Rahm Emanuel's and David Axelrod's New Dilemma
The President's top political counselors face the following dilemma. They want to be tough on banks because that makes sense politically and, presumably, because it fits how they - with considerable relevant experience - would like to address the deeper underlying problems in the financial system.
But at least some prominent economic counselors to the President strongly disagree. The Treasury Secretary, in particular, articulates the view that being tough on the banks and top bankers would further worsen credit markets and thus deepen/prolong the recession. Mr Geithner wants to try other routes, and while he does not rule out imposing policies that banks would not like, it is not in his Plan A or likely a feature of his Plan B.
The President has evidently sided with Treasury, either because he decided they have superior technical competence, or because Emanuel and Axelrod themselves gave way when the experts stared them down.
The dilemma is this.
Should Emanuel and Axelrod continue to push hard for being tough on big banks, or should they throw in the towel for now and let Treasury run through its various schemes? To oppose Tim Geithner would divide the Administration and also seem strange - after all, presumably they were closely involved in his selection. But standing quietly by, say for two years, is not appealing if a critical part of our economic policies heads down a long blind alley. And as a midterm election strategy this would be questionable.
The presumption in this dilemma is that Treasury officials are the experts. But is that really the case?
As the President stressed Monday night, we face an impending financial system collapse of a kind not seen in the US in over 70 years. The situation, both technically and politically, is akin to what - over the past 25 years - we have seen frequently in emerging markets but seldom in more developed countries (with Sweden and Japan as notable exceptions.)
The world's leading experts on such problems are for the most part not at the US Treasury, which is staffed primarily with people who have spent their careers working in (until now) relatively tranquil markets. Most of the relevant crisis resolution experience is to be found at the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF is not comfortable giving advice to the Administration - the US is its largest shareholder and the Fund's HQ is a few blocks from the White House for a reason - and IMF officials also cannot be called to testify before Congress. But the views of leading IMF banking crisis experts are freely available - off the record.
What they say is this. The right thing to do is reboot the financial system. Find out immediately which banks are insolvent, using market prices. Allow private owners to fully recapitalize, if they can. Have the FDIC take over all banks that cannot raise enough private capital. Try to re-privatize those banks quickly, while making sure the taxpayer has strong partcipation in the upside. The difficulty with this approach is not, in the US or elsewhere, anything technical - it is really quite straightforward. The problem here and everywhere else that has faced a serious financial crisis is: the power of the banking lobby.
If the IMF experts are right and Treasury is wrong, does that help resolve the dilemma?
Much too cavalier about the costs of a "scaled up FDIC-type procedure" (whatever that might be; there is a current statutory procedure for receiverships and conservatorships) and about the effects of putting Johnson's preferred solution into action upon the remainder of the financial system.
Until these costs and effects are described specifically (in the absence of having the on- and off-balance sheets of the subject banks, they can't), muddling along is the only policy that responsible officials can be expected to take.
February 12, 2009 12:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
First and foremost this entire financial shitstorm is about trying to find a way to preserve wealth where that wealth has been obtained in an unscrupulous way and which has been thoroughly undermined by the various financial instruments which dubiously created it.
The preservation of that wealth will require a similar sleight of hand which created it in the first place. You can't mistake the strong essence of bullshit in all of this. Geithner has been a participant in the making of that bullshit and his opponents in the administration are having trouble with piling more of that same BS on top of what is already there. We are already in the midst of a collapse because of having piled lie after lie upon one another. The Axelrods in the administration recognize the inherent folly of continuing that practice. The problem of course is acknowledging the financial charade that has been going on and devising a structural remedy that truly fixes it. Doing so carries a negative connotation for a lot of people in a lot of ways, most of which are certain to be unpleasant. Those persons who are affected by that, not unexpectedly, are going to fight it to the bitter end. Obama has to recognize that Geithner, while knowledgeable, along with certain other persons, has been at the center of the charade.
February 12, 2009 2:46 AM | Reply | Permalink
What exactly is the charade? I see narratives in conflict, attacking each other with strawmen.
