Why can the powerless sometimes challenge the powerful successfully? Why can resourcefulness sometimes compensate for lack of resources? Why can "David" sometimes defeat "Goliath"? In this book I respond to these questions, questions to which I've devoted a lifetime of practice, study, and teaching.

Based on an analysis of the struggle of California farm workers to organize a union - a struggle undertaken at four moments since 1900: prior to World War I, during the 1930s, in the late 1940s, and, finally in the 1960s. Each time immigrant associations, radical organizers, and the AFL tried, but until the 1960s, each effort failed when the growers used mobilization for war to suppress the organizing and import new workers. In the early 1960s, three groups took advantage of the end of the Bracero Program to try once again: the AFL-CIO, in 1959, the Teamsters, in 1961, and an independent farm worker association, later to become the United Farm Workers, led by Cesar Chavez, in 1962. But in 1966, when a breakthrough was achieved, victory belonged to neither established, well-financed, and well-connected union, but, rather, to the fledgling farm workers' association.

In this book I show that it was neither the "ripeness of the times" nor the "charisma" of the leaders that can explain this result. The explanation, rather, lies in how they devised strategy or their "strategic capacity." I show that their depth of motivation, appreciation of the value of their unique resources and commitment to learning from their experience - and the arrogance of their opponents - enabled the farm workers to devise better strategy and, as a result, prevail. In this they emulated David who committed to the fight motivated by outrage at injustice and hopefulness of calling; who recognized his unique skill, as a shepherd among soldiers, of slinging stones; who creatively re-imagined Goliath as a wolf threatening the flock; and who took advantage of the arrogance of his opponent.

The lessons this book teaches are meant for organizers as well as academics, for practitioners as well as students; and for leaders as well as readers -- and they remain as timely as ever. Over the last two years the insurgent campaign of a resourceful candidate "had no chance" to defeat the overwhelming resources of the establishment candidate. But, as the book shows, there was a logic to Obama's unlikely success. As the Medieval Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides, argued, "hope is belief in the plausibility of the possible, as opposed to the necessity of the probable." While it was probable Obama could not win, realism required recognition that the possible can sometimes happen. One reason it can happen is because, like David, and like the farm workers, we can learn to make it so. And that is what this book is about. The dedication sums it up: