I am certain the people who originally supported the invasion are more likely to feel a moral responsibility to stay and fix Iraq.

I understand why they feel that way - the pottery barn rule has a psychological dimension to it. But to borrow the money quote from your piece:

"Morality is about consequences not just intent."

Perfectly said.

Tom,

Why insist that the only other option is the extreme one of naked withdrawal, let all hell break loose? Don't you think that if the USG genuinely put its mind to it and weight behind it --- including making the argument to others that whatever else they think about how we got to where we are, the worst case scenario outcome threatens their interests not just ours --- that there could be some better alternatives along the lines of stabilize-withdraw-contain? Not great options, but better than the ones Bush is pursuing? My point in earlier post about comparing best option to best, and worst to worst.

Bruce

The only solution to "fix" this problem is to add several hundred thousand troops to the country, seal the borders as tight as we can and disarm the Iraqi army, the Iraqi police and the Iraqi people. The black market trade in weapons in the country is completely out of control just as oil smuggling is out of control.

We won't be able to stop it, but with massive effort we can slow it down. At the same time, the Iraqi army and the Iraqi police must be removed as far as possible from civilian centers and completely retrained. While the army and police are being retrained, massive WPA type projects must be initiated and financed by the U.S. government, administered by the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers and oversight by a civilian committee much like Truman's during WW II. Private military contractors must be transitioned out of the country as quickly as possible - not only does the civilian population resent their immunity from law, the U.S. Army resents and envies the huge differential in pay scales.

Food distribution and health care must be returned to government control and funding and "subcontractors" banned from participation without some sort of system of licensing and monitoring under the strict control of U.S. state department monitors.

Oil reserves and distribution must be brought under strict and rigid control, with patrolling done by the U.S. Navy whose strength must be doubled.

Finally, a formal apology must be made to the Iraqi people and every possible way explored to speed up reparations to civilians and make repairs to their infrastructure.

Of course these are not the only problems that need to addressed, but they are the most important in terms of stabalizing the country. This notion that the current Iraqi government can fix these problems is preposterous - it's the equivelant of making someone who has never ridden a bike before a bike messenger in New York City - if they don't get killed, they'll surely kill someone else.

This administration must admit that to fix the problem we've created it will take at least ten years, and probably more. It will empty our treasury (more so than it already has) and will take at least ten to twenty years (and I'm being optimistic here) for the U.S. citizens to pay off the debt incurred by this misadventure. It will not only take time, but will be extremely dangerous - the American people should expect at least another 3000 casualties in the next six years and made to understand it no uncertain terms that progress will be at a snail's pace, especially in the first few years of population disarmament.

Quite frankly, I don't believe the American people want this kind of committment or cost of repair of Iraq. I don't. Not only can we not afford it economically, I don't have the nerve to ask anymore kids to die for this misadventure.

Do we have a moral responsibility to the Iraqi people? Yes, we do, but we have neither the will nor the money to fulfill it.

The only action the US could take to earn back a shred of "moral credibility" would be to enforce article 14 of the UN charter and demand Israel remove it's nuclear arsenal and other WMDs and then do the same. One could then almost believe the US had turned over a new leaf. I wouldn't hold my breath. The only other moral action possible is to declare a winner in the civil war in Iaq and help the losers re-settle.Then there are the massive expenditures for reparations and rebuilding in Afghanistan as well.

I don't think the case for eventual UN involvement in Iraq is as farfatched as other posters are making it out to be. It's a strategically important country whose internal security directly impacts one of the major global hotspots (Israel/Palestinian Territories) and Iran. Not to mention the gigantic oil reserves. And the nearly certain humanitarian disaster. I think that the UN will be getting involved in Iraq eventually -- although it's an open question as to whether or not the US will be mediating that reaction.

The United States absolutely has a moral responsibility to the Iraqis. We took a stable, safe country (although one with an oppressive government) and turned it into a dangerous, anarchic, warzone. Of COURSE we bear a responsibility to keep people safe. But while this responsibility is all of America's, the decision to do anything about it rests in the hands of our Federal government. And that immediately cuts down our choices.

The President is refusing to define any measurable, accountable goals for Iraq. He is refusing to define any sort of accountability. He is refusing to delineate any specific strategy. His plan for the years ahead -- couched in the language of fulfilling our moral responsibility -- is to simply leave the troops in harm's way and hope everything turns out all right. Discussions about America's moral responsibility need to include that variable. Simply staying the course is not going to make America safer or Iraq more secure.

