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The Case for a US-Iran "Grand Bargain"

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Flynt Leverett previously served as Senior Director for Middle East Affairs on President George W. Bush's National Security Council and is now the Director of the Geopolitics of Energy Initiative at the New America Foundation.

At 2 pm today, he offered this testimony, "All or Nothing: The Case for a US-Iranian 'Grand Bargain'" at a hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Government Oversight and Reform.

As usual, Leverett is mesmerizing in his sober, serious, analytical take on what needs to be done with Iran and how to correct our course.

From his intro that advocates abandoning incrementalism, with which I fully concur:

It is becoming increasingly clear that the Bush Administration's refusal to pursue comprehensive, strategic engagement with the Islamic Republic of Iran is profoundly misguided, and is imposing real costs on American interests in the Middle East and the war on terror. In recent years, a growing body of politicians, distinguished foreign policy hands, and eminent persons' groups -- including a Council on Foreign Relations Task Force and the Iraq Study Group -- has advocated more sustained U.S. diplomatic engagement with Iran.

In almost all instances, recommendations for diplomatic engagement with Iran take an incremental approach. In this approach, the United States would identify particular areas where American and Iranian interests presumably overlap -- e.g., post-conflict stabilization in Iraq or counter-narcotics initiatives in Afghanistan -- and engage Tehran on those specific issues. Assuming that Washington and Tehran were able to cooperate productively on those issues, establishing a minimum level of "confidence", the range of issues under discussion could be gradually expanded.

This kind of incremental approach seems prudent and relatively uncontroversial -- except to the strategically autistic opponents of any engagement with Iran. Unfortunately, incrementalism will not work to produce sustained improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations. Advocates of incrementalism ignore an almost 20-year history of issue-specific engagement between the United States and the Islamic Republic: regarding Lebanon, Bosnia, and Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks. In each case, as my wife and former NSC colleague Hillary Mann documents in her testimony, it has been the United States which declined to expand tactical cooperation on specific issues to explore possibilities for a broad-based strategic opening between our two countries.

Today, the United States is pursuing extremely tentative issue-specific engagement with Iran regarding Iraq. The Bush Administration has also indicated a highly conditional willingness to engage in multilateral talks with Tehran over Iranian nuclear activities.

However, given the record of U.S.-Iranian tactical engagement since the late 1980s, at this point Iran is unlikely to offer significant cooperation to the United States -- whether with regard to Iraq or on the nuclear issue -- except as part of a broader rapprochement with Washington that addresses Tehran's core concerns. This would require the United States to be willing, as part of an overall settlement, to extend a security guarantee to Iran -- effectively, an American commitment not to use force to change the borders or form of government of the Islamic Republic -- and to bolster such a contingent commitment with the prospect of lifting U.S. unilateral sanctions and normalizing bilateral relations.

The rest is here.

-- Steve Clemons publishes the popular political blog, The Washington Note


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Presumably this is advice for a possible Democratic President, otherwise it is just another pony hunt.

...American interests in the Middle East and the war on terror.

Am I the only person that tastes a little bile upon hearing the term "the war on terror". It strikes me as even more nauseating in cases such as this where it's being used so matter-of-factly as if we all agree with it and it's amorphic definition. It's preposterous and hides some very sinister and ill conceived motives and ideas.

But aside from this disturbing point it sounds like he's saying what many people have been saying - we need to start behaving like adults. We need to sit down and have real diplomatic negotiations and relations with Iran. Not silly staring contests to see who will blink first, or temper tantrums when if we don't get everything our way. It's the only way anything positive will ever occur for either country.

It would be a breath of fresh air if a democratic presidential candidate were to matter of factly state that there is no "war on terror", and there never has been one. They should state that this is just a GOP PR game intended to maintain their hold of the American government. Once you dispose of that bit of misleading language, the whole issue of Iran, as well as Pakistan, Syria, and Afghanistan, becomes much easier to discuss intelligently.

Hoppy in Sacramento

Aside from the semantic vagueness of a war on a tactic, other Presidents have come up with marginal names for "wars" against no particular enemy, with especially silly acronyms, such as JFK's War On Poverty (WOP) or Carter's treatment of dealing with inflation as the Moral Equivalent Of War (MEOW).

