Popper Ain't Palaver
I should have mentioned this in my first post, but thanks so much to the fine folks at TPM Café who saw my initial post on the book club and invited me to join in. And, of course, thank you Susan Faludi for so graciously and promptly responding to my piece. As I was nervously checking the book club throughout the day, I was worried that my post would be ignored. But thankfully, Faludi herself weighed in.
Let me clear a few things up about this entire “not reading the book” business. First of all, I was invited to join this book club Wednesday morning by TPM. Since I’m in high school, I could hardly tell my English teacher that he should let me skip class to run out and buy The Terror Dream while I was supposed to be discussing King Lear. Though I understand why Faludi would be “cranky” after receiving a negative review from someone who hadn’t read her book, she’s being mightily unfair. Last time I checked, the point of this book club was for Faludi to synopsize her thesis and then have a discussion start off from there. Does she think that her book club entries and her New York Times Op-Ed aren’t representative of her work? Moreover, I was invited by TPM to join the Book Club after I wrote a post responding to Faludi and Ducat. I made it very clear to TPM that I hadn’t (yet) read the book, and they were OK with me joining in.
There’s also this attack on my qualifications. Faludi mocks the “About” page of my blog, in which I say “I have zero qualifications to write about anything of importance besides the fact that I have a computer, internet access and spend too much time reading.” This description was intended as a joke. Allow me to explain myself here: I’m a high school senior who’s trying to write about politics and culture, what was I supposed to do, post my transcript? More importantly, Faludi has many other arguments, so why does she need to quote me in an attempt to degrade my qualifications. I read her posts and (now) have read her book, no reason we can’t just leave it at that, right?
But enough of this peremptory business. Let’s go to her first entry, where she claims, after discussing the elevation of the “helpless homemaker” and the cultural reaction against assertive 9/11 widows, that:
ultimately we’ve had a go-it-alone militarism fueled in part by cowboy tough-guy superhero fantasy that justified torture, secret prisons, preemptive attacks and the erosion of civil liberties, that led our nation into new danger instead of renewed security, and that slammed the door shut to badly needed introspection and insight.
Call me simple minded, but it looks to me that she is trying to weave in our reactionary cultural response to 9/11 with our militaristic foreign response. And moreover, the initial post is where, I imagine, one would put forth their strongest and most important arguments. Despite Faludi’s contentions otherwise, the link between the Puritan rescue narrative, the feminist backlash and our foreign policy is made by her in that post. Stephen Ducat, who seems to agree wholeheartedly with everything Faludi wrote, further connects the two responses:
And for them, like so many men in our own culture, the most important thing about being a man was not being a woman. In the present era, this leads to a pervasive and readily exploitable anxiety, I refer to as femiphobia, which my research and that of others has shown to be highly correlated with a range of conservative political positions. We should not be surprised, then, that an invasion of Iraq becomes the preferred strategy of counter-humiliation (in addition to satisfying imperial and economic motives) for the national shame of 9/11, in spite of the total lack of evidence linking Saddam to the incendiary horror of that day.
Maybe Faludi can claim that she’s merely examining a “single facet,” but it’s not a claim that holds up in light of her own attempts to connect our foreign policy shift/amplification after 9/11 to our cultural one.
But she then goes on to admit, while discussing the liberal hawks, that these ineffable motivations were, in her approximation, quite important, “[liberal hawks] were also driven by unexamined impulses—in particular, a need to prove their virile bona fides in a time of fear and threat.” So again I pose my simple question, how does Paul Berman or Peter Beinart prove that Faludi’s self-serving analysis isn’t true? Despite her protestations to the contrary, falsifiability is important. Otherwise we’re left with analysis that can’t predict how people will respond specifically in any useful fashion, and on can always cherry pick events and actions ex post facto to prove one’s theory.
Faludi also implies that other material factors, specifically “the troubled American economy, the interests of corporate multinationals, and the globalization of trade” have influenced our post 9/11 milieu . Well, I’m more than happy to discuss these factors and how they relate to foreign policy and how the public reacted to the attacks. So, did the globalization of trade increase after 9/11? Can support for the Iraq war or hawkish foreign policy be predicted by the uneasiness the American middle class feels about trade and economic security? Did economic expansion or median wage growth affect foreign policy or the differing cultural aftershocks of 9/11? These are questions that can be answered by looking at data, polls and experiments. Even something to close to the Terror Dream's hypothesis can be explained by that pesky experimental data and statistics.
John Judis had a great piece back in The New Republic about psychological and experimental research on how fear of one’s own death can trigger “worldview defense” whereby one will feel more nationalistic, heteronormative and hawkish by merely being reminded of their own mortality. We can talk about our “mucky id,” but it’s just not clear if Faludi's chosen method is the best way to do so.
But please allow me to engage in some more meta discussion for a moment. Faludi, not surprisingly, brackets off my arguments about falsifiability by saying they are methodologically inadequate:
“Falsifiable,” by the way, is one of those very scientific sounding terms that omits all the factors that aren’t strictly quantifiable. That sort of diagnosis may itself may be part of the problem; by failing to explore the underbelly of our actions, we make ourselves more vulnerable to the “rational” arguments for, say, invading a country that didn’t attack us. I wish before that invasion that we had paused to consider our unfalsifiable psychological motives before shedding so much rational blood.
