Hello there!

I'm thoroughly enjoying your book. Thank you for illuminating this chapter of our history.

One thing that strikes me right off the bat. The U.S. then didn't seem too concerned with rebuilding Berlin or it's infrastructure. Berlin in 1948 didn't reveal too many tangible signs of progress compared to June of 1945.

There's alot of talk now about how the Iraqi's continue to live in squalor and suffer daily power outages, etc... The people of Berlin suffered under similar or worse circumstances. In spite of that, they came to view us as allies against a threat.

I can't wait to get your book. After reading this post, I am intrigued. I hope to have more to say after finishing it.

Thank you for coming to the TPM Cafe.

What - if anything - can America during the Berlin Airlift and the early Cold War teach us about America during the occupation of Iraq and the War on Terror? What are the lessons of the past?

Precious little I suspect. I am always skeptical of such attempts to distill simple "lessons" from a tiny sample consisting of a couple of notable events. And the geopolitical situation is so vastly different now from the situation in 1948 that I don't see much we can draw on.

And I hope you're not one of those who is about to tell us that the US needs a "Marshall Plan" for the Middle East. What the people of the Middle East seem to want from us most is that we trade with them, but otherwise stay out of their domestic affairs.

There is something a bit pathetic about the increasingly frequent attempts by contemporary Americans to reach back with nostalgia into the WWII and postwar American Century glory days for re-assurance and re-affirmation. It is good to seek more amicable relations with the rest of the world and to repair the diplomatic damage that Bush has done. But the ceaseless cravings of the exceptionalists for something from abroad that goes beyond good relations and mutual respect - for something more like love and constant admiration - are childish and dangerously quixotic.

The new generation of megalomaniacal exceptionalists, among whom speechwriting and wordsmithing seem to be very popular occupations, are lost in their own elevated and inflated rhetoric. They seem to be mourning over the death of a place that has more reality in their imaginations and illusory childhood memories than in historical events, and pine for the return of that place. As a consequence they will repeat the tragedy of Iraq over and over gain if given a chance to get their hands on the wheel of the ship of state.

WWII is over. The Cold War is over. We are not the City on the Hill; we are not the Indispensable Nation; we are not the Benevolent Hegemon; we are not the Republic of Virtue; we are not Captain America or Superman or Spider-man. Stop trying to make America into a superhero. It's hard enough being an ordinary, decent, neighborly country that makes its way in the world and cooperates with others without killing millions of innocent people.

The Greatest Generation is gone. But we are perfectly capable of building a happy new America, even if it will be a somewhat less egotistically romantic and titanically heroic America. It's a new day. Let's move on.

Wow, so much negativity here.

Answer? Back then, we had good clear intentions and were sometimes tough as nails in our resolve. People respect that combination. Who knew a bag of raisins would be so appreciated?

I spent the summer of 1950 in Europe. (In the third year of the four-year-long Marshall Plan,) much of West Germany was still in ruins, like much of today's Iraq is in ruins. And that's where any similarity ends - I didn't need an armed military escort to roam the countryside nor was I looking at day-old rubble.

I'm all for the 'carrot' approach (the Marshall Plan) but when it's accompanied by daily bombing raids, it's hardly likely to win hearts. Until we pull out of Iraq - quit bombing it and killing Iraqis, if ever, rebuilding it as we contributed to doing in West Germany can't be on the table

The difference? Back then we simply supported actual democratization in the face of militarism and totalitarianism. Germany went through a variety of civil war in the 1920s in which most internal scores were settled with minor outside interference, and Hitler proved the major late gasp of the anti-democratic forces. (The Soviet-type Communism Ulbricht was head of in East Germany was also a manifestation of anti-democratic forces and beliefs, but historically lesser and obsolete by the Seventies or so.)

Iraq is happening under a colonial hegemonic theory on the part of the executive branch in Washington. The result is American interference in an Iraqi civil war and internal settling of historical scores whose end result will be democratization. But the present American interference is excessively in favor of the wrong and popularly discredited side(s) in the process, just as in Vietnam.

American efforts at wiping out the violent anarchist forces, e.g. AQI, is probably for the good of Iraq's future. But in Iraqi eyes, that is exceeded by creating, propping, and manipulating Maliki. Maliki is being kept in power as colonial-type strongman with a very small real constituency among Iraqis via electocracy based in ruining any and all competing coalitions with American and Iranian help and consent. Al-Sadr is leader of a growing popular plurality, perhaps soon a majority. He stands to inherit non-Kurdish Iraq.

The Berlin airlift equivalent in Iraq would be for Americans to do what was done in Yugoslavia- withdraw to 'safe haven' zones, protect and aide civilians there, and allow the Iraqi factions to fight out the remains of the civil war on roughly equal terms of armaments and minimal foreign participation.

"What - if anything - can America during the Berlin Airlift and the early Cold War teach us about America during the occupation of Iraq and the War on Terror? What are the lessons of the past?"