Nevertheless, it is equally inaccurate to speak of "the" War in Iraq. Iraqi operations are a major campaign, within the Central Command, with Afghanistan also being a substantial, albeit far more multinational. Realistically, it is worth having a framework that can include such things as joint antiterror work with the ASEAN nations or Europe, which are more intelligence and training "operations other than war." The Balkans need to fit somewhere, although they are less a matter of terrorism. Counterproliferation against nation-states also needs to go somewhere, especially when it involved real defenses in the waters between Korea and Japan, and in Japan, against actual missiles. Let me not start on why Iran is a more existential threat than North Korea, and we carefully observe the fiction of the 800-pound gorilla of Israeli nuclear weapons, which have taken claim of the most comfortable couch in the figurative living room.
--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

The entire framework of anything remotely resembling "antiterror work" would appear to me to be papier-mâché and balsa wood at best. What are we anti exactly? How exactly? Why exactly? And if that's the case then why are we not consistent across the spectrum in terms of those more specific definitions? I for one do not think it is too much to ask for specifics when this much blood and money is at risk. And they can shove "national security" where my foot would be if they were standing in front of me. These decisions need the facts, on the table, in order to make the correct choices. And some of those might be difficult one but let's know up front what it is we're even talking about. If our track record for recognizing these sorts of threats and the people we use as informants, contacts and political connections in those countries is any indication, then I'd go so far as to say we have no idea what the hell we're doing and probably never have. And to anyone with the audacity to say "well we haven't been attacked since 9-11" I say this - "I haven't been struck by lightning in my life, therefore I'm lightning-proof right?" It's meaningless and illogical to put it politely.

The levels of corruption, drug money, assassinations and worse which we turn a blind eye to in order to further our own "interests" or to give support to our own puppets in power in many countries is not lost on those who live, fight and die in these places. And they have long memories of our past failures too. These things seem to only be lost to our nation and it's leadership. How else can you explain that our last regime change in Iran gave us the new regime we are now so intent on changing? Are we out of our minds? Cue the Marx brothers now please.

I don't mean to suggest that there are not regions which do require unique methods to combat the problems and that intelligence work is vitally important across the board. But intelligence is supposed to deal with facts is it not? Why have departments dedicated to intelligence when all that's really needed are some modestly talented screenwriters (although the current strike might prove irksome to writing the Middle East's future at the moment).

It does seem to me that we use the term "terrorism" and our whole war on it as a generic blanket to cover what really amounts to organized criminal organizations and other things we want to simply change or get rid of. Then there are politically or religiously motivated separatists and uprisings that throw their hats into the ring. It seems especially foolish to me that we prop up some of these groups and demonize others. This practice certainly can not help our overall efforts (if what we say truly represents what we mean). And by mislabeling these organizations or generalizing all of them as part of some vague "war on terror", do we not also all but ensure that we handle them incorrectly or even disastrously? Certainly a religious movement should not be dealt with the same as a political uprising or a criminal operation. Yet in all of these cases, we seem to now label them terrorism and then want to send in the American military (which seems either overkill or foolhardy in all but a few extreme cases).

I'm tired of the secrecy, double-talk and flexible definitions that seem to be the stock and trade of our nations leadership. They are making things worse not better and I would challenge anyone to find a glimmer of hope that's emerged from any of these grand schemes, plans or operations.

I think that Hillary and all other Democratic candidates propose US-Iran "Grand Bargain"
without calling it "Grand Bargain".
However, I don't see what US have to give up in this "Grand Bargain"? US pretty much get everything they want and need. It sounds too good be true.

There is one problem though Davai. Any bargain would mean that we blinked. It would mean that we made a deal with Iran. And that is something that I'm afraid goes deeper than mere political shortsightedness.

Our posture of inflexibility and obtuseness can be seen in just as clear detail if one were to look at our (non)relations with Cuba.

mcboo: re: If our track record for recognizing these sorts of threats and the people we use as informants, contacts and political connections in those countries is any indication, then I'd go so far as to say we have no idea what the hell we're doing and probably never have had.


