Yes, Bush is the legitimate heir of Woodrow Wilson
I appreciate the opportunity to appear on this website. The invasion of Iraq was arguably the biggest mistake in the history of American foreign policy. Our book asks how we got into Iraq so as not to make a similar mistake again. Were Wilsonian concepts responsible for this calamity, or might they spare us further misadventures? John Ikenberry sets the stage well when he opens the book asking, "Was George Bush the heir of Woodrow Wilson?" All four of us will be interested in comments on our contributions.
As I see it, our book asks three questions.
I. What is the theoretical center of gravity that holds all else together in "Wilsonianism" (or liberal internationalism)? My answer is what we today call democracy promotion.
II. Was Bush Wilsonian in invading Iraq? My answer is yes; his quixotic hope was to democratize not only Iraq but the "Broader Middle East" on the basis of American bayonets.
III. What can be done positively with Wilsonianism today or are we better off chucking it all or at least most of it? My answer is beware the many "neo-liberals" in Washington who continue to insist on the importance of the radical distinction between democratic and autocratic governments and who would unite the former against the latter.
Many of these men and women are today in policy making positions in the Obama administration and constitute a group almost as unified politically and ideologically as the neoconservatives were under Bush. Fortunately, President Obama thinks for himself on most issues and it is plain to see the problems democracy promotion has wrought with the invasion of Iraq. But many important questions remain to be tackled and members of the Democratic party's Progressive Policy Institute may continue to provide their misguided advice, just as the Agency for International Development and the National Endowment for Democracy remain hard at work.
I.
I maintain both logically and historically that the core concept of Wilsonianism is democracy promotion. Those of a Marxist persuasion might argue that the economic open door was Wilson's central aim. My co-authors say it is multilateralism. I did not deal with Marxists in my piece but concentrated instead on insisting that the multilateral institutions so dear to Wilson's heart presupposed a predominately democratic membership. If you look at the record--Wilson's ideas for a Pan American Treaty/Union in 1915, then his first drafts for the Covenant of the League of Nations in early 1919--you will see that he anticipated these organizations being dominated by democracies. Whether you consider Wilson's non-recognition doctrine for Latin America first used in Mexico, or his later interventions in Haiti and the Dominican Republic, or his statements before we entered the Great War, democracy promotion again was his central preoccupation. Ultimately the League did admit members without regard to what we today call "regime type." But backing down on this point was the best Wilson could do given the forces arrayed against him in Paris and at large in the world. He could only hope that in due course the growth of international law and institutions would promote the democratic governments that he was convinced alone could genuinely change world history by creating a stable and durable peace.
Ironically, Ikenberry and Slaughter (hereafter I&S) unwittingly make much my point in their 2006 Princeton Report, "Forging a World of Liberty Under Law." Here they maintain that the United Nations, with non-democratic states in the Security Council, has not turned out to be very effective at humanitarian interventions or at stopping rogue states developing weapons of mass destruction. Instead, I&S call for a Concert of Democracies (or "Community," in Madeleine Albright's phrasing a decade ago) so as to be more successful. (Robert Kagan's continued fulminations against autocracies and in favor of unity among the democracies go along the same lines.) In 2006, I&S put heavy emphasis on American leadership of international institutions composed of democratic peoples in contradistinction to the inability of the UN to act decisively in terms of human rights and democracy promotion. In 2008, they changed their tune to say that multilateralism in and of itself, apparently without democratic leadership, was enough to qualify as being Wilsonian. Why the retreat?
II
I believe Wilson's notion of America's mission in world affairs was to promote democracy wherever he could, using force if he thought that would be efficient, so as to create a stable world peace. By contrast, my co-authors, including Tom Knock, would presumably agree with John Milton Cooper in the book he recently edited, Reconsidering Woodrow Wilson when Cooper explained that Wilson's famous phrase "the world must be made safe for democracy," should be understood in a particular way: "that passive voice contains a world of difference from notions of actively imposing democracy on other peoples, especially by force." The usual argument here is that Wilson was a Burkean, insistent on the "organic growth" of democracy for others and so would not have engaged in regime change of the kind the Bush administration engaged in when it invaded Iraq in 2003.
