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FBI Quickly Discovered NSA illegal Activity: Where Was DoJ OPR, IG?

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We're told the FBI-related personnel "stumbled" upon the NSA's illegal activity withing "twel've" hours. Then when did the President know about this discovery to block DOJ OPR and DOJ IG from reviewing the NSA activity; where was the FBI referral to the NSA IG, DoJ IG and DOJ OPR when FBI-connected personnel apparently did not follow-up on this illegal activity? Many questions about the timelines, notifications, and what really blocked the reviews.


Comments (13)

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TPMM shares this NYT article raising many questions about what we've been asked to believe about the NSA domestic surveillance. We've been asked to believe that the program was lawful, there were no disagreements, and the disclosures about the program were unlawful. Today's revelations cast these assumptions aside, and require a revisit of what we've been told since 2001.

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Until now, we've been asked to believe there were no internal disagreements about the legality of the program. However, this revelation in the NYT review certainly reaises some eyebrows:

The adviser warned him not to sign the warrant applications because it was unclear where the wiretaps were coming from.

Until now, the President and others asked us to believe that he had a controlled review, the program was lawful, and there was no data mining without warrants. However, if the warrant applications weren't getting signed, how was the NSA conducting the warrantless surveillance; and who was processing the warrant applications?

It appears the President's "rigorous program of oversight" wasn't operating as he described. Even without a warrant application getting signed, the NSA surveillance continued, minus a warrant, and minus a warrant application. This raises the question: Who was directing the surveillance to continue without both a warrant and no signed warrant application?

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Another curious revelation in the NYT's review of the novel includes:

technicians stumbled onto the N.S.A.’s program accidentally within 12 hours of its inception, setting off what officials described as a brief firestorm of anxiety among senior officials.

Within 12 hours of the program's inception doesn't tell us much:

- Which program are they talking about;

- How do we know that the program they stumbled upon had not been operating longer?

- If someone was able to determine the FBI technicians did stumble upon a specific activity, who did this review to ensure the FBI's claims were about the program they thought it was, and not another program?

If the timeline is true -- that the program had only been operating for 12 hours, but was discovered -- we need to re-examine the review of that discovery. Someone had to do the following:

- Understand that they had detected something which was not lawful;

- Work as liaision between the FBI, FBI technicians, telecoms, and the NSA to compare what the technicians were looking at, the results they were observing, and the ongoing NSA-telecom coordination on the warrants;

- Establish there were no other explanations;

- Get a confirmation from the NSA that the FBI technicians had "stumbled upon" something that had been coordinated with the NSA, telecoms, and done without warrants

- Confirm that the activity the FBI technicians stumbled upon was related to government-related wiretapping, but was not lawful or authorized according to the law

- Then make a decision not to review that program under FISA for legality;

- Make a decision, despite FBI technicians learning of illegal activity, to not prosecute that violation of FISA.

The above chain of events required several breaks in what was suppsoed to have happened:

A. Illegal surveillance should have been provided to the FISA Court and US Attys for review. Someone in the White House or DoJ blocked that prosecution and court review.

B. The evidence of the unlawful surveillance should have been secured and forwarded to appropriate law enforcement, IG, and ethics personnel. However, we learn the President blocked DOJ OPR from reviewing this program, and that DoJ IG and Congress claim they never knew. However Harmon's revelations paint a different picture: She knew.

C. Congress should have been made aware of the unlawful government surveillance. Upon notification, the Congressional committees, even the minority members, had the power to direct DoJ IG and NSA IG to revivew these. Yet, despite the events of 2001, it apparently wasn't until 2005 when the NYT story broke that Congress acted.

- When did Congress really learn of the illegal activity; and why is there no direction by any of the Committee staff to the IGs to provide details?

- Or, were the Members of Congress informed of a program they knew was illegal, and refused to investigate, despite DoJ legal counsel's reservations?

- Was there no record of anyone in DoJ or NSA talking to anyone in Congress about their concerns within days of this discovery by the FBI technicatians?

- What happened between 2001 when the program was first started and 2005 when the NYT story broke: Which people in NSA and DOJ, knowing of the unlwafulness, were dissuaded from communicating their concerns to DOJ OPR, DoJ IG, NSA IG, Congress, the FISA Court, and the District of Colubmia attorney disciplinary board?

