Bailing on the Bailout, or Is It Too Big to Bail?
The Democrats have made good progress in getting the Bush administration to move from the $700 billion blank check proposal that we saw last weekend. The initial draft agreement provides for some real oversight, restrictions on executive compensation, and an equity stake for the government in exchange for taxpayer dollars. It is also includes language committing the government to seek workouts on mortgages that will allow people to stay in their homes.
This is all great progress, however there is still much that is missing.
The limits on executive compensation are vague. It is not clear whose pay will be restricted and by how much. It is reasonable to ask that these terms be spelled out. When Henry Paulson became chief executive officer at Goldman Sachs, his contract didn't promise him "adequate compensation," it provided for a specific package of millions or tens of millions of dollars. This deal should include the same sort of specific provision on pay restrictions that business people negotiate when they make a deal.
The same applies to the rules on acquiring equity. Senator Dodd had a very reasonable formula in the proposal that he put forward on Monday. His plan called for the government to get $1.25 in equity for every dollar that we lose on assets purchased from financial institutions. This would be applied to the value of the equity at the time the assets were purchased so that if the stock price subsequently rose, the taxpayers would get the benefit of this increase.
We can quibble over the number, but not the principle. Warren Buffet didn't give $5 billion to Goldman Sachs for an unspecified amount of equity. He had a contract that gave him a specific stake in the company. That is the way people do business. Why wouldn't we expect that the government would have the same sorts of contracts when it provides capital to banks?
The bankruptcy provision that the Bush administration insists is a deal breaker should in fact be rather innocuous. It just changes one provision of the bankruptcy code back to what its pre-1991 wording. Under the proposed change, bankruptcy judges would be allowed to reset the terms of a mortgage contract just as they can reset the terms of a car loan, business loan, or any other debt.
It is bizarre that President Bush is telling Congress that he would rather allow the financial system to collapse than have the banks lose a few dollars due to this change. Remember, the vast majority of foreclosures do not involve bankruptcy (the share would increase with a change in the law). And even in the cases involving bankruptcy, judges are not going to just give away the house. We are talking about limited reductions in mortgage payments which in many cases may still give the banks more money than they would get from carrying through a foreclosure. And, over this President Bush is willing to wreck the financial system?
The bill also offers nothing by way of stimulus. This is important not only because the bill will not directly provide a boost to the economy, but the opponents of stimulus are sure to use the money spent bailing out the banks as an argument against another stimulus package.
In other words, putting stimulus in this bill is not just a question of treating the bill as a Christmas tree. If we spend $700 billion or even $350 billion to bail out the banks, it is much less likely that we will then be able to get the support for the stimulus needed to boost the economy out of recession.
This leaves the question of whether the Democrats can responsibly walk away from the bailout. This involves a tough call. The financial system was really shaken by the events of last week when Lehman Brothers went under and AIG was about to follow suit. However, Ben Bernanke and Henry Paulson were able to duct tape things together with the cooperation of the other major central banks.
The financial markets remain extremely unsettled and more bad news is a virtual certainty, but Bernanke and Paulson have lots of duct tape at their disposal. The sort of financial breakdown that we all fear remains a possibility, but my bet is that they will be able to deal with whatever crises develop.
Of course it would be better to have a more settled financial market, but this should not come at any cost. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that this package will fix the problem. As many economists have noted, the more obvious way to address the current situation is to directly inject capital into the banking system, something this proposal does not do.
There is one other point worth considering in assessing the responsibility of a walk-away strategy. Suppose the Paulson plan goes through. It is virtually certain that the economy will weaken further and the number of foreclosures and people without jobs will continue to rise.
This is the fallout from a collapsing housing bubble. Families that have seen most of their home equity disappear will feel the need to cut back their consumption and increase their savings. We have a huge cohort of baby boomers at the edge of retirement, most of whom who have accumulated almost no wealth during their working lifetime. When these families respond to their loss of home equity by cutting back their consumption it will deepen the recession.
In this context it might prove very important to have the resources needed to provide a substantial stimulus. In principle, even a $700 billion bailout package would not be so large as to preclude a further stimulus next year. However, there is no doubt that this bailout will make further stimulus much more difficult to sell politically.
In this sense it is hard to view supporting a bad bailout package as the responsible course of action. While the bailout may lesson a presumably small risk of financial breakdown, it could have the effect of making the recession much longer and more painful than necessary. This would not be responsible.















Dean, could you comment on the House Republicans' proposal?
I don't understand how cutting the capital gains tax would help at all with the current crisis. And the insurance idea seems plausibly helpful, but a less direct tactic.
I'd love to hear your analysis on this. Thanks.