Having recently watched 60 Minutes on Curve Ball I have a cui bono question.

The neo cons are visibly and pubblicly slavering to invade Iraq. {and Iran). Iraq was the most secular Moslem state and the most highly controlled. A dissatified young Moslem man goes wandering around and disappears for two years. When he reappears, he provides false information which alledgedly provokes us into the Iraq War and which Colin Powell peddles to the UN despite grave misgivings among some of the intelligence agencies experts. We go to war and take out Sadam and proceed, which is probably forseeable to confront. Iran.
So Al Qaeda has its far enemy( the US)fighting its near enemy(the Shia).

Question: Where was Curve Ball during those two years?

"We actually misnamed the war on terror, it ought to be the struggle against ideological extremists who do not believe in free societies who happen to use terror as a weapon to try to shake the conscience of the free world." --President Bush
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040806-1.html

Clear?

I agree that "antiterror" doesn't have much meaning. That being stipulated, there are certain classes of attacks that are attainable with less than a large nation-state base. While I do not minimize the threat, perhaps in some nonobvious ways, of WMDs, I tend to think of "terrorism", at a grand strategic level, with neither a military nor law enforcement model, but a public health one.

Every year, we have tens to hundreds of thousands of death from motor vehicle accidents, cardiovascular diseases, and a number of other condition that no one expects to eradicate. I use "eradicate" here in a particular epidemiological meaning: remove the source of death and disease from existence. Assuming there aren't more than the two secure cultures in labs, we've achieved that with one disease, over a couple of hundred years: smallpox. There are a handful of other infectious diseases, some mostly limited to Africa, which might be eradicated in the fairly near term. Of better known disease, the eradication of polio is probably the closest; there were some false celebrations that it was gone from the Western Hemisphere, but its end is close.

In general, however, public health/epidemiology looks at two problems: reducing the incidence of causes of morbidity and mortality (disease and death respectively), and reducing the virulence of incidents when they do occur. I see terrorism much in the same light. It isn't going to disappear. Its incidence can be reduced. The virulence of terrorist attacks can be reduced.

Reducing the incidence of terrorism won't come through any one mechanism. In some cases, economic development and the reduction of economic exploitation may help. Some brilliant diplomacy might deal with some of the religious and ethnic issues, but I doubt they can be rubbed out -- it then becomes, at the first line of defense, an intelligence problem to detect the threats, and, use a variety of means to stop the attack. Those means include law enforcement, economic/financial actions, and military operations mostly small, and some large.

There is also a need to limit the impact of events, which includes hardening vulnerable and critical target systems. It is rather silly for terrorists to try to smuggle chemical weapons into the US, when there are vulnerable chemical plants and toxic chemicals in transit. Telecommunications and the electrical power grid is vulnerable to certain threats. In most cases, it's fairly well understood how to harden the systems, but it will take money. Some of the increased vulnerabilities, especially in the electrical power grid, are unforeseen consequences of deregulation.

I see attacks on infrastructure, or accidents and disasters hitting vulnerable infrastructure, as significantly more likely then ICBM attack. Theater ballistic missiles are another matter of higher priority, but a few tens of billions could be shifted. Reallocating the costs of the Iraq operation is rather obvious.

There are ways to have a more open debate about some parts of national security, but there are also parts that legitimately need to be out of public view. The latter doesn't mean that there aren't ways to have independent review, without simply accepting the executive view. Congress, however, is going to have to take on more responsibility than it has in years.

I can deal with specifics, and, over the last month or so, I've been writing extensively on intelligence at Wikipedia. Certainly, we can get into more specific discussions here.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

Cuba is a completly separate issue.
I don't think that Bush is really looking forward to start a war with Iran, if Iran is ready to give Us everything they want.

Much more clear, thank you Don! ;)

Cuba is a separate issue that has been and still is handled in a similar (also see exactly the same) manner. Saber-rattling. Open threats. Statements to the American public and the world in general that we will not talk to or negotiate with them. This sounds terrible similar to me and therefore merits mentioning.

And if you believe that a laundry list of issues (including the nuclear issue) is all that troubles us about Iran then you are gravely mistaken. We (Bush) wants to go to war for other reasons, not the touted nuclear excuse.

