Tab 19: DoD Visitor Trip Report

50 of 63

There are two reports within Tab 19. One is a trip report; the other is a discussion of the techniques. There's a subtle issue with the FAX numbers in the upper right.

Unique SASC Numbering in Tab 19

The lower right of the documents in Tab19 have a SASC-numbering system which combines all seven pages of the two documents into a single SASC number:

SASC 11-Jul-07-#

The last number of the SASC goes from 1 through 7.

The SASC-numbering is not consistent with the date of the reports in the upper left. There is a four (4) year-time lag between when the information was first faxed; until the SASC numbering.

It's unclear if the SASC numbering correspond to the date the SASC received the inforation; or the date the SASC prepared the documents for another review; or how the SASC decided upon which numbering system to use for what internal reviews, logs, or filing system.

This SASC-numbering format at Tab 19 does not appear in either Tab 18 of Tab 20.

Two Documents Combined In Tab 19

Page 52 of 63 is marked "Page 02" on the fax (upper right), while 51 of 63 is marked "Page 03". This suggests this section of Tab 19 was faxed in reverse order.

However, this reverse-numbering is not the same within Tab 19. Look at page 51 of 63, and notice the date the fax is stamped:

7/17/2007

This date is different than the first half of Tab19, four (4) months earlier:

3/19/2007

Page 50 and 51 of 63 are the ends of two different documents, but are combined within the same Tab.

48, 49, 50: Jan 15th, 2003

51-52: Jan 3rd, 2003 (01/03/03); [Date could be March 1st 2003]

We don't have the fax cover sheets.

page 50 of 63:

Operation Valiant
From John F. Rankin
15 Jan 2003

Note the concern with $50.00 savings for a rental car drop off fee.

Unclear why Scheduled Airline Traffic Office (SATO) was not handling the details; or why Rankin was not working in-house to process a suggestion for monetary savings.

The $50.00 seems trivial given the trillions spent in Iraq. The small dollar-concern suggests despite ongoing combat operations, the President did not give high budget priority to this activity.

The $50.00-concern suggests there is a small budget, monitored during budget status updates.

Recommend

Committee ask for the detailed budgets linked with this office, and review the timelines of trips, Guantanamo visits, and the budget review cycles. This may give some insight into contract language, legal issues discussed at these budget meetings, or whether there were separate "executive sessions" which were not documented.

The budget reviews may include details matching the Congressional lists of contractors providing interrogation support. These contractors possibly linked indirectly with these budget reviews might be on DoD program budget documents called, "Descriptive Summaries." It depends on how the President classified the program; or whether money was appropriated to a procurement office, then transferred to a classified operating fund for intelligence and/or combat support.

However the budgets are linked to the President's Budget, it will be important to clearly identify the senior DoD personnel with budget oversight responsibility, and compare their actions to the standards imposed on the German Reich after WWII at Nuremberg:

- What legal training did these senior US personnel have;

- What legal counsel assistance did they have access to;

- What inputs should they have sought from legal counsel and staff advisors on Geneva and POWs;

- What information from the JAGs did these military and civilian leaders reject;

- How were their concerns documented, if at all;

- What steps, if any, did they take to ensure an adequate Geneva-compliance program within their area of control to ensure the POWs were properly handled;

- Where is the leadership's concerns with adequate protections for civilians as required under Geneva;

- How were legal requirements of Geneva adequately or inadequately incorporated into prisoner handling procedures before first combat activities started in 2001; then revisited before combat started in Iraq in 2003;

- What cross flow of information between these civilian and military personnel should have happened:

(a) before 9-11; (b) after 9-11; (c) after POWs were first captured in Afghanistan; (d) after the military learned the bounty program was yielding non-combatant civilians; (e) after abuses first reported after 2001; (f) after personnel cycled through the different detention centers; and (g) after abuses were first reported in the media.

Possible CIA Link, Inconsistent Dates

The "worship the gods"-term corresponds to details presented here, identifying some of the interrogation centers.

Here is an extract. Note the document reference date. The date doesn't match.

Tab 16: "18 Dec 2002" . Reference below: 10 Dec 2002

This suggests:

A. The Dec 10 date may have been mistyped;

B. There are multiple versions of this report; and/or

C. There are multiple CIA, DoD, and DOJ documents which use the same terms, and were published near each other because they are linked with earlier meetings before Dec 2002; and/or

D. There was inadequate fact checking (staffing on the sources prior to publication) to ensure either the SASC or Common Dreams could independently duplicate the reference using working papers.

