TPMCafe
« Anti-Choicers Switching up Strategy? | Home | What Really Happened »

Potemkin Washington

user-pic


My opinion of Angler has become more favorable during the course of this discussion as I see some of the paths Bart didn't take. Before I fall into the tank completely, I should post some of my promised criticism of the book.

One of my main complaints has to do with the portrayal of official Washington. That, of course, is the setting of the events Bart describes. It seems to me, then, that one cannot fully understand the Cheney vice presidency without a fair account of Washington and its bureaucracy.

I don't think Bart provides one. In the Washington of Angler, the only pairs of sharp elbows appear to belong to the vice president and his counsel, David Addington. Everyone else plays "fair," never seeking an edge for the purpose of advancing an agenda.

There are no snakes outside of the vice president's office, not even Richard Armitage. Indeed, no one outside of that very small circle would even think of cutting an adversary out of the loop, or of letting their stated expert or scientific views be influenced by an agenda. It is inconceivable, for example, that CIA officials would, for the purpose of limiting the administration's policy options, conclude that Iran halted its efforts to obtain nuclear weapons (a position that, to my knowledge, even the leading Democratic presidential candidates took no heed of during the campaign). Nor would anyone adopt one view of the prerogatives of an office when he holds it and another view when he holds a competing job. There may not even be such a thing as a "competing job" in this harmonious village.

In such a Washington, it becomes more than plausible to say, as Jacob Heilbrunn does, that Cheney operates on a different planet.

Bart does not assert the existence of the "Potemkin Washington" I've just described. If he did, his book would lack credibility and thus would not work as a "brief." Instead, like a good lawyer, he simply ignores, by and large, the existence of what I take to be the real Washington. I may be overlooking something, but I don't recall anyone in Angler, other than Cheney or Addington, playing "hardball" until somewhere around page 300. At that point Jack Goldsmith and James Comey finally do, but purely as a last resort in response to several years of vice presidential skullduggery.

Bart did not invent the Washington of Angler. That town will be familiar to readers of the Washington Post, at least during Republican administrations, although the Post extends the circle of the "long knives" beyond the vice president's shop.

But I've lived in Washington for more than 50 years, including six spent working for the federal government at three agencies, and I do not recognize the Washington that Angler, by omission, depicts. In the summer of 1972, my job at the old Department of HEW (now HHS) was to develop data showing that a program favored by the president wouldn't work. As a government civil rights lawyer later in that decade, nearly everyone I worked with viewed his or her role as pushing laws protecting women and minorities as far as they could be pushed, not as attempting to determine the correct interpretation of the law and pushing for that position.

I doubt that the Cheney vice presidency can fully be understood outside the context of this Washington.

Some, including Bart perhaps, will consider "paranoid" the view that career bureaucrats and presidential appointees and staffers sometimes act in bad faith or with excessive caution. But it seems clear that some of what Cheney did was informed by this view (I know this is true of certain Cheney's allies in the administration). Thus, in my opinion, any account of his vice presidency should address this view far more comprehensively than Bart does.


2 Comments

| Leave a comment
user-pic

That town will be familiar to readers of the Washington Post, at least during Republican administrations...

Maybe that's why people voted the b***ards out (and that's why McCain's claims to be a "reformer" rang so hollow).

But that doesn't mean that laws are toilet paper (such as the National Security Act of 1947, or the laws against torture). Especially when the results have been so disastrous.

Just take a look at crap like this:

The OSP had access to a huge amount of raw intelligence. It came in part from "report officers" in the CIA's directorate of operations whose job is to sift through reports from agents around the world, filtering out the unsubstantiated and the incredible. Under pressure from the hawks such as Mr Cheney and Mr Gingrich, those officers became reluctant to discard anything, no matter how far-fetched. The OSP also sucked in countless tips from the Iraqi National Congress and other opposition groups, which were viewed with far more scepticism by the CIA and the state department.

There was a mountain of documentation to look through and not much time. The administration wanted to use the momentum gained in Afghanistan to deal with Iraq once and for all. The OSP itself had less than 10 full-time staff, so to help deal with the load, the office hired scores of temporary "consultants". They included lawyers, congressional staffers, and policy wonks from the numerous rightwing thinktanks in Washington. Few had experience in intelligence.

"Most of the people they had in that office were off the books, on personal services contracts. At one time, there were over 100 of them," said an intelligence source. The contracts allow a department to hire individuals, without specifying a job description.

As John Pike, a defence analyst at the thinktank GlobalSecurity.org, put it, the contracts "are basically a way they could pack the room with their little friends".

"They surveyed data and picked out what they liked," said Gregory Thielmann, a senior official in the state department's intelligence bureau until his retirement in September. "The whole thing was bizarre. The secretary of defence had this huge defence intelligence agency, and he went around it."

In fact, the OSP's activities were a com plete mystery to the DIA and the Pentagon.

"The iceberg analogy is a good one," said a senior officer who left the Pentagon during the planning of the Iraq war. "No one from the military staff heard, saw or discussed anything with them."

The civilian agencies had the same impression of the OSP sleuths. "They were a pretty shadowy presence," Mr Thielmann said. "Normally when you compile an intelligence document, all the agencies get together to discuss it. The OSP was never present at any of the meetings I attended."

It's shades of the Data Quality Act, or the censorship of a 60 year old distinguished scientist at the hands of a 24 year old political commissar without even a bachelor's degree, or the staffing of the Justice Department by a political-cultural nomenklatura.

I mean, this is the "values" party? The cynicism is breathtaking.

All I can say is, don't let the door hit your a**es on the way out.

user-pic

I wonder how Mr. Mirengoff's apologia would play at the Hague, were Cheney ever to be indicted for war crimes, as he should rightfully be.


Leave a comment

Advertisement
Please disable your adblocker!
Ads are how we pay the bills!

Subscribe

The Coffee House
TPMCafe's regulars

House Brew
From Your Cafe Editor

Special Guests
Big names and big brains

Special Features
Pressing topics and trends

Table for One
An expert's week-long talk.

All Reader Posts
TPM readers discuss.

Recent Reader Posts

All Reader Posts »



Book Club Calendar


Coming Soon



Nov. 30-Dec. 4



January 12-16



« Book Club ArchiveFull calendar »

Book Club Archive



Masthead

Editor-in-Chief
Josh Marshall

Site Editor
Lila Shapiro

Intern
Kyle Krahel-Frolander



Subscribe to TPMCafe's feed.
Subscribe to TPMCafe's reader blog feed.

Advertise Liberally
Share
Close Social Web Email

"To" Email Address

Your Name

Your Email Address