In his second post, Steve summarizes the conclusive points of RBNG vis a vis the evolution of Turkish military and national state. His warning, that sustainable democratic change in civil-military relations will only be achieved through "the institutional bridling" of the military, is valid. This, of course, as Steve also points out, will necessitate a "fundamental re-evaluation of Kemalism."

It all boils down to the struggle between the two concepts of change in Turkey. One is change as social phenomenon--the authentic and inevitable process that is shaped by many entangled factors and by both national and global dynamics. The other is change as social engineering--an elite activity to resist, control and domesticate social dynamics in order to keep them within Kemalism's prescribed formula of "progress."

Turkey has been undergoing tremendous change in the last couple of decades. The segment of society that is perhaps most impacted by the increased economic activity and mobilization is the religious conservatives of Anatolia and their newly urbanized peers--in other words, the part of the society that for decades had remained on the margins of the national discourse. Never quite fitting into the narrow confines of the imposed Kemalist identity, they were, for the most part, peripheral, silent and inward-looking. No longer. Today, Turkish religious conservatives are not too conservative to be social and outgoing. They have opened up and diversified. They participate in the market economy; many among them are on their way to becoming global economic actors. Under Ak Party, they have also become national political actors and are making their claim on the public sphere. Indeed, via AK, they have governed the country for the last four and a half years, but will they ever rule?

The recent political events are manifestations of social change vs. engineered change in Turkey. The April 27 e-memorandum of the Turkish General Staff; the secularist rallies against the likelihood of a member of AK becoming the president; the ever-so intricate plans to block a possible Ak Party victory in the July 22 elections, all reflect the Kemalist lack of trust in the genuine change that Turkish society has been undergoing and the consequent effort to resist, control, and domesticate it. In order to preserve the state structure from the popular democratic manifestations of a social change that contradicts the prescribed direction of Kemalist progress and therefore is deemed to be harmful to the nation, the Ak Party, they believe, should never be allowed to rule.

This brings me to Steve's questions about what is next in Turkey: What happens if AKP wins big in July? Will the Turkish General Staff acquiesce if Foreign Minister Gul is renominated for president and wins?

Like most key questions, these are hard to answer. The current polls show AKP at around 38-40 percent. They are about to unveil a list of candidates that will include Alevis for the first time, some prominent social democrats, more than a few women, and perhaps even one or two non-Muslims. The party platform for the elections will be headlined "It is time for democracy now." AK seems to be aiming to appeal to democrats --areligious as well as religious-- and consolidate the popular reaction to the military's recent show of muscle. This might, indeed, work. And there precisely lies the problem.

Social engineers are deep in thought about finding ways to block an AK victory in the polls. One idea that is being circulated is to go to the court to ban the AKP. Such a court case might eventually fail, but still achieve its immediate goal. Would Anatolians risk wasting their vote on a party which might not be around for long? After all, aren't they voting to elect service providers rather than to exercise ideological solidarity? Why not vote for an alternative party, the existence of which is not challenged by the state? This line of thinking is what the Kemalist establishment hopes will prevail if they indeed go ahead with a court case.

Also to be watched closely these days is the PKK situation. Any terrorist attack will be used to bolster the military's popular credentials and help nationalist parties. Yesterday's bombing in downtown Ankara, which might or might not be PKK's doing, is a case in point. More such attacks and more intensive military action on the Iraqi border might follow.

Inspite of all efforts to stop it, AK can still manage to receive a strong mandate from the electorate. Then, I believe, they will be likely to opt to elect the new president by parliamentary vote again and this time they might even settle for an AK member whose wife does not sport a headscarf. Even a female candidate with a good hairdo is possible. Of course, popular vote might indeed favor Mr. Gul, but will AK risk a second term in government by sending him and his headscarved wife to the Presidential Palace? The risk, you see, arises from the establishment's abundance of engineering tools, including, possibly, a post-postmodern coup.