The revelations today raise more questions about the timelines, assumptions, claims, and whether the FISA-related circuit breakers were corrupted in other to-be-understood ways.

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This claim does not reconcile with what Members of Congress have publicly asked us to believe about their concerns after the NYT revelations in 2005:

Some who had not been told about the program were concerned that the agency was violating laws that required a court order for the singling out of Americans in wiretaps, and they immediately alerted higher-ups to what they had discovered.

If there were "immediate" notifications to FBI leadership, why wasn't this information provided to Congress; or was Congress informed, and sat on this until the NYT article in 2005?

When did Members of Congress first learn, after the FBI leadership notification, of the FBI technicians' discoveries?

Did the President block Congress from reviewing this information; or why didn't DoJ OPR and DoJ IG provide a briefing to the Senate Intelligence Committee?

When did the Senate Intelligence Committee first learn of the FBI technicians' discoveries?

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Here is something that doesn't reconcile with the telecom's claims about their activities. Qwest refused to participate because of questions about unlawfulness. We're also asked to believe that the telecoms should be eligible for immunity.

The NYT's report raises questions about the merits of the telecoms' claims:

But the presidential approval, one former intelligence official disclosed, came without a formal legal opinion endorsing the program by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department.

and:

The adviser warned him not to sign the warrant applications because it was unclear where the wiretaps were coming from.

Withut a signed warrant application, and no legal opinion behind the Presidential order, what documents were the telecoms relying on to support the NSA?

Were the telecoms only relying on a verbal order of the President; if so, what were they promised would be forthcoming?

Is the problem with the NSLs -- that more information would support the NSLs, but that information didn't appear, nor was provided -- repeat the larger problems of the NSA surveillance with the telecoms' assitance: There was no required documentation ever provided despite legal requirements on the telecoms to secure that documentation per FISA?

Here are some key issues:

- Who was signing the documentation the telecoms were relying on; or was there no documentation, and the telecoms knew or should have known that, without that documentation, the activity was not lawful?

- How was the FBI so quickly able to determine the surveillance was not lawful: Did they look for required documentation, and within 12 hours learn from whom that the required legal authorizations were not available?

Within 12 hours, the FBI technicians knew that the required legal oversight had not been followed. This raises questions about what other reviews in DoJ and NSA were not getting followed, who knew about those lapses, and which specific personnel with responsibility to enforce those requirements knew within 12 hours that those requirements were getting ignored, but did not notify COngress, DoJ OPR, DoJ IG, or NSA IG? Conversely, if there were notifications in 2001 to these entities, then for four [4] years until the NYT story in 2005, many people knew here was illegal surveillance, but would ask us to believe they all 'believed' it was lawful. That defies reason, especially on Hayden's confirmation hearing/claims.

Absent a legal opinion or required documentation to get a warrant, DoJ OLC in the wake of the NYT reporting had no basis to assert the program was lawful or consistent with anything. It appears Hayden and DOJ OLC were retroactively asserting lawfulness of something they knew never had been approved, as required, in writing as lawful. Retroactive recollections suggest, after the NYT story, people within the White House met, coordinated stories, and retroactively asserted timelines which defied memoranda, and manufactured "beliefs" about things which they knew or should have known were not credible retellings of any beliefs.

This could form the basis of conspiracy, perjury, obstruction of justice. It is not lawful for targets of a criminal investigation to, after the fact, manufacture timelines and recollections; nor assert something as a "belief" when they, at the time of the original alleged wrong doing, did not hold that belief, but the opposite: Genuine fear that the program, it's illegality, and lack of documentation violated the law. They cannot credibly claim they believed anything: They emphatically knew, asserted, and inner concern to the opposite. This could support allegations that the evidence provided under oath to Congress was manufactured, not a genuine belief, but designed to mislead Congress.

Absent legal memoranda, it could also attach to DOJ OLC legal counsel subsequent legal memoranda they provided to the Judiciary Committees. DoJ OLC responded to several questions in writing to the Committees. These statements need to be revisited. If, as it appears, the DoJ OLC in 2001 did not have written documentation, but later said to Congress they "concluded" the program was lawful, this could subject legal counsel to a disbarment investigation for alleged frivolous statements they knew defied the written record, and attaching DoJ OLC and WH legal counsel to the underlying unlawful telecom-NSA violations of FISA. What was the motivation of legal counsel to mislead the Congress? They appear to have a larger problem on their hands. It could be that the NSA illegal activity, and the legal counsel retroactive statements about those timelines relate to something larger: Alleged war crimes attached with that unlawful activity.

