The RAND Corporation dug into its own funds to produce an unusual report. It seeks to determine how terrorists groups end. It found that in the best cases, they turn into political parties (like the Resistencia Nacional Mozambicana in Mozambique did). When force must be used to end terrorism, a combination of policing and use of intelligence is much more effective than committing conventional armies. The RAND report provides more ammunition to those who reject the metaphor of a "war" against terrorism and all that it evokes. At the same time the report points out that Al Qaeda is especially unlikely to agree to a political settlement, given its ambitions, goals, and religious fundamentalism. To learn more, go here.

Because the report draws mainly on data about groups that functioned in countries in which they had no realistic chance of gaining control of nuclear weapons, such as Columbia and El Salvador, the report does not deal with what practically all experts consider by far the greatest threat to security, what is referred to as massive or catastrophic terrorism-- by those who employ nuclear weapons.

This grave threat is directly tied to the question of what is the best way to curb terrorism. Some hold that terrorists should be treated like other criminals. However, the criminal system focuses on prosecution. That is, bringing offenders to trial and deterring future crime by punishing those that have already committed crimes. In contrast, to counter terrorism, prevention is much more important. We seek to ensure that such attacks will not occur, rather than go after the perpetrators after the fact. Moreover, given that many of them commit suicide during their attacks, they fear not the prosecution that might follow, as they will be unavailable to face trial.

Last but not least, in the criminal justice system those charged with a crime have a right to face those who bear witness against them, and the state must disclose to the defense all the relevant information it has. This would mean, for instance, that if the US found a collaborator or planted an agent among bin Laden's close associates--he or she would have to be appear in court! And if the US succeeded in planting a microphone in Iran's command and control center, this source would have to be disclosed.

Our mind is big enough to accommodate more than two options. The image of a war against terrorism is clearly a wrong one, if only because the other side will not abide by the few rules that wars have, especially wearing a uniform or some other insignia so one can tell fighters from civilians. (One should though note that Bob Woodward's new book, The War Within, shows that what is working in Iraq is a combination of better methods of collecting intelligence and better use of special and conventional forces--that is better use of the military.) Policing is the wrong model for reasons just indicated. The RAND report uses the term counterterrorism to imply a third approach. As I see it, a third approach would grant terrorists basic human rights (e.g. they cannot be tortured, and they cannot be held indefinitely without being charged) but not the full list of rights a citizen of the United States (or whatever nation is involved) commands. Thus, terrorists should be required to choose a lawyer from among those that have security clearances. They will not be able to see sources and methods, and can be held for longer than 48 hours--say 21 days--before they have to be charged, to allow time to roll up their cells, trace their phone calls, and decipher their computer files.

Finally, we need another RAND report on the best ways to win over the sympathizers of the terrorists, on which they draw for funding, supplies, and intelligence. In that sense, the fight against Al Qaeda is an ideological confrontation. The best way to proceed is to ally ourselves with the majority of Muslims who abhor violence, who make reliable Partners in Peace, against the violent minority. [for more on this point, go here]

All in all, thanks is due to RAND (and especially to Seth G. Jones and Martin C. Libicki, the authors of the report) for a work that lifts the deliberations about how to end terrorism to a new level. It is at this level that we must find new ways to fight terrorism.

Amitai Etzioni is Professor of International Relations at The George Washington University and author of Security First (Yale 2007). www.securityfirstbook.com email: comnet@gwu.edu