Counsel,

This message is not intended as legal advice. It points you to specific emails showing DoD password coding issues. This information would help pinpoint whether there are or are not reasonable procedures in place to adequately access or not access the DoD email systems. By analogy, these password issues should have been resolved with the White House and DoD. Whether the White House and DoD, as part of their information warfare planning do or do not still retain the information on the Wecht Jury contents is subject to discovery.

The links show there is a back-up email system which DoD IT personnel were using. Here is a sample private email attached to the OVP legal counsel, which may be of interest on the rendition and FBI contacts with the Wecht Jury.

The Italian war crimes prosecutor has had some difficulty in getting US government cooperation on various email requests. There is also speculation that the White House email retention problems may have some relevance to the Wecht Counsel discovery and Congress.

This note is intended to guide you to specific evidence which may have bearing to the ongoing war crimes investigation and FBI contacts with Wecht Counsel

There is information showing private contractors with official US government addresses. The information below points you to specific evidence of the DoD password account software discussions. This would set a time-certain when specific, known IT personnel were or were not involved with specific problems. As with the DoD public affairs namies, the names of IT personnel in DoD should be known to the White House, DoJ, and civilian IT contractors.

The email shows us that there were specific people openly talking about password coding issues on a specific date. This means that those software personnel would have a specific contact within DoD, the IT industry, and other agency/community contacts within DoJ, DoD, and the White House.

If it is your intention to seek these back-up emails to the White House, and possible emails retained by private counsel on White House It issues, the discovery may wish to focuse on the key names, their trouble reports, and whether the now-reported email problems are or are not consitent with the supposed failure modes they originally handled during software development.

The information below may include specific points of contact of IT personnel who have direct knowledge of how the password software within DoD was or was not resolved; and how these lessons did or did not get applied to the DOJ JCON, White House, and other rendition-related software email system.

Here is some backup email information related to the data mining. You'll find a sample message showing the OSD password coding. Note the email includes a civilian contractor, but that contractor has an official OSD email address. That may shed some light on why some of the DOD emails were or were not deleted.

Here is the archive of that non-US government controlled email, which may or may not shed light on other OSD communications with the White House or DOJ on similar password, coding, or other issues involving access, trouble logs, and software stability. This information would shed light on whether the current White House/DoJ email retention issues are or are not consistent with the original coding issues and how they were resolved.

This disclosed password coding message shows us that civilians were using official US government email accounts, but assigned to contractors. This would be relevant when asking for specific DoD or DOJ emails related to contacts with the White House on the FBI's contact with the Wecht Jury members.

Also, when reviewing the White House software development, the issue should be broadly couched in terms of which emails did private contractors use sending non-White House accounts, but may have been assigned to DoD, DoD contractors, or other contractors linked with DoJ or the DOJ JCON database management.

Note the disclosed code includes DoD password coding information. This password information would be relevant when establishing the date-certain for specific White House, DOJ JCON, and FBI-US Attorney password access as connected with the planning for the Wecht Jury contacts. Key programmers would have discussed similar coding issues with the DoD, White House, and DOJ JCON databases.

This information would be useful in understanding what types of security protocols were in place; but whether someone unusual changed related to the dates key information related to Wecht went missing. Password access lists should have been formalized, tested, and well documented. However, if, despite this planning, there are no emails specifically raising the supposed failure modes the White House, DoD, or DOJ would have us believe exist, then we know there is a problem.

The IT account/trouble logs and software coding issues should track to the disclosed problems related to the email retention and access. However, if there was no issue during development, and this software problem (later disclosed) was never an earlier problem, then we need to understand why the software programmers' emails, related to that development effort, are not available. This comparison would show us whether the original troubles identified and resolved during coding do or do not square with the asserted failure modes linked with problems with the White House, DoD, or DOJ JCON database access.

Below that sample message, you'll find corrected links to the software development messages. These may be of interest when looking for the software coding messages send to/from OSD-connected software developers; and getting backup information from the IT-community of who was doing what on the White House emails.

Here is a sample argument, and outline for your discovery plan of the White House and DOJ JCON emails.

Here is a sample line of questions when reviewing the White House involvement with the contact of Jury members.

Here is the basis to question a presumption of good faith.

Here is a discussion of why knowing how the FBI obtained the names of the sealed jurors may not necessarily be relevant.

Here is a sample discovery plan of the DOJ JCON database, using an exception to the Attorney-client privilege as it would relate to Wecht-related emails.