Though Faludi surely wouldn’t put it this way, The Terror Dream is a scientific hypothesis. She tries to explain the reemergence of a national narrative of men as virile protectors and women as helpless victims/damsels in distress and th national lashing out against inscrutable others as caused by a feeling of invulnerability. She has her data and she has an explanatory mechanism. My question to her is when it comes down to particular actions and stances taken by individuals, how does one prove that they aren’t influenced by this narrative or need to project invulnerability?
Not surprisingly, Faludi claims that this type of “rational” (which is such an oddly loaded term, hopefully Faludi thinks our response to 9/11 was irrational…) reasoning isn’t only a poor way to explain behavior, but also a type of reasoning that lead us into Iraq, “shedding so much rational blood.” This is simply an unsupported smear; of course she thinks that the nation should have examined its psychological motives in the way she prescribes, but that’s not a particularly useful method of persuasion or of argumentation. Faludi is essentially speaking in a private, incommensurable language. My method of obtaining proof or John Judis’ can be explained to most anyone, it doesn’t rely cherry picking to fit a literally preconceived narrative. But Faludi’s criticism of my criticism goes even deeper.
My own desire for falsifiable explanations of human and national behavior is just a deep psychological drive of my own: “I suspect underlying this tendency is a desire to make things clear-cut and neat, to stick to the tidy football field/stock index of agate and stats, of winning and losing in a world where individual and great (and not so great) men call the shots. The mucky id realm of national fantasies and fears may be just too messy and alarming to ponder for long.” After much consideration, she’s right, I hate messiness and am just too scared to ponder the mucky national id. Of course, if I were to deny her suspicion, it would merely be a defense mechanism, and around we go again.
PS - I can't wait for the other contributors to get in the thick of this. Have I mentioned how much fun all of this is?














This description was intended as a joke. Allow me to explain myself here: I’m a high school senior who’s trying to write about politics and culture, what was I supposed to do, post my transcript? More importantly, Faludi has many other arguments, so why does she need to quote me in an attempt to degrade my qualifications.
You don't have to defend yourself against people who simply don't get the joke. It was funny...perhaps you need to think like a blogger to get it, though. Either way, it was an unfair and silly attack on you.
Though Faludi surely wouldn’t put it this way, The Terror Dream is a scientific hypothesis.
This, I think, is wrong. It's a pretty far stretch to call Faludi's, or any cultural theory, "scientific." While it's true that cultural studies and sociology have scientific branches (audience studies, opinion polling, etc), there are plenty that don't work in this field.
There's nothing scientific about theories about art. There's nothing scientific about Habermas, or Baudrillard, or McLuhan, or any other thinker who's tried to examine our culture, and to try and apply some kind of scientific "falsifiability" standard to this type of work is as silly as attacking a blogger for being snarky.
"Thank God George Bush is our president." -Rudy Giuliani
November 9, 2007 5:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
I don't think it's quite right that falsifiability has NO application here. Matt is right that if Faludi wants to claim that a particular myth of the frontier characterizes the hypermasculine US response to 9/11, there ought to be some comparison to the responses of other societies to similar events, to draw some distinctions.
"All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out." - I.F. Stone
November 9, 2007 5:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
Okay, you're being simple-minded. Your contention that the gender anxiety zeitgeist had nothing to do with the war relies on willfully ignoring the propaganda crunch to get people to support it. You get the impression from your post that Bush administration didn't do *shit* to try to get people behind the war. Remember the lies about the WMDs? Why would they tell lies if they weren't trying to exploit the public's anxieties to get their support?
Your entire argument is based on the notion that public support was *irrelevant* in the lead-up to the war, and I'm not buying that. The Bush administration dropped the words "9/11" as much as possible to dredge up anxieties (which Faludi proves had a gendered angle to them) and garner support. Right now Giuliani is practically waving his cock around and screaming "9/11" all day, and the strategy is working. Because anxious masculinity has a lot of power over a lot of people.
As for the word "falsifible" that you introduced to create the false standard that every book of cultural or political criticism should be a book of empirical science---a high standard I suspect you don't hold against books that have a thesis that doesn't make you anxious for whatever reason---well, you kind of stumbled into a landmine if you wanted to hand wave feminist theorizing away with assumption that feminist theories are a tad to femmey to exist in the world of empirical science.
In that you're wrong. Faludi and Ducat's theories actually have a lot of genuine, falsifiable scientific research behind them, namely in the study of terror management theory. The Faludi/Ducat cultural theory is that people retreat to reactionary (and sexist) tropes when threatened with death. TMT research demonstrates, though gen-yoo-wine studies, that if you make people think about their deaths, they have a whole slew of conservative tendencies, from being knee-jerk anti-abstract art, to being more likely to vote Republican to....being more misogynist. Yes, women's bodies are considered vulnerable (!), soft (!), penetrable (!), and by othering women in this way, men can deal with their fear of death by positioning themselves as the stalwart (!), stoic (!), impenetrable (!!) protectors who "save" women and save their own selves from confronting their mortality.