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This misses the point:

a surveillance program that appeared to test the limits of presidential authority

The issue isn't about the President's power, but about the Constitution's requirements. The President cannot trump the Constitution. Legal counsel know this. This doesn't test the limits of the President's power, it stretches his power beyond what the Constitution permits. It tested the Congress and Judiciary in whether they would check this President's illegal activity.

Seven years on, the answer remains: "No." This is evidence of 5 USC 3331 violations by Members of Congress, legal counsel, Judicial officers, and Executive Branch employees.

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This is a problem: Only Congress has the power to declare war. The President only has one power: Executive.

the office had already issued a broad, classified opinion declaring the president’s surveillance powers in the abstract in wartime

DoJ OLC cannot say the President has "broad" powers in re surveillance, when the FISA Court must approve that surveillance. FISA is the exclusive means to conduct surveillance.

- How was DoJ OLC defining "broad" powers without coordinating with the FISA Court?

DoJ OLC cannot declare the President has any power. Only the Constitution can do that.

- Has DoJ OLC pretended it is the Constitution, and declared the President has a new power to ignore the Constitution, bypass the FISA Court, and self-review despite illegality and non-compliance with warrant requirements?

It appears the answer was unconstitutionally, "Yes," which DoJ OLC legal counsel should be subject to a DoJ OPR review.

- What is the status of the DOJ OPR review of these apprarent reckless actions of DOJ OLC; when will the DC Disciplinary Board get a DoJ OPR referral on these issues?

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NYT reports it was John Yoo who asserted the following legal opinion. The question is whether, under FISA, this legal opinion relied on frivolous legal arguments:

opinion from John Yoo, a deputy in the Office of Legal Counsel, declaring that the president’s wartime powers allowed him to order the N.S.A. to intercept international communication of terror suspects without a standard court warrant

If Yoo was the deputy, who was the DOJ OLC director; what review did they do of Yoo's work product, if any; has Viet Dinh commented on these issues before the DC Bar; how do his comments then reconcile with today's timelines in the NYT?

Was Yoo's opinion, contrary to FISA, used to monitor American citizens suspected of terrorism; how did the minimization procedures get adjuted?

If, as Yoo asserts, no "standard warrant" was required, why was DoJ concerned there was no legal basis to sign the warrant application: Who in DoJ disagreed with Yoo's conclusion, how was this resolved, and when did DOJ personnel refer concerns about Yoo's legal conclusions to DoJ OPR?

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Hayden during his confirmation hearings made statements to the SEnate about the "lawfulness" of the surveillance. He's also signed affidavits asserting to the lawfulness of various NSA programs.

Today we learn NSA lawyers did not get access to Yoo's legal opinions:

Even after the final legal opinions were written, lawyers at the National Security Agency were not allowed to see them, officials said.

- What was the basis for Hayden's statements before Congress on the lawfulness of the surveillance?

- Did Hayden, outside official channels, receive a direct order to do something, without the required legal documentation related to FISA requirements, warrants, or DoJ OLC commentary?

- How does Hayden's actions as NSA director square with NSA policies on affidavits related to lawfulness of activity, and need to protect state secrets: Did Hayden assert something was lawful, yet there was no legal basis for that assertion in those affidavits to Congress, the FISA court, or other courts reviewing alleged illegal surveillance?

- Where is EFF on Judge Vaughn Walker's review: Is EFF comfortable with DoJ OLC legal statements to Judge Walker on the civil litigation; or are these revelations in the NYT raising doubts about the truthfulness of DoJ OLC affidavits provided to the court?

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Executive orders prohibit the classification of illegal activity. It is not lawful to hide evidence related to incompetence, maladministration, and unlawful activity.

State secrets claims can be trumped when the substantial purpose of that classification is less to do with national security, but more related to hiding evidence of illegal activity (Reynolds). It is also possible for the court to order the government to disentangle classified information from non-classified information.

Justice Department officials declined to comment for this article, saying that they would not discuss internal deliberations on a classified program. The White House also declined to comment.

