Do you at all get into the notion that Saddam had legitimate reasons for believing that the US, up until then his ally, would have tolerated and maybe even quietly condoned his initial invasion of Kuwait?

According to the Duelfer Report, Saddam thought as recently as 2002 that the relationship with the US could be repaired and that Iraq could regain its status as a US client state. That alone is proof that he was never going to attack us. He wanted to rejoin the club of thugs and villains that the US has always used as arms of its foreign policy.

Your metaphor of Hussein cutting the limbs and leaves away from his protective tree is apt, but I think the US is largely to blame since we condoned his actions and propped him up for so long and then kind of double crossed him.

Well Destor23, it's a good question. My suggestion would be watch episode 2 of the series. It deals, among other things, with what Saddam believed about about himself and his relationship with the west during that period. We have dramatised the meeting with April Glaspie (then US Ambassador to Iraq) during which Saddam felt he received certain assurances.

It is my view that Saddam wanted to believe he had a green-light, or at least a promise of inaction from the US, and so constructed meanings that suited him. Saddam was aware of muliple audiences for his actions and I believe he felt that in invading Kuwait he was both calling the bluff of the US, but more importantly sending a important message to his Arab neighbours that he was to be treated with repsect.

Whether his belief was legitimate or not is something that only the US officials involved at the time can answer, and that would be the subject of a different series.

Anyway, I hope you enjoy the show.

Times are tough!

At an extra $24.95 a month for premium channels, I guess I'll have to be satisfied with Frontline's take on Saddam.

This is quite a revelation: Saddam's biggest problem is that "he couldn't come to trust people". Not that he was a sadistic mass murderer. No, that couldn't be the problem. It was his distrustful personality. Otherwise he would have been fine. Yeah. No wonder why so many commentators here at TMP hate the guy who ousted him so much....Saddam had so much fine potential.

When I first heard of the proposed mini-series ‘House of Saddam’ I was suspicious. Why would the BBC/HBO, UK/America, want to make a drama series about Saddam Hussein? I wondered what the hidden agenda might be. Were they trying to cash in on the demonisation of Saddam - already Enemy Number 1 as far as the Western media were concerned? Whose “version” of history was this going to be? After meeting Alex Holmes I soon realised that this drama series would be different. Not a lesson in the history of Iraq, not about condemnation or praise, it was to be about understanding a tightly knit group of people whose lives orbited around their sun, Saddam Hussein. The perspective was going to be from inside the inner circles and family, looking out. It would be an attempt to go behind closed doors and shed light upon the man himself. That really interested me so I spent the next 2 ½ years researching and script editing the ‘House of Saddam’ mini-series.

I had been to Iraq in 2003 working on a documentary series for British & Arabic TV. There, I conducted harrowing interviews with the Iraqi people. I met grieving families of all faiths and political persuasions at the Free Prisoners Association, who were searching for their missing loved ones. I stood at the mass graves of Hilla and saw the remains of Saddam’s victims – shreds of clothing, prayer beads, a child’s shoe. There were thousands missing, thousands tortured, countless thousands dead. The atrocities the Iraqi people have endured as a result of this man’s rule are well documented, but after Saddam their suffering has continued. Some Iraqis I know even wish him back. So who was he? What formed his character and drove him? Here was an opportunity to present a different perspective and to try to understand the most important question… WHY he did what he did. I don’t know if I found an answer but I certainly understand more about Saddam the man as a result of looking at events through his eyes. What would you have done if Hussein Kamel fled into the arms of the CIA with Iraq’s weapons’ secrets?

Initially Saddam Hussein had an admirable vision of a strong and modern Iraq and he worked hard to create it. He built hospitals and schools. The Iraqi people were well fed and well educated. Even UNESCO praised his literacy programs. He was a supporter of women's rights. Yet behind these successes the fear and the terror existed, growing like a cancer as time went by. Ultimately his own paranoia and brutality eroded away everything he had accomplished.

What emerged from the research and interviews was a portrait of a man full of contradictions. After executing his best friend Adnan Hamdani he went to visit his friend's widow to offer his condolences. There were tears of sorrow in his eyes. He modelled himself upon past dictators, studied Stalin, and yet wrote romantic novels, which he published anonymously. And despite his bloody reign he went to the gallows like an innocent man, full of Bedouin honor, head held high, reciting the Qur’an.

