These are JCS comments in the wake of the Iraq NIE. The comments indirectly discuss a military draft. A draft may be required if measurable US combat forces are required outside armed Iraq or Afghanistan:

The current demand for our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan exceeds the sustainable supply and limits our ability to provide ready forces for other contingencies. . . If unaddressed, this lack of balance poses a significant risk to the All-Volunteer Force

CRS Iraq reconstruction budgets and audits. Reconstruction relies on military personnel trained in counter insurgency. (CRS-36,"Excessive Reliance on the U.S. Military.")

Here is the official Special Inspector General website for Iraqi Reconstruction. We have no confidence in the milestones the President provided to Congress. Money appears to be getting thrown around, disconnected from a creible plan. The milestones match, without explanation or justification, the 5- and 10-year points.

The question is how these dollars are being managed, or are there leaks. There's a difference between obligation/expedenditure (1) goals, (2) actuals, and (3) real results. Example, Jan08 report to Congress:

The capacity of the ISF to provide its own logistical support has progressed slowly. Funds excecution rate problems are described in terms of symptoms, not, as they should, mis-management decisions. There are inadquate methods/baselines to evaluate current funds execution rates in Iraq, and no credible basis for goals.

Check the "Allocations by Sector" and compare them with the CSIS-sourced documents.

Illusory Reconstruction Progress

- Without a plan, where is the money going; and what is basis for celebration for funds execution rates?

The VIP visits to Iraq appear to be photoops, without measured evaulation of real reconstruction progress.

PRT civilian management are program liasion, and not assigned to do the contracting work: 323 required, 298 assigned as of Jan07. President's focuse on PRT staffing is meaningless, unless he's poiting to total contractor personnel required for the PRT objectives. Whether the PRT schedules and objectives are reasonable is a secondary issue ("October 2007 found no
coordinated strategic plan for PRT activities.").

Need more information on the results of Iraqi contractors in the "Iraqi First Program": Are the contractors making progress on reconstruction; or are they still training and organizing. (Without a plan, where is the money really going: "critical need to identify each province’s resource requirements and to assign appropriately trained personnel to address those requirements") This does not address reconstruction milestones or progress, only guidance: ("provide more timely and reactive strategic guidance")

Slogans Without Real Progress or Plan

The "Year of"-language on the yearly reconstruction reports, matches the Iraqi Deputy PM comments.

There has been insufficient time for Iraqi forces, civilians, or US personnel or contractors to modernize, much less start these programs. Subsequent 2007 GAO findings match SIGIR conclusion: "noted a lack of an overarching U.S. capacity development program with specific roles and objectives."

Key problems, at odds with the President's statements on Iraqi reconstruction. The systems in place do not support the President's assertions about progress in Iraq. There's no basis to believe the data is connected with any claims about management, progress, planning, or auditing (from SIGIR, Jan08 Report):

Transition risk: "very high risk for the timely transition"

Reporting: No "requirement to report completed projects"

Assessment: "The absence of an overall strategy makes it difficult to assess the adequacy of funding to meet the desired end state."

Oversight: "no single office had the authority or
responsibility for the oversight and coordination of anticorruption efforts."

SIGIR "politicial reconcilation" findings appear to be conclusosry, without data to support findings, nor discussed in context of larger, unfolding civil war. Other problems relate to poor visibility into how reconstruction relates to combat losses, or sustained infrastructure decay since sanctions. There's little sense of how new road availability compares with requirements. A single comment on one port or cellular contract: What else?

DoD electricity-capacity claims in the SIGIR report appear to be incorrect accepted without supporting documentation. DoD forecasts, in light of the problems with planning, need substantiation and follow-up. "Pre-war" electricity production levels included the impacts of sanctions. We're beyond that, yet SIGIR uses this as a reference. Benchmarks need to be revised to what Iraqis need, and should reasonably expect in 2008, five [5] years after the invasion. Look at sabotage, idle time, and down-time due to energy shortages.

- What was the basis for the energy allocations for each region?

- How have these assumptions/allocations been revised downward since invasion?

- What is the plan to use meaningful progress indicators?

- Energy plans without coherent plan. Without a coherent reconstruction plan, what is the basis for "success or failure" in the energy sector, presumably also not linked with that non-existent plan?

- Inadequate basis for comparison. Why were oil production goals lowered in 2007; how is this reflected in the President's claims about oil production?

- Energy supplies are still off their peaks, yet near-term percent changes appear favorable. How were energy supplies channel stuffed to create dips, then turnarounds in recent reports?

How common is this: "Private contractors and Army officials denied SIGIR’s request for military escorts to visit the site"; any subsequent access? Presidential VIPs to a combat zone, but no auditors? "The assessment
team relied solely on photo and contract
documents to complete the assessment."