"this entire financial shitstorm is about trying to find a way to preserve wealth where that wealth has been obtained in an unscrupulous way"
No, it's largely about how homeowners effectively took investors for about $9T (less marginal equity payments) over about 10 years. And now the underlying assets and homeowner incomes cannot support the investors. So in a sense it's about the investors trying to get some of that $9T back.
And then to make things worse, it's about stupid "insurance" companies which wrote "insurance" on overpriced lousy assets using practically no collateral or even accepted side bets.
February 12, 2009 3:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
The investors were also quite willing to be taken. In fact, they took those bad mortgages and constructed all kinds of derivative securities on top of them to artificially magnify their wealth. When the mortgages went belly-up the derivatives multiplied the homeowners' losses many times over. This is a real collective failure of a society blinded by the ideology of Reagan and the desire to be rich without work. The greedy banks and brokers pushed bad mortgages to make money, foolish and greedy homeowners accepted bad mortgages and home equity loans to appear richer than they were, the greedy investors packaged these bad loans into complex securities to magnify their wealth, and the greedy insurance companies and hedge funds created new vehicles to artificially insure the whole mess of bad loans and securities and therefore enable investors to purchase even more of these bad loans and securities. A huge house of cards, all of it tumbling down.
February 12, 2009 7:40 AM | Reply | Permalink
Excellent summary of how we got here. I can't improve it.
Now, about the banks. We obviously have many banks, including some really big ones who are insolvent when you use honest bookkeeping practices. We already have laws and procedures for handling insolvent banks. Let's get cracking and use those laws and procedures.
If the stockholders and executives of those insolvent banks lose their money, I will shed a few tears for them....done, now let's get cracking.
February 12, 2009 2:40 PM | Reply | Permalink
You confuse Investor with Broker, or some such. Investors didn't create the vehicles, they bought them or rode in them. Some vehicle builders may have also invested, perhaps that's the source of your confusion.
"When the mortgages went belly-up the derivatives multiplied the homeowners' losses many times over."
That's a really twisted notion. Some derivatives minimized losses to investors, that was the purpose of CDS instruments. But not all derivatives were themselves sound, thus the bailout of AIG so that GS wouldn't lose $20B. And homeowner "losses" are iffy at best, esp. if a homeowner took cash out of the equity thus leading to foreclosure.
Your very long sentence, with the above corrections, is pretty close.
February 12, 2009 6:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
"this entire financial shitstorm is about trying to find a way to preserve wealth where that wealth has been obtained in an unscrupulous way"
pretty much, however eds sees it this way:
"No, it's largely about how homeowners effectively took investors for about $9T (less marginal equity payments) over about 10 years. And now the underlying assets and homeowner incomes cannot support the investors. So in a sense it's about the investors trying to get some of that $9T back."
eds, you are kidding, right?
If it is as you see it, why on earth should anyone interfere? And why would that affect the markets of those not directly involved? Why not simply pay financial institutions in these securitized instruments themselves, and keep the public out of the dispute.
In regards to wealth being "unscrupulous", perhaps a better description would be "phantom" or bookkeeping wealth. It really had no other existence. But yes, much of it has been skimmed, in an attempt to make it nonreturnable. Real wealth never disappears, it just changes ownership. A good question to ask is, in the S&L scandal of the 80's, or the Enron or Madoff scandal, where did the real wealth go, ie who has gained and who has lost?
February 12, 2009 3:11 PM | Reply | Permalink
"eds, you are kidding, right? "
No. But someone today reminded me of Schopenhauer's notion that truth goes through three stages: ridicule, antagonism, acceptance.
I'm simply taking a larger view than are many other folks.
"If it is as you see it, why on earth should anyone interfere? And why would that affect the markets of those not directly involved? Why not simply pay financial institutions in these securitized instruments themselves, and keep the public out of the dispute."
That makes no sense to me as written, sorry. I'm not in favor of "interference" but I doubt that's what you meant. "HOW" the markets are affected is an important other issue, but basically the attempt to spread and diversify risk backfired. Pay institutions??
February 12, 2009 6:29 PM | Reply | Permalink
Good post, People. There's something very true about what you're saying. We wish we could do without the heroin that's killing us, but we just can't. We've been spending and borrowing too much (individuals, corporations, government). Now, with the economy collapsing because we spent more than we earned and took on too much debt, we're doing everything possible to increase spending and encourge the taking on of more debt.
