Google this to find the other organizations involved with the read-aheads, which contractors were preparing inputs, and how civilians and military personnel were organizing the information:

Information Warfare Doctrine

jp3_13.pdf

Here is the at this link

Look at the contractors referencing this document. Those are contractors that are well aware that they may have a potential for favorable contract awards if they present information to the public consistent with DoD objectives.

DoD has a goal of not only providing information through retired military officers, but also through other not-yet-publicly-disclosed avenues. These include deliberately false information passed from non-directly-connected US sources. These sources are designed to be discredited, and distract attention, as needed, from potential problems. These are for contingency plans.

Use the listed guide as a framework for understanding how DoD was planning to support ground combat/post-invasion with information warfare.

We recommend TPMM community analyzing these FOIA releases consider the following suggestions.

A. Use an Excel Spreadsheet

B. Identify themes, plot them on the y-axis (vertial)

C. Read through releases, and identify when key documents were used to advance these themes, and plot these along the horizontal, x-axis. This will help you see the DoD-level planning using the information warfare guide.

D. Then assign, on a speculative basis, the most likely contractors, offices, and agencies tasked to support these themes. There will be gaps in the disclosed notes because there are other sources which have not yet been connected with these disclosures.

You'll notice as you read the DoD FOIA information that there are changes in themes. Compare these changes to new findings or public issues related to Abu Ghraib, legal challenges confronting DOJ OLC, or some of the POW issues which the JAGs were raising.

Compare also the disclosures to the Iraq NIE analysis, focus on known problems with planning in the NIE; and contrast those with the public statements suggesting other progress.

You'll also see some changes as he information warfare command changed. The name may have changed, but there will be the same people. You'll want to conduct some reviews of personnel names assigned to the following:

Joint Information Operations Center
Joint Command and Control Warfare Center
Joint Electronic Warfare Center
Joint Information Operations Warfare Command

Also, the information may touch on some cryptographic information with the NSA. NSA would have been attempting to (in some cases) provide misleading, untimely, or deceptive information about its operations. One method is, despite NSA knowledge of an event, for the NSA and others to craft a deliberate error to make the enemies of the US focus on a wrong problem, or conclude a deficiency where none existed.

Part of the information isn't only to deceive the public, but to affect how the enemies of the United States monitor US progress in Iraq; and methods the US Commanders have at their disposal to mislead potential and actual adversaries.

See iii for changes since 1998 in the 2006 edition.

II-9 shows you some criteria DoD was using after 2006 to issue public information.

These can be compared to the DoD releases to review:

- Were these factors met
- Where did DoD fall down on their own standards

IV-3 shows the "cell" concept for information operations. Note legal counsel is involved.

- Why didn't legal counsel, as part of this pre-2006 "cell" concept, object to alleged breaches of Smith Act in providing allegedly false information to the US public?

- Did legal counsel voice any objections in these "cells" to using illegally captured, unreliable information for subsequent unlawful uses against civilians, in alleged breaches of Geneva?

- When did DOJ OLC factor into the discussion on how unreliable POW-sourced information be provided to American civilians?

V-4 shows you the Joint Staff view of how various timelines are coordinated with various actors. This is a top level view of the process: From identifying issues, down to implementing that approach.

DoD PA would have been involved with this process. the FOIA responses show, or should show, the complete picture of decision making, planning, and implementation of the strategy.

APpendixB shows you summary charts, and the last chart shows Public Affairs roles. Consider the PsyOps column in re military analysts.

- Mutual support
- Potential conflicts
- Support Functions

The above issues would have been considered, organized behind the scenes: The documents in the FOIA response are (in theory) the fruit of this planning.

This is a sample contract for informatoin warfare. The Omnitec is not necessarily in direct NSA support.

HOwever, the NSA does have classified contracts which transfer NSA-collected information, then repackage that information for domestic consumption. This is through the "media messaging" aspect of the classified contract. The terms, as with the Verizon contract, are classified, and subject to gag orders. However, DoJ OLC legal counsel have publicly commented on the Verizon-related contract issues.

