Andrew's book is an important corrective for the hubris that has, time and again, led American foreign policy astray. His dissection of the national security ideology that inflates American power and virtue should prompt any member of the permanent policy elite to reflect, and squirm. That said, I think the indictment is too sweeping. I have a similar qualm to Michael's: is there really no such thing as benevolent exceptionalism? Is America's role as an indispensable backbone of the international order (p. 2) truly dispensable?

According to Andrew, the high-minded global roles the United States has assigned itself have been delusions at best, or pretensions at worst. But it's one thing to face up to the presumption and sanctimony of American exceptionalism, and another to claim that US power is only a force for good when good is achieved as a side benefit of a dispassionate calculation. Which leads to some of the most interesting questions for current foreign policy: the relationship between national interests and the international greater good, the nature of interdependence, and the meaning of pragmatism.

Showing a fairly hard-core realist bent (in terms of schools of international relations theory) and invoking Niebuhr, Bacevich categorically states that "self-interest determines state policy" (p. 174). Indeed self-sacrifice by a nation-state supposedly lies beyond the realm of possibility. And yet at the same time -- and again citing Niebuhr -- Andrew talks about the statecraft of seeking a convergence of interests, the effectiveness of forming common cause, and the folly of seeking selfish advantage.

So here's my question: are enlightened self-interest and idealistic pragmatism really poles apart? If the well-being of those in other lands must be coolly relegated to a lower-order consideration, it would seem so. Bacevich for instance tars President Obama's call for US "global leadership in the understanding that the world shares a common security and a common humanity" as a perpetuation of bipartisan national security ideology -- sharing more in common than difference with George W. Bush. The notion of the global common good cast as a mask for hegemonic freedom of action.

It seems to me, though, that Bacevich and Niebhur's idea of shared interest as a prudential consideration (i.e. playing it smart) leaves considerable room for a foreign policy not dominated by selfish interests. For one thing, national self-interest has a massive moral hazard problem of the same kind Andrew is worried about. Not all of the War on Terror's threat inflation has been couched as the struggle for freedom; much of the justification has been: do-everything-we-can-to-stop-those-who-mean-to-harm-us. Second, how much of the benefit of international common cause can a powerful nation can reap without concessions to others' interests -- as distinct from, rather than aligned with, one's own interests? If perceived benevolence matters, and in the Bacevich-Niebuhr scheme it does seem to matter, can it be achieved through self-interest alone?

For Andrew, globalization is global hegemony dressed up as a grand project of the integration of nations. With apologies to Churchill, for me it is the worst form of international order, except for all the rest. And yes, it benefits the superpower. And yes, it benefits others, and needs to spread those benefits more widely. In other words, the global economy and global trade show the imperative for America to attend to wider international interests. At the risk of sounding like one of the very alarmists Andrew warns against, the potential breakdown of the international trade system looks like a pretty ominous prospect. If the history of the Great Depression wasn't already warning enough, recent headlines point towards those stakes. If it's true that the United States has shortsightedly sought selfish advantage in the global trade system (see Joseph Stiglitz), what solution can we expect from enlightened realism, with its denial of the possibility of self-denial?

The hard line that Bacevich draws between individual virtues and the ethics of international politics creates a real bind. Indeed, the approach I'm advocating actually calls for many of the same civic-minded virtues that Andrew touts in the book. Several years ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote a book about 'The Choice' between global domination and global leadership, with a particularly incisive section on globalization and trade (pp. 151-163). If Bacevich views the very notion of global leadership with radical skepticism, where does that leave us? Is it really impossible to be both idealistic and pragmatic?