Maybe it will work. But sometimes I wonder if the flaws in our economy really are fatal. We gave up too many good jobs to other countries. And now we don't have the income growth to support the desired level of economic growth. Maybe we're now a third-world country. Maybe we just have to hope that someday the first-world of China and India will ship us some jobs.
February 12, 2009 7:32 AM | Reply | Permalink
We could buy their discarded chopsticks and recycle them? Or, buy the empty vodka bottles and make Christmas ornaments? This should be viewed as a business opportunity for ex-bank CEO's.
February 12, 2009 2:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
Super comment, tpc! You might want to consider putting that up as its own blog. And if you do, go back and read what you've said and consider how so much of it also relates to the crimes perpetrated by bushco, lies upon lies there too, an effort to just want to move forward and not face all the damage that's been done.
Purple State wonders if the flaws in our economy really are fatal. I wonder if the flaws in our system of govt have been fatal!
February 12, 2009 7:39 AM | Reply | Permalink
William K. Black, Associate Professor of Economics and Law, University of Missouri - Kansas City, held senior regulatory positions during the S&L debacle and is the author of “The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One” (2005). Over at Huffington Post, he nails it, beginning thusly:
“We are being played for chumps. The Bush and Obama plans could only have been designed by failed bankers — for their principal beneficiaries are failed bankers.”
February 12, 2009 2:48 AM | Reply | Permalink
Your man is confused!
He thinks the FDIC can take over an insolvent bank and run it "with minimal disruption to . . . creditors and retain 'going concern' value." At the same time the FDIC managers are supposed to "produce an honest evaluation of which assets are toxic and how much they are worth" -- a guaranty that "creditors" will definitely be "disrupted" and that the bank has no "going concern value."
And finally, the "FDIC managers [are to] preserve the going concern value by making prudent loans and get the "New Federal" in shape to be acquired."
If the banks had money, they wouldn't be in crisis. Where does Black imagine the FDIC managers are going to get the money to make these loans? His call for an "evaluation" of bank assets will prove that the bank is insolvent and prove that it doesn't have "going concern" value.
What makes Black think anyone is going to want to "acquire" an insolvent bank.
I have no objection to killing these zombie banks, but don't tell me that creditors are going to be minimally "disrupted" and don't tout a program to sell the bank without mentioning how much taxpayers are going to have to invest to turn the bank into a "going concern."
February 12, 2009 3:30 AM | Reply | Permalink
And what is your plan, Ellen?
Mr. Black may be minimizing the difficulty and the ramifications of these large banks going into FDIC receivership. But on the whole, I still favor that idea. Let's rip this bandaid off and get the pain over with. Then at least we'll all know what we're up against.
-- ARG
February 12, 2009 1:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
I would add that Roubini seems to agree, as does Krugman, and now Jon Markman of MSN.
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/SuperModels/geithners-first-test-is-a-disaster.aspx
(OMG, it's practically becoming mainstream conventional wisdom! Next we'll hear the bubbleheads on CNBC talking about how it's time to nationalize the banks afterall. Okay, maybe not CNBC.)
-- ARG
February 12, 2009 6:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
Heh.
February 12, 2009 6:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Find out immediately which banks are insolvent, using market prices. "
No big bank using mark to market is currently insolvent, if they have been using mark to market. So the rest is irrelevant narrative based on stories about banks valuing assets in non-standard ways. Unless there is regulatory muscle which applies, the government has no business looking at inner bank workings.
Johnson is jumping the gun, eager to tear into the banks. He's pushing the IMF view for obvious reasons.
The true dilemma is not the bull about WH inner circle politics, but that there are two things going on here: The idea that lending should increase (magically or otherwise), and the problem of what are now magically called "banks" and other institutions (AIG) failing.
Let the banks just fail (and then step in) or save themselves privately. That solves one problem but does nothing for the lending issue. But just what IS the lending problem, in detail? What are the numbers?
There ARE fundamental reasons why lending should be down, such as that real credit risks are up. Let's not lose sight of reality in favor of yakking about Presidential Advisers.
February 12, 2009 2:56 AM | Reply | Permalink
One could argue that the "reality" people desire is that of the yakking.