I believe this argument is mistaken. True, in his 1885 piece "The Modern Democratic State," Wilson depicted democratic government as something one could think only Teutonic peoples might enjoy, and of these especially the English and the Americans. That the United States would act imperialistically to force others to be free is ruled out by the logic of his argument. But Wilson was only 29 in 1885. By the time we get to The State in 1898, or to "The Ideals of America" in 1901-02, not only had Wilson matured, but he had digested the fact that the United States was an actor on the world stage (especially with the taking of the Philippines, which he approved) and that now it had a democratizing mission to perform. Cooper's misreading of Wilson is easily demonstrated by looking at the text of the famous speech of April 1917 calling for a declaration of war against Germany, where the president declared "The world must be made safe for democracy." The very next sentence (which Cooper omits) reads, "Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty." And elsewhere in the address, (which Cooper also passes over): "A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion...Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own." Pace Cooper, Wilson was not engaged in war only to protect democracy but also to expand its range.
Given the unmitigated disaster of the invasion of Iraq, today's Wilsonians must say either that Wilson never would have backed forcing people to be free (Cooper's argument) or that Bush never meant democracy promotion seriously to be a result of the invasion, the idea was only tacked on after no weapons of mass destruction were found (an argument made by Bruce Russett, for example). Yet before the Great War began, Wilson had already declared "liberty is a spiritual conception and when taken up so as to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare." And what he came to feel thereafter was that democracy had far more of a universal appeal than many appreciated, but that the flame was kept under control by autocratic leaders like those in Germany and Russia who were best done away with. To be sure, democracy might not appear overnight; "tutelage" by Americans was called for--witness Wilson's attitude toward the American occupation of the Philippines. I must have a score of citations by George W. Bush along this same line in my book A Pact with the Devil. All point to the responsibility of democratic governments to unite to be done with autocracy, as in the famous lines of the Second Inaugural in January 2005: "We are led by events and common sense to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world... So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." If this is not pure Wilsonianism, what is it?
In our book I&S appear to reject my position. But the irony is that in their 2006 Princeton Report (and Slaughter again in her contribution to Cooper's 2008 book mentioned above) I&S explicitly call for the use of force to promote human rights and democratic governments in situations of gross human rights abuse or the accumulation of weapons of mass destruction by non-democratic states. They unstintingly support "the responsibility to protect," (R2P in today's parlance). Indeed, armed intervention in the name of human rights and democracy promotion is the very mission they assign to their Concert of Democracies given the likely unwillingness of the UN to endorse such undertakings.
III
Our books asks whether Wilsonianism will endure as a framework for American foreign policy in this century. I do not advocate that we abandon Wilsonianism altogether as a way of operationalizing American interests in the world and encouraging a peaceful international order. In my opinion, the Occupations of Germany and Japan were essentially Wilsonian in inspiration and constitute the greatest successes in the entire history of American foreign policy. By 1989, even Mikhail Gorbachev had become a Wilsonian and the Cold War came to an end. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International are organizations that deserve our unstinting support. And so much the better should China and Russia democratize, and the European Union strengthen its democratic institutions and invite a democratized Turkey to become a member. But as we have seen in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, not all the peoples set free have been capable of forming democratic governments. The question is whether we will go on a crusade to see that this happens or whether we will respect the limits on our power and the nationalistically based resentment of foreign peoples against efforts to try to force democracy on them.
For current affairs, several questions can be raised. One of the most important has to do with the expansion of NATO and our relations with an increasingly autocratic Russia. Will the Obama administration push ahead with the incorporation of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO? With people like Michael McFaul, Ivo Daalder, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Philip Gordon in important policy making positions today in Washington, why not?
What, then, about Israel and the Palestinians as well as relations with Iran? Once again, the Wilsonian solution could be twisted into a blank check for Jerusalem because it is a democracy and a hard line on Iran because it is not. At the time of this writing, it would appear that Obama will continue to threaten the Iranians but that Israel will not recognize a Palestinian state nor end its settlements in Palestinian lands. Let me hold in abeyance comments on US relations with Hamas, which likewise appear subject to veto by our democratic ally Israel.