Point is that even your initial assumption that these ideas couldn't be applied in a scientific manner and developed into genuine, falsifiable theories was wrong. Plus, there's the ignoring of the propaganda effort behind the war, that did and does rely heavily on the tendencies Faludi describes. Maybe you could quit flailing and admit you jumped the gun?
November 9, 2007 7:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
I agree with brooksfoe here re: falsifiability
In short, if there isn't some sort of overarching/explanatory/causal claim in Faludi's work, what on earth is the point? Is she merely claiming that "amongst many other very important factors, the fact that patriarchy runs deep in our culture contributed to our reaction to 9/11, but was not sufficient to be causal?" If that is the case it hardly warrants a book. It warrants more of a "Duh."
If she is not making such a limited claim, then I think that Matt's original counterfactual demands an answer.
November 9, 2007 7:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
Amanda, with all due respect, no one is claiming that the "gender zeitgeist" had nothing to do with the war, the question is whether it is dominant enough to be explanatory or causal. In order for Faludi's argument to be important, it needs to access something on that level, otherwise it's sort of a nice aside, an ancillary reason the US populace drank the kool-aid so to speak.
There were lots of cultural reasons that the populace reacted the way it did, all of them are tangential to this conversation, but what Matt seems to be pointing out is that if hyper-masculinity were so dominant a theme it would pervade any single person holding the presidency. That doesn't seem to be the case, which mitigates the importance of Faludi's claim a great deal.
Falsifiability is not just a claim in science, it is a claim in logic. Without it, people can develop non-testable super-hypotheses and pounce when others don't have an answer. It seems to be a pretty fair standard to me. I'm sort of baffled that so many supporters of Faludi take offense to such an obvious argument.
I can't access your terror management theory link, but my cursory google search brought up this, which seems ridiculously on point:
Link
It seems this type of theorizing lends itself not to falsifiability, but to findings that ignore alternate causalities...which would seem to help Matt's argument, not hurt it.
Additionally, I don't think falsifiability was the end point of the argument, it was a reason to be skeptical. The crux is the question of whether or not conceptions of gender are such a driving force in politics that they can dictate extreme policies such as war. There is an example on the table (Gore) that this is incorrect. So far, no one has refuted that argument.
November 9, 2007 7:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
Is this what TPM Cafe is coming to? It's pretty low down if we have to get high schoolers to contribute to the site.
November 9, 2007 7:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
That is ridiculously not fair. Matt is articulating arguments that are far more sophisticated than many adults, he deserves a fair hearing based on the merits of his claims, not his age.
November 9, 2007 7:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
Reece,
If you can do better, I will gladly promote a reader post you do responding to Faludi to the front page.
November 9, 2007 7:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
I agree that the rebuttals were inadequate and indeed off the point. Not all our guests will have read the book to join in a discussion, and you were only being honest and clear in acknowledging your limitations owing to that. The lack of qualifications frankly baffles me altogether. We all gather here to talk about politics because in a democracy we all have a stake in it and all very much should be talking. Besides, as the saying goes, this isn't rocket science.
The use of falsifiability also seemed perfectly fine. We all require evidence, even if we don't require the kind of case made in the sciences or even if we've read Kuhn and Feyeraband and think Popper's claim about science is misleading. Faludi phrases it as a need to consider soft things like the emotions, but while emotions aren't necessarily public and logical, how we discuss them can still be. Besides, if we should have discussed things like emotions in the run up to war, we should also have discussed evidentiary things like the need for war to knock out WMD or the point of fighting bin Laden by invading Iraq.
Indeed, the bulk of Faludi's reply, a list of things she didn't really mean, does make the thesis sound slippery enough to accommodate an awful lot of qualifiers. And at that point, it's not unreasonable for someone to ask what would count against the thesis. In effect, her reply seems to make Matt's objection that much more plausible to me. I of course shall read the book to decide for myself, and of course I have no qualifications to judge it, so don't expect me then to say I like it. That's be presumptuous.
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
November 9, 2007 7:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
I agree her premise can be critiqued. Just not on the kind of scientific, evidentiary basis that's being asked for here.
November 9, 2007 8:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
Falsifiability doesn't demand scientific evidence, merely a premise that can be proven wrong. I think it's fair to critique an argument that cannot be proven false as non-falsifiable, particularly when the answer to the argument against it is that it isn't meant to be so explanatory.
November 9, 2007 8:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
Andrew,
I don't see any reason to engage with Faludi's arguments. As I noted in my comment on her first post, I don't find her book to be informative or interesting. I remain surprised that she took the time to write a book about it.
November 9, 2007 8:25 AM | Reply | Permalink
Ad hominem.
Jerk.
November 9, 2007 8:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
Perhaps I'm getting caught up on the precise meaning of "falsifiable." But the standard being applied here is more than "merely a premise that can be proven wrong."
Here's what Matt asked for:
All I'm saying is there is meaningful, theoretical work that helps explain our world that doesn't have, or need to have, data and statistics to support it.
November 9, 2007 8:38 AM | Reply | Permalink
The crux is the question of whether or not conceptions of gender are such a driving force in politics that they can dictate extreme policies such as war. There is an example on the table (Gore) that this is incorrect. So far, no one has refuted that argument.