You are assuming things will settle down more quickly if we stay. I think it's just as likely that neither the Iraqis nor their neighbors will do anything constructive until we leave and they are forced to take responsibility for their own neighborhood. That's what freedom is for after all. It would be different if Uncle Sam had the first clue how to be a wise old uncle but we're more the doddering old fool these days. The "we broke it, we fix it" adage assumes that the ability to break is the same as the ability to fix. My cat can demonstrate the difference.

Bruce, Ivo and Rachel taking up this debate is more than welcome, but I get distressed by so many commentators first putting up the expectations to sky high levels, and then using the impossibility to reach that level as an excuse for not doing anything at all.

It may be more productive to discuss what could be done, particularly what may be within reach during the nearest two years with this political setup in Washington that we can be reasonably sure to know.

1. One thing that can be done immediately is a shift in tactics by the occupation forces. For a couple of years, we have seen enemies among the Iraqis, and as a result all Iraqis have been suspected, and treated accordingly - or actually worse than so. This could end. Aircrafts do not have to ("precision") bomb houses or roads, and foot soldiers do not have to search houses for suspects or hand arms. These activities provoke a lot, that is easy to understand for anyone.

Information gathering, i.e. intelligence activities, would be at least as important as it has been the last years, but maybe it would be less challenging to find information sources if our footprint became smaller and our day-to-day behavior less aggressive. Maybe, also, there could be some clever way to make inside-the-beltway people follow al-Jazeera?

This is an interesting and tenable position. The first objection I would raise is that you are asking American troops to die in order to accomplish nothing. How do you ask a man to die for a rearguard PR campaign? If US troops simply pull back into FOBs and "force protection" mode while ethnic cleansing takes place under their noses, that will hardly make it "look as if we tried".

The second, related, objection is that it is not clear that most people around the world (in Europe, or in the Muslim world) will actually perceive our continued ineffective presence in Iraq as "trying" to help the country. They may perceive it as evidence that we never cared about the Iraqi people at all, and only wanted to ensure a pro-US government and permanent military bases for expanding US hegemony in the ME. Military engagements as speech acts -- "sending a message" -- are very hard to pull off, because violence tends to send lots of scattered and confused messages to people watching it from different angles.

"All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out." - I.F. Stone

Troops (in considerable ammounts) committed to Iraq may deter other countries from invasion attempts or other more active and open efforts to support one or another warring faction inside Iraq.

Maybe it wouldn't be necessary, but is that a risk worth taking?

The situation for the troops wouldn't be easy if they were withdrawn from the field back into their bases and atrocities were going on all around, but their situation wouldn't be easy if they were out in the midsth of it either.

And they would not be asked to die for no reason other than a PR-campaign. They are asked to die for the sake of regional stability.

Maybe we should ask China instead?
They ought to have a sufficient number of soldiers, and if provided with some American aircrafts and other heavy stuff they would have a fair chance to fend off invasion attempts from states fighting with American arms.

Again, this is a reasonable way to view the value of US troops. But I think there is a risk that you are using the term "regional stability" to mean "our troops in Iraq backing some faction, rather than someone else's troops in Iraq backing some other faction." I doubt that Iran and Saudi Arabia will actually come to war over the clashes between their respective friends in Iraq, and a settlement between the two of them over their spheres of influence in Iraq may be a more realistic way of achieving stability in Iraq than this artificial presence of troops from a country 8000 miles away.

"All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out." - I.F. Stone

The war needs to be over before we pay reparations.  They will have a strong case.  The sooner we get the hell outta there, the less we will owe.

If the times had been different, if the U.S. for instance had behaved differently in recent years, I too may have been tempted to put my hope to a diplomatic agreement between Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

I may also doubt that it would come to a regional war, but that is not enogh. A regional war in this region is a risk that we have strong reasons to avoid.

The sufferings caused locally by a war is, regrettably, the lesser reason. The impact on the world economy and the living conditions in the industrialized world are the more compelling.

This is not to say that the diplomatic road should be avoided. Quite the contrary! But there is no equivalent of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to slice up Iraq yet (that we are aware of). Hence troup retreat would be premature.

We could probably get our moral bearings back in Iraq if, from this point forward, we proceeded with the old rule "first, do no harm." That means our moral responsibility at this point is to get the hell out of there militarily. The war itself is and always has been illegal which means everything we do there is part of a larger war crime. Our only moral course from this point is to get our military out of there and then help the Iraqi's rebuild after their civil war is settled. Nothing we do there with our military power can or will secure the peace. Withdrawal is the swiftest and surest course to peace and stability in Iraq. It really is the only "moral" course left to us. Of course, that's just my opinion, but I think many others share it.

I have been hearing this idea a lot lately. The idea is "Bring the Iraqis to America".

This seems like such upside down thinking.

It seems to argue that the solutions to the world's problems should be solved by just bringing the world here. I am for immigration and more of it, but this is a joke.