February 12, 2009 3:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
One could argue ad infinitum, but I think ad nauseam would strike me from the debate first!
February 12, 2009 6:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
The primary issue that concerns Geithner and Bernanke is not "lending" -- the level of lending's merely a symptom.
They're concerned about a 1931-style collapse of the money supply -- "debt destruction," a lowered money multiplier, and slowing money velocity.
The assets on bank balance sheets are debts owed to them. As the banks lower the value of those debts on their balance sheets, they lower the base against which they can make loans and lower the amount of the loans they can make; and too, as they experience debt destruction banks become increasingly conservative and reduce the money multiplier, and of course with less loans being made the multiplier necessarily will fall.
And then, we enter upon the spiral.
As an aside I agree with you that in this economy the only people who are desperate for loans are people the banks shouldn't be loaning money to.
February 12, 2009 3:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
"And then, we enter upon the spiral."
No, that is already the spiral. But deflation isn't necessarily any scarier than inflation. Managing deflation is possible (if not advisable). I've described one tool which Krugman ignores, negative Fed Funds rate. Nobody seems interested in attacking or supporting it, so maybe it's a stupid idea or maybe I wrote it terribly. But I've seen at least three other similar suggestions since I posted my idea, so I know I'm not the only crazy person in the room.
"They're concerned about a 1931-style collapse of the money supply -- "debt destruction," a lowered money multiplier, and slowing money velocity."
Hello? Mulitpliers are KNOWN to have been too high, they NEED to come down but not crash. I don't really understand velocity here, but so what if velocity slows? Is high velocity good? Then have Peter pay Paul and vice versa, digging and filling in holes daily, sheesh. That's the epitome of the failings of Churning in an economy.
"The velocity of money is the average frequency with which a unit of money is spent in a specific period of time. Velocity affects the amount of economic activity associated with a given money supply." -wikipedia
In case it's not obvious, macroeconomic handwaving is less interesting to me than the "realeconomik" aspects facing real people. So while Generals in armchairs spout off abstractions, I'm concerned about foot soldiers in the concrete trenches of the economy.
February 12, 2009 6:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
I don't get this:
"No big bank using mark to market is currently insolvent, if they have been using mark to market. So the rest is irrelevant narrative based on stories about banks valuing assets in non-standard ways."
They are booking the toxic stuff - or much of it - as level three assets. I.e. not m2m. My guess is the big four are all insolvent if you force them to value them at currently depressed market prices, and if you force them to stop using accounting fictions such as counting deferred tax credits towards tier one capital.
Maybe I'm not getting your point (?)
February 12, 2009 9:18 AM | Reply | Permalink
I think the point of my comment came later.
I'm trying to understand how bank balance sheets work, in the remark you mention. And I don't see why mark to market should be forced on them suddenly and capriciously. That's the meddling of the IMF I referred to later. Drive the banks into the ground, like some other economies were manipulated by the IMF over the past 30 years or so.
I'm suspicious to say the least of such suggestions.
February 12, 2009 6:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
'capriciously' - it depends on whether you think that market prices offer more transparency of a bank's ability to handle its liabilities. Right now, I'd say Johnson is wrong. Market prices are no or worse than bank models. But that's a judgment call. I think Geithner is doing a decent job of finding a way to evaluate these opaque assets and the balance sheets they're on.
February 12, 2009 6:59 PM | Reply | Permalink
No, you miss my point. You, and maybe Geithner, are borrowing trouble. While it's good to have contingency plans, y'all are talking like we MUST NOW try to close down these banks.
I'm saying, let things play out a bit longer, and please get the MSM to stop yammering about "need to get the banks lending again".
This is worse than apples and oranges, it's apples and pie-in-the-sky.
There are technical and fundamental reasons lending is low. From my personal viewpoint, that is how it should be. It's called "deleveraging". Trying to stop deleveraging is like trying to shout down a hurricane. Well, maybe not the best metaphor...
February 12, 2009 7:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
Still trying to pin you down. I don't think anyone wants to reverse deleveraging. It's a matter of letting it come down a bit more gently, softening cycles and all that.