Yet I somehow feel this is a little off-target too. This is a book of cultural critique; I don't think it's making testable predictions. It's important that it make arguments which could in some way be wrong, but I don't think the way in which cultural-critique arguments are proven wrong is that they fail to be predictive. It's that they don't fit the array of signs, or don't make a distinction between these signs and any other ones in the category.
And I don't think that Faludi is saying that the US was doomed to invade Iraq because of our Puritan heritage. I think that to say that in the US's invasion of Iraq, one sees the marks of our Puritan heritage, and to go into that, is an interesting and useful exercise.
"All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out." - I.F. Stone
November 9, 2007 8:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
TMT research doesn't demonstrate that at all. What it demonstrates is that those people who already identify with high authoritarianism, will, when primed with suggestions of their own mortality, advertise their allegiance to their own ingroup.
In subsequent studies, they found that participants also have the same reactionary behavior when primed with suggestions of theft or social isolation. Other studies suggest that when any participant, liberal or conservative is primed with these suggestions, they will advertise their allegiance to their own ingroup.
November 9, 2007 8:44 AM | Reply | Permalink
That's pretty nitpicky. Forgive the wikipedia link, but they have a good definition of falsifiability a la Popper (which I'm guessing is what Matt meant):
Data can do it, but it's more about their being a mechanism to prove it is false than anything else.
November 9, 2007 8:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
I wasn't arguing what it tries to prove, I was pointing out a crtiticism that based on the methodology, seems correct.
I mean what you've just said basically means that there are leaders and followers, and the followers will follow the leaders even unto crappy consequences like terrorism because they live in a certain type of culture (for Faludi this is hyper masculinism). For any kid who ever got teased by someone they thought was their friend this is a no brainer.
November 9, 2007 8:57 AM | Reply | Permalink
After much consideration, she’s right, I hate messiness and am just too scared to ponder the mucky national id. Of course, if I were to deny her suspicion, it would merely be a defense mechanism, and around we go again.
I thought this was a generally good response up until this point, Matt. But this statement is actually quite weird, and tends to undermine the rest of your argument. It's one thing to say that one rejects a certain line of explanation because the explanation has not been adequately justified or empirically confirmed. It is another to say that one rejects a certain line of explanation because one finds it just too unpleasant to examine, and therefore one is disinclined even to inquire about whether and to what extent the explanation is true.
One might wish, to take an analogous example, that the human body were a perfect marvel of interacting "systems" and its behavior and conditions could be explained according to idealized models of the proper functioning of those systems. But in fact, the human body is filled with parasites, toxins, infections agents, congenital defects and other things that make it far from the well-functioning machine we might like it to be. What would we think of someone who rejected an explanation of some person's physical pathologies on the grounds that they just don't like to contemplate all that chaotic, yucky stuff?
Throughout this extended discussion, there have been a number of rather confused assertions about "rationalism". It's a fluid term, but we can and should distinguish at least two clearly distinguishable uses for the term.
On the one hand, "rationalism" is sometimes used to refer to certain normative epistemic claims about method and justification, that is, about the "right way of conducting our reason". Rationalism in this sense is an outlook characterized by views about how we ought to think and seek the truth; about what constitutes the most reliable method in a given science; about how deliberation and evidence ought to influence our behavior; about the appropriateness of certain decision procedures, etc.
On the other hand, "rationalism" is sometimes used to refer to descriptive claims about human behavior, and about what actually motivates people. A rationalist in this second sense might be one who claims some particular rational choice model of rational decision making under imperfect information, or some model of reasoning, methodology and rational inquiry in the exercise of theoretical reason, is an empirically adequate descriptive model of actual human behavior.
Now it should be quite clear that these are logically distinct doctrines. One can easily be a normative rationalist without being a descriptive rationalist. One can easily endorse certain rationalist ideals about how people ought to think and behave, about what forms of inquiry, deliberation and decision-making would be optimal, while at the same time accepting that people are on the whole not terribly rational, and are driven by all sources of irrational or non-rational motivations, drives, impulses, etc. One might even strive to employ scientific method, in its most sophisticated and well-developed forms, to study the non-rational dimensions of human behavior.
My own view is that human beings are full of all sorts of motivations and that are non-rational. Their thinking is fraught with dreamy images, fantasies, gross metaphors, impulsive habits, crude dualistic distinctions, chaotically undisciplined association, magical thinking, superstitious obsessions and primitive drives, and is compromised by weak attention spans, limited cognitive capacity, faulty memory, inferential simplemindedness and other forms of relative stupidity.
I think Ducat is right when he says that modern liberalism has suffered from excessive rationalism. I took him to be talking about rationalism in the descriptive sense. His point, as I understood him, is that some liberals - particularly of the wonky technocratic variety - have tended to substitute simpleminded and empirically inadequate rational choice models of human behavior, of the sort popular in the social sciences, for a more sophisticated, mature and supple understanding of the complex reality of human behavior. They are thus consistently surprised by non-rational responses. They fail to predict them, and are unprepared to deal with them as they arise.
Your methodological views here, Matt, strike me as a bit too doctrinairre and inflexible. There are important aspects of the real world, particularly in the world of human behavior, that are vital for us to understand, but challenging to study. Understanding them requires the application of different, complementary methods from different fields. It's unfortunately quite a mess, but we have no choice but to do it since we live and interact in a world of human beings, and bring our beliefs about them to bear in everything we do.