-- ARG
September 26, 2008 2:57 PM | Reply | Permalink
Seems like a dumb idea to me, but what about Cantor's plan to insure every mortgage in the United States (we already insure half of them), the insurance premium to be paid by the banks? Presumably, the stand-alone mortgages, the MBSs secured by mortgages, and the derivatives based on them would all be money-good.
The objection seems to be 1) that the insurance premium would be extremely difficult to calculate and 2) that it wouldn't get capital into the banks.
As to the second objection I don't know why we can't just loan the banks money if they require additional capital. Why do we need all these sub rosa shenanigans?
As to the first objection I've no idea how difficult it would be.
September 26, 2008 5:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
I can see how the capital gains tax reduction would make for a nice windfall for the people who have bought some of the sh*tpile-related assets for pennies on the dollar and plan to sell them to the Treasury for rather more.
September 26, 2008 3:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
Why wouldn't we expect that the government would have the same sorts of contracts [as Warren Buffet has with Goldman Sachs] when it provides capital to banks? Dean Baker
Except that under the Dodd/Frank bailout bill, the government is purchasing assets at their fair "hold to maturity" price. Buffet was investing capital in Goldman Sachs.
I mean -- what? I sell you a product from my store and now, you want to own part of my business? You know what I say to you? Get lost!
September 26, 2008 3:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen,
I think it would be just great if we passed the bailout and the banks decided to tell us to get lost. It must mean that they don't need the money. what could be better?
September 26, 2008 3:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
You might but Mssrs. Dodd and Frank wouldn't -- or hadn't you noticed?
September 26, 2008 4:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
As an aside it may be noticed that Barney Frank is absolutely salivating at the thought of controlling these mortgage assets. Then, he'll be able to rewrite the underlying mortgages -- at huge taxpayer expense and all hidden.
He'd pay the banks anything they demanded if he could only get his hands on these MBSs.
September 26, 2008 4:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
What about the over leveraged derivatives that these institutions hold? Why are we buying worthless paper? If the process doesn't include unbundling packages and discounting bad derivatives, don't we reward the speculators again?
September 26, 2008 5:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
You raise an excellent point, one (how to even think about it) I've been struggling with.
I suppose you could start by thinking about credit default swaps as two different types -- those held as insurance and those held as purely, speculative investments.
The first shouldn't be a problem. A bank buys a CDS insuring a particular MBS. The value of the MBS goes down; the value of the CDS goes up -- and vice versa. If you think of the two instruments as paired it's a net zero arrangement except --
If the counterparty to the CDS isn't financially sound and may not be able to make good on the contract, then, the CDS won't go up as much as the MBS goes down. Are banks carrying these CDSs at unreasonably high values because they're not looking at counterparty solvency?
In any case if the government buys the MBS it should get the "attached" CDS for free since it presumably, no longer has value (the MBS owner, the government, won't be making demands for payment if the MBS fails).
The second type, CDSs held by hedge funds, are a pure speculative play. But many are pledged to banks to secure loans and are a significant factor in valuing those bank loans (the difference in values between secured and unsecured loans).
Does this second class of CDSs have to be left with the banks? Do they impact the banks' balance sheets negatively?
September 26, 2008 6:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen,
MSNBC is reporting on HDTV that if the CDSs go belly up and the MBS fails, won't the GDP bounce back and increase APRs of loans made by MBAs working for ING overseen by SEC at the same time the ARMs adjust?
September 26, 2008 6:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
TSARTM!!!!
September 26, 2008 8:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
I guess that begs the question of institutions not covered by this welfare/bailout. Will they swap their over leveraged derivatives for better paper with the welfare recipient Co's?
September 26, 2008 6:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Dean,
This and the recent post by Elizabeth Warren are sounding more and more informative and potentially instructive. I have one comment and two questions.
Comment: I'm not sure that boomers should be viewed as consumers. For the most part they've raised their kids and bought their toys. It's young people that really need the money and opportunities. Boomers will increasingly need more health care. The important point here, though, is that we need a much better focus on the radical change in demographics that is beginning to take place. That's not the end of the world and a better understanding will help investors and businesses make good decisions.
Question: Is it possible that this will be the end of what one might call "bubblenomics," which turned out to be the only engine supply-side thinking can build. Warren's post seems to indicate that more and more economists are starting to think that there may be more to economics than monetary policy and the phrase "free market." What a radical idea!
Question: Has anyone looked seriously at the possibility that asset prices are inflated and that a source of the inflation is the move away from pensions and Social Security, which pool uncertainties, and IRA's, SEP's and 401K plans which on an aggregate basis over fund retirement while still posing risks on an individual level. I wonder how much money has been dumped into financial markets to fund these retirement vehicles and driven up prices. The implication is that boomers will be trying to sell what are overpriced assets. (Example uncertainties are length of life and medical needs. Those are not predictable on an individual level.)
September 26, 2008 7:47 PM | Reply | Permalink