Will the democracy project continue to inspire American policy toward Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan? The rhetoric is softer than before but has the dream yet died?
Will the Progressive Policy Institute, with its democracy promotion agenda through force, continue to influence the Democratic party in important ways as it has in the past, when Vice President Joseph Biden along with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton were its members?
The title of our book is "The Crisis of American Foreign Policy" with the subtitle "Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century." In the twentieth century Wilsonianism gave America its greatest victories in world affairs; with the invasion of Iraq, Wilsonianism provided a good part of the spirit that delivered America's greatest defeat. What can we extract from liberal internationalism and use wisely? Where can it lead us badly astray?





















re:"Wilsonianism" --
from a Pankaj Mishra review of "The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anti-Colonial Nationalism", by Erez Manela, the Harvard historian.
Wilson....[heralded] a world where small nations would enjoy the right of self-determination. And so ‘when peace came,’ Manela writes, ‘colonial peoples moved to claim their place in that world on the basis of Wilson’s proclamations.’
In Egypt, Sa’d Zaghlul, a liberal reformist, organised a new political party called the Wafd (‘delegation’) in preparation for the Paris Peace Conference. Soon after war began, the British had declared Egypt a protectorate of the British Empire, formalising their invasion and occupation of the country in 1882. Zaghlul...denounced the protectorate as illegal and hoped to enlist Wilson on his side. ‘No people more than the Egyptian people,’ he wrote in a telegram to Wilson, ‘has felt strongly the joyous emotion of the birth of a new era which, thanks to your virile action, is soon going to impose itself upon the universe.’
Inspired by Wilson’s rhetoric, nationalist leaders in Korea wrote their own Declaration of Independence. Expectations ran even higher in India and China, which had contributed more than a million soldiers and labourers to the Allied war effort in Europe and the Middle East. [The poet Rabindranath] Tagore wanted to dedicate one of his books to Wilson and, stirred by Wilson’s wartime speeches, Hindu and Muslim leaders of the Indian National Congress jointly demanded to send their delegates – Gandhi among them – to represent India at the peace conference. In Beijing students gathered in front of the American Embassy chanting ‘Long Live President Wilson!’ Liang Qichao, the reformist intellectual and earliest inspiration of Mao Zedong, went to Paris to ensure that China’s sovereignty was respected by the victorious powers, particularly Japan, which, in a campaign green-lighted by Britain during the war, had seized German-held territory in the Shandong peninsula.
Wilson had had his chance in the spring of 1917 when he first heard of the secret treaties that outlined how Britain, France, Japan and Italy planned to divide up entire empires among themselves after the war. He could have made American intervention contingent on the Allied powers cancelling these arrangements. Instead, he pretended that the treaties didn’t exist, and even tried to prevent their publication in the US after the Bolsheviks exposed their existence.
Ho Chi Minh would not have bothered to rent a morning suit [for his failed attempt to meet Wilson in Paris] had he known that Wilson believed as much as his bellicose rival Theodore Roosevelt in America’s responsibility to shoulder the white man’s burden. In January 1917 Wilson argued that America should stay out of the war in order, as he said in a cabinet meeting, to ‘keep the white race strong against the yellow – Japan for instance’. He believed, as he told his secretary of state, Robert Lansing, that ‘“white civilisation” and its domination over the world rested largely on our ability to keep this country intact.’ Though apparently all-encompassing, his rhetoric about self-determination was aimed at the European peoples – Poles, Romanians, Czechs, Serbs – who were part of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires. In his effort to establish the League of Nations as a framework for collective security and enduring peace in Europe, he had little interest in persuading Britain and France to relinquish their colonial possessions.