The Iraqi people I interviewed were also full of contradictions; they both hated and admired Saddam simultaneously and in equal measure. But looking into his past one can begin to understand where the admiration came from. Saddam grew up in poverty, illiterate, and fatherless in Al Awja, a backwater of Tikrit. To be fatherless within Arab or tribal Bedouin society cannot be under-estimated. It meant to have no status or future. Who could have predicted that this barefoot boy would become the ruler of Iraq and change the course of world history? He single-mindedly forged his journey with sheer determination and willpower and it is clear that his childhood shaped his character. Refusing to endure regular beatings from his cruel stepfather, Saddam ran away from home at the age of eight and an uncle took him in. At school he was further humiliated by having to learn to read and write with children half his age. But he quickly taught himself both and rose through the ranks, determined to prove his worth. His need for status and power came from a start in life where he was deprived of everything. Once he had that power he began to reinvent himself into the hero he had wanted to become. In the end he believed his own mythology as the terrified individuals around him reinforced it. And the circle completed itself; he ended up hiding on a farm, only miles from the place of his birth.

This mini-series presents a more human image than the Western media usually portrays. As a result, we better understand not just Saddam the politician and tactician, but Saddam the father and husband. Those who met him were always amazed at how respectful and caring he was; he loved children; he never broke a promise; his charisma had all the ladies swooning. Humanising him is not a denial of his crimes and I don’t think we were ‘easy’ on him. The facts exist and his crimes are documented in the series. However, this approach gives us a wider viewpoint, the chance to ponder different questions, and to learn more perhaps about the nature of dictatorship itself. Sadly, Saddam’s rule is an example of many regimes still in operation today.

Stick to the facts and you can't go wrong. That would be a good place to start. If only it were as simple as that.[T]here were two challenges to following this good advice. The first was: whose facts?

It is my view that Saddam wanted to believe he had a green-light, or at least a promise of inaction from the US, and so constructed meanings that suited him.

"whose" facts?

"wanted" to believe?

evidence the above, i think the essential problem, mr holmes, is whose facts did you choose to believe and so construct conclusions to suit them?

new york times lede from CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF: U.S. Gave Iraq Little Reason Not to Mount Kuwait Assault by ELAINE SCIOLINO with MICHAEL R. GORDON, 23 sep 1990:

In the two weeks before Iraq's seizure of Kuwait, the Bush Administration on the advice of Arab leaders gave President Saddam Hussein little reason to fear a forceful American response if his troops invaded the country. The Administration's message to Baghdad, articulated in public statements in Washington by senior policy makers and delivered directly to Mr. Hussein by the United States Ambassador, April C. Glaspie, was this: The United States was concerned about Iraq's military buildup on its border with Kuwait, but did not intend to take sides in what it perceived as a no-win border dispute between Arab neighbors. In a meeting with Mr. Hussein in Baghdad on July 25, eight days before the invasion, Ms. Glaspie urged the Iraqi leader to settle his differences with Kuwait peacefully but added, "We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait," according to an Iraqi document described as a transcript of their conversation.

relevant passage from CONFRONTATION IN THE GULF: Excerpts From Iraqi Document on Meeting With U.S. Envoy, Special to The New York Times, 23 sep 1990:

On July 25, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq summoned the United States Ambassador to Baghdad, April Glaspie, to his office in the last high-level contact between the two Governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2. Here are excerpts from a document described by Iraqi Government officials as a transcript of the meeting, which also included the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz. A copy was provided to The New York Times by ABC News, which translated it from the Arabic. The State Department has declined to comment on its accuracy.

GLASPIE: I have a direct instruction from the President to seek better relations with Iraq.

HUSSEIN: But how? We too have this desire. But matters are running contrary to this desire.

GLASPIE: This is less likely to happen the more we talk. For example, you mentioned the issue of the article published by the American Information Agency and that was sad. And a formal apology was presented.

HUSSEIN: Your stance is generous. We are Arabs. It is enough for us that someone says, ''I am sorry, I made a mistake.'' Then we carry on. But the media campaign continued. And it is full of stories. If the stories were true, no one would get upset. But we understand from its continuation that there is a determination.

