Michael Levi
- : Michael Levi is a fellow for science and technology at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and director of its Program on Energy Security and Climate Change. He was previously science and technology fellow in Foreign Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution, and Director of the Strategic Security Project at the Federation of American Scientists. Trained in physics and in international affairs, Mr. Levi has written extensively on arms control, terrorism, and science in the Islamic world. He is author of On Nuclear Terrorism, coauthor (with Michael O'Hanlon) of The Future of Arms Control and (with Michael d'Arcy) of Untapped Potential: US Science and Technology Cooperation with the Islamic World.
Parting Thoughts
Thank you to Bill, Mike, and Matt for an interesting and enlightening discussion of my new book, On Nuclear Terrorism, over the last week. In their final posts, Matt and Bill lay out a set of points where we all...more »
Posted on December 9, 2007 5:12 PM
Worst-Case Thinking at Work
Matt makes an important observation: “In judgments about how much effort to put into securing nuclear stockpiles around the world, I repeatedly see gross underestimation, not overestimation, of likely terrorist capabilities.” This is a fair description of how people...more »
Posted on December 6, 2007 8:32 PM
The Iran NIE
I largely agree with Mike’s assessment of what we should take away from the NIE. One might argue that for a weapon delivered by aircraft, a design that didn’t require symmetrical explosives and precise electronics would suffice. But if...more »
Posted on December 6, 2007 2:18 PM
Is It Worse Than You Think?
The short answer is: it depends on what you think. The long answer is, well, a bit longer. Matt makes a strong case for emphasizing the centrality of security for nuclear weapons and materials to any defense against nuclear terrorism –...more »
Posted on December 6, 2007 1:41 PM
What Scares Terrorists?
Bill Hartung raises a number of important questions. Let me address the first in this post and tackle the others later. I don’t doubt that there are folks out there who would love to pull off a nuclear attack....more »
Posted on December 5, 2007 2:09 PM
Detecting Nuclear Smuggling
Today in the Washington Times, I apply some of the ideas in On Nuclear Terrorism to the problem of nuclear smuggling. Drawing from the arrest last week of three people who were trying to sell uranium powder, I argue...more »
Posted on December 5, 2007 9:49 AM
No Defense is Perfect
It's great to be back at TPMCafe. And it's a pleasure to have the chance to discuss and debate my new book, On Nuclear Terrorism, which came out just last week.To understand how to confront nuclear terrorism, we need to...more »
Posted on December 3, 2007 6:13 AM
Meaningful UN Sanctions Would be Great, but...
I agree with everything Bruce says about Iran – strong UN sanctions would be ideal. What I disagree with is what is implicit: that we can still get UN sanctions that send a meaningful message....more »
Posted on December 12, 2006 1:39 PM
Iran, China, and the UN
In response to Lee’s post on Iran, Ernie asks about the consequences of US-EU sanctions against Iran for relations with Russia and China, specifically asking about China and Darfur, and Dan Greenbaum follows up by adding Chinese policy on...more »
Posted on December 11, 2006 11:09 AM
More on UK Nukes
Ivo is right on the mark when he writes that Tony Blair missed a big opportunity to send an important message about the limited utility of nuclear weapons. What's really odd is how the politics of this played out....more »
Posted on December 5, 2006 5:00 PM
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Even activating but not shooting in response to a North Korean launch would be an admission that the system is weak, and would reduce its deterrent value. Better to simply say that a DPRK launch would pose no immediate threat to the United States.
Posted at June 20, 2006 8:37 AM in response to Missile Defense Miscalculation
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Thanks for the catch -- the link is fixed.
Posted at June 9, 2006 11:41 AM in response to Religion and Biotech
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This is a great discussion! A few specific reactions:
Several people have taken up the question of whether one reason nuclear proliferation is bad is that it insulates regimes from change. Whatever we want to say about sovereignty in theory, the last decade shows us that sovereignty is becoming more conditional than before -- and that's been welcomed by a wide swath of the political spectrum. If the spread of nuclear weapons reverses that trend -- that is, if it insulates regimes -- shouldn't we be concerned? Dan K is probably right that this complicates our nonproliferation efforts in some ways. But could it also bolster them if it drew advocates of democracy and human rights to the nonproliferation cause? All that said, paulw's comment that nuclear weapons might not provide too much insulation is very well taken -- I'd be interested to read what others think.
CKR asks whether big principles are needed, rather than just specific policies. To me, it depends on the time frames you're looking at. Coalitions persist through ups and downs because of agreement on fundamentals. Democrats and Republicans, as I see it, agreed on the basics of arms control for most of the Cold War because they agreed on the basics of containment. Even the United States and the USSR agreed on many basics of arms control, because they also agreed on many of the broader foundations of strategic stability. I'm not sure that arms control could have survived simply as a series of tactical compromises.
Finally, Arnold Evans asks what I mean by "limited" concessions, and wonders whether those can be "substantial". They can. What "limited" means is that we don't give up all our bargaining chips to solve only one part of the problem -- but that doesn't mean we can't put some big things on the table.
Posted at February 24, 2006 2:09 PM in response to What's the Context for Non-Proliferation?