There are different reactions one can have to this mess. One is to withdraw from it, and to restrict our inquiries to the least messy, most tidy and methodically tractable corners of human life. The benefit of this approach is that one ends up with well-confirmed views. The drawback is that those views concern such a narrow realm of human behavior and experience - only the tidy stuff - that their applicability is limited. The practitioner of this approach probably ends up with a crippled, crabbed and unsophisticated understanding of human nature - even one's own nature.
An alternative is to let oneself go a bit, and consider and investigate a broad variety of areas, even those areas that are quite messy and confusing, and for which it is hard to devise controllable experiments or make quantifiable observations. One does the best one can with the looser causal explanations that are proposed, and one tries to confirm or disconfirm these explanations by bringing in other, admittedly sporadic and imprecise, observations about human behavior in concrete circumstances, and subjecting the input to some sort of rational argument and disputation, to the extent possible.
Presumably, there is some sort of Aristotelian mean to be struck between the extremes of exclusive attention to the experimentally tractable and wild undisciplined exploration of every facet of human craziness.
Rationality is not, primarily, a set of innate competencies that require only normal biological nurturing in order to flower. Rationality is an evolving individual and cultural achievement, and and body of skills and habits that have been discovered, developed and acquired by our ancestors, and passed on through culture. Rationality has been fashioned and perfected from the rough and messy raw materials of human cognitive and behavioral nature, like a dwelling built from the raw materials of the woods in the middle of a wilderness, and hopefully over time advances in method and choice skills, and in the ways of teaching and disseminating them, has made us somewhat less stupid. But don't make the mistake of thinking the wild stuff isn't still there, or that its impact on human behavior is negligible and can safely be ignored.
November 9, 2007 9:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
Well, I and quite a few people here clearly disagree with you. So I hope you'll forgive the vast majority of us if we continue the conversation without your needless complaints and criticism. If you have something constructive to say (for instance, an effort to prove the semi-ridiculous claim stated above), say it. If not, stop hatin'.
November 9, 2007 9:37 AM | Reply | Permalink
My apologies, I ,meant to post this as a response to Marcotte.
November 9, 2007 9:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
I call bullshit on the use of "falsifiable" here. If you're going to criticize Faludi's discussion of the post-9/11 national psyche as unscientific, then you've got to show that enough other entries in the marketplace of ideas about our national behavior are "scientific" and "falsifiable" or else you have to throw up your hands and take Wittgenstein's position of silence.
Since the people tossing "falsifiable" around haven't even hinted at what they might consider a "significant" or "primary" or "deciding" role in the country's behavior, it's hard to see what scientific principles they're invoking other than "I know it when I see it."
I think it's also no coincidence that Faludi, one of the few women in this national debate, is coming in for particular vituperation as unscientific.
November 9, 2007 9:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
Noone would have guessed that Matt is in high shcool if he had not anounced it. Why not judge his contribution based on its content? His commentary is certainly supperior to anything I have read of yours and I suspect you are beyond high school.
November 9, 2007 10:12 AM | Reply | Permalink
I think science is getting a bad rap on these boards. Sure, Susan’s argument deals with the “social sciences” rather than physics. But still, she is talking about factual events and their actual causes. Even if we can’t break out the microscope to evaluate her theory, it’s still empirical, and a bit of critical analysis is perfectly appropriate.
At the same time, Matt throws around the word “falsifiability” but I don’t think it’s key to his argument at all. In fact, quite the contrary: Matt attempts to falsify Susan's theory, not with empirical facts but with a counterfactual hypothesis. The way I see it, here is Matt’s argument:
1) Susan believes post-9/11 American behavior (culminating in the invasion of Iraq) is predominantly explained/caused by deep-seeded psychological issues within American culture that have their origins in the Puritan roots of the country.
2) If Susan is right, then we could expect an invasion of Iraq regardless of who the President was.
3) But, Matt believes, if Gore had been declared the president in 2000, the US would not have invaded Iraq after 9/11.
4) Therefore, Susan is wrong.
There you go: Susan’s theory, falsified. Of course, there are a number of weak spots in this argument. For one, it’s no mere matter of chance that Bush was elected president. Rather, it may have been a result of the very deep-seeded psychological issues that Susan points to. Sure, it may have been a matter of sheer chance that, as a result of the actual election that occurred, Bush was declared the president as opposed to Gore. But the fact that Bush got anywhere near close to 50% of the vote may be partially explainable by Puritanisms. This is significant and explanatory.
Then there is the other assumption: that, with Gore as president, we would not have invaded Iraq. However, even assuming this is true, American puritanisms could still “cause” such a war, especially if great public dissatisfaction led to a Gore defeat in 2004 and a neo-con victory. The war may have been delayed for a few years, but America’s psychological problems would have surfaced eventually.
But I think the biggest problem with Matt’s argument is this: a preceding condition doesn’t need to completely determine a subsequent event in order to be a “cause”. Take the example of radiation and cancer: exposure to radiation causes an increased chance of developing cancer. Whether the cancer actually develops is a more-or-less completely random event. But if it does develop, it’s absolutely because of the cancer.
So there you go: Susan may be right, even if Gore wouldn’t have waged war in Iraq. America’s psychological issues set the stage for Iraq being even possible, let alone relatively likely.
