So many intriguing points, so little time.

Jake asked if I took on Cheney's working style and wrote from a subterranean lair. Can't disclose that. ;-)

On Spencer's quest for a grand unified theory, I generally agree that Cheney did not transform himself from the administration of Bush the father to Bush the son, and that much of the apparent change can be explained by the absence of counterweights the second time around. I also agree that Cheney believes the expansion of executive power is a good thing, regardless of the particular dispute at hand, but I can't endorse Spencer's view that this is a quest for power for its own sake alone. Cheney believes the executive branch, and the president as its chief, is the only one capable of responding with the swiftness and unity of purpose required to defend vital national interests. Anyone would travel part of the way with Cheney on this -- nobody serious could argue for government by plebiscite, or that every executive decision must first be put to Congress and the Supreme Court -- but my book argues that Cheney misreads the Federalist papers and takes the point way too far.

There have been several substantive questions and arguments here about the NSA's warrantless surveillance program. I'll try to address those separately, in one last post.

David asks for more on Cheney's motives for the Iraq war. I'd love to know more myself. The central point made by his own senior staffers -- they include Aaron Friedberg, Steve Yates and David Wurmser, speaking on the record -- was that Cheney sought a "demonstration effect" in Iraq. David sees a conflict between this explanation and Ron Suskind's "one percent doctrine." I see them as two sides of the coin. Cheney really did fear a potential nexus among hostile states, terrorists, and the WMD that one might give the other. Suskind may simplify it a bit too much with his "one percent doctrine," but Cheney did believe in addressing some "high consequence, low probability events" as if they were clear and present. (See e.g. the narrative in Angler about Cheney and the smallpox vaccine.) Yes, Cheney sought to prevent the formation of the much-feared nexus in Iraq, but that was not the biggest thing on his mind. There were hostile governments he worried about even more, but they were less attractive venues of war. The "demonstration effect" explains Iraq, in substantial part, as a war to reestablish deterrence with the others.

On the question of Bush's relationship with Cheney, which David and Jake both ask, there's no single answer. On page 388 I say Cheney acted "sometimes at Bush's direction, sometimes with his tacit consent, and sometimes without the president's apparent awareness." The book has plenty of examples of each. So Paul is correct to say that Cheney can't take the heat for all the procedural fouls:

The president knew he had an EPA administrator and an Attorney General, but apparently thought he could make certain decisions without hearing (or hearing further) from them. Unless Cheney falsely claimed that the official in question was on board, the main issue here is the president's approach, not Cheney's.

But there are other stories in Angler -- and one of them takes up two whole chapters -- in which Cheney left Bush unaware of vigorous debate, and Bush signed orders in the dark. Partly because of these events, the Bush-Cheney relationship changed. Over time, my narrative shows a president who grew more confident in his own judgments and less confident in Cheney's.