"A secret government document, dated December 10, 2002, detailing “SERE Interrogation Standard Operating Procedure,” outlines the advantages of stripping detainees. “In addition to degradation of the detainee, stripping can be used to demonstrate the omnipotence of the captor or to debilitate the detainee.” The document advises interrogators to “tear clothing from detainees by firmly pulling downward against buttoned buttons and seams. Tearing motions shall be downward to prevent pulling the detainee off balance.” The memo also advocates the “Shoulder Slap,” “Stomach Slap,” “Hooding,” “Manhandling,” “Walling,” and a variety of “Stress Positions,” including one called “Worship the Gods.”

Recommend

The Committee needs to understand why the dates do not match. This may be a simple typographical error, or a misreading.

However, there is an interesting possibility: That the reports were thought to have been the same, but they are different, but linked with different publication-cycles/offices which the FOIA analyst may have not understood, or made an error in disclosing.

What could have happened was the analyst mistakenly disclosed "the same" document which had been "previously disclosed," but didn't realize that the documents were different.

The Committee needs to compare the details in Tab19; with the document referenced above, and explore where there have been redactions disclosed in one, but not the other.

Another possibility is that the documents are from different origins, and different drafts of a similar guide or planning document. The update logs for the original documents need to be compared:

- Are the updates for both documents similar;

- Were there two different update cycles/reviewers for the two different documents

- Are the two different documents, in effect, products from teams within the CIA, DoD, or outside contractors who did not know about eachother

- How does the document review cycle compare with the civilian contract names within the DoJ Small Business Unit Contract areas

- Were some contractors connected with the DoD emails (in Arizona/Intelligence area) working independently than other contractors near McClean or the Garland, Tx area?

Lessons From Iran-Contra Minority Report

Recall the lessons of the problems with the details within the Iran-Contra minority report. One of the errors related to a retroactively made change to a law review article. The problem was that the publication date was before the name of the publication changed; however, the index includes the publication name that did not match the date on the article, but matched the name for the subsequent publication.

However, if someone had actually read the cited report, they would not have made this error. They would have had the document in their hand, seen the date, and had the correct title to put into the Minority Report. The inconsistency between the date of the report; and the listed journal title told us something very important about the sourcing, research, and whether there may have been some deception on sources consulted.

This led some to suggest that the original minority report staff never read the original article; but that they took an excerpt from a separate report or study. It may be that Addington referred to his subsequent notes or another staffer's white paper. The error should be followed-up: Why was there a problem with this citation; and which documents within Addington's notes had the correct title: Was there an undisclosed work product which the Committee should review when exploring Addington's statement related to his staff work on the minority report; or was someone else doing detailed sourcing, and Addington never double checked the citations. That source, person, or other product needs to be brought to the attention to the Committee. It sheds light on how these documents are staffed.

This SASC Tab

The same may have happened here with this Tab. SOmeone may have referenced a separate report, and would have the SASC believe that they're reviewed the original report; but they do not want to discuss how they got access to that original information; or they're relying on someone else's retelling of that document.

The important point is to ensure there is a chain of custody on the reports linked with this date; and can we trace why there is an error. Something may seem like an irrelevant issue, but it could lead us to an interesting discussion into which original documents were read, the sourcing, and whether there are other problems we need to be aware when reviewing the other SASC25 documents.

Tab 16

43 of 64

Possible Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC)

There are two numbers which may or may not be real phone numbers. The words "office" and "home" may be deception. The two numbers cross reference also with the NEC.

Handwritten:
3376 Office
8306 Home

Do these numbers refer to "Dean Sessions, SPC"?

If the Numbers Are Bonafide

Let's assume (for now) the numbers are valid. Someone needs to discuss these terms linking the CIA with Shannon, rendition; and make a good story in terms of the military analysts listed in the DoD emails:

airportwatch.wikispaces.com/space/showimage/EU_submission.pdf

and

DAL20060524A Bagram

and

.oireachtas.ie shannon Bagram What's the connection between this policy at Tab16, Shannon Airport, and the CIA activities in Ireland?

- Which legal counsel, again, is "having trouble" remembering whther the rendition is or isn't a state secret?

- Does legal counsel formerly connected with the White House and indirectly connected with Abramoff care to discuss the details they have about rendition; and why their name is on the DoD list of military analysts in the DoD emails?

- Does legal counsel with DOJ OLC, WH, and OVP not understand that this is an international investigation, involving multiple foreign jurisdictions; and the US courts have no power to block foreign entities from gathering evidence of White House counsel-connected involvement?

Are the Numbers A Ruse?