I think the question you have to ask yourself is this: was the Berlin Airlift truly a simple, selfless humanitarian measure done out of pure concern and goodness... Or, was it a strategically calculated move meant to deal a psychological blow to the Soviets?
Similarly was the Marshall plan a selfless attempt to help the war torn people of Europe, or a very clever economic move to stop the spread of communism?

If you agree that there's no such thing as a purely selfless foreign policy then in actuality nothing has changed. All US foreign policy is based at least in part on securing some sort of short term political advantage.
In the case of Berlin it was executed perfectly, the situation was carefully analyzed, and the correct conclusion (that the Soviets would not respond with force) was reached. In the case of Iraq no attempt was made to analyze the situation.
I think it's obvious that the administration naively believed it would be a quick and very easy way to score political points. They likely felt Iraq would fall quickly with very little casualties, that there would be no resistance, that the country could be quickly secured and paraded as a victory against oppression and an example of American military might. We would establish bases in the region, and the administration would pat itself on the back and proclaim themselves champions of freedom and democracy. Hence the goal was actually not so different from 1940s politics...
Of course it was painfully obvious that none of these people had any interest in history and did not understand the extremely fragile situation in the region, or learned a single thing from the previous experience in Vietnam, another war where easy victory was predicted.

... the tale of how America turned around that failing occupation of Germany

yes. star-spangled mise en scène is ill served by clutter, especially german flotsam, like, say, ludwig erhard.

I too spent considerable time in Berlin over the years -- as an exchange student before the Wall was built in 61, (and thus with access to the whole city with ease) and a number of return trips, including a research stay in E. Germany during the 1980's. The Occupation of Germany intrigues, I would suggest lack of knowledge generally as to what was actually involved set many in this country up to be propagandized by the Bushies in the run up and immediate aftermath of the Iraq war. Condi could lightly reference the "success" of occupying Japan and Germany, and heads nodded and we went off to shop.

What happened in Berlin in 1948 can't be comprehended unless you know the details over a number of years of the dialogue between George Marshall and Franklin Roosevelt. You see -- they met during the Versailles Conference in 1919, both then quite junior members of Pershing and Wilson's staff's respectively, they compared impressions of what was going wrong in the wake of World War One (both had traveled in Germany, taken a long look at the anarchy, the rise of the Frei Korps -- political militias -- and while they were not then influential, both were impressed with the other's observations.

Marshall had been Pershing's Liason with the French and British forces in the joint occupation of the Rheinland in 1919 -- and he understood the end phase of the war was failing due to lack of mission clarity and planning. In the 20's he did two things -- he got Pershing to commission a study of the US Army's experience with military occupation, 1775 - 1922, and he set himself a very elaborate study of the Histories of various occupations. George Marshall wrote and taught about it in the Command School, at the Army War College. By the time he came back into FDR's orbit in 1934 (Building CCC Camps) they had both had considerable time to consider the political failures at the end of WWI. What would become the Occupation of Germany at the end of WWII was very much a sub-set of their Political objectives, and while FDR was dead, and George Marshall was Secretary of State in 1948, the concepts that had emerged from their dialogue still guided German Policy.

Their overall intent was to quickly destroy the former government, its institutions, and civil society institutions that had been Nazified, and quickly bring into being new local governments. To this end, elections had been held in the fall of 1945 in the French, British and American zones, including those in Berlin, which operated under a limited mandate, subject to the Military Government. This quickly put normal services back in the hands of Germans. In 1946, work restoring the Lander (state) governments began, charters were written, elections held, and by early 1947 these were functioning. Traditionally Lander Governments in Germany operate schools, and deal with most transport issues. Following the Failed Foreign Ministers meeting in late 1947 to reach agreement on future occupation policy, the French, US and British agreed to combine zones, and begin the process of drafting a basic law (constitution) for West Germany. They established a Central Bank, and commissioned a new currency. It was the conversion to the D-Mark for the western Zones in 1948 which was the proximate cause of the Berlin Blockade, because it essentially cut the Soviet zones out of the economy. But each of these steps were key moves in rebuilding a working German Government. The decision to respond to the Blockade with the airlift was an improvised move, but totally consistent with the interpretation of Yalta and Potsdam, that the American, French and British zones in Berlin were a part of what was becoming West Germany. Supplying them with food and fuel that could only be purchased with D-Mark was a necessity, given the decision to proceed with the creation of West Germany under its new basic law, and consider West Berlin as an outpost of the new West Germany as well as in compliance with the 4-power occupation agreements at Yalta and Potsdam.

There is no question that the commitment of the Allied Military to supplying Berlin, including the candy bombs and the summer camp trips for kids to W. Germany, were part of an overall strategy of bringing the West German population into the institutions of the new Germany. There was almost immediate pay-off, in that the combination of the Marshall Plan (economic reconstruction as distinct from his planning for occupation) The new currency, followed by the creation of the Bonn Government forshadowed the economic expansion of the early 1950's which by the mid 50's restored the standard of living in W. Germany to the late 1930's level.

