1. This is a template For Grand Jury Review to Prosecute and Disbar US Attorneys In re Wecht Jury contacts.

Disclaimers

2. The following information is not a statement of fact, nor an assertion of criminal activity. These are allegations of breaches of the attorney standards of conduct, and intended for a wide public discussion, not intended to be read by any specific person in the Department of Justice, the White House, or by any legal counsel.

3. The following information falls under the exceptions of fair comment on issues of public interest. The information below is not intended to be any assertion that the US Attorney has violated the law, or that they have breached their attorney standards of conduct, nor a conclusion of law, nor any statement about the competence of a specific attorney licensed to practice law.

4. The information is for discussion purposes only, is not a conclusion of law, and is not an assertion that there is criminal activity. These are merely allegations related to alleged conduct which violates court orders. How this does or does not relate to war crimes and Geneva violations is the subject of ongoing discussion.

5. This is a discussion of the US Attorney Conduct in re Wecht Jury contacts after being released from trial. This note first narrowly focuses on the irrelevant excuse of how the juror names were derived, then discusses the implications of these conclusions in the context of a potential disbarment investigation by the DC Bar, and subsequent DOJ OPR review.

Broad Pattern of Legal Counsel Misconduct: White House, DOJ Staff, US Attorneys

6. Congress needs to review these issues and determine if the President or DOJ Staff have blocked DOJ OPR from reviewing these allegations. Based on information and believe, we conclude the President and White House counsel have worked with the DOJ Staff to orchestrate impermissible contacts with jurors after trial, and attempted to confuse the public about this activity which would breach the attorney standards of conduct. If proven, it is possible and highly likely DOJ Staff counsel, and White House counsel could be implicated in this effort to breach the attorney standards of conduct, and organize to release to the public misrepresentations, further violations of the attorney standards of conduct.

Summary Allegations

7. Alleged Breach of Attorney Standards of Conduct in re Prohibited Post-Trial contacts with Wecht Jury members after Jurors had been released from trial; and other alleged misrepresentations and violations of the Attorney standards of conduct.

Irrelevant Ruse: The Derivation of Seated Jurors Names From List of Prospective Jurors

8. The US Attorneys office claims they derived the Wecht Trial seated juror names from another list of possible jurors. This is an irrelevant argument and defies reason.

9. Our position is that it is irrelevant how the US Attorney obtained the list of sealed juror names. Rather, a convoluted story about how the US Attorney obtained the list of sealed juror names is misdirection. The US Attorney knew the court, in sealing the names, did not intend for any post-trial contact with jurors. Rather than accept responsibility for the impermissible contact, the US Attorney allegedly worked with others to sidestep the prohibitions against attorney contacts, and created a false timeline and explanation to legalize what was impermissible and a violation of the court order and attorney standards of conduct.

US Attorney Fatal Assertions in re Derivation of Seated Juror Names From Potential Juror List

10. The US Attorney asserts or admits (rightly or wrong) the following, and have dug themselves into a hole.

11. The US Attorney asserts they derived the list of seated juror names from another list. This is irrelevant. Once the US Attorney admits they didn’t have the seated juror names, they know or should have known that they didn’t have access to that list of seated jurors. By admitting or asserting that they “derived” the list of seated juror names from a separate list of potential jurors, the US Attorneys office is implicitly admitting the following:

12. The US Attorney knew or should have known it did not have access to the list of seated jurors; and that the court had not given any permission to anyone to contact any juror after trial;

13. The court did not intend for the US Attorney to have access to the names of seated jurors, not contact them after being released; and no reasonable attorney could conclude that the court, despite sealing the names, intended for the US Attorney or others to ignore this restraint and contact the jurors after they were released at their home;

14. The US Attorney had to obtain the names of seated jurors through another method, outside what the court intended for the US Attorney to use, access, review, or exploit. By implicitly admitting they had to use another method, outside what the court knew, to obtain names of the seated juror members, the US Attorney should have known they were departing from what the court intended, permitted, or ordered. The US Attorney is allegedly recklessly in failing to respect the reasonable implications of this court order; but in devising a ruse or pretext to explain why impermissible conduct occurred despite this clear court order and intent of the judicial branch: Safeguard the independence of the jury, and ensure they remained free from coercion for their independent, honest views during jury deliberations.

Asserted Derivation Process Implies US Attorney Knew They Did Not Have Access To Seated Juror Names

15. Some may argue that the US Attorney didn’t do anything wrong because they derived the list of seated juror names from the list of potential jurors. That is an irrelevant argument. Putting aside the impossibility of driving the list of seated juror names from a list of potential jurors, the US government asserts (rightly or wrongly) that it only contacted one juror, yet we have no reports that non-seated jurors have been contacted. This would imply, on chance alone, the US Attorney used a list of potential jurors, only contacted one name, and on chance alone, selected a seated juror. That defies reason.

