not have known the Wecht Juror names were sealed; but it is likely the GOP-political arm inside the White House would have approved the plan. However, it is possible someone connected with the DOJ or outside counsel requested GOP comment on the proposed Jury tampering, as we saw in with the Abramoff emails.

Once the GOP presumably approved of any Wecht Jury tampering, the President would have had to endorse that plan, as we saw with the Abramoff emails.

Once the plan to tamper with the Wecht Jury was approved, and the White House took a position on the editorials, it is likely someone from outside the White House personally visited. The Abramoff emails show the type of coordination required to enter the White House; which White House staff would be involved, the email accounts to confirm permission (access confirmation) to enter; and the identifying information required to access either the White House or Old Executive Office Building, as we saw with the Abramoff emails.

Trumping Claimed Attorney-Client, Executive Privileges

The Abramoff emails and Wecht Jury tampering provides an avenue to
breach the attorney-client privilege claims, and assert there are
alleged crime-fraud exceptions to that privilege. The Abramoff emails show something important having bearing on the DoD emails, and outside counsel: Who was meeting, who made comments, who publicly disclosed important information about key meetings on key areas of interest, who provided disclosed comments on attorney work products: Rendition, POW abuse, FISA violations, and US Attorney firings.

Let's presume as with the US Attorney firings, DoD emails, and McClellan's disclosures there was some planning between the White House and the  Department of Justice on tampering with the Wecht Jury. One line of evidence disclosed in the Abramoff emails are private couriers. If there is a paper copy of the plan still available, it is likely we could review the White House/Old EOP building entry logs to determine who most likely received a package; or went outside to accept a deliverable. This assumes the White House didn't send/receive the information via email or other electronic messages.

When you seek through the FOIA process the above information, here is an example from the Abramoff emails showing DoJ and the White House shared files. A file like this would be similar to the US Attorney firing plan, and any coordination the White House and DOJ Staff had on media messages for the Wecht Jury Tampering. Once transmitted from DOJ, the White House-connected information in re Wecht would appear in the DOJ JCON database.

There may be an inadvertent disclosure. Here is a sample file format to request, look for, or notice when you are noticing emails between the White House. When reviewing emails sent back and forth between the White House and DOJ during the Wecht Trial, you'll want to ask through the FOIA process an explanation of the content of similar files. The FOIA process requires the President to explain to the court why a specific document is privileged. These file formats should be requested; and the President and White House Staff explain the general contents of similar files sent back and forth between the White House and DOJ during the Wecht Jury tampering.

The War Crimes Problem

Normally a political run down against a target would end, nobody would discuss it, and life would move on. We saw with the Valarie Wilson outing that the Grand Jury takes a dim view of this assumption.

However, the problem with the Wecht Jury tampering isn't that it is a political action by one branch of government. It's crossed into a second branch; and the conduct appears to have a war crimes issue of interest to the Italian war crimes prosecutor. This is not a simple issue of tampering a jury. The Wecht Jury tampering raises reasonable doubts in the mind of foreign war crimes prosecutors whether the United States is or isnt' capable of conducting independent judicial review of war crimes. Nuremberg shows us what happens when the courts are not independent, and the government turns a blind eye to executive interference: Judges and court officers (lawyers) can be adjudicated with war crimes.

The implications of the Abramoff emails for the Wecht Jury tampering are simple: They form a line of evidence for war crimes prosecutors to seek evidence from the White House, outside counsel, and the DoJ"s JCON database to make a declination decision on war crimes indictments against the President, outside counsel, and civilian policy makers. If the US government refuses to enforce the laws of war, foreign powers shall continue their efforts.

Evidence destruction in re a war crimes trial is a serious problem. We've seen the DoD issue guidance saying POW interrogation records
should be kept to a minimum. The record suggests someone issued a
similar order in the White House on many other legal issues including
the Wecht Jury Tampering.

It is troubling American legal counsel, Congress, and government fail to seriously confront these war crimes-connected issues serious in re Wecht Jury tampering. Any effort to thwart any war crimes prosecutor from conducting discovery on these allegations may be construed as a subsequent war crime under the laws of war.

The way forward is to conduct discovery, support the war crimes prosecutors, examine the evidence, and not to make excuses to pretend nothing happened. When we find out, we'll make an informed decision whether to continue with this system of oversight; or support something else. In the meantime, Pelosi must be removed as speaker to make way for an investigation. The Action Alert in here provides other ideas of what you can do.

Thank you for your support in ensuring the United States government fully meets its Geneva obligations under the laws of war. If we refuse to do this, foreign powers have a reasonable basis to claim the United States is a failed state. Once determined as failed, we may lost the right, independence, and sovereignty to consider this alternative.
 These are very serious issues. We were supposed to have learned these lessons from Nuremberg: Illegal abuse of power must be checked, not given an excuse to flourish.