As far as I can see -- the only relevant comparison between the occupation of Germany after 45, and the Iraq project is that it illustrates what Marshall and Roosevelt thought was the lesson of Versailles -- if you don't have a clear mission well conceptualized, and a detailed plan as to how you intend to proceed, and the assets in place as required, you will totally fail either in the short or long term.

As I said, the proximate cause of the Blockade was the introduction of the D-Mark. The French, British and Americans did let the Soviets and the E. Germans know they intended such a currency conversion, but they refused to give the Soviets the plates for printing currency, as they had massively over-printed Reichmarks, causing the total destruction of that currency. (Worth something as cigarette paper.) This was in response to the Foreign Minister meeting in late 47, where the Soviets had pretty much rejected all proposals. You can just see the decision clicking in at that point -- rebuilding W. Europe with Germany integrated into it was priority. With the Soviet moves in Czechoslovakia, unwillingness to deal on Poland, the flip in Yugoslavia -- it was just time for a clear decision, and you can just see Truman and his Sec of State Marshall, being the kind of decision makers who would execute. I think diplomacy as a process with the Soviets pretty much ended in 1947.

The Morgenthau Plan -- I don't think this was ever a serious plan. Remember, FDR frequently had members of his cabinet, his policy aids, draft plans for the same thing, and when he got them they went in opposing directions, he would end up saying -- well just combine them. I think Morgenthau was an example of this. When it became public (and someone leaked it)FDR immediately got criticism from Churchill who was horrified, and FDR backed off with respect to Churchill. FDR and Churchill clearly knew by the time of the plan (as did Henry Morgenthau himself) just how bad conditions were in Germany -- with respect to Jews and other political enemies, but also POW's and all, and for public consumption the word needed to be that Germany would be punished harshly. The idea of the Morgenthau's draft plan made that very clear to the public, but if you look for planning on the part of Marshall's staff, what you find is that they just executed what had been agreed as early as 1942. There is simply no evidence that FDR ever asked Marshall to alter any of his post war plans for Germany -- and FDR had taken a personal hand in evolving them. He even personally recruited the kind of experts the occupation required, he filled about 1500 slots in the occupation officer's corps created by Congress, all selected in support of Marshall's overall plans.

One thing frequently overlooked with regard to FDR is that he was quite knowledgable about Germany. He read and spoke German, his parents took him to the German spas many summers when he was a child, he attended regular German schools for about 6 months, and when Eleanor and Franklin married, they honeymooned in part in Germany and Austria. Roosevelt's family had relations among the minor Austrian nobility, and FDR kept track of these cousins, visited them when he was at Versailles. He held a number of opinions about Germany with which I disagree -- I think he put too much emphasis on Prussian Militarism, for instance, as cause for the rise of the Nazi's and not enough on economic causes ... but above all he was not uninformed, and he was quite comfortable with all sorts of German experts. Quite a contrast if you will with those who can't yet figure the Sunni-Shia split. Anyhow, I don't think FDR was ever serious about the Morgenthau plan.

Rebuilding Europe. Well, the Industrial Powerhouse of Europe was always Germany, and you could never achieve economic take-off without the Industrial Sectors. The key was to incorporate it into European structures, which the Iron and Coal Community accomplished in 1949. This plan, The Schumman Plan, had been around since the 1930's, had always been understood as an alternative to Fascism, it could easily incorporate many Social Democratic objectives, (Such as Labor Rights, Social Market Economy,) and in the period prior to 49 it was being prepared by the French, Dutch and Belgiums, and once currency reform was accomplished, and the Bonn Government was in place, the US signed off on it. I would suggest that looking at how this plan evolved in the immediate post war period is key to understanding European Reconstruction, and it very much influenced the specifics of the Marshall Plan of 1948. In particular, countries participating in the Marshall Plan had to collaborate in making economic plans -- estimate each country's economic advantage sector by sector, and then assign Marshall funds on those terms. Dealing with the Marshall dollars forced this economic planning practice, and thus trade and economic cooperation. Begger thy Neighbor policy was left in the dust -- assets went toward developing the most promising plans. The upshot was reasonably quick restoration of living standards.

Operation Vittles (the Berlin Airlift) which was capable of providing adequate if plain food, and sufficent energy for a City under Blockade for a year -- including a fairly cold winter, convinced the Soviets the West would follow its own plans for rebuilding Western Europe, and that by standing in the way of such plans, their own friends in the west would change positions. For instance in Denmark in the immediate post war election, the Communists got about 17% of the vote, a good deal of this a recognition that the CP had led the underground resistance to the Nazi occupation. After the Blockade of Berlin, that support dropped by about ten points, and a year later, Denmark became a charter member of NATO. Much of this change was a rejection of Soviet behavior in the German Occupation. Similar patterns can be seen in France, and the low countries. The Blockade was a mistake from the Soviet point of view, and it provided the US and GB with an opening to demonstrate determination to preserve the essence of Yalta and Potsdam, which provided for the zones of occupation. The rest of the Cold War era essentially was defined by this drawing of a line.