Asians and Africans accustomed to stonewalling colonial officials were naturally attracted to the generous promises of the American president. But Wilson, a Southerner who shared the reflexive racism of many in his class and generation (and liked to tell jokes about ‘darkies’), was an unlikely hero in the alleys of Delhi, Cairo and Canton. Piously Presbyterian, and a helpless anglophile (he had courted his wife with quotations from Bagehot and Burke), he had hoped that in the Philippines and Puerto Rico the United States would follow the British tradition of instructing ‘less civilised’ peoples in law and order. After all, ‘they are children and we are men in these deep matters of government and justice.’
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n04/mish01_.html
May 19, 2009 11:46 AM | Reply | Permalink
This is another zionist attempt to lend legitimacy to suppression of other peoples.
Because "democratic" Israel wants to ethnically cleanse Palestine and assert hegemony over their region, its apologists are regularly positing new philosophical justifications for their aggression.
If Wilson doesn't work, maybe Teddy Roosevelt is next. Or Churchill?
May 19, 2009 11:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
One problem with much of the contemporary debate about Wilsonianism is that it is often misleadingly cast as a debate between “idealism” and “realism”. And foreign policy realism is not unfairly considered to be a cold, uninspiring and selfish doctrine. If the argument against Wilsonianism is reduced to the claim that we must abandon efforts to improve the world politically just so we can get a better price on imported lug nuts; or that we must jettison sentimental concerns about the lives of non-American human beings so that we can pursue the “national interest” with single-minded ruthlessness, then we are probably doomed to a perpetual oscillation between Wilsonian “idealism” and cold, hard-boiled “realism”. When things go badly with our activism abroad, we will retreat to realism, and when we have become fed up with the selfish, mercenary pursuit of the national material interest we will launch some inspiring Wilsonian democracy crusade.
But it is a mistake to grant to Wilsonianism a total command of the territory of idealism. We don’t just have debates to consider between selfless idealism vs. some kind of cold, grubby, hard-hearted realism. Wilsonians don’t have a monopoly on ideals, because there are also important choices to be made and values weighed among different, competing ideals. Wilsonians seem to elevate their own supreme ideal of correct procedural political ideology over all other ideals, and as a result Wilsonianism sometimes actively interferes with the pursuit of global progress and the realization of other equally important ideals. Wilsonians shouldn’t get a pass on this obstructionism from idealists of a different tendency.
The dream of world in which we are surrounded by the beauty and sublimity of nature and not choking on our own garbage? That’s a pretty lofty ideal! And so is the ideal of world peace – the trite but enduring longing of beauty queens and John lennon fans everywhere. A dream of world in which children are not butchered and incinerated very often? Highly idealistic! A world of widespread prosperity and communal equality? Whoa, what an ideal! But these aren’t the chief Wilsonian ideals.
The problem with Wilsonians isn’t that they think some forms of government are better than others, or that it is worthwhile trying to advance good government. It’s that the form-of-government issue dominates everything else in their thinking, and that leads them to make bad tradeoffs. For one thing, they are, in my estimation, somewhat too ready to kill people to establish better government. (Remember Madeleine Albright’s statement about how killing half a million people in Iraq through sanctions was “worth it”.)
What if we have to make a choice between either working effectively with a non-democratic China to save the world’s natural environment or sacrificing cooperative global progress on the environment in order to work on democratizing China? My impression is that Wilsonians tend to opt for the second horn of the dilemma. What if we have to choose between either a world in which there is a treaty-based low risk of nuclear conflict and mass nuclear slaughter, but in which that safe world has been purchased at the cost of tolerating some bad forms of government, or a world in which there is a significantly higher risk of nuclear slaughter, but in which we are working more aggressively on challenging, changing and reforming the world’s governments? Wilsonians often seem to suggest by their words and preferred policies that they prefer the lastter.
The responsibility to protect is a logically separate issue from the matter of democracy promotion. The question raised there is not primarily how democratic countries should deal with non-democratic countries. The question is how powerful, orderly and capable countries should deal with countries that are anarchic and violent, and where the local governing authorities lack the will or capacity to restore order. I don’t think here is any one right answer. But this is not essentially a debate about democracy promotion vs. something else. Restoring civil order in a country need not go hand in hand with a crusade to establish democracy there.
