Interesting read, MJ, thanks for passing it on. Appropriate July 4th.

It's interesting to compare the interviews because, not only are they written for different audiences, they go into different details about Franklin's relations with Rosen and Weissman. The CQ article goes into detail about why Franklin chose to give initial information to Rosen, believing Rosen would get it to Elliot Abrams, but instead Rosen gave it to others.

Rosen assured him he would get his Iran information to Abrams, Franklin said.

"But he didn't do that. He went to The Washington Post and the political officer at the Israeli embassy." (Rosen's indictment spelled out those acts.)

The Forward article details how the FBI then set Franklin up with false classified information for Weissman, which he took to Rosen who gave it to the Israelis:

Though Weissman didn’t take the document, he read its content, which was allegedly classified, and the sting operation succeeded. Weissman hurried back to AIPAC headquarters with the supposedly classified information disclosed it to Rosen, who subsequently relayed it to an Israeli diplomat. Even without Weissman taking the actual paper, prosecutors, who were wiretapping all the players, felt they had enough of a case to press charges against both Rosen and Weissman for communicating national defense information.

If Franklin is being forthright, he comes across as very naive for someone who lives in Washington and analyzes the Middle East. I understand that Having Feith as a boss could be frustrating to anyone. But going to PNAC signatory Rosen to get information to PNAC signatory Abrams for help in preventing or delaying an attack on Iraq (even if the concern is for some American lives), does not seem like a rational course.

For Franklin, ties with Rosen and Weissman were instrumental. He had grown frustrated with decisions made by his Pentagon bosses on Iraq and Iran, believing that regime change in Iran was the course America should pursue.

Franklin warned that Americans “would return in body bags” from Iraq because of Iranian intervention, and called for a preliminary show of force against Iran before invading Iraq, but got no response. Viewing the AIPAC lobbyists as well connected, Franklin bypassed his superiors and asked Rosen to convey his concerns on Iran to officials at the National Security Council, to whom he believed the influential lobbyist had access.

“I wanted to kind of shock people at the NSC,” he said, “to shock them into pausing and giving another consideration into why regime change needed to be the policy.” Franklin’s attempt to reach out over the heads of his bosses was unsuccessful and eventually got him in trouble.

For the CQ, even though "Rosen boasted of his contacts in the NSC and the State Department," Franklin doesn't blame him for the first incident:

"He was duped -- he was duped real, real good," said a senior law enforcement official involved in the case. Another said, "My feeling was that they took advantage of him."

Franklin shook his head.

"No...this was my initiative. I was not directed by him," he said.

But to the Forward, he does place some blame on Rosen and Weissman for the second incident:

Franklin said he felt betrayed by the two former AIPAC staffers. He believed that he was sharing information with them so that they could pass it to other government officials, and was disappointed to learn they conveyed it to Israeli diplomats and to the press. “I do think they crossed a line when they went to a foreign official with what they knew was classified information,” Franklin said.