Deliberations can only be protected when they are pre-decisional. Once there is a decision, as the President is reported to have said, all DOJ OLC comments after this decision are not protected. These DOJ OLC conversations are post-decisional.

- What is the basis for DoJ OLC assertions that these deliberations, which supposedly never occurred as evidenced by no DoJ OLC memoranda, can be classified?

- If there were deliberations, why was the FBI concerned about the lawfulness, but not provided warrants connected with any DoJ OLC legal memoranda?

- Where is there any evidence of "deliberations without a DOJ OLC finding"?

- Since the President supposedly ordered the NSA surveillance without any DoJ OLC memoranda, how can anyone say that there were any deliberations?

- Has DoJ OLC retroactively created the memoranda and deliberations, and classified information that was not created until after the 2005 NYT article?

- Is DoJ OLC improperly protecting post-decisional deliberations, but pretending they were connected with pre-decisional deliberations?

- How much of the DOJ OLC deliberations after the President made his decision is being improperly being shielded by a privilege which cannot exist: Post-decisional deliberations by DoJ OLC to explain away concerns after the 2005 NYT article?

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It looks like the NYT had some DoJ spin on this article. It does not appear the DoJ "nervousness" was related to secrecy, but with the real belief/conclusion the program/surveillance was illegal. It appears the FBI and DOJ are recasting "real concerns about illegal activity" as "concerns with secrecy":

At the F.B.I., the secrecy and questions surrounding the program bred suspicion among officials.

The concern wasn't the "question" or the "secrecy" but whether the illegal activity would be prosecuted, or swept under the rug by the President, DoJ AG, and others.

If there were "concerns," how does the President's blocking DoJ OPR from reviewing this fit in with the FBI technician's discovery of the illegal surveillance:

- How soon afer the FBI technicians discovered the illegal activity did DoJ OPR attempt to review this activity?

- When did DoJ AG (Ashcroft and/or Gonzalez) order US prosecutors not to enforce the FISA requirements against US government officials, telecoms, or other Executive Branch-connected contractors, agents, and personnel?

Once the FBI technicians discovered the illegal activity, there would have to be (at least) a second legal review by another lawyer to answer the FBI technicians' question: Was this illegal or not; and who was doing it. It appears the retroactive statements about "concern" are designed to shift attention from the legal problems, and sugar coat the multiple, known legal conclusions that the activity was illegal.

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There's also evidence that there were problems. When the NSA conducts an activity, they have various checklists, approvals, and confirmations. However, absent these approvals, NSA and DOJ have yet to explain how the surveillance continued, or was allowed to go unexamined. Once there are gaps in the checklists, this should have sent signals to others in the telecoms, DoJ, NSA, and elsewhere that there was a problem. The failure isn't just with the original activity, but in exploring which reviews and approvals within NSA and the telecoms glossed over these missing steps. This appears to be something Congress, NSA IG, and DOJ IG need to explore with the telecoms:

At the Justice Department, for instance, the fact that Mr. Thompson, the second-ranking official, was not given access to the program led to problems in getting court-approved wiretap applications signed for those surveillance operations that started as warrantless N.S.A. operations.

Something failed in the NSA-DoJ-telecom procedures and oversight. Where is the evidence that these "problems" with getting approvals affected other required reviews within NSA and the telecoms; how were these problems handled; without the required approvals, how did NSA/telecom personnel justify the continued surveillance; how did this surveillance continue, despite the FBI technician's fidings: Which reviews did not occur; and did the President override these procedures NSA, DoJ, and the telecoms developed to ensure the warrants were obtained, and the proper authorizations obtained before NSA surveillance continued:

- Which procedures required this review?

- Without these approvals, what problems did this present for the NSA and telecoms?

- Were there timelines which the telecoms knew had to be met, but absent these approvals meant FISA requirements were getting ignored?

- Which activity were the telecoms still supporting despite them knowing that specific requirements were not being met?

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All, please beware that the individual who posted this blog posting and all comments,known as TESTING, is known to post unsubstantiated accusations such as this blog posting. He is little better than a spammer and his blog postings are spam at its worst.

While there may be some truth in the posting, it is only surely a result of pure accident on his part if there is so. Testing simply posts things he does not know about and then says because no one has stopped to explain the topic to him and the ins and outs, there must be a conspiracy.

He is no better than ChickenLittle....THE SKY IS FALLING THE SKY IS FALLING.

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