Jon - I agree with your main points, but parallels with Vietnam and other regimes break down at the level of certain details. In many of the other cases, we supported a corrupt regime in conflict with a popular uprising. In Afghanistan, the regime is unpopular, but the Taliban who threaten it are even more unpopular. The challenge here will be to extract some value from the Karzai regime without being too closely wedded to it. That will include deal-making with other factions - a phenomenon not unknown to the indigenous population of Afghanistan. It is my impression that many Afghans, at this point, are not so much resentful of U.S./NATO involvement as fearful of being caught in the murderous crossfire between the Taliban and the NATO forces. They are reluctant to embrace our support not because they hate us, but because they fear we will depart, leaving them vulnerable to reprisals by the insurgents after our departure. It will be important, therefore, to try as best as possible to transition from outside stabilizing forces to indigenous ones without too much of a gap in between.

Our tax dollars are being put to good use:

“If you don’t pay, you will get attacked, you will not get through,” says Peter Jouvenal, a British expat and former BBC journalist who has been living and working in Kabul for nearly 30 years. He has operated several businesses in Afghanistan, including a small trucking company. “Everybody wins in the short-term,” he tells TAC. “The Taliban get their money, and the contractors get their money, and the soldiers get their food and fuel supplies. The only one that loses out is the United States taxpayer, who has to foot the bill for all this. That would be acceptable if we were achieving something, but we’re not.”--http://amconmag.com/article/2009/nov/01/00020/

How else can field and flag officers make their bones without fighting the good fight? Jeese!

DTroub - I think you're right that we neglected Afghanistan because of the Iraq obsession, but I don't believe Obama shares blame for that neglect. He has been consistent in opposing the Iraq war while asserting that our efforts needed to be focused more vigorously on Afghanistan/Pakistan, seeing Iraq as a war of choice and Afghanistan as a war of necessity. Circumstances appear to be bearing him out, despite some grumbling on both sides of that equation.

Parallels are informative, but should not be overinterpreted. Which parallel matches our current Afghanistan scenario - our failure in Vietnam or our success in routing the Taliban in Afghanistan, with the help of the Northern Alliance and others, shortly after 9/11? I believe the answer is obvious - neither one. Unlike Vietnam, we face an insurgency in Afghanistan that is wisely despised by the people, who in turn, yearn for the better life (particularly for women) that they briefly enjoyed after our 2001 successes. As Ahmed Rashid recently pointed out on NPR, they don't want us to leave, because they see that as the end of their hopes. Equally fervently, however, they don't want to be killed by our bombs, or the suicide bombs of the insurgents. Unlike 2001, we are not nearly as well prepared to guarantee them the security they demand, and that remains a serious challenge. For a recent discussion by Rashid, see http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/09/04/AR2009090402277.html

Although there is little disagreement about our need to remain engaged in Afghanistan to avert uncontested Taliban domination, with its threat of catastrophic destabilization of the entire region, the means are less clear. McChrystal and others argue for a massive troop enhancement, while at the other end of the spectrum, some within the Administration, Congress, and the foreign policy establishment prefer a far more focused approach, without further troop increases, or even with a reduction. Their emphasis is on training Afghan forces, which are currently acknowledged to be incapable of providing adequate security. As Rashid argues in the piece linked-to above, an emphasis on infrastructure of value to the civilian population would also be an integral part of a combined strategy.

Diachronic and Jon - I appreciate the points made about the corruption of the Karzai government. Karzai has been thoroughly discredited, and Holbrooke is already trying some end runs to gain support elsewhere. However, the Karzai government may be despised, but it is not about to evaporate, nor is there an obvious alternative in sight now. In fact, Abdullah, his main rival, is probably equally corrupt, and unlike Karzai, is not a Pashtun, thereby further disadvantaging him. It seems to me that the way through this minefield is likely to involve an international effort to impose future benchmarks on Afghanistan's electoral processes, so as to give greater credibility to future elections, but also to pressure Karzai to include reputable and capable individuals within his cabinet and among his allies, so as to remove some of stigma his government currently bears.

I would guess that all these tasks will meet with setbacks, but there is also a reasonable prospect for ultimate success, where "success" is not defined as a military victory, but as a return to a society where insurgency is containable, and most civilians can enjoy a better life. The history of Afghanistan is one of constantly shifting alliances, where many factions are quick to gravitate to the side they see as likely to win. In that sense, Taliban support, except for the core fanatics, might erode quickly if its opponents seem able to improve the lives of the population while maintaining reasonable security.

The Taliban can guarantee Afghans the security that comes with brutal repression, but not much else, and it would seem to be job of those inside and outside of Afghanistan to demonstrate that they can do better.