Let me begin my final post by thanking TPMCafe and Bart for inviting me into this discussion, and the other members of the discussion group for their thoughtful and respectful posts.

Second, I'd like to revise a statement I made at the outset, namely that I would recommend Angler only to those who wish to read an "anti-Cheney brief." Actually, I would recommend Angler to anyone who wants to read about Cheney, but with the proviso that, in my view, it is somewhat slanted against the vice president.

Third, how do I see the Cheney vice presidency? I certainly have my disagreements with aspects of it. For example, I've never liked the Bybee (Yoo) memorandum which contains an untenable definition of torture and an overreaching view of presidential power. And as a general matter, I think Cheney was mistaken to the extent he declined to cooperate with Congress, where doing so would have formed a stronger basis for vigorous prosecuting the war on terror, in order to uphold abstract principles of executive power. Given the importance I attach to the war on terror, a more flexible and pragmatic approach was in order.

Overall, however, I think Cheney (along with President Bush) was just the leader the country needed to spearhead the war on terror, especially in its early years. I suspect that the forceful nature of the administration's response to 9/11 prevented subsequent attacks and saved lives. It certainly seems to have dealt a series of powerful blows against al Qaeda. But even if it didn't, the Bush-Cheney response was, on balance, the correct approach to the threat and the uncertainty that we faced.

I'm pretty sure we would have invaded Iraq if, say, Frank Keating had been vice president instead of Cheney. In any case, I think (as many prominent Democrats did) that this was the right decision based on the available information. Nor do I fault Cheney for believing that the "demonstration effect" of a successful military action against this enemy was a substantial argument in favor of the war.

As Bart points out, this argument was contingent on success, and success was far too long in coming. But if, as now seems likely, success is achieved, I believe the U.S. will be better off for having replaced Saddam Hussein's regime with a functioning democracy in the heart of the Middle East, one with whom we can expect to have decent relations. Time will tell on this question, if Barack Obama permits it to.

I also give Cheney credit for things he wanted to do but was unable to accomplish. At the top of the list is his energy policy, which called for offshore drilling and the development of nuclear power. The nation would be in much better shape, I think, if these ideas had been implemented early in the first Bush term.

Finally, a note on the idea of the Vice President as uber-Chief-of-Staff. Cheney is different from others who have served presidents aggressively through the gate-keeping, information processing role for a number of reasons. First, he was more canny and (for a long time) more effective than most. Second, his portfolio was more wide-ranging than most. Third, he was the vice president.

Bart stresses that, unlike a traditional Chief-of-Staff, the vice president can't be fired by the president. But he can be cut out of the loop. The more salient point may be that, unlike the normal chief, the vice president has been vetted by the electorate. Voters witnessed Cheney go through two presidential campaigns and two vice presidential debates. At least during the period when Cheney was so influential, voters seemed to like what they saw. If anything, it seems desirable that the vice president be the president's most influential adviser.

I doubt, however, that we will soon see this model again. On this, we probably all can agree.