The questions to ask on this DoD contract, at the link:

- What sources of information from the NSA collection did the media messaging conrtactors use?

- How were these media messages, gleaned from analysis of NSA surveillance of US domestic conversations, folded into the military analyst's comments to the US media?

Contracts like these may have been segregated, and the information would show up, out of nowhere, and then passed to a third, unknown party. It's possible people working on these contractors may not have known the NSA was conducting surveillance on American conversations; or that the information they were asked to develop plans for was illegally captured. This is a compartmentalized approach.

If connected with war crimes, the attorney-client privilege of the DoD "cells" would be subject to the "fraud-crime" exception. DoJ OLC should have discussed this, as recorded in the JCON database.

Page 6 is the address in Alexandria.

Recommend DOJ Small Business Unit be factored into this analysis. You'll want to look for language translation contractors.

Page 15 shows the contract-management is in Indianapolis.

This explains the common sites outside legal counsel were interfacing with.

Have the White House emails to/from outside counsel been back-traced through this facility?

Page 25, last item shows this contract is going to year 2011, another three (3) years.

This contradicts public statements of an early withdrawal from Iraq.

What does DoD plan on using these contracts for after operations in Iraq have ended?

Page 1 shows the Guantanamo connection with the statements.

This is from 2005.

This suggests there was a DoD-effort to dissuade Congressional action. Could have Geneva , Nuremberg implications.

This shows the role the analysts had in getting supplemental funding.

Alleged false information to Congress to secure funding for additional alleged war crimes.

- How much money did these CEO/retired officers get through the contracts by way of bonuses for securing contracts funded with this supplemental?

III-1, 40 of 117 shows what happened:

Intelligence Support to Information Operations

The US Constitution was sidelined. Information warfare took center stage. NSA was viewed as a tool to collect intelligence about potential threats, and US citizens' willingness to support combat operations.

Law enforcement (JTTF, local law enforcement, FBI) using NSL's was viewed as an arm of information operations, unconstrained by law.

Here is the key guidance, which was ignored:

Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The IC must implement technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally, intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement or other sources. xi, 12 of 117 (also 43 of 117)

The problem isn't just with the DoD analysts providing allegedly false information about Iraq, but how the overall cells were legally advised.

Even if the lawyers were ignored, someone in DoD would have had to assent to OVP directions, despite the DOD guidance which reminded cell management of legal requirements on data collection.

- Once the JAGs were sidelined, who made threats against the cell management/officers to dissuade them from privately discussing legal issues with the JAGs?

Connection Between DoD Information Warfare, DOJ OLC Yoo Memoranda

78 of 136, is consistent with the DOJ OLC Memoranda from John Yoo in re DoD warrants: He viewed the Untied States as a battlefield. DOJ OLC memoranda and Yoo's Berkeley Law Review article stated terrorists could be disguised as civilians.

Figure V-2. Templating Information Operations Planning and Assessments

DOJ OLC memoranda was not created in a vaccum within DOJ

- POWs were abused in violation of Geneva;
- FISA violations occurred, without required warrants
- NSLs were used, despite their illegality
- Telecoms supported illegal information warfare against American citizens
- Contractors were linked with allegedly illegal domestic media messaging

The DoD retired military officer analyst problem is merely a subset of the larger FISA-NSL violations occurring under the Information Warfare umbrella. The Untied States viewed American civilians as legitimate military targets, until proven innocent of a connection with a possible threat of terrorism.

As a consequence of this reckless conduct, a presumption of good faith fails. Indeed, the United States is presumed guilty of war crimes and unconstitutional conduct until it fully cooperates with oversight.

JOPES

89 of 136

JOPES are well understood to the intelligence community contractors. They are guidance documents used for information planning, discussions, and other planning documents. JOPES can be linked to government agencies, intelligence functions, and civilian contractors.