That kind of thinking argues that if a regime is screwed up and trying to destroy the world, just suck all the people out of the country and bring them to America. We could have saved a lot of time if in 1991 we just sent 35 million visas to Iraq. Wouldn't it be better to encourage other nations to be more like America, so their countrymen can stay home and enjoy freedom.

I envision a world where the entire population is crowded into our country and complaining that we are the worst country ever.

Daniel, I think you are right to worry about expanded Saudi and Iranian intervention in Iraq - and the danger that poses to the region and the world - if the US merely withdraws from Iraq without a serious rethinking of its diplomatic strategy, and without doing anything to foster a regional security dialogue aimed at forging a coherent vision at a post-US Iraq. And I'm afraid that there is no hope of achieving any kind of stable situation in Iraq, and preventing the expanded conflict you foresee, unless Iran is brought into the picture diplomatically. They are the key to a new regional security understanding.

Without such a diplomatic effort, the proxy conflict you are talking about will happen whether or not the US withdraws, since the US is unable to prevent an escalating civil war on its own. If there is any solution at all in Iraq, the solution must be political, and that means the Saudis and Iranians, among others, have to start talking.

Unfortunately, at the present time an opening with Iran seems to be the farthest thing from Bush's mind, and all indicationas are that they view Iran as the next front in the Great Global War against the Expanding Islamofascist Menace, and are waiting for the opportune time to open that front.

Defeatist!
:-)

You don't believe stabilization is in the cards. Well, to be honest, you may be proven right, but would it be right to do less than is in our capacity to avoid a full scale war that will be hard to contain to the Middle East, and that will cause much more sufferings to the civilians than they yet have dreamt of in their worst night mares?

Refugees of other faiths and ethnicities may be fewer in numbers, but no less suffering humans. And also if the victims are Sunnis, it's not the Sunnis collectively that have deserved punishment for their leaders' crimes and domination in previous decades. Furthermore, internal refugees may be a much more important matter than the issue of middle-class brain drain, and economic drain, when wealthier Sunnites are able to go into refuge abroad.

With regard to Turkmens, the actual numbers may betray us if we forget that their initial number is pretty low.

But, most importantly, also if it may be the case that most refugees be Sunnis today, nothing at all says that this is how it will be in the next phase, or the then following. The Shia are not in such a strong position that you proposes. It may seem so now, although falsely. Arab neighbor countries, as well as the Kurds and the Turks, tend to be Sunni, and those Sunni governments have plenty of arms and well working contact channels with greater powers around the world. The Shia Arabs may become forced to intensified cooperation and submission under the Persians, but that is the seed of continued uncomfortable relations.

I do not know if mere ethnic cleansing short of blatant genocide is such a bad alternative to ethnic cleansing by means of genocide or a full scale war. This is, possibly, the point where we divide in our evaluation. I agree totally with you that a refugee problem is very much unwished, and I agree totally that it's questionable how much Western troops can accomplish, but I question if it could be wise to give in. It's no more just to cause an accident and escape than to stay an offer the little help one can.

I am convinced that a partition of Iraq is much to prefer over for an outcome where Shiites oppress Sunnites, or Sunnites have returned to their dominance and oppress Kurds and Shiites - only this time with even more intensity as a thank for the last years' humiliations.

If it can be avoided, Iraq must not result in a new refugee problem of the Palestinian kind. Organized population transfer and reasonable chances to make a life there whereto people get evacuated must be offered if that ever gets possible. The WWII-connected transfers of Finns and Germans and Poles and Ukrainians and whatmore is more what one should strive for than refugee camps of Gaaza type.

Then, of course, there is the risk that a regional war would harm the industrialized oil-dependent world severely.

There is the litttle matter that in the special case of Iraq, we came uninvited and BLEW UP THEIR COUNTRY! In that special case, escape might be the only realistic alternative. Effectively, we now have 27 million wards. I prefer to think of them as belonging to the red states, particularly Texas.

Our wards can demand a lot of us, but their first demand should be safe haven. I am not so worried about the ones who are well off enough to move themselves. It is the other ones I think we should be most concerned about.

I recommend wide open refugee status and a flat 15 day countdown to the end of the war. (I assume it may take 15 days to drive some of the tanks back to Kuwait, since it took about that long to get into central Iraq in the first place.)

Our wards might want more, and we likely owe more, but UNTIL THE WAR IS OVER, we cannot sort it out. If they don't want to be our wards, then whatever happens might be their problem (we still are likely to owe war reparations, but as with any wrong, the wronged has a duty to mitigate the damage, so those who stay and get killed in a civil war WHEN WE OFFER REFUGEE STATUS and support, are on their own).