Governance and Financial Management

This needs a follow-up: This is the second round of audits (125 of 245, and other comments) :

Iraqi needs were not considered when the system was being developed

These are problems with the financial management system:

In January 2008, SIGIR released its audit, “Efforts To Implement a Financial Management Information System (IFMIS) in Iraq.”399 The IFMIS was intended to streamline Iraq’s financial systems by improving transparency, accountability, and fiscal analysis. The audit is a follow-up to an October 2007 interim report on the implementation of the IFMIS system.400 The original report found that the project did not have a firm development plan, did not have Iraqi buy-in, and was suspended in June 2007. This quarter, SIGIR auditors completed the IFMIS review and found: • The project remains suspended. • Iraqi needs were not considered when the system was being developed and the project, therefore, did not have full GOI support. • USAID had insufficient documentation to differentiate funds earmarked for IFMIS. • USAID issued a broad scope and offered broad guidance, which is not advantageous and not the best contracting method for the project. • ITAO had sufficient documentation to differentiate between funds that were allocated and expended.

- If Iraqi needs were not being adequately considered, who/what is driving this "transition" from what to what?

167 of 245 (Section 3, SIGIR Report) outlines sample audit issues, methods, and conract problems.

224 of 245: Other agency audits, sample inputs/factors to an Iraq NIE.

GAO 351092 August 2007 Planning for Iraq Drawdown

GAO 320461 October 2006 Efforts To Stabilize Iraq and Achieve Conditions To Allow the Drawdown of U.S. Troops

GAO 351016 March 2007 Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Processes to Coordinate Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) Intelligence Support

GAO 351017 March 2007 Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Organizational Management Support Capabilities

Crocker incorrectly reported there were no US-funded reconstruction efforts, when there are $600M. This raises questions about what Crocker is looking at in terms of audit reports on US spending in Iraq; and how, without knowing what funds were going to US reconstruction, the US leadership is effectively overseeing much less establishing goals for US funding. It appears the SecDef is not reading the Iraqi Reconstruction audits, not familiar with the findings, and unclear what problems thare are with funding, and in no position to respond to audit reports he and others in the administration are not reading.

Failure of SecDef and Crocker to immediately know there were US funds being spent on Iraqi reconstruction suggests they have no idea what progress has or hasn't been made; nor clear how US PRT, and contracting assistance to the Iraqis should or shouldn't be better assisted. Crocker's comment suggests several problems:

- Despite audits from the US Auditor for reconstuction, the SecDef is not reading those reports, concerns, recurring problems, nor is responding to the auditor's recommendations;

- The US goals for Iraqi reconstruction are not being effectively interwoven with Iraqi-supported success criteria;

- Problems the auditor found in previous years has not been given sufficient attention at OSD level;

- There are more pressing issues, other than US funds for reconstruction, despite the President declaring "mission accomplished";

- The President and Joint Chiefs of Staff are not effectively discussing Geneva-related requirements in Iraq for civil society;

- Presidential statements on US funding projections going forward are not connected with real requirements, goals, or plans.

The President does not appear to be well managing these distinct Executive Branch responsibilities. He appears to have been let down by Senior personnel trained on this management; or the President is not listening to repeated concerns.

Recommendations

The Congress needs to review to what extent the SecDef and Joint Chiefs of Staff are discussing the Auditors Reports for Iraqi reconstruction;

GAO needs to enter the nexus to examine to what extent there are similar problems with SecDef, Joint Staff, and Presidential "lack of time" to meet Geneva obligations

DoD IG needs to provide a summary report to Congress on findings related to DoD reconstruction programs, oversight, PRT management, and other concerns to date with DoD-led efforts with reconstruction

State IG needs to provide to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee detailed evidence behind the President's statements on PRT, reconstruction coordination, and other efforts; to include contract management progress, budgets expended, and schedule completion relative to original US forecasts, and now Iraqi requirements; to include expected get well dates;

Iraqi Reconstruction Auditor needs to outline in summary form in the next report an overview of his findings to date to include: the specific issues, letters, and other memoranda of findings that he has expressly provided to the Joint Staff, SecDef, and President; and show key recommendations, promised get well dates, and recurring problems related to reconstruction goals, success criteria, and contract management.

Note the factors deleted from the speech closely match those listed on page 6 of ( of the 2007 NIE Summary. These issues dovetail with the problems raised in the DoD information provided to contractors:

- De-Bathification
- Ethnic support

Note also the flaw of the NIE Summary and Key Judgments: The NIE lists things that are undesirable (Iranian power expansion) as if it were a problem for Iraq. The US's NIE on Iraq incorrectly characterizing an "undesirable political goal for the US" as an adverse Iraqi stability issue. Not necessarily. A stronger Iran could be good for Iran if Iran were to provide a moderating element, or help manage the civil war in Iraq. Iranian-US joint military cooperation in Iraq does not mandate repression of any ethnic group.

Absurdly, the US cannot credibly argue or be concerned Iran wants more Iraqi instability: That would put greater pressure on finite Iranian resources. US analysts need to explain why they are invoking a Nicaraguan-Cuban model: How Central American meddling in Haiti would drive refugees into Miami and destabilize the United States. As with Central America, such a nexus is more of an American-driven model, than one the Iranians would support. Recall, Hamas did not lose against Israel; not all Iranian support to Hamas or Lebanon was military, but financial. As with the Crusades, Iran is supported because they are viewed as a regional power which can marginally perform better than a distant western meddler.

US funding profiles for Iraq: (15 of 58). The issue is whether lower US budgets for Iraq are adequately matched by rising Iraqi financial, training, manpower resources. The worst case: Even if Iraq complemented US budget reductions, Iraqi forces could be untrained for the real challenge: Spreading civil war, different than an insurgency.