November 9, 2007 10:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
I don't think you understand the context of Matt's quote. As I understand it, this is Matt's summation of what Susan wants Matt to "realize." If Matt doesn't conform to this belief, then Susan would say he's in denial. It reinforces his argument that her theory is unfalsifiable.
November 9, 2007 10:58 AM | Reply | Permalink
But I think the biggest problem with Matt’s argument is this: a preceding condition doesn’t need to completely determine a subsequent event in order to be a “cause”.
I also think this is the crucial point. The concerns raised earlier about inevitability are a bit of red herring.
November 9, 2007 11:13 AM | Reply | Permalink
On further reflection, you might be right. I couldn't tell whether Matt was partially agreeing with the diagnosis, or was just being sarcastic.
November 9, 2007 11:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm not sure that the issue with "falsifiability" really gets at the core problem here.
It's easy, of course, to come up with facts that would contradict Faludi's theory. If, for example, the US were tomorrow to give up its nuclear arms unilaterally, and disband its military, that would falsify her theory. Hence, it is, strictly speaking, falsifiable.
Of course, the real question is whether it's falsifiable, or, as I'd rather think about it, does any real explanatory work, in the sorts of events we might realistically expect. In this, it shares the same status as that of old time Marxist or Freudian analyses of societal phenomena. A distinctive characteristic is that they too could rearrange their constructs so that any realistic scenario could be "explained" by them. It's hard to see how that could be a virtue in a theory, rather than a significant defect.
What I'd like to see from Faludi is any kind of account whereby her overarching theory has any more explanatory power than Freudianism and Marxism did in their time. Why shouldn't we expect that some fine day in the future, explanations by patriarchy won't seem as quaint and deluded and, well, ridiculous, as do Freudian and Marxist accounts nowadays?
November 9, 2007 11:32 AM | Reply | Permalink
What!!!? How DARE you suggest that Freudian and Marxist explanations are quaint and deluded!!!
I'm just kidding. I agree with your point 100%. But if my mother-in-law were here right now, she'd be dead serious.
November 9, 2007 11:39 AM | Reply | Permalink
In a certain sense, a deeper issue in how Faludi constructs her argument is not so much one of not being falsifiable, but rather of her committing a species of the so-called "genetic fallacy".
Basically, the genetic fallacy attempts to discredit an argument by presenting something about the source of the argument that appears negative. Of course, this is a staple of political debate, but it has nothing to do with logic.
For example, simply dismissing the actual arguments presented in favor of an aggressive action as deriving from the gender of the advocate would be an instance of such a fallacy. The fact is, that argument should stand on its logic and evidence alone as a good one or not.
Basically, what Faludi attempts to do is employ the genetic fallacy to undermine every argument for the use of American military force that she doesn't favor. Indeed, she pretty much pulls the same sort of stunt on virtually any argument she doesn't favor.
In this, she is again in company (though certainly not in good company) with old time Marxists and Freudians, who made the genetic fallacy the core component of their argumentation. Contradict them, and you've got a bourgeois issue or a thing with your mama. Object to Faludi, and your patriarchy is showing.
The day finally came when Marxism and Freudianism were abandoned as useless at best and damaging at worst as theories of human behavior. I have little doubt that Faludi's will find their way to that inglorious dustheap as well.
November 9, 2007 12:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ah, but here I disagree with you. Faludi is not attacking arguments about going to war--she's explaining decisions about going to war. And she's consistent: I imagine she would offer the same explanatory analysis whether she agrees with the ultimate decision or not.
This is not an appropriate use of the genetic fallacy. Whether or not her explanations bear the test of time (a good question in itself), they at the least are a possible explanation (or partial explanation) of the phenomena she seeks to explain. To this degree, so were Freudian and Marxist analyses.
November 9, 2007 12:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, consider this passage as one example:
The clear import of this passage is to dismiss, as arguments, the position of Liberal hawks as being logically based, and appealing to "humanitarian and liberal reasons". They are not to be evaluated and accepted on "face value". Instead, they are mere expressions of "macho" posturing.
This is classically how the genetic fallacy worked with Freudianism and Marxism as well. Arguments were not accepted on their logical merits; they were instead explained away as expressions of some "deeper" motivation.
November 9, 2007 12:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, daruber muss man schweigen."
Yeah, Wittgenstein!
November 9, 2007 12:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
But you are living in a fantasy world if you think that the only motivations people have are the ones that they admit to having (or even realize they have). I say this not because I don't take people's rationales at face value, but because I have experienced it first hand. I have been ignorant of my own motives and, when others challenged me, I was forced to admit to myself that I had reasons for acting that I was not aware of.
Human beings are complex animals driven by evolutionarily-designed instincts. The human mind is incredibly complex. The mathematical algorithms that the mind must process to enable a small child to catch a ball are incredibly complex, yet we are not aware of them. It seems an enormous leap to believe that we are always conscious of the motives of our own actions.
November 9, 2007 1:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Be that as it may, in the end we can't simply dismiss all logical arguments as deriving fundamentally from unacknowledged impulses. In the end, everybody needs to grant that some arguements must simply be dealt with on their own logical merits, otherwise thinking and debate are pointless -- including, of course, the arguments of the likes of Faludi and the Freudians and the Marxists as well.