And I'm not for taking over the banks this minute (or do I have a paper trail, crap...). I think there is a case for it to happen sooner rather than later, but you've got to establish which banks are clearly insolvent, with no prospects for dragging themselves back to health, before you dive in. Restructuring the financial sector should start happening as soon as it can be done prudently. In the meantime you're just handing money over to the crooks and liars you dislike so much...
February 12, 2009 7:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
"In the meantime you're just handing money over to the crooks and liars you dislike so much..."
How are we doing that now??
"you've got to establish which banks are clearly insolvent"
Why? I mean, outside of the normal process, give or take a few days?
I suppose I object to Interventionism, the practice of intervening for the sake of intervention. Wait. The time is not right.
What I read is that People Want Lending Now, so our hero Timmy is scrambling to Save The Banks Which Don't Yet Need Saving. I find the premise and the logic both faulty.
February 12, 2009 9:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
Two comments.
First, I find it deeply ironic that the left, which has as far back as I remember been critical of the IMF's advice to developing countries in crisis, would suddenly decide to turn to the expertise of none other than the IMF.
Second, on the one hand we hear complaints about the lack of expertise at Treasury and by extension other USG agencies. On the other hand, we get demands that they take over the bulk of the banking system and run it in an "orderly" way. Something's not computing here in your assessment of the government's technical ability.
February 12, 2009 7:57 AM | Reply | Permalink
The author, Mr. Johnson, is a former economist with the IMF. So he does not so much represent the "left", per se.
You might wonder why Josh would invite him to post, but it seems to me that his views are not so out of step with mine, at least in this case, and I consider myself a leftie.
As long as he doesn't start telling us why we need to privitize our water systems...
-- ARG
February 12, 2009 6:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm not sure it's fair to criticize the Obama team's lack of 'experience' with financial crises. No doubt, if the team was packed with 'experienced' people, everyone would be complaining that the people in charge are part of the old boys network that caused the problem in the first place.
Geithner has experienced the most significant crises over the last 15 years at treasury, ny fed, or the IMF. he saw how not to do things last fall after observing Paulson. Granted, his record was not perfect during TARP I, but he has said as much.
Geithner cannot offer specifics in his plan because it is not prudent to do so. He can't specify his actions because he hasn't seen the results of the stress test. He still has to negotiate deals with investors for the public-private partnership plan, so he doesn't want to tip his hand and specify deal terms until he has leverage on his side.
He's left himself options and flexibility and he's repeatedly said that each situation may require its own individual solution. Some managers will get fired. Others won't. Some banks will get the government as a shareholder. For the insolvent banks, my bet is that they will be auctioned off to private equity turn-around shops rather than nationalized. Assuming the treasury sets appropriate rules/restrictions for the new banks, isn't it better for the taxpayer, if those insolvent banks are fixed without spending government funds?
Geithner is shrewd because he's under-promising and hopefully going to over-deliver. Many criticized him and said 'if you can't offer specifics, why didn't you wait til you were ready?'. If he did that, people would criticize him for being secretive. He's being transparent by laying out a basic strategy that attacks the problem from multiple angles. He's been honest about what he doesn't know and also that he'll probably need more money. Think about it, the only way he'll get more money if he shows tangible success and keeps his transparency and oversight commitments. He's keeping his cards down, because he's negotiating on behalf of the taxpayer and trying to maximize the taxpayer's value here, while also fixing the system.
I'm cautiously very optimistic that Geithner will execute. I think the best sign is that Wall Street HATES the plan so far. I appreciate the need for more answers, but let's keep in mind that it's an enormously complex problem whose fix needs to be executed flawlessly. It is better for Geithner if he has all options at his disposal and doesn't make statements that put him in a box.
February 12, 2009 10:11 AM | Reply | Permalink
Some would argue that it isn't Geithner's "plan" which "Wall Street HATES" but rather that there isn't any plan, that there's no there there.
February 12, 2009 11:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
This is arguably the most complicated problem in the history of the United States. Through no fault of their own, very few journalists or average americans understand the problem, let alone the potential solutions. The same applies to some in the government. If Geithner came to the table and made specific promises it would have been disingenuous and also put the taxpayer in a worse position at the negotiating table. Why commit to anything specific before you know the results of the stress tests??? Geithner knows that the solution won't be one size that fits all. He'll be in much stronger position to recommend solutions to Congress, once he has the best information. He'll be in the best position to negotiate with private investors, once he has the best information.
