Heartbroken by Standard Operating Procedure

Thank you, Philip, for another heartbreakingly brilliant book. I have already told several people that they MUST read it, and am planning to give it to a number of others. I'll get to some of your questions here and in later posts, and will ask some of my own. But I don't want to assume that TPMCafe readers have read or seen S.O.P., so I'll write a little about the book and movie first. Just a little ... because I've got little post-it flags and yellow highlighter notes through far too much of it to mention here. Read it for yourselves, please.
I am assuming that everyone here remembers the horrible photos: the caped and hooded man on the box; the pyramid of naked prisoners; the skinny female soldier holding the detainee on a leash. And I am assuming that most of us were shocked and profoundly ashamed, as I was, that this is now what America stands for: torture and occupation and humiliation, rather than truth and justice and morality and honor. (I'm not saying that the U.S. has always fulfilled the ideal, but I am ashamed we have so actively rejected it.) Or am I assuming too much? A friend recently told me that, after 9/11, he took for granted that something like Abu Ghraib would happen, given human nature, given all we know from the Stanford prison experiment and so much else. I was shocked by his cynicism. To realize that human beings were being tortured in my name, with my tax dollars, and that I had no idea how to make it stop, sickened me with shame.
Gourevitch and Morris offer a window into the hearts and minds of soldiers who were distorted by war and abandoned by their country, who were forced to do brutal and brutalizing things, and who were scapegoated when their acts were exposed. The movie asks: what was actually happening when those photos were taken? How did people feel about them? I saw Errol Morris's movie a couple of months ago, in an early screening at Brandeis, and was so heartbroken that I couldn't speak the rest of the night. It's one thing to know intellectually that the low-level MPs who were prosecuted were taking the fall for the administration; it's another to watch as a naif like Sabrina Harman talks about taking pictures to prove that they were told to do such things. To listen to Javal Davis, Lynndie England, and Sabrina Harman and grasp how intimately their inner lives were distorted -- and their public lives destroyed -- by what they were ordered and expected to do, and by what they had to witness, was heartbreaking.
I find Errol Morris's method to be profoundly affecting, emotionally wrenching -- and yet the movie left me with a lot of factual questions. Gourevitch's book took me much deeper into the facts and documents, and so was heartbreaking in a far deeper and more intellectual way. I wasn't sure, watching the movie, what had actually happened and what those interviewed were saying self-servingly; the book answered the smaller questions, such as the dates that Harman wrote her letters or how Javal Davis actually behaved. And to know that Lynndie England still hears the screams of someone whom military intelligence (or the CIA, or FBI, or civilian contractors) were torturing--seeing from that small angle is, as I have to say again, heartbreaking. Of course the big picture is horrible in its own way. But seeing how U.S. actions at Abu Ghraib shattered lives -- and not even the lives of the tortured or torturers, but the kind of rural working class folks who I went to grade school and high school in southern Ohio -- is distressing in a more personal way.
The book also gave me the larger background, which made it far more damning. It puts us inside a small portion of the chaos created by the occupation itself, which anyone in her right mind could have predicted would lead to ongoing revolt; it shows us some of the consequences of the wholesale arrests of bystanders and civilians; it adds up what we know about the famous torture memos, the disavowal of the Geneva Conventions, the abrogation of habeas corpus, and the general trampling on the moral compass of the nation, the entire 1984-like nightmare that we've all been watching with slackened jaws.
Here's some of what the book gave me that I didn't already know:
--The distressing chain of document errors, willful legal misinterpretations, and the strange game of "telephone" between D.C.'s official policies and prison local implementation ... which resulted in an entire prison's worth of people being treated like sacks of meat with no human value. How could there have been no serious review, anywhere along the line??
--The incompetence of putting untrained and unprepared reservists in charge of daily oversight of prisoners with no manuals, no guidance whatsoever.
--The shock of seeing central military functions fully outsourced, with civilian contractors paid to torture, apparently with no oversight and no accountability.
--The shame and demoralization of officers who tried to--and could not--arrange for the release of some of the innocent bystanders who had been swept up in random security sweeps.
--The regular refusal of moral responsibility up and down the chain of command, as people under pressure worked to satisfy Rumsfeld's demand for information, and were never held accountable for the resulting criminal behavior--including torturing and even killing ordinary civilians.
I think that's my first outburst. More later in the week. Meanwhile, three questions for Philip.
Small question: why didn't you ever use Rumsfeld's name? Was it a literary device to call him only "the secretary of defense," an attempt to show that the nation at large was responsible for what happened?
Medium question: Were you ever frustrated by the limitations of your material? Errol Morris, genius though he may be, did not ask all the probing intellectual questions or do the in-depth investigative research that I suspect you would have. And I see that you used his structure, revealing small insights along the way. Were there others you would have interviewed, or questions you would have asked, had it been your project alone?
Larger question: Do you really believe that there will be no accountability whatsoever? I assumed that Morris's full court press -- the movie, the blogging, the collaboration with you, even your appearance here -- was aiming toward some sort of policy response. Do you truly not expect the Democrats to hold anyone accountable or at least to expose and attack the thinking and the policies behind them?