16. The US Attorney, by having to use a convoluted process to (a) take a list of potential jurors; (b) select one name at random; (c) visit that one name; and (d) derive useful information knew or should have known that this many steps would work around something the court did not want: US Attorney access to the list of seated jurors for post-trial discussion; and contact with those seated jurors after release from trial.

Irrelevant: Failure to Adequately Explain How Obtained Seated Juror Names

17. The US Attorney knew or should have known that the court did not release the list of sealed juror names. The Court did not intend for the US Attorney or anyone to have contact with the jurors after the trial, as the Attorney Standards of conduct prohibit. The US Attorney knew, by using a supposedly convoluted process to contact sealed jurors that the court did not intend for this contact to occur after trial. Had the court intended post-trial contact, they US Attorney would not be required to use a convoluted story to explain how they obtained the names of sealed-seated jurors.

18. It is a red herring, and an alleged subsequent breach of the attorney standards of conduct, for the US Attorney to communicate through others that these types of jury contacts are normal. No, they are not.

Deliberate Misrepresentations To Confuse (A) Jury Polls and (B) After Trial Interviews

19. Jury polls are not the same as after trial interviews. The US Attorney knew the after trial interviews were prohibited when the court did not release the names of sealed jurors.

20. To explain away the contacts, the US Attorney induced others to provide misinformation about jury polls, with the intent to induce others, and mislead them to believe the prohibited after-trial interviews were the same as a jury poll. They are not the same. The US Attorney attempted to rely on the assumed ignorance the public and media would have about the attorney standards of conduct, prohibited post-trial interviews in the attorney standards, jury polls, and whether the juror names were or were not released. This suggests the US Attorney and others attempted to exploit superior legal training to the advantage of the public who relies on their skill, talent, and experience to effectively enforce the law, support justice, and ensure the attorney standards of conduct are fully enforced.

Attorney Standards of Conduct Prohibit US Attorneys To direct Others To Misrepresent Information, Facts, or Trial Procedure When the Standards Prohibit Attorneys From Making Those Statements

21. It is also a red herring for the US Attorney to communicate through others that a jury poll is or isn’t the same as a post-trial interview of jurors. The two are not the same. It is an alleged subsequent breach of the attorney standards of conduct for the US Attorney to have allegedly communicated through others a misrepresentation about what a jury poll is or isn’t; or attempt to confuse the public or investigators about the nature of the contact.

The Most Likely Timeline in re US Attorney Involvement With White House Efforts to Tamper With Wecht Jury After Trial

22. Allegedly, here’s what most likely happened:

23. The Court sealed the names of the seated jurors.

24. The US Attorney knew they were required to meet the attorney standards of conduct for attorneys licensed to practice law in Pennsylvania.

25. The US Attorney received improper direction from the DOJ Staff and White House to determine what went wrong with the case, and ensure there were no acquittals at a subsequent trial; and the US Attorney impermissibly complied with this direction knowing they were breaching their attorney standards of conduct.

26. The US Attorney knew the names of the sealed juror names had been sealed; and the court did not intend for the attorneys to contact the jurors after being released.

27. The US Attorney knew the court did not intend for the US Attorney to access the list of sealed juror names, nor use that list to contact released jurors. The US Attorney and others on the DOJ Staff and White House counsel’s office convinced themselves that FBI contacts was a workaround. They did not consider that the direction to use others to engage in prohibited contacts was a subsequent breach of the attorney standards of conduct.

28. The US Attorney knew or should have known that the attorney standards of conduct did not permit the US Attorney to contact the jurors after they had been released from trial because the names of the seated jurors had not been disclosed.

29. The US Attorney knew the Court did not intend for the US Attorney to contact the jurors, and this contact would have been a violation of the Attorney standards of conduct.

30. The US Attorney received the list of seated jurors, in violation of the court order. The NSA, FBI, DOJ OLC, or someone on the court knew or should have known that the US Attorney, DOJ Staff, and White House had access to this list of sealed names.

31. The FBI was directed by the Attorney General or Deputy AG, with White House concurrence with the US Attorney and DOJ Staff, to contact the Wecht jurors at home.

32. Jurors complained because they were led to believe that their names had been sealed, and they were alarmed that they had been contacted at their homes despite assurances their identities would not be disclosed outside the Judicial Branch of government. The Jurors were alarmed because they know FBI agents are not connected with the court, did not have access to the sealed court names, and had no lawful method to obtain classified, sealed information the jury members were led to believe would be forever protected.

33. The US Attorney took unreasonable responsibility only for directing the FBI to contact. The US Attorney attempted to misrepresent the contacts, and confuse the public, by pretending that this contact was normal, when it was not.