Stop fighting, remove our weapons, refugee status & support, war reparations. That about covers it.

Update: plus war crimes prosecution of the entire group that started this mess, including the neocon promoters. 

If the UN resolutions meant something, why did we ignore the UN and charge in without waiting for UN authorization? The phrase "serious consequences"was not ours to interpret. Borrowing a law and enforcing it yourself is usually known as vigilantism. 

As for the the whole world inviting us into Iraq, our friends tried to warn us off the adventure, good old "Old Europe". I still wonder how Saddam went from being a useful bludgeon to hammer Iran to being evil incarnate. If we had "no position" on his dispute with Kuwait (Sec Baker's instruction to April Glaspie), how could we claim to be so determined that the result "Shall not stand"?

Tom, the comic book image that we did not think of Saddam as evil prior to 1990 is old hat. Kissinger said at the time, "Never have two combatants both deserved to lose a war as in the case of Iraq and Iran". Instead of rewriting history, lets look at what our congress had to say about Saddam and what he has been on trial for up until last month.

http://members.aol.com/apollo711/war/genocide-act.html

It was called the Prevention of genocide act of 1988. Let's quit trying to pretend he was not on the US radar screen just because he was not on yours.

BTW, we don't know each other so I'll request less un-asked for familiarity--it smacks of the telephone salesman.

I'll grant you a non-black-and-white Saddam characterization if you'll spot me a less-than complete wolrd approbation of the recent invasion.

Then answer this: If we knew the color of Saddam's spots why did we not warn him off invading Kuwait?

Regarding my calling you by name. I mention your name at the beginning because many people here read something and flame out on me when I am responding to someone else. I was not trying to be overly familiar and no offense was intended.

You said:
"...Then answer this: If we knew the color of Saddam's spots why did we not warn him off invading Kuwait?..."

I won't waste your time playing 20 questions to dealve into what you are implying in your question, but I will address it and make some "assumptions" about this type of question. I am sure you will let me know if my assumptions are incorrect.

Since the April Glaspie story is a favorite of those that opposed Gulf War one, I assume you are refering to her. The imaginary plot line has a number of flavors. One, GHWB 41 wanted oil so he tricked Saddam into invading. Two, GWHB 41, was incompetent and unattentive by not warning Saddam that we would unleash the largest Military invasion against him since WWII, if he chose to invade Kuwait. Three, every war in history is somehow our fault ultimately and we should repent. I am not implying that you indulge in these storylines, just clarifying the context of the Glaspie story that GHWB 41 gave a "green light" to rape and pillage Kuwait.

The key phrase that is usually attributed from Iraqi sources to April Glaspie is that she said,"We have no opinion on your Arab - Arab conflicts".

Without context the meaning of the statement can easily be twisted.

Glaspie's succesor, Joseph Plame Wilson, attended the meeting and remarked: "...said to me very clearly that Saddam did not misunderstand, did not think he was getting a green or yellow light..."

This was based on remarks in the meeting that she attributed to Secretary Baker, that he was concerned about the buildup of troops. She made a variation on the "None of my business" remark, when she said regarding the buildup, "Usually it would be none of our business, but..." which clearly denotes "it is our business" in the parlance of the time tested Diplomacyspeak.

She pushed him for assurances asking what do you intend to do. Saddam gave assurances in the form of a deception reminicent of the Japanese deception in 1941. He claimed that a diplomatic meeting had been setup with Kuwaitis to work it out diplomatically. This gave Glaspie some level of reassurance that Saddam would not be insane enough to actually invade.

Tariq Aziz would say later, that Sadam was under no illusions about a military response based on the Glaspie meeting. Aziz remembers that Saddam expected a light military response, like Panama or Grenada that his massive, dug in, mechanized army could easily repel and why wouldn't he believe in feeble responses with regard to force since Vietnam. Saddam even mentioned Vietnam in his Human Shield speeches in 1990.

Saddam believed they could beat back the Americans and then wait them out until war critics demanded a quick pullout. Then Saddam would be recognized as the most prestigous figure in the Middle East.

We warned him. He knew we were coming. He took a gamble and he lost. It wasn't our fault he invaded. He murdered people because of a perceived weakness of the US and confidence in the ability to use American internal partisan bickering to ensure the emergence of an antiwar movement. He believed we would lose our will. He believed that our threats are not backed up by a will to use Force when necessary.

He didn't get that chance to see his expectations come true in 1991 because of the limited scope of the mission and the rapidity of victory, but some of his assessments have come true in the 21st century.

In answering your question, I am not attributing all of these "assumptions" to you, only stating the most common myths about the run up to the invasion.