The deep problem with Faludi and crew is that they use their "explanation" in terms of patriarchy to dismiss all manner of arguments opposed to their own position. When they do so -- and the case of the liberal hawks would be a good example -- they are employing the genetic fallacy. They are basically abandoning logic.
How many times do feminists "argue" against a position merely by pointing out that the arguer is a male, represents the male point of view, and therefore can't be taken seriously, because he reflects the "patriarchy"?
Very nearly always, in my experience.
November 9, 2007 2:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
when theories reach these atmospheric levels it is sometimes hard to tell.
Jack
November 9, 2007 3:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
I don't agree that Faludi, or most fair-minded Marxists or Freud followers, "dismiss all manner of arguments opposed to their own position". As Ducat mentions today, they are focused on one particular strand of a multi-faceted discussion. They acknowledge the economic and political dimensions to complex human events, but their purpose is to point out other components of the explanation as well. Perhaps there are some ill-informed feminists, or Marxists, etc., who actually believe that THEIR perspective is the only one that truly "explains" events in the world, but mostly it is a straw man that your are exposing. The Faludis of the world are merely calling our attention to one neglected and important aspect of the overall phenomenon.
November 9, 2007 3:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Amanda, if a specialist sees an event through specialist's eyes, then writes about the event from the specialist's perspective, that perspective will be very special. And the specialist ought to say so. If they so qualify, they lend a facet of understanding to a complex event. If they don't, and the book or comment comes without any other contextual perspectives, it will be novel. And if novel, it is a part substance, and lots of entertainment. If it overstates the specialty in the analysis or its focus in the investigation, it comes off as a hobby.
Casting complex events as proofs of theoretical feminist sociology in such a case ceases to be specialty and becomes hobby. Is it fun?
November 9, 2007 4:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
I wholeheartedly embrace TPMCafe's populist openness to hear the unstuffy views of intellectuals young and old and especially those not related to some kind of legacy.
Well done TPMCafe and well done Matt. Keep on.
November 9, 2007 4:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
The attack on Matt's profile info from his blog shows an entitlement mentality in the attacker with regard to whose writing and thinking matters. The quality of what's written any given day is what matters, or else pampered fame hogs will demand more time while real time quality takes a back seat.
What are the merits of their work, thought and writing before us today? Leave it a present-tense meritocracy, not a resume goat-rope.
November 9, 2007 4:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
Geeze, talk about simplistic. Kicking off with multiple straw men based on infinitives... And the punctuation (!)
Where do you see the argument it had zero influence? The argument I've seen has been Faludi and Ducat, and by extension you if you're supporting them, have vastly overstated it, and the theory doesn't hold up factually or logically in many of the examples give by Faludi or Ducat, and fares even worse in examples given by other contributors. Basically, that it's wildly exaggerated and doesn't hold up.
Furthermore, it been argued they, and probably you, come from an ideology, school of thought, and movement prone to such exaggeration and gender polemic.
wow, somebody has "gen-yoo-wine" (!) issues (!)
November 9, 2007 5:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
As much as we've crossed swords, thought I'd take the opportunity to point out what an important insight that is.
So often people are trapped into notions of permanent group identity, mostly through habit. Some upon achieving status in a group behave like feudal lords, serving only themselves, and continually agitating to maintain their domain.
But the fundamental principle is simply strength in numbers to achieve common goals and in the modern world, historical limitations on communication, physical capability and labor/gender/class/etc specializations are less relevant. We should be discussing pragmatic common interest more, and gender polemic less.
November 9, 2007 5:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
Excellent link to the Judis piece, btw. cheers.
Very impressive, especially for a 17yo. You rock! Keep up the good work. (Oh, and don't get a big head or blow it. lol. )
November 9, 2007 5:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
Right. It's more a matter of whether Faudli has shown sufficient skepticism, throughly vetting and putting her theory through comparative analysis before launching unfalsifiable allegations, or whether she's done an agenda driven hatchet job via shoddy research and cherry-picked anecdotes to inflame gender polemic, which seems to be increasingly where her bread is buttered.
Or as Zeitlin put it well:
It's odd that Faudli picks the agenda driven rush to war, unfalsifiable claims of hidden WMD and intentions, general hubris and ideological zeal, all told a grab-bag of unpleasantness to caricature as "hypermasculine." Then, as a woman, demonstrates them so fully.
November 9, 2007 5:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is great to see that Matt is enthusiastic about Popper who in many ways did seminal work in post positivist philosophy of science.
The position is Popperian "falsificationism".
First, it is necessary to point out that Popper's whole theory demarcates scientific from non-scientific theories on the basis that the former is falsifiable and the latter is not. So Newton's law of universal gravitational attraction was/is scientific (according to this view) because it was falsified by Einstein's relativity theory.
However, no such falsification ever took place. Historically speaking what did take place is that Newtonian physics was abandoned and Relativity Theory was adopted as the official theory for other than falsificanionist reasons. There was neither a single recalcitrant observation nor a set of data that falsified Newtonian physics.
So not only is Marxism and Psychoanalysis not falsifiable in the Popperian sense (Popper actually uses Marxism and psychoanalysis as examples of the un-scientific) neither is anything else we call science.