We need to find out whether these interrogation-related documents have hand writing that connect to a bonafide office/home phone; or whether they were the Navy personnel codes for something else going on.

- Were these the classification codes for the CIA personnel assigned to the NAVY to conduct this interrogation aboard the floating vessels?

We need a straight answer: What role did any US Contractor play in coordinating any POW abuse by hiding the people behind the following classification:

Nuclear Propulsion Plant Maintenance Supervisor - Radiological Controls

E-2C Group II Systems Organizational Career Maintenance Technician

Dean
Sessions
SPC

Left margin, vertical hand-text: "Coercive Management Techniques"

Written above memo, with "SERE" x-d out, replaced with "Management"

"All references to SERE (double underline) will be removed [? "ac" ] per LtCol Mo [?, redacted]"

- When did the GOP legal counsel review these "unusual" rendition-related activities in Ireland; and

- How many golfing trips connected with Abramoff had anything remotely to do with visiting anything related to foreign rendition airfields?

Searching Tab 15

Unlike SASC25, the book references are searchable.

Tab 15 (
(42 of 63) matches book page 237

flow chart on Gonzalez view of POW abuse.

Tab 13 is curious. The memo calls for hiding the techniques; and says the techniques might be disclosed by the ICRC or international delegations.

Other than the Chinese, which "international" delegations did the President authorize to visit Guantanamo?

Testing:
You have obviously chosen to disregard my "almost friendly advice" from your previous thread.
Throwing this much verbiage at the point you are trying to make only obscures it.
Until you learn to focus, I'm going to stop even trying to read your posts. Life is too short.
And I'll bet I was one of the last who were still bothering to try.
Good luck with your future endeavors.

8 of 63 Waterboarding described as part of the interrogation training for students. Part of a "distraction" program.

Some people think it is illegal abuse of civilian prisoners.

11 of 63 Para 5c: Waterboarding observed during training, Sept 2001 at Navy facility: NAVY North Island SERE sschool.

water board

Tab 7

13 of 73 is DoD NCIS.

senior NCIS Special Agent Mark Fallon

13 of 63

Fallon says conduct should "shock the conscience" and mentions the legal community.

See 342 U.S. 165, Supreme Court Decision [comments added]:

Restraints on our jurisdiction are self-imposed only in the sense that there is from our decisions no immediate appeal short of impeachment or constitutional amendment. But that does not make due process of law a matter of judicial caprice. The faculties of the Due Process Clause may be indefinite and vague, but the mode of their ascertainment is not self-willed. In each case "due process of law" requires an evaluation based on a disinterested inquiry [FISA warrants?] pursued in the spirit of science, on a balanced order of facts exactly and fairly stated, on the detached consideration of conflicting claims, see Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 , on a judgment not ad hoc and episodic but duly mindful of reconciling the needs both of continuity and of change in a progressive society.

Applying these general considerations to the circumstances of the present case, we are compelled to conclude that the proceedings by which this conviction was obtained do more than offend some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combatting crime too energetically. This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's contents - this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation. [Waterboarding puts them on the rack]

It has long since ceased to be true that due process of law is heedless of the means by which otherwise relevant and credible evidence is obtained. This was not true even before the series of recent cases enforced the constitutional principle that the States may not base convictions upon [342 U.S. 165, 173] confessions, however much verified, obtained by coercion. These decisions are not arbitrary exceptions to the comprehensive right of States to fashion their own rules of evidence for criminal trials. They are not sports in our constitutional law but applications of a general principle. They are only instances of the general requirement that States in their prosecutions respect certain decencies of civilized conduct. Due process of law, as a historic and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend "a sense of justice." See Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for a unanimous Court in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285 -286. It would be a stultification [ "the act of making something futile and useless" ] of the responsibility which the course of constitutional history has cast upon this Court to hold that in order to convict a man the police cannot extract by force what is in his mind but can extract what is in his stomach.

. . .

To attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call "real evidence" from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions. Use of involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. [Torture was used to gather unreliable information; but assumed to be true until proven otherwise through other NSA/rendition/abuse/targeting/JTTF intimdiation]

Coerced confessions offend the community's sense of fair play and decency. So here, to sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the court whose judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law. Nothing [342 U.S. 165, 174] would be more calculated to discredit law and thereby to brutalize the temper of a society.

Tab 7: 13 of 63.

Look at the email dates, starting from the bottom.

The first Fallon message is October 2002; then the next message from Fallon is August 2003, almost a year later. This is surprising because the October message raises the prospect of Congressional investigations, but the delay suggests there was not a swift review.