34. The US Attorney could not adequately explain how they knew who the seated jurors names were; or why those names were disclosed outside the court to the FBI.

35. The US Attorney could not adequately explain why the post-trial interviews occurred, or why this interview was not something they US Attorney knew violated the attorney standards of conduct.

36. The US Attorney attempted to invent a story that “jury polls” were the same as “after court interviews.” The US Attorney knew or should have known this was a misrepresentation, a subsequent violation of the Attorney standards of conduct; and an impermissible post-trial communication they induced others to communicate. The US Attorney knew the attorney standards of conduct prohibited this post-trial comment, disclosure, misrepresentation; and that attorneys cannot provide this prohibited communication through others to side-step the standards applicable to the US Attorney.

37. The US Attorney attempted to invent a story that the after-trial contacts with jurors was normal, when it was not. The US Attorney and others hoped to create the impression that after-trial interviews of released jurors was normal, as misdirection from the attorney standards of conduct which prohibit this after-trial contact.

38. The US Attorney and others knew the after-trial interviews at home of jurors was coercive and not consistent with the attorney standards of conduct, nor did it have an appearance of impartiality the court requires. The US Attorney knew the after-trial interviews were not consistent with the court order sealing the juror names. The White House counsel, DOJ Staff, and US Attorney incorrectly assumed the jurors were ignorant of court orders or prohibited contact. The White House, DOJ Staff, and US Attorneys office attempted to provide misleading information to the public to confuse other past, represent, and future jurors about what was or was not appropriate. This was designed to open the door to future jury tampering and an impermissibly assault on the independence of the Judicial Branch. American legal counsel attempted to exploit their position of public trust to induce others to cooperate with impermissible activity which violated the attorney standards of conduct, court orders, and independence of the judicial branch.

39. The US Attorney directed others to communicate misleading, incorrect, or invalid information to the public about the FBI contacts with the seated jurors. This communication through others was a prohibited act, which the US Attorney knew or should have known was not something the US Attorney could directly communicate. The US Attorney knew or should have known that directing someone else to communicate information the US Attorney was prohibited from communicating was a subsequent violation of the Attorney standards of conduct. The US Attorney incorrectly believed this secondary communication, not directly related to the US Attorney, would not be traced to the US Attorney.

41. The US Attorney invented the fable that post-trial interviews were normal, and that the court, in error, released the jurors before the after-trial interviews could occur. The US Attorney knew or should have known these post-trial interviews, in this case, where the names had been sealed, were improper, not normal, and not within the permissible communications between the attorney and released jury members after trial.

Misrepresenting Results of Interviews With Seated Jurors

42. The US Attorney knew or should have known they were misrepresenting the jury deliberations, and that the majority of jurors supported acquittal. However, in alleged reckless disregard for the truth, the US Attorney pretended that the majority of jurors had voted to convict. This was a false statement, irrelevant to the second trial, but material in appearing to tamper the potential jury pool. The US Attorney allegedly made after-trial statements they knew or should have known were in breach of the attorney standards of conduct, tended to cast the defendant in an unfavorable light, and in no way was an approved exception permitting attorney comments to the media about a trial.

Implausible Derivation Method: Evidence of Lack of Contrition, Remorse, or Respect For Attorney Standards

43. The US Attorney knew, or should have known, that the post-trial interviews of sealed jurors was not normal, but a breach of the attorney standards of conduct. Rather than accept responsibility for the impermissible, unintended, and prohibited contact with jurors, the US Attorney fabricated a story that they had derived the names from another list. The US Attorney, in arguing that they did not have access to the sealed juror names, knew or should have known that they were attempting to do something the court did not intend: Contact sitting jurors after trial. This ruse was intended to be used in other court cases with the intent to dissuade future jurors from disclosing these contacts to the media and Members of Congress on the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.

Conduct Does not Reflect Well on US Attorney Or Court Shielding of Jurors

44. The US Attorney, in fabricating a story about how they derived the names of sealed jurors from the list of potential jurors, knew or should have known that this was an implausible, false, and irrelevant argument. Even if they were, on chance alone, able to derive the name of one seated juror from this list of potential jurors, the US Attorney knew or should have known that they did not have access to the list of sealed jurors, the court did not release this list to the US Attorney, and the court did not intend for the US Attorney or anyone to contact the seated jurors after they had been released from trial.

45, The US Attorney knew, or should have known, that the story about how they did or did not obtain the list of seated jurors was irrelevant, a misdirection, and unrelated to whether or not the US Attorney did or did not have authorization to contact seated jurors after they had been released from trial. The US Attorney, DOJ Staff, and White House counsel knew the court had sealed the names of the seated jurors; but they attempted to create a pretext that would bypass this court restriction, and engage in prohibited conduct which violated the court order and attorney standards of conduct.