One of the biggest problems we and our assorted "friends" in the region have with Iran is that it is becoming more and more of an influential player in the region. And even if paragraph 49, subsection G of some magical Grand Bargain said "We Iran promise that we will, from this day forward, be quiet as mice and promise not to be important in the region" countries like Saudi Arabia and Israel would still not be content. Neither would the United States for that matter. This is much closer to being the thorn in our collective side.

One of the biggest problems we and our assorted "friends" in the region have with Iran is that it is becoming more and more of an influential player in the region.
OK, this is the main issue. How Iran wants to influence the region?

mcboo.

This is one great rant and I mean that in the most positive way.

Appropo this sentence:

"But intelligence is supposed to deal with facts is it not?"

I've been following the fools' labyrinth of the whateveritwas strike by someone maybe on the Syrian whachamacallit and as is predictable, leave it to a self-described "old man" Israeli writer to put things in proper perspective .

(Posted in full due to reporting that the English version of Ynetnews is soon to shut down and the author hits this one out of the park):

"Satellite photos don’t lie

Details of Syria ‘nuke site bombing’ emanate familiar scent of political spin

B. Michael
Published: 11.07.07, 20:04 / Israel Opinion

The story known as “the operation in Syria” (according to foreign sources: an Israeli bombing of a Syrian target) continues to stir the imagination of journalists across the world. Not a week goes by without yet another hair-raising twist being reported regarding this mythological incident.

Last week we saw Aviation Week, a respectable magazine by all means, join the ranks of storytellers. It told its readers that Israeli satellite Ofek 7, which was launched to space in June 2007, directed the first accusatory finger at the site suspected of being a nuclear reactor.

Meanwhile, al-Jazeera went as far as taking the Israeli Air Force out of the story, attributed the mission to the American Air Force, and informed its viewers that the site was hit by a “tactical nuclear bomb.” No less.

As we recall, the Sunday Times reported that the IDF’s elite Sayeret Matkal unit was part of the celebration and told its readers how those guys infiltrated the Syrian desert in the middle of the night and marked the target with lasers. The newspaper did not detail whether only Jean Claude Van Damme took part in the operation, or Tom Cruise as well.

Each legend of this sort is marketed enthusiastically, read passionately, and then spreads from one newspaper to another, from one channel to another, and from one website to another, as if it was some kind of contagious virus immune to doubts.

Yet the questions, doubts, and bewilderment refuse to go away. Here is a hint below:

* Initially, the 2007 satellite images were published, as if the suspicious structure was only discovered this year (see the abovementioned Aviation Week report.) However, soon after that, images from September 2003 surfaced, and it turned out that the American intelligence community has been familiar with this structure for four years. Why then did persistent leaks to newspapers claim that Israel was the one that relayed the information to the Americans? Isn’t it more logical that it was the other way around?

* Any child with a personal computer can view (even now) the “reactor” using Google Earth. The coordinates are as follows: 35.42’24.68 – North; 39.49’56.44 – East. Those who do this will realize quickly that this story is even more ancient than thought. The main structure in Google can be seen clearly and sharply, but the other two structures are completely absent from the images – the “pumping station” on the riverbank and the rectangular building a bit north of the “reactor.” In the images from 2003, we can already see some of the rectangular structure, but the “pumping station” is still absent. One does not need to be a genius to realize that Google’s satellite images were shot even before September 2003. That is, this “reactor’ was at least five-years-old. Perhaps more. So what exactly happened that made the operation so urgent and essential?

* Close scrutiny of Google Earth elicits an almost grotesque finding. This “reactor” is not surrounded by any fence. There is no wall there either, no watchtowers, no residential structures, no patrol roads, no anti-aircraft positions, and no barracks…nothing. Just like that, on the riverbank, between two civilian roads, lies a nuclear reactor, and we don’t even see a guard post in the periphery. Does this sound serious? Recently, so it seems, someone directed Israel’s attention to this embarrassing inconsistency. Quickly, a wonderful excuse was found: this facility was so secretive that even the Syrian army didn’t know about it, and therefore it was unguarded. It appears that it’s much likelier to assume that this reactor was so secretive that nobody in Syria knew about its existence. Only the Israelis knew.

