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The Effect of Bankruptcy Reform on Mortgage Interest Rates

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One of the key questions about H.R. 3609 is whether its provision permitting the modification of mortgages in bankruptcy will drive up mortgage interest rates, as the mortgage industry claims. Currently, the Bankruptcy Code bars the modification of mortgages on single-unit primary homes. This is a special protection that no other type of creditor receives; all other debts may be modified in bankruptcy.

The policy assumption behind the bar on mortgage modification is simple enough. Prohibiting modification will reduce mortgage lenders’ losses in bankruptcy. Lenders will then pass these savings on to all consumers in the form of lower mortgage interest rates, which will encourage homeownership.

This economic rational sounds convincing at first blush. The Wall Street Journal (subscription required) certainly bought into it in their lead editorial last Thursday, claiming that “High levels of homeownership have been the result [of the modification bar]. To repeal this policy and make lenders wonder whether mortgage loans will be secured or unsecured can have only one result—more expensive mortgage loans.” The only problem is the empirical evidence does not support it.

I have been testing the policy assumption behind the anti-modification provision empirically. Between 1981 and 1993, many federal judicial districts allowed for stripdown, the most drastic form of mortgage modification, in which the secured claim on an underwater mortgage was reduced to the value of the house. The split in the law among judicial districts allowed us to compare the historical mortgage rates in districts permitting stripdown with those that did not. I have not found any statistically significant effect on mortgage rates.

There’s other evidence suggesting that modification is unlikely to impact mortgage interest rates. First, Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, the two largest purchasers of home mortgages on the secondary market, do not charge a risk premium for mortgages on certain types of properties that can currently be modified in bankruptcy. Second, historically, at least, only a small percentage of mortgages are underwater, and then only by an average of about $9,000. While today’s market is very different, in part because of aggressive lending practices requiring little or no down payment, the historical data suggests that most mortgages would not be subject to stripdown, much less by more than a lender would lose in a foreclosure. Finally, H.R. 3609 allows only limited modification of interest rates—lenders are guaranteed an interest rate of at least the most recent national average 30-year mortgage fixed rate. It appears that the impact on lenders from modification will be quite limited. But for families struggling to keep their homes, however, these changes can make a real difference.


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Very nice empirical work. Thanks!

But...

The idea that industry will pass on savings to consumers, if only the government doesn't pass this law that industry doesn't like, is not a proposition that sounds "convincing at first blush" but just happens to not be supported by evidence.

The proposition is laugh-out-loud ridiculous on its face, even without the Wall St. Journal's endorsement! Every corporate shill who claims this should be treated like a prankster who claims to have invented cold fusion. Cover your mouth and cough, in a way that sounds vaguely like "bullshit."

Very nice empirical work.

Historical analysis isn't all that helpful. Traditionally, mortgagors put 20% down and we haven't had a period of 20% reduction of residential home prices ever (farms in 1931-33 are more like businesses). Those who didn't pay at least 20% had to purchase mortgage insurance.

Thus, prior to 2002-7 there could not have been many bankrupt mortgagors who would have been under water, that is, qualified for "cram downs" in those judicial districts which permitted the procedure. It seems unlikely that the few "cram downs" which may have taken place in selective judicial districts over the years would be statistically significant in relation to anything whatever.

I think we're left to use common sense to conclude that the proposed bankruptcy revision is 1) a one-off form of relief affecting participants in this bubble (2004-6), only, and 2) as against requiring real credit analysis and real equity investment in the residential property, is too unimportant to have any effect on mortgage interest rates.

You are correct that PMI was required on mortgages with less than 20% borrower equity, but that situation could arise from home appreciation as well as from downpayments or principle pay down. Also, the 20% downpayment ceased to be a general rule a long time back, and FHA-backed mortgages allowed as little as 3% down. As for people who are upside down in their mortgages, even people who bought their homes prior to the bubble may have ended up in this situation if they subsequently took out (and charged up) HELOCs or other home equity loan products.

Ellen is right that we should not place a lot of confidence in data from 2001 in regard to the current market. But it is the only data point we have, and it helps explain why historically, at least, there doesn't appear to have been a statistically significant effect on mortgage rates from allowing cramdown: of all the factors that determine mortgage interest rates, cramdown just isn't that important because it is neither likely nor particularly costly compared with foreclosure.

Dumb question, but saying that you found an 'effect' implies that you were looking for a cause. Did you mean that there was no correlation or was there a correlation and the "rate effect's" contribution to that spike was minimal??

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