Conceding a Bit Less
I hope it's not breaking the rules to respond to something Kevin Drum wrote on his blog . . . anyways, he says I was conceding too much in my last post. I think that's true in one respect. It seems to me (and I say so in the book) that one can realistically imagine the emergence/evolution of a doctrine that would legitimate great power military intervention on the say-so of the relevant regional organization. So maybe the OAS for the Western Hemisphere (or separate groups for South America and the Caribbean region), the AU for Africa, some new East Asian outfit for that area, etc. If you could develop some kind of adequate level of consensus around an idea like that, it seems potentially promising. What I don't like are pure forum-shopping proposals -- I don't think it makes sense to say that NATO (an organization of European states plus the U.S., Canada, and Iceland) can in any meaningful sense "authorize" an intervention in Sudan. NATO might play a larger global role logistically (as in Afghanistan) but it's hard to see what kind of authority it could plausibly claim outside of Europe.
Another thing I wanted to say in response to Kevin is that derisive talk of "outsourcing our military policy entirely to the Security Council" is one of the things I'd like to see less of from liberals.
For one thing, the United States is the leading member of the Security Council so there's no real question of outsourcing. But beyond that, in terms of things like George W. Bush's dread "permission slip" it's worth emphasizing that the U.N. Charter recognizes an unrestricted right of member states to act in individual or collective self-defense -- not coincidentally the two core legitimate uses of military power. So it's not as if anyone's proposing to give Russia an unrestricted veto over American security policy (or France a veto over China, etc.) we're talking about the limited number of cases that involve attacking a country that hasn't attacked any other countries and it seems to me that it ought to be difficult to start a war under those circumstances.
Matt,
Is your book about anything besides the norms or doctrines that should govern great power interventions abroad? The discussion so far has had a very narrow focus. Foreign policy and national security professionals go to work every day, all around the world, pursuing complex agendas and dealing with a substantial number of challenging problems. The occasions on which they are deciding whether to intervene militarily in other countries are relatively few and limited.
April 23, 2008 9:47 AM | Reply | Permalink
Matt
The only problem I would have with that is that given the history of the OAS--where the US gets to strong arm countries into acceding to what the US wants most of the time--an intervention requested by the OAS would not take much 'requesting'. I can't speak for the other ones you mention but just a thought to keep in mind.
April 23, 2008 10:37 AM | Reply | Permalink
The larger question is how to handle the failed states (and I include Sudan here). When you've got millions of your own citizens fleeing for fear of their lives you're a failed state. The AU has intervened, but African troops aren't really allowed to do anything to stop the violence. Political pressure has only resulted in Khartoum paying lip service to action.
The Taliban misery went on in Afghanistan unchecked, forcing more millions to flee.
Should the international community have the right to replace a government that is so badly abusing their own people and even committing genocide?
April 23, 2008 11:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
The Taliban misery went on in Afghanistan unchecked, forcing more millions to flee.
Odd.
It is true that throughout its ascendancy the Taliban was in conflict with non-Pashtun tribes and that the resulting fighting produced, as it always does, refugees.
My understanding, though, is that at least in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban eliminated warlordism and that far from "forcing millions to flee," established sufficient security in Helmand, Kandahar and Uruzgan, the provinces the Taliban controlled, to allow millions to return from Pakistan where they had earlier sought refuge.
Is my understanding wrong?
April 23, 2008 1:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ellen, that eye moniker is scary. Are you trying to peer into our souls?
To answer your question -- yes and no. Pakistan had about 1.5 million refugees and Iran had another .5 to 1 million in their country on 9/11.
April 23, 2008 8:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, but what were the number of Afghan refugees in 1995 or perhaps, in September 1996*? It is the difference between that number(s) and the 9/11 number which will prove -- or disprove -- your assertion.
* The Taliban began their campaign in late 1994 and captured Kabul in September 1996.