May 19, 2009 12:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
Steve Clemons would be (more) proud of you if he were to read this.
May 19, 2009 12:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
I don't think it's arguable at all that invading Iraq was the biggest foreign policy mistake in our history. It most certainly was the biggest. What's upsetting is that despite the fact that it was illegal, immoral and stupid, we are still there and have no plans at all to leave. Obama's decision to keep an small army in place in Iraq is horrendous and will keep us at war, losing money and lives for many years to come.
May 19, 2009 1:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sure it's "arguable."
I vote for Wilson's decision to go to war in 1917 as the "biggest foreign policy mistake in our history."
May 19, 2009 3:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
ditto. Wilsonianism failed miserably in its first action.
May 19, 2009 3:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
All of which begs the question of whether Bush's invasion of Iraq was for 'democracy promotion' or for establishing a munitions base smack dab in the middle of the oil fields of the Middle East? Perhaps a chicken/egg debate in the end, but our continued involvement contradicts the argument in favor of democracy promotion, IMO.
May 19, 2009 3:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Right.
The purpose of the war was to have an army within striking distance of the oil fields so we can control them if necessary, all other consequences be damned. We could buy the stuff at almost any price cheaper than what it has cost us to pull of this sickening, immoral debacle. Now there's an idea huh? Just paying for the oil instead of killing lots of people and then paying for it anyway.
May 19, 2009 3:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
Guess what -- Iraq just inked an agreement with Iran to pipe their oil to Iran refineries.
May 19, 2009 4:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
What I find fascinating (in the same way we have to look at traffic accidents) about today's "Wilsonians" is their utter sociopathology and amorality. They are completely lacking in empathy and understanding of any people who are not them.
The irony of advocating "self-determinism" by force escapes them as does the sublime ridiculousness of an exclusionary "concert of democracies" as a means to compel the world to compliance with their policies does. Exclusion is the very heart of our and the world's disastrous global policies of the last thirty years, to create another exclusionary decision making entity to form policy and enforce it is
to continue the disaster of global policy and make it worse, which would have seemed impossible after the last eight years.
Wilsonianism didn't work in Wilson's time - it was an arbitrary, racist and paternalistic policy - and it is glaringly obvious that it still the same - paternalistic, selfishly disdainful and cruelly comptemptous of the poor beneficiaries who are not the enlightened elite.
Several years ago, Slaughter advocated the partitioning of Iraq as a solution to the problems of sectarian violence that we caused. It struck me then as it still does today, the sociopathology, the lack of compassion and the inability of Wilsonians to link policy to people and see cause and effect. Over and over again, the fail to ask the one question, the one policy that has any chance of succeeding globally - would you like it if someone was doing it to you? If the Iraqi people insisted that the policy makers at universities demanded the partition of the United States, that you yourself would have to sell everything, leave friends, leave your career and give up everything you love and worked for all your life, would you like that? If you wouldn't like it, what makes you think anyone else would? If you resent the idea of other nations enforcing their policies, no matter how much those other nations thought it was good for you, on you, why would you do the same to them?
To paraphrase Ghandi, no matter why the policy was carried out, no matter how idealistic the policy makers were, the people are still dead, aren't they?
May 19, 2009 3:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is irrelevant what was rattling around inside Bush's head when he decided to go to war in Iraq, that is pointless conjecture. However, we have to see that Wilsonianism was a major factor in assembling the political coalition that pushed us into war. That coalition was made up of multiple forces but the one on the left that was most significant was made up of the Wilsonians. Friedman's advocated for war in terms of 'forced democracy','humanitarian intervention' and other oxymorons. Slaughter herself was such an advocate.
It is very disheartening to see that she has a position in the State Department. Hopefully, she will not cause too much damage at least for another decade since the American people are right now sick and tired of anymore reckless military adventures.
May 19, 2009 4:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is irrelevant what was rattling around inside Bush's head when he decided to go to war in Iraq, that is pointless conjecture.