I agree that the uncertainty is a cause for concern, but I also believe that President Obama is smarter than most. We elected him because we believe that he has the best judgement. If he trusts Geithner, I'm willing to be open-minded in trusting Geithner and giving him credit for the positive aspects of his 'plan'.
Maybe you're right, maybe it's not yet a plan, but at the very least it's a strategy. It's also a strategy that has some points that all of us who distrust wall street can be optimistic about. Geithner is committed to transparency, has admitted that the cost is going to be enormous, has drawn a line in the sand vis-a-vis Wall St (banking stocks got crushed because the stress test will expose insolvency), and has focused a sizable portion of the plan on fixing consumer and mortgage credit markets, which are the underlying problem. Fix the underlying problem on Main Street, and the benefits trickle up.
What we learned from the campaign, the transition, and his first days as President is that Obama always takes the long view, even if the short view is misinterpreted by the media or not well received by the political convention wisdom. Geithner has basically outlined a strategy that costs a lot of money. Relatively speaking, he does not have a lot of money leftover from TARP II to execute his full plan. That means that if he is going to go back to congress and ask for more money, he'll only be able to do that, if he is transparent and shows successful implementation of the TARP II funds.
Also, I don't buy for a second that Wall Street is upset that there is no there there. Despite the evidence to the contrary, these people aren't completely dim-witted. They completely understand the basic proposals laid out by Geithner. They're crying about it, because it puts them in a weaker position and isn't a handout. They (not all of Wall St mind you) and their specific media enablers (kudlow and most of cnbc) are using the lack of detail as a red herring to cover up their real concern, which is the stress test that exposes insolvency. Once insolvency is exposed, management teams will be fired, and those banks will either be nationalized or auctioned off to private equity.
Finally, I think it's telling that Krugman is cautiously optimistic about this plan:
http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/the-rorschach-plan-wonkish-or-at-least-hard-to-read/
February 12, 2009 12:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
I am with you, samaestro, in being cautiously optimistic.
I also interpret the "stress test" as the means with which to take over the insolvent banks while mitigating the political problem of "nationalizing" them.
As you say, Geithner is playing his cards close to his vest. But that makes sense at this point. And Wall Street is nervous. As they should be.
-- ARG
February 12, 2009 2:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
Or, perhaps, as someone recently suggested Geithner is being attributed ownership of the plan, be that as it is, so that in the case it doesn't work he take the blame.
I swear, some reporter wrote that Axelrod and Emmanuel lost an internal struggle to Geithner, it's repeated throughout the echo chamber media, and it's taken as gospel.
With all due respect, Mr. Johnson, I don't think you really know how the policy was derived.
February 12, 2009 6:18 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes. All I've learned from these inane stories is that Axelrod likes washing his dirty laundry in public.
February 12, 2009 7:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
When Obama announced his picks of Geithner and Summers last November, my jaw dropped and quickly re-closed and a wave of disappointment swept over me. If I could figure out that this meant business-as-usual for the very crowd that got us in this mess, how come Axelrod and Emmanuel couldn't/didn't? I find that dubious.
We've been had as far as doing anything necessary about the big banks is concerned, I fear. Obama has been duly bought and/or wants to be a player in the plutocracy. He should let Geithner (did you notice how nervous he was on tv?) and Summers go and do the right thing.
February 13, 2009 5:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
What would the right thing be, in your value system?
I'm worried about Geithner, but mostly my opinion is from MSM articles which drop clues which might be the spin of the author or the buzz on the street, rather than reflecting the aim of G et al.
February 13, 2009 2:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
I believe that Geithner and Summers are actively part of the "oligarchy" as Simon is dubbing the small group of Bilderberg zone inside rich elite (I call them the "plutocracy" - same thing) - anti-democratic elite group robbing us blind for their own (self-justfied) greed and (fear of death, frankly, imo).
The right thing is to fight them - that is to take down these big banks down. Obama could do it, but he's not. Why not?
February 13, 2009 10:30 PM | Reply | Permalink