April 23, 2008 10:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
The Taliban began their "holy jihad" from Pakistan remember, so they were all (including Mullah Omar) refugees from the Soviet war. However, their war sent as many refugess back out of the country as those that returned. I'm not sure anyone knows what the actual numbers are for that migration. I think you'll agree that hundreds of thousands of your citizens living in UN camps is a clear sign you're doing something wrong. The US invasion hasn't solved all their problems (and created some new ones) but the refugee camps have emptied. The topic is intervention, and the Afghan example proves how difficult intervention can be, but there are times when it is worth doing.
April 24, 2008 12:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
Matt:
Stepping back a bit, there SEEM to be three questions about military intervention of any sort that haven't been raised yet: 1) is it effective at achieving its stated aims; 2) does it inevitably (as far as "inevitably" can ever be determined in human affairs) produce as many problems as it solves; and 3) is it ethical and under what circumstances?
You seem to be moving toward answering the third question.
However, in thinking over our history, there seem to be precious few cases in which I would say that military intervention was effective at achieving its stated aims. The two world wars come to mind with some caveats. Kosovo is showing some cracks. But our two major post WWII interventions--Viet Nam and now Iraq--have been complete disasters with long tails.
All of our interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean would appear to have ended in fiasco as well, if a bit less disastrous for everyone involved.
So, moving to my question #2, it would appear that almost all our foreign interventions have created as many problems as they have solved, if they solved any problems. So what have we, or anyone else, gained by intervening? Some losers became winners and vice versa. One danger, or potential danger, was averted; two others were created.
More and more on these and other threads, I hear not the drumbeat of isolationism, but a call for a sort of foreign policy Hippocratic Oath: Above all else, do no harm. Any number of situations may be very bad, but let's not aggravate things further. I have some sympathy with this, in large part because it seems that we inevitably aggravate things when we intervene.
Even if you look at the two world wars, a credible argument could be made that war was made "necessary" by the failure to do the right things before things got to the point where war broke out. Things that might have averted war.
Often these "what ifs" are treated as fun diversions for historians in which everyone is meant to understand that, "but seriously folks," the war was pretty much inevitable and these what ifs are merely parlor games.
But what if we took the what ifs seriously? What if there were an "art of peace" as serious, complex, and substantive as the the "art of war?" Or the art of military intervention? Often this sort of what if is relegated to the amorphous category of "diplomacy." The general public is told that "we need to renew diplomatic efforts with X." But what does that really mean? We get the idea that it means "talking to our enemies." And it's often pooh-poohed by the right as just so much chin music.
But isn't there a real art to peace worthy of study, as in the old folksong refrain "...study war no more"? Amazing books are produced on military strategy, complete with maps, timelines, daring strikes, ambushes, and retreats. Gen. Schwarzkopf dazzled audiences with his depiction of the "Hail Mary" strategy in the Gulf War. What if there were the equivalent in the art of peace?
I don't have the foggiest how to do this, but you're much smarter than I am. However, as a start, you'd have to step back from scenarios in which peace meant JUST averting war. In other words, you'd have to start long before the trouble was brewing between two or more parties. This would entail getting to the ROOTS of conflict at their root and recognizing that, if left unchecked, these roots are likely to grow into open conflict. In other words, it would entail the open recognition that one is already at war--or headed to war--long before the signs are obvious.
It would also entail an understanding of how those self same roots could be trained in a direction that doesn't simply avert war, but enhances the stature and well-being of the parties involved. So that peace becomes much richer than the absence of war or conflict. Here we might delve into large scale issues like conflict over resources, food, room, etc. And the discussion could and should extend to recognizing and dealing with "really evil people."
April 23, 2008 12:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
Peter, you're asking the right questions, I think. One thing we need to realize is that, while there certainly are times when war is necessary, war should never be thought of as anything but a last resort. And this isn't just because of the moral issue of whether killing people is an acceptable way to achieve any ends. From a purely pragmatic perspective, war is a very poor solution to any problem for many reasons:
1. It is extremely costly to execute
2. It is extremely destructive and therefore even more costly to recover from
3. It tends to create additional foreign policy problems as various parties are hurt and seek revenge for their injuries
4. And, most important, it is chaotic and its outcomes completely unpredictable--therefore making it an extremely unreliable way to solve any problem
Even if one ignores the moral issue of whether it's acceptable to kill people to achieve any end, military intervention is always highly risky and highly expensive and therefore--from a purely utilitarian perspective--always a poor option.