This is a crucial point. And it's not as though Woodrow Wilson is some sort of God whose words we are commanded to follow. So distinguishing true Wilsonianism from pseudo-Wilsonianism is a secondary scholarly issue, not a pressing political issue.
May 19, 2009 4:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
. . . Wilsonianism was a major factor in assembling the political coalition that pushed us into war.
IIRC we were told we went to war because as Bush, Cheney, and Powell averred, Saddam threatened to use his WMD to harm us -- sooner or later -- and had to be "prevented" from doing so, now.
Advancing the tenets of Wilsonianism was a late post hoc justification and rationalization for a war turned occupation sold on non-Wilsonian grounds.
May 19, 2009 6:03 PM | Reply | Permalink
Wrong. Go back and read Thomas Friedman in the build up to the war. There were other liberal war hawks that brought up the humanitarian angle before the war started.
May 19, 2009 7:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Friedman? Thomas Friedman?
Who reads Friedman?
May 19, 2009 8:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, I'm glad a few posters finally got around to using the word OIL, which is obviously what the war in Iraq was about. Why do you think Cheney kept his energy conference in 2002 classified - because they had the maps of the location of oil fields in Iraq on the table.
I thought Smith's use of the word "Marxist" was interesting. Is it Marxist to say Iraq was about oil, or is it realistic.
May 19, 2009 5:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
That is naive. It was not all about oil. Oil was only one of at least three or four reasons for the US invasion of Iraq. There was a complex coalition of forces that urged this war, each group had its own reasons.
May 19, 2009 5:28 PM | Reply | Permalink
In spite of all my alleged naivete, I'm telling you
if Iraq was awash in seaweed instead of oil, we would not have invaded.
May 19, 2009 6:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is the narrow mind that clings to the 'it is only oil', the problem is very complex. The problem with the oil explanation is that there is no evidence in its favor, though I suspect Cheney had it in mind. The oil companies had long lobbied against war, though they may have changed by the time war started.
May 19, 2009 8:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
one of at least three or four reasons
I always thought that the nail in Saddam's coffin was the Palestininian F-16 pilots widows and orphans fund.
It is odd how the criminalization of charity is a recurring theme in this little clash of civilizations thingee.
May 19, 2009 6:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
The US will also be keen to use Saddam's provocative intrusion into the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as another reason for its planned military strike against him. The Sydney Morning Herald 3/26/2002
Six months before the WHIG rolls out its September marketing campaign, the Aussies are confident we're going to war.
Dontcha just love it?
May 19, 2009 8:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Why is it that I usually agree with your cryptic comments and then end up contesting them. Yes you illustrate one of the big reasons for the US going to war against Iraq.
May 19, 2009 10:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
There is similiarities of Wilisonianism and neo-conservatives in that as Don Bacon pointed out is that both of them still believe in the White Man's Burden in which Western Nations are above those in the Third Word. However there is a difference among today's neo-conservatives, liberal internationalists, and Wilsonians when it comes to international organizations such as the UN. Woodrow Wilson had an idealized picture of how the United States can exert its influence through his planned League of Nations. However both today's liberal internationalists and neo-conservatives want to break away from the United Nations and form a seperate Concert of Democracies. The liberal interationalists and neo-conservatives also supported the unilateral invasion of Iraq. It seems that both liberal internationalists and neo-conservatives have a lot in common with the advocates of American Empire such as Henry Cabot Lodge and Teddy Roosevelt. Liberal internationlists and neo-conservatives share the beliefs of both Lodge and T.R. that America can exert its power more successfully unilaterally as opposed through acting within a international organization.
May 20, 2009 12:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
According to Steve Clemons, Slaughter and Ikenberry renounced 'Concert of Democracies' at a Democratic Party caucus last August. Ikenberry didn't mention it in his previous post.
Since these book-promoters generally don't lower themselves to participate in these comments we don't really know what their current position is.
May 20, 2009 10:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
I have done a video on Wilson Worship that you can see HERE
May 20, 2009 1:44 PM | Reply | Permalink