Many thanks for this, E.J. --
Regarding your small question: I chose not to use the names of the highest US office holders in the war because I was tired of the toxic partisan way that those names had become like slogans -- and because it seemed to me that by personalizing their offenses, one seemed to diminish it, when their disgrace was really our collective problem, a very big problem which derived entirely from the offices they held and dishonored by their crimes. It began with the President. I started typing his name, Bush, just as I always have when writing about him, and it made me recoil. I thought - yuk, do I really have to him in my book, it makes me not want to write it or read it. Not because I want to deny his existence, but because that name, Bush, seemed like a slur or a punchline at this point in the nation's political debate which he has done so much to poison. So I thought -- dammit, it's the president and the vice president we're talking about not a couple of late night joke characters: it made it less repellent and much more shocking to me.
As for your medium question: No. I had such a mass of material to work with that I never felt limited by it. I never would have believed that I'd be able to work with somone else's interviews, but the volume and detail that Errol's interviews contained did not leave me wanting. Our understanding was that I could go follow up with anybody he'd interviewed any time - but I never felt the need. I did mine the material very heavily, and I did a huge amount of my own investigating and analysis into the side of this storythat exists in documents: the army investigations, the paper trails of torture memos and interrogation rules and internal memoranda at the prison, and sworn statements by members of the command who have never sat for interviews. Much of this material was stuff that Errol's team had vacuumed up in the course of their research, crates of it, but which did not go into the movie. And I spent a lot of time doing my own digging. I did some interviews of my own too (for instance with Stuart Herrington, the Military Intelligence officer who got his start in the Phoenix Program in Vietnam and was brought over to observe Abu Ghraib in November of 2003, and who filed a never released report that was one more piece of evidence that everybody in the command had been warned about the comprehensive cluster fuck, to use the technical military term, that was unfolding at the prison). And finally, I used a number of interviews in the book which Errol had conducted and was unable to fit into the movie. The first two chapters of the book tell the story of the CPA project, in the heady, can-do, first weeks of the occupation, to build a new modern criminal justice system for Iraq -- and they tell them through the eyes and voices of two men who reclaimed the hard-site at Abu GHraib where all the abuses took place. These men, Lane McCotter and Gary Deland, were former Utah prison commissioners, whom Errol interviewed, but who are not in the movie. I also was able t use material from several interviews with MI officers and interrogators that didn't make it into Errol's cut. And I used an extraordinary interview with Joe Darby, whom the press tends to describe as the Abu Ghraib whistle-blower, but who emerged in his own account and in the words of others' as a much more complex and conflicted figure in the story. But perhaps most powerfully, I was able to draw from the pair of never-published 250 page interviews which Army invesitgators conducted with Charles Graner and Chip Frederick, the MP night shift commanders, after they were sentenced for their part in the abuse and were granted immunity from self-incrimination for further prosecution in exchange for cooperation with the investigation. In this way, these two crucial figures who remained out of reach behind bars, were able to speak in the book and not to be what I would have felt was a painful absence in their own stories. So, I had way more than enough to work with, and the book follows its own course. I didn't feel the need to opine or intellectualize the material, because I felt the story was most powerful if my hand was least visible -- except here and there where I think I leave my mark pretty plainly.
As for your largest question -- my shortest answer: I don't say there will be no greater accountability for those in political and military leadership who clearly have committed crimes, but I would be highly surprised. One commenter yesterday took comfort from the expectation that international law cases would confine Bush and Rumsfeld and Cheney, say, in their international travels in coming years, as warrants are issued in keeping with the Pinochet precedent. But I don't take much encouragement from that, because the stain is ours as Americans and we have to account for it ourselves, or else, if the high and mighty are immune from justice our democracy is badly badly broken. This is at least as grim a crisis for the nation and its honor as torture. As I said in my first part, the non-accountability is the greatest shock of the story. But I have never had any grandiose illusions about my writing changing things, or blazing a path for justice. Even in the absence of justice, it's worth recording injustice.
June 24, 2008 3:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
Very interesting. Thank you for the answers.
And you've answered the one of your questions that I was going to comment on later: "Even in the absence of justice, it's worth recording injustice." Essential, I think. Doing so testifies that one's eyes were open to evil, even if the evil couldn't be stopped. And it makes it possible for people later to learn some lessons from the evil time.
Thank you enormously for doing it.
June 24, 2008 3:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
This latest Gourevitch blog dismantles (as does Standard Operating Procedure en toto) the towering moral vanity that has characterized some responses to Abu Ghraib. I'm thinking of those responses that look no further than the pictures.(i.e. My own response before I read SOP.) It's satisfying to put horns and scaly tail on your adversary, and it's a sad hangover of the Bush years that our political discourse has become packed solely with angels and demons--nobody in between. Not since Nixon have the good been so good, the bad so bad. I just finished JW Shenck's fine book, Lincoln's Melancholy, in which he argues that Lincoln's ability to hold opposing ideas in his head pained him, made him crazy, and lent a thoughtfulness to his leadership. I don't know enough about Lincoln to yea or nay this, but such thoughtfulness is a good antidote to my own hubris, and Gourevitch has dished it.
June 25, 2008 5:16 PM | Reply | Permalink