There are times, of course, when military intervention will be pursued. I think, however, the attempt to find any general principles to govern when such intervention is appropriate is futile. Obviously using military force in response to an attack on one's own soil is always justifiable. Beyond that, though, the resort to military intervention requires careful weighing of all the possible risks, costs, and benefits. Every situation will be unique and the best guidance we can provide is that all the factors pro and con be analyzed very carefully--and that a full public airing of those pros and cons occur. To put it succinctly: the process by which the decision is made--its thoroughness and its openness--is far more important than the principles behind the decision.
That said, we must remember at all times that war is a poor option and should be adopted only if the problem is extremely serious, their are no serious alternatives, and the country is fully able and perpared to bare the high cost and the high risk.
April 23, 2008 1:40 PM | Reply | Permalink
"When you've got millions of your own citizens fleeing for fear of their lives you're a failed state."
Which of course is an excellent description of Iraq. Call it the law of unintended consequences, call it what you want, Iraq is proof that the general principle that you need to appeal to the whole 'international community' prior to armed intervention is a sound one. I am not a big fan of the big five Security Council veto powers in principle, but insofar as it limits the possibilities of wars of choice it functions as designed.
There is a fundamental distinction between TDR's 'Speak Softly but Carry a Big Stick' and 'Whack-A-Mole'. Having a Big Hammer does not automatically transfer into the right to consider the world a Nail. The implicit suggestion that the answer to the problems of the Sudan is just to green-light the AU troops to turn it into a free-fire zone is just the magical thinking that actually delivered us the Afghanistan we have today. People at various levels of government concluded: "Lets give these islamic radicals a bunch of weapons to oppose the Russians. What could it possibly hurt? After all this Bin Laden boy has solid family ties to western oil companies, certainly he would never turn on us."
You can argue and I have that the Bush I Administration stayed on the side lines without needed intervention in what is now the former Yugoslavia. Which doesn't translate into a governing principle that outside military intervention is the default. In the event our intervention in Yugoslavia seems to be resolving itself in a way that is promoting peace and democracy in Eastern Europe. Which is just to say that it was a huge gamble that paid off. That doesn't mean that we should just plop down the rent money on 23/Red on the roulette wheel on the grounds that we got lucky last week.
April 23, 2008 12:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
To date, the concern about "forum-shopping" has never involved gaining the approval of far-afield well-constituted international bodies, i.e. NATO approval to intervene in Panama, ASEAN approval to intervene in Darfur, etc. It's been the "coalition of the willing" thing, where you just get a grab bag of whoever's up for a war this year. For that reason I think this is all a lot of worrying about something that isn't likely to happen.
April 23, 2008 2:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Any drastic change is going to bring new problems vs. the old problems, so making decisions based on fear of creating new problems is folly.
The fall of the Soviet empire (which we did not intervene in) brought freedom, but it also brought a whole new set of problems to Eastern Europe and Russia.
Vietnam was a mistake. It's really going to be another 10 years before we know how effective our intervention has been in Iraq and Afghanistan. These countries were basket cases, and it's going to be a long road to stability for them.
The reality of Iraq was that it existed in a state of paralysis. It was a nation with no future, and there are others (like N Korea) like it.
April 23, 2008 8:47 PM | Reply | Permalink
why does anyone listen to Kevin Drum on national security matters at all? how did he get the position of prominence that he's in? I don't understand. I don't think I've ever seen him get one single matter of national security right yet. he just doesn't seem to know very much on the topic.
April 23, 2008 10:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Where is the Matt we used to know and love that fought corruption of the DOJ and our Courts?
You made no comments on the TPM issue of the Dept of Justice shutting down the Public Corruption Unit and Tom O'Brien or Mukasey's comments that it was a way to make the DOJ more efficient.
http://fraud-corruption-mnat.townhall.com/default.aspx
Stand up and fight for your American way of Life
OR
LET IT GO!
April 24, 2008 11:25 AM | Reply | Permalink