GLASPIE: I saw the Diane Sawyer program on ABC. And what happened in that program was cheap and unjust. And this is a real picture of what happens in the American media - even to American politicians themselves. These are the methods the Western media employs. I am pleased that you add your voice to the diplomats who stand up to the media. Because your appearance in the media, even for five minutes, would help us to make the American people understand Iraq. This would increase mutual understanding. If the American President had control of the media, his job would be much easier.

Mr. President, not only do I want to say that President Bush wanted better and deeper relations with Iraq, but he also wants an Iraqi contribution to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. President Bush is an intelligent man. He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.

You are right. It is true what you say that we do not want higher prices for oil. But I would ask you to examine the possibility of not charging too high a price for oil.

HUSSEIN: We do not want too high prices for oil. And I remind you that in 1974 I gave Tariq Aziz the idea for an article he wrote which criticized the policy of keeping oil prices high. It was the first Arab article which expressed this view.

TARIQ AZIZ: Our policy in OPEC opposes sudden jumps in oil prices.

HUSSEIN: Twenty-five dollars a barrel is not a high price.

GLASPIE: We have many Americans who would like to see the price go above $25 because they come from oil-producing states.

HUSSEIN: The price at one stage had dropped to $12 a barrel and a reduction in the modest Iraqi budget of $6 billion to $7 billion is a disaster.

GLASPIE: I think I understand this. I have lived here for years. I admire your extraordinary efforts to rebuild your country. I know you need funds. We understand that and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. But we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait.

I was in the American Embassy in Kuwait during the late 60's. The instruction we had during this period was that we should express no opinion on this issue and that the issue is not associated with America. James Baker has directed our official spokesmen to emphasize this instruction. We hope you can solve this problem using any suitable methods via Klibi or via President Mubarak. All that we hope is that these issues are solved quickly. With regard to all of this, can I ask you to see how the issue appears to us?

My assessment after 25 years' service in this area is that your objective must have strong backing from your Arab brothers. I now speak of oil. But you, Mr. President, have fought through a horrific and painful war. Frankly, we can only see that you have deployed massive troops in the south. Normally that would not be any of our business. But when this happens in the context of what you said on your national day, then when we read the details in the two letters of the Foreign Minister, then when we see the Iraqi point of view that the measures taken by the U.A.E. and Kuwait is, in the final analysis, parallel to military aggression against Iraq, then it would be reasonable for me to be concerned. And for this reason, I received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship - not in the spirit of confrontation - regarding your intentions.

I simply describe the concern of my Government. And I do not mean that the situation is a simple situation. But our concern is a simple one.

Hi everybody.

Thanks for all your comments.

A couple I will pick up on:

JohnW1141:

For me there is a much more straightforward explanation as to why Saddam went from US ally to US enemy, which is that Saddam was an ally as long as he was a useful club to beat the Iranian regime with. The Iran/Iraq war effectively neutralised the two strongest powers in the region and created room for the US to operate its foreign policy more effectively. As soon as that war ended Saddam intended to flex his power and looked as if he might become predominant in the region, hence it became important for the US to undermine him.

Your second point - that Bush "suckered" Saddam into invading Kuwait - may well have some truth in it. However, to my mind this seems to allows no room for Saddam to have a powerful over-riding agenda of his own. What would it have taken to persuade Saddam not to invade?

As it was Saddam interpreted the invasion of Kuwait as a glorious success, which to him showed that he was able to face down the aggression of 50 nations. He famously said to his Head of Military Intelligence that in 300 years no one would see the invasion of Iraq as a mistake.

I am wary of the tendency to find the cause of too many actions simply in a reaction to an American position. That comes dangerously close to ethnocentricity.

Take a look at Part II on sunday where some of these themes are explored.

Morsus Mihi : you are in similar historical territory. I'm sure you'll be pleased to hear that we do indeed dramatise sections of the transcript you refer to which details the meeting between Glaspie and Saddam/Aziz. I'm not entirely clear as to your point, about my choice of facts, but in assessing Saddam's view of the American attitude towards his dispute with Kuwait we relied heavily on the transcript which you have reproduced in part, though of course it's worth remembering the original was released by the Iraqis bcause they clearly thought it served their interests. However we also talked to several members of Saddam's establishment who were party to the internal discussion leading up to the invasion of Kuwait.

It is also worth underlining that my interest was not in what message the US intended to send to Saddam, but rather in what Saddam thought and felt. As I say, a series about US foreign policy would be a different series, and probably not a drama.