* One must completely lack a sense of smell in order not to sense the heavy familiar scent emanating from this story: The scent of a political-intelligence spin incredibly similar to the pre-Iraq War spin. A sequence of circular and manipulative intelligence schemes, piles of nonsense premised on tidbits of information, and the exploitation of this entire mess for the sake of political objectives of various leaders and their camps, both here and in the United States.

As we excitedly read the Sunday Times legends and eagerly go over Aviation Week’s tales, we should dedicate a few minutes of thought to the abovementioned option as well."
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3468755,00.html

Considering that the Israeli military gag order is still in place, hats off to B.Michael for working within the restrictions and so masterfuly nailing it, regardless. Experience is telling.

The eagerness of the some of the elite pros traveling within American media circles to progagate and promote this con, which is nothing more than establishing a pre-emptive casus belli for an unprovoked attack on Syria, is beneath contempt. What explains their behavior other than complicity?

Let us speak of a hypothetical country in the Middle East, which we shall call...Syria. Through several layers of contractors, an OSINT report was requested on the underground tunnels in a certain area, since the original requester (I really don't know who it was) though the elusive Iraqi WMD had been smuggled into the Batcave the hidden tunnels under Damascus. You see, Gotham City is really Damascus. The clever Syrians only made it look like an American city in the movies, and Catwoman was really wearing a burka with very special effects.

A contractor I know, who is, among other things, a retired military C3I officer, was asked to analyze the tunnels. She had retired from the Air Force after becoming a fully qualified AWACS battle controller, at a time when women were not allowed on AWACS combat missions, something she saw as career-limiting.

Unknown to all of us, among her assorted and rich academic credentials was a very solid background in geology. She checked for about an hour and called back the contract monitor. "There can't be underground tunnels under Damascus. It's a form of sandstone. Unless you lined them with steel and concrete, they'd collapse as fast as they were dug.

"But...we have a brochure here than says Damascus Rapid Transit, with a train. It must be a subway."

"I'm telling you they couldn't have a subway, secret tunnels or the Batcave. What's the URL of that brochure?" click-click..."that's not a subway. It's a monorail. Look closely."

"But we know there must be tunnels!"

"Read...my...lips. (Well,over the phone). There can't be tunnels in that rock. Now, they do have karst caves in the mountains outside. Those could be made into shelters. Should I look at them?"

"No, we hired you to find the tunnels."

"Never mind. I'm not going to bill you. I can't stand this any more. Maybe someone else will find the tunnels. Maybe Batman will turn out to be a Syrian Ba'ath party leader, and Robin is his love child. You go figure it out. I'm done with this."
And that, as far as I know, is where it was left.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

Ah yes, Axis of Evil (tm) Iran and it's terrible plans for carving up & running the Middle East. Unlike the evil plans of the United States, Saudi Arabia & Israel...for carving up and running the Middle East. Wait, those later countries all love peace & democracy...nevermind...you got me there...

Please. If any nation wants to complain about anothers "designs" for a region, here's a word of advice - don't have any of your own! Iran has at least as much right as Israel & Saudi Arabia to have a say in what happens, and certainly more than we do.

This is exactly the type of inside out nonsense people get when they do not engage in rational discussion or thought & instead practice hypocritical self-serving policy and belief.

Howard, I always enjoy reading your posts and have a great deal of respect for your vast experience & knowledge. However I too have some of those thing (certainly not in your fields specifically). And my experience & mind tells me that most people in intelligence (making policy decisions) are neither smart (as I define it) nor right very often. I grew up reading the DoD Soviet Military Power publications every year as if they were the next volume of Harry Potter. I know the fantasyland many of these people reside in. And now that I'm an adult, I require a bit more convincing. If only they could clone a few of you to lend a hand perhaps things would improve slightly.

In the meantime I see what we are doing, want to do, and are threatening to do and I call foul. I know for a fact there are better ways to do things, we just need a better team. And nowhere in all of this, ever, will I embrace secrecy. I know there are occasions when it's helpful but if that means we have to deal with where we are now I say ban it all. No secrecy at all if you can't us it responsibly