The consequences (and curse?) of sentencing certainty and severity
As I jump into this fray, I'd like to focus a bit more on the snitching phenomenon that is the focus of Ethan's book (even though a "war on drugs" debate is also appropriate and timely given the book's themes). Specifically, as a sentencing geek, I want to spotlight that, though snitching "issues" will always be a part of criminal justice realities, the move toward greater sentencing certainty and severity ensures that these "issues" get magnified in the admininstration of modern criminal justice systems.
There are lots of good arguments to support criminal laws with clear and predictable sentencing rules. Also, for serious crimes committed by people with serious criminal histories, there are lots of good arguments to support criminal laws with long and harsh imprisonment terms. However, advocactes for certain and severe sentencing rules often fail to appreciate the ripple effects of such rules on many traditional and important structural safeguards that the Framers put in the Constitution to limit government power.
Through many provisions of the Bill of Rights -- particularly the right to a jury trial and the rights of confrontation and counsel -- the Framers sought to limit the ability of govertments to convict and punish persons based on suspect accusations. But, as Ethan shows with many anecdotes, persons facing certain and severe sentencing consequences quickly realize that flinging allegations may be their only sentencing life preserver, and some of these allegations are sure to stick.
Relatedly, and integral to this story as well, is the weakening of the privilege against self-incrimination. By threatening even more severe and certain punishment after a trial conviction, the feds now can tell suspects that only through self-incrimination and cooperation is there any real hope of a mitigated sentencing term. In this context there is a particularly disturbing irony: those who are most guilty and would least benefit from traditional trial protections are necessarily going to admit guilt and point fingers in the hope of reducing their sentencing exposure; in turn, those who believe in their innocence end up subject to the full brunt of the certain and severe sentencing realities if convicted after a traditional trial.
A final point here might be a good way to test Ethan's true feelings about snitching: these dynamics not only impact drug cases, but of late have become a central part of white-collar prosecutions. Andrew Fastow of Enron fame ended up with only a 6-year sentence because he was such a good snitch, while Jeff Skilling got a sentence four times longer because he contested his guilt at trial. It is clear that Ethan is very troubled by sitching in the street; is he also very troubled by snitching in the suites?














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