JOPES connect with the intelligence community's coordination with civilian contractors supporting the NSA and CIA. JOPES planning documents are linked with specific travel, conferences, and other meetings between the NSA contractors, the intelligence community personnel, intermediaries.

These connect with the NARUS STA 6400-planning related documents, meetings, and other things.

Organizationally, these also connect with the outside counsel, and civilian contractors providing language translation services to the CIA for POWs; and connect with the DOJ Small Business Unit.

Auditing JOPES Breakdown

Congress needs to review the specific agreements used to explain away these risk mitigation requirements, and understand which specific legal authority from DOJ OLC was recklessly used to explain away planning requirements. These will be documented in the JCON database.

Example: Look at page B-A-2

What impact will the absence of feedback have on the plan?

Congress needs to understand why this question, when asked, did not generate information and discussion to mitigate this risk; and understand why the manning required to support post-invasion planning in Iraq was four-fold below requirements. Inadequate manpower translates into higher costs and more time to reach objectives.

The military analysts appear to have supported the absurd forecasts, and substantially delayed needed consideration of the Baker-Hamilton options.

Let's consider to what extent these background briefings were using checklist=terminology.

DoD Information Warfare Guidance:

IO cell assists in transforming staff estimates into the Commander's Estimate.

Press Briefing:

"They are highly transformational."1 of 5

The words appear to say one thing, but when you compare the jargon with the information warfare guidance, you'll see it's going according to a checklist, and is not anything related to independent thinking. This was sold as objective, but it was highly managed to present a skewed, warped picture. It's as if these are transcripts from CEO discussions with analysts, hoping to hype the numbers which have been highly massaged, in violation of the securities rules.

4 of 5 "Cutting and Running"-theme.

1 of 8:

Note the language substantially mirroring the information warfare guide:

"Industrial"

"Joint"

One Part of Missing Puzzle

1 of 5 Guantanamo (GTMO) Abuses, FBI Reports

Senate Armed Services Briefing

The person briefing says they Appointed Furlow.

"I ordered a 15-6, Amry Regulation 15-6 investigated, and appointed . . . "

Brigadier Genera John Furlow Appointed by an official with US Souther Command.

''U.S. Southern Command headquarters appointed Army Brigadier General John Furlow to direct “an internal investigation into recently disclosed allegations by members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of detainee abuse” at Guantánamo.''From

Southern Command is providing information, and the Florida Connection would allegedly implicate, by inference, Telestrategies, Terremark (State Department Diplomatic Communications), NARUS fiber optic interception, and the CIA communication relays.

Iraq Stability Report To Congress

See for Syria, reconstruction, foreign fighters.

5 of 8: FFRDC Federal Research (Rand, Center for Naval Analysis)

See for Afghanistan.

See for Army Procurement, PEO.

See for Iraq security.

Mighty tasty analyses, testing. Yum! This is even better than chocolate!

See for names on DoD conference calls. Lists the ranks of personnel. 287 pages.

18 of 61 Where is Iraq WMD?

30 of 61: "No threat" to civil liberties. (see first question)

58 of 61 Liberia.

Page 47 POW detention photos. These do not square with US comments in re Iraq/Nuremberg.

See: No Fly zone violations.

Dramatic photo presentation.

Unrelated to WMD. Continuing operations.

US shows it doesn't have enough air power to challenge the breaches of the post-Gulf War I "no fly" zone. Rather than address the failed air power-problem, the US exposes, by invading, the failed ground force problem.

See for Iraq reconstruction data.

Briefing: 2003.

However, the US Auditor for Iraqi Reconstruction in 2008, five years later said there were still no clear goals.

- What was the basis for the 2003 briefing?

- Why weren't the "other views" (see Joint Guide) introduced in planning, pre 2002?

See for DOD monitoring of the analysts statements in media.

See for Afghan drug money.