Faye-Jones Investigation authorized by SecDef 2 December 2002.

Here's the evidence the NY Bar has known about this legal requirement since at least 2006.

- Why has there been no bar-directed/sponsored/supported prosecutions of the President and others for war crimes?

These are alleged complicity issues, which Nuremberg said legal counsel could be adjudicated with war crimes.

What happened, American legal community: you were given access to the DoD requirements; but aren't making a strong case you've aggressively enforce the laws of war through state-level or federal-level prosecutions.

- What got in the way?

15 of 63, Friedman discusses moving prisoners to hide them from the ICRC (not allowed, see Article 143, Faye-Jones findings on ICRC).

15 of 63

Beaver: We may need to curb the harsher operations while the ICRC is around.

Note: Not calling them "harsh interrogation techniques" but calling them "harsher operations".

They weren't stopping the abuse, merely delaying it until the ICRC left.

The comments on page 16 are legally convoluted.

- Where were the JAGs?

Evidence (Wrong) Legal Standards Ignored (Despite Relevance)

Even if we ignore the fact the POW abuse violates the 8th Amendment; and the US courts prohibit coercion (to gather evidence for prosecutions), they've caught themselves in a trap. By asserting CAT was ignored because the 8th Amendment applies; they can't explain why they've ignored the Constitution (with the 8th Amendment), which includes treaty obligations and Geneva Conventions as part of the Supreme Law and oath of office.

16 of 63

Fredman: Says US didn't sign Convention Against Torture because of 8th Amendment.

Huh?

They've got it backwards. The 8th Amendment, in th e US Constitution, was presumed to prevent torture; so there was "no need" to duplicate that, so the US refused (they said) to sign the CAT. But the CAT (and supposed US failure to sign "the second part") has no bearing on Geneva which still applies, prohibiting all abuse.

Yet, the US government said the POWs weren't protected by either the CAT or the 8th Amendment, abused them; but ignored the Geneva requirements.

Tab7: 16 of 63

Fredman: "Significantly harsh techniques are approved through the DOJ."

- Was this a case-by-case approval; or was it the approval of the policy?
- Did DoJ take any steps to review DoD or CIA compliance with their approvals/policy?
- Where was the President on the DOJ OLC "approval policy memo"?

Seems odd for DoD field-level, junior officer/personnel to be relying on DoJ.

- Why weren't the JAGs involved with the reviews, communication, approvals, and oversight, rather than giving DoJ a direct line to the field?

- Was there no method of tracking these approvals within DoD; who in the DoD chain of command would know that DoD personnel were getting approvals from DoJ; or was there no case-by-case review, merely a blanket policy from DoJ OLC?

- Who delegated to DOJ this "approval" authority?
- How does it relate to SecDef and the President?
- MajGen Teguba, your views on what you're reading on this page?

Tab 9

19 of 63 JAG approves 14 of 63 methods, reference in the 18 of 63, Tab 8 memo.

Beaver was at the meeting, she's a JAG.

23 of 63 is the legal brief on the techniques, but does not mention Geneva.

Beaver memo: "No international body of law applies"

Nuremberg precedents, Geneva?

27 of 63

Beaver (JAG) memo: Mentions Supreme Court, said force OK if "necessary". Sounds like Yoo.

"Legitimate government objective"

Is it a legitimate government objective to:

- Spread propaganda to justify an illegal invasion; - Ignore the FISA courts and warrant requirements; - Illegally invade a country; - Block impeachment investigations on war crimes; - Tamper with prosecutors, juries, and the judicial branch - Mislead the public to induce them to support partisan goals - Mislead investigators, falsify or destroy official records - Spread propaganda to induce elected officials not to challenge the President

This went on for seven years after 2001.

29 of 63

POC: Captain Michael Borders x3536

Compounding CIA Tape Destruction Problem: 2002 DoD Discussed Foreseeable Litigation

32 of 63

Evidence future litigation was foreseeable, meaning records should have been retained per the foreseeable subpoenas.

"Defense counsel will undoubtedly argue. . ."

The letter is dated 4 Nov 2002, and does not square with the CIA tape destruction timelines. This memo destroys the CIA's claim that they had no inclination there might be litigation.

Also, we read on page 32 of 63, statements obtained will be "inherently suspect" for prosecutions, which contradicts the DoD General Counsel pressure for Guantanamo indictments.

33 of 63

White House Fact sheet mentioned, refers to Geneva.

Why wasn't the Geneva obligation on the US, as a detaining power -- regardless the supposed status of the POW -- factored into the policies and procedures?

