As President Bush is packing, a review of his legacy is starting in earnest. Much of it is troubling at best, and all too often, it is profoundly regrettable. However, he deserves kudos for the way his administration dealt with Libya. Even more important: It suggests steps the next administration should consider in dealing with other rogue states.

In 2003, Libya ended its support of terrorism, compensated the victims of a previous attack, and, most importantly, dramatically announced that it was voluntarily dismantling its nascent nuclear program and other weapons of mass destruction programs. Indeed, Libya's centrifuges and mustard gas tanks, as well as some SCUD missiles, were loaded onto a U.S. ship and removed. Sensitive designs of nuclear warheads were transported on a chartered 747 to the United States. Thirteen kilograms of highly enriched uranium were moved to Russia (America has no blending-down facilities for uranium), and chemical weapons shells were destroyed. Tripoli has been credited with helping the United States to shut down a global black market for nuclear weapons technology run by the Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. In short, major contributions to international security were made on two important fronts: nuclear deproliferation (vastly preferable to inspecting facilities still in place) and prevention of terrorism.

All this was achieved without firing a shot, in part because in this case no attempt was made to change the regime. Libya was allowed to maintain its form of government, although now that the security goal has been achieved, Libya is encouraged to move toward a regime that respects human rights and is based on free elections.

Applying the Libya Lesson to Iran and North Korea
Both Iran and North Korea are reported to have sought non-aggression treaties or security guarantees from the West as part of a deproliferation deal. Selig Harrison of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars reported that Iran, during 2004 negotiations with the "European Three," offered guarantees that its nuclear program was "exclusively for peaceful purposes," in exchange for an understanding that the West would provide "firm commitments on security issues." Similarly, North Korea has repeatedly put security guarantees on the table as one of its conditions for halting its nuclear weapons programs.

There is no way to determine a priori whether Iran and North Korea made these offers in good faith or merely to gain time in order to further expand their nuclear programs. From their view-point, however, one can readily see the reasons these regimes might seek such a deal. Both nations are facing military bases belonging to the United States and its allies close to their borders. If the United States and its allies were willing to remove those bases and provide assurances that they would neither attack directly, nor indirectly subvert these harshly authoritarian regimes, one can see why their governments would be willing to give up their nuclear weapons programs. The only way to find out if this analysis is valid is to offer such a deal seriously.

One thing, however, is clear on the face of it: One can hardly expect these governments to consider seriously a deal that would remove those currently in power, the very same ones that must agree to the deal--which is exactly what regime change entails. It would be like demanding that Bush turn over the reins to Gore, or replace the U.S. Constitution with Islamic sharia!

The deal that the Obama administration should consider can be simply put--if you deproliferate and cease supporting terrorism (the Libya formula), we will leave your regime intact--and it is less bitter than it might initially seem to some. It would not mean that the West must engage in some kind of Faustian bargain and give up its liberal soul to purchase security. Regime change is coming on its own in Iran soon enough, and has already come in some form in most communist states--North Korea, granted, is an exception. In Iran, many reporters have found that the majority of the population rejects the mullahs' strict theocratic rule and would prefer modern political and economic life along Western lines (from consuming alcohol to sporting popular consumer brands). In spite of the mullahs' bellicose foreign policy pronouncements, their authority is waning. And there is much more conflict among various factions of mullahs than is commonly acknowledged in the Western media. Furthermore, Iran has started to liberalize its economy, which in the longer run tends to undermine politically authoritarian regimes.

Finally, we must face the fact that no matter how much money and effort the United States and its allies expend, they cannot make such nations into liberal democracies. As we have seen time and time again, the West can easily topple Saddam or the Taliban, but it cannot establish a liberal-democratic regime in their place. Hence, there is little to be lost and much to be gained by providing security guarantees and other rewards in exchange for deproliferation, and an end to harboring, financing, and equipping terrorists. Obama's big tent should have room for acknowledging that in Libya, the Bush Administration did well, and its approach is well worth extending to other rogue states.

Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University. For more discussion, see his book: Security First (Yale, 2007) or www.securityfirstbook.com email: icps@gwu.edu