46. The US Attorney knew or should have known that this misrepresentation was an alleged breach of the Attorney standards of conduct, and impermissibly attempted to induce others to communicate information that the standards do not permit attorneys to communicate. The misrepresentations to the media, public, and next pool of jury members impermissibly communicated that they would misrepresent information, and not feel bound by the Attorney standards of conduct.

47. The US Attorney allegedly breached the attorney standards of conduct in the following ways:

48. First, by ignoring the court order that sealed the seated juror names;

49. Second, by directing others to engage in prohibited contacts the attorney standards of conduct do not permit attorneys to engage

50. Third, by communicating through others information that was incorrect, misrepresentations, or false

51. Fourth, by directing through others impermissible communications, interviews, and contacts with seated jurors after they had been released from trial

52. Fifth, by fabricating a story about how they derived the names of seated jurors, when they knew or should have known this derivation-argument was irrelevant, and outside what the court intended as permissible contact after trial with seated jury members.

53. Sixth, by admitting that they did not have the access to the seated jurors, but supposedly derived those names from another list, the US Attorney knew or should have known the court did not intent for after-trial contact with seated jurors, but the US Attorney worked with others to create the ruse that the contacts were normal, regular, routine, expected, and proper, when they knew these were not normal in light of the court order, FBI involvement, home visits, and other alleged deceptions.

54. Seventh, the US Attorney knew or should have known the direction to the FBI was not authorized; the court in sealing the names, did not intended for the US Attorney through others to engage in post-trial contacts with seated jurors; and that the US Attorney agreed to take responsibility for the FBI contacts which they knew or should have known violated the court rules and attorney standards of conduct.

55, Eighth, by engaging in misrepresentations, fraud, and other alleged breaches of the attorney standards of conduct, raising doubts about the truthfulness, reliability, and trustworthiness of the attorney

56. Ninth, invented a fable about how they obtained the list of seated jurors, when they knew or should have known that it was irrelevant how they obtained the list of seated jurors, only that the attorney standards of conduct prohibit the attorney to contacted released jurors.

57. Tenth, The US Attorney knew or should have known when the court sealed the names, those jurors were not to be contacted; and there was no excuse for anyone to retroactively pretend they derived the list of seated juror names from the list of possible jurors.

58. Eleventh, The US Attorney knew or should have known that the ruse about how they derived the list of seated juror names was irrelevant, meaningless, subject to discovery, not protected, and defied reason.

59. Twelfth, the US Attorney conduct raises substantial doubts about their fitness as supervisors, integrity, honesty, reliability, and trustworthiness. The US Attorney knew or should have known that a simple review of the facts would raise reasonable questions about the explanations which defy reason, appear implausible, and appear to support an impermissible agreement to violate the attorney standards of conduct directly and through others.

60. Thirteenth, the US Attorney, DOJ Staff counsel, and White House counsel through others were making allegedly recklessly false and misleading statements about the jury deliberations. The intent of this agreement and statements was to make impermissible statements about the jury deliberations with the goal of tampering future jurors involved with this case and future war crimes prosecutions against US government officials.

Remedy

61. The adverse consequences have occurred. They must end. Until the juries are free from all intimidation, the world rightly raises doubts the judicial branch can adequately adjudicate war crimes against the President, DOJ Staff, civilian legal counsel, and civilian policy makers. Outside enforcement of Geneva against US government officials, contractors, and agents is required.

62. One remedy to punish the government for the alleged breach of court order sealing the juror names and engaging in alleged breach of attorney standards of conduct is for the Court to dismiss the case and all charges against Wecht.

63. The US government, US Attorney, FBI, and White House are on notice any time they attempt to corrupt justice, their cases will be ejected from the court. This rule applies to whether the US government attempts to tamper with jury members on a public corruption case, with jurors on a possible war crimes jury reviewing rendition, or when POWs are abused and not afforded all Geneva protections as required under the laws of war.

64. Until the Judicial Branch aggressively challenges the White House, DOJ Staff, US Attorney, FBI, and other attorney violations of standards of conduct, the public and world legal community will continue to view the US judicial system as corrupt and incapable of impartially adjudicating alleged war crimes against the President, DOJ Staff, and other US government civilian legal counsel and policy makers. This appearance of judicial incompetence justifies non-US prosecutions of American policy makers, contractors, legal counsel, and civilian policy advisers.

65. Until the US government respects the independence of the court, the world community can reasonably assume the President, DOJ Staff, White House counsel, US Attorney, and FBI agents will continue to attempt to compromise jury independence, and seek to tamper with jury members called to review war crimes evidence related to US government officials, legal counsel, and civilian policy makers.