Why didn't Beaver, as JAG, mention Geneva as the White House fat sheet does; Guantanamo trials show us there were inadequate methods to distinguish between civilians, Taliban, and AlQueda: Supposed AlQueda were really civilians.

Until adequately screened, why weren't all POWs treated as if they fell under Geneva; and why, without a competent tribunals, were civilians denied POW protections?

DoD POW Abuse Policies Applied to CIA Black Sites Through DoD Commanders

33 of 63

JCS Action SJS 02-06697

Air Force Legal Assessment of Counter resistance techniques for Guantanamo, JTF-170.

"proposed by the commander" means the commander, when they left and were assigned elsewhere, could use these in Iraq or Afghanistan, or elsewhere.

- How many Guantanamo-related personnel were assigned to the CIA black sites to provide logistical support?

- Does the military provide any command and control assistance to the CIA at these black sites?

- Does DoD provide security and force protection services at the CIA black sites?

Dual Tracks

35-6 of 63 Read para 3 closely. They've created two classes of interrogations: One for intelligence; another for prosecutions.

The Two Interrogation Tracks

1. Intelligence gathering using abuse, Without a plan to Prosecute;

2. Interviews Without abuse, to keep prisoner clean for Prosecution.

Yet, recall the FBI and CIA took down the wall on information sharing. While the "terrorists" at Guantanamo were shielded, American citizens were subjected to warrantless interrogations, without any debriefing. Protections for some from Afghanistan; American citizens not granted the same protection.

This doesn't square with the interrogation videos: All of the CIA videos were destroyed/not available, regardless whether they were or were not interrogated in the "prosecution" or "intelligence" tracks.

It doesn't look as though any of the CIA-interrogated (abused) POWs were every going to face trial.

- How many POWs were accused of being with AlQueda, subjected to torture, determined to "never be eligible for prosecution", but were innocent civilians?

Significance of the Extra "a"

Note the typo in this, did they mean to say, "a candidate" instead of "a considered":

" a detainee subject to the treatment would not be a considered for referral to the Military Commission"

Echoes of Yoo and Addington

36 of 63: Admitted to degrading treatment (banned by Geneva) justified because the goal was to gather information, not inflict pain. (Necessity doctrine in Iran-Contra Minority Report, and Yoo's Declassified DOJ OLC memo)

Invoking "authority" as if it were a higher doctrine than the law, granting to all a license to do what they like. Echoes of Addington from the Iran-Contra minority report:

"it does not conflict with the well established authority under the U.S. Constitution"

- The Constitution has not authority, only a person does. "The well established authority" -- whose, the President's?

They neglected to mention that the President's power is constrained by Statute and Geneva, per Article I Section 8; and the treaty obligations under the Supreme Law through the oath of office to the Conventions, and Nuremberg precedents.

- Where is the impeachment investigation/or prosecution, as Nuremberg precedents require into war crimes?

Cross Flow of Army-Air Force JAG Data

38 of 63 This isn't a problem isolated to the Army JAGs; but something that broke down. Something must have driven the JAGs in all services to avoid mentioning Geneva, despite Geneva-related concerns at the POW working group meetings.

- Why weren't these Army comments developed independently of Air Force's Beaver?

- How was the data from the Air Force provided to the Army?

- Where are these emails?

58 of 63

Para X

They said (incorrectly): Geneva doesn't apply to unlawful combatants.

Despite the foreseeable risk of future litigation, requiring evidence in response to foreseeable subpoenas, they show not regard for the Geneva obligations on the US as a detaining power, regardless the status of the prisoner:

"Although the provision of Geneva are not applicable to the interrogation of unlawful combatants, consideration should be given to these views prior to application of the technique."

Just "consider" then.

Hey, acanuck ..

Some of us Canucks care mightily about WAR CRIMES.

We work our asses off each day, trying to get social justice!

How about helping us out, rather than throwing MUCK at the very wrong people !

Remember: Your fellow citizen (and he IS) Omar Khadr is STILL in custody. He wants to be a doctor after EVERYTHING he has been through. Could you stand being used as a human mop and still stay confined?

Meanwhile, there are TORTURE victims going around Ontario on buses trying to educate people like YOU; working hard at healing.

We have Afghani war du victims living in YOUR community. (Oh, we don't talk about THAT stuff, do we? Well, I do .. ) We had a government Minister spreading dope among YOUR children. We are trying to start an international community!! Join in.

That's the great thing about Canada, we can all work together! :-) (And thank Gawd for that!)