Critics of Popperian philosophy of science make the case in many ways, which I cannot go into here since it gets technical. But suffice it to say that given Popper's own assumptions, scientific theories are simply not falsifiable (let alone anything in the social sciences).
See for example the work of Miller and Tichý (1974) on the issue of verisimilitude. Also look at Lakatos, I. The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes. Hilary Putnam has some valid criticism too. Then there is Paul Feyerabend's criticism and finally there is Thomas Kuhn's work
November 9, 2007 8:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
The history of the emergence of special relativity has been fraught from early on with myths. In more recent times the romance of Kuhnian "incommensurability" and scientific "revolutions" has combined with earlier heroic myths about leaps of inexplicable genius, gedanken experiments and the like to portray relativity as a revolutionary rupture with everything that came before it.
But the picture that is emerging through contemporary research is much more gradualist, and looks a lot more like ordinary science, with its usual concerns about empirical adequacy, simplicity and symmetry. Some of the writers I have found most illuminating are Olivier Darrigol, Harvey Brown, John Norton, Michael Janssen, Oliver Pooley and Robert Rynaciewicz.
Special Relativity emerged from a long evolution, and was preceded by a whole series of failed attempts to discover either an ether wind or ether drag effects. Along with these empirical developments came greater mathematical and theoretical insight into the structure of Maxwell's electrodynamics, particularly the appreciation of what we would now call the Lorentz covariance of Maxwell's laws, and what Einstein described as "asymmetries not present in the phenomena".
Of course, "falsifiability" does not mean the same thing as "falsified", so even if Newtonian mechanics had not been falsified that would not mean it is not falsifiable. But in fact, Newtonian mechanics has been falsified and shown to be only a good low-velocity, macroscopic approximation. Special relativistic dynamics is confirmed all the time in the lab, along with the empirical inadequacy of Newtonian mechanics at high velocities.
In any case, Newtonian mechanics is the wrong place to look for the empirical challenges to which special relativity was a response. The part of classical physics that was under stress was electrodynamics. Einstein's procedure in "On The Electrodynamics of Moving Bodies" is to introduce a new kinematics to solve problems in electrodynamics, and then from the theory he deduces consequences for ordinary particle dynamics that were later confirmed.
November 9, 2007 10:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
Fair enough, sorry, I jumped the gun. :P
November 10, 2007 12:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
When people say that falsifiability does not mean falsified they are saying that just because a statement is falsifiable does not mean that it is in fact false.
In the sense that Popper means falsifiable, Newtonian physics was never falsified even though Popper would try to avoid that conclusion. Again the technical arguments against falsificationism, I don't really want to get into in too much depth. You can look up Popper in the Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy as a good source.
Popper was trying to get away from Instrumentalist and Convetionalist theories that were prevalent during the positivist era. Popper in this sense was a realist. A realist believes that science is progressing ever so much closer to the ultimate truths about the natural world. Popper has a problem with this since for him theories can only be flasified but never confirmed. So he substitutes truth of a theory by the notion of verisimilitude. To do that he had to introduce the concept of observation sentences that are compatible and observation sentences that are incompatible with a given theory. T(1) is closer to the truth than T(2) iff T(1) has less sentences that are incompatible with it than T(2).
On the other hand Popper also maintainst that a theory is more scientific (paradoxically) if what it implies is LESS probable than a competitor ( i.e. has more falsifiable sentences against it). Remember he is not saying that the observation sentences have actually falsified the theory, but only that they would if they were proven to be true. So for example if T(2) is God makes everything happen, then it is hard to see what observation sentences would be in the category of being incompatible with the theory. There are no observation sentences that would qualify as potential falsifiers. So seen this way, the God theory has more verisimilitude than say the latest TOE theory since the latter would have observation sentences that are (presumably) incompatible with it and thus (paradoxically) the God theory would be more scientific. Much of Popper's method has, again as I said earlier, to do with demarcation between scientific theories and non-scientific theories.
Further, Popper is clear that there are no pure unvarnished observation sentences that wear their "truth" on their sleeves. All observation is "theory-ladden". Given this position, there is no such thing as an observation sentence that
strictly falsifies. For example the Michelson-Morley experiment does not falsify the ether theory tout court. The fact that there was no interference pattern visible did not necessarily disprove the ether theory. The notion of Newtonian space (as a kind of container in which things moved around relative to it) was not falsified by the Michelson-Morley experiment as Popper would have it. It did however lead to the abandoment of Newtonian conceptions of absolute space.
I can go on. But you will have to be a lot more specific about how an observation can falsify a theory than you have been in your post
November 10, 2007 11:12 AM | Reply | Permalink
Amanda, where in anything that Matt has written does he give the indication that he's criticizing Faludi's theory because it's feminist?
This is even more bizzare, since Matt himself mentions it as an example of a falsifiable theory:
Why do you feel the need to create straw anti-feminists, when real ones abound?
November 10, 2007 7:08 PM | Reply | Permalink
Wovon man nichts weis soll man erst forchen und dan sprechen
November 10, 2007 11:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yeah, and if the external world doesn't exist, I paid way too much for this suit. Give Popper a rest, folks.
November 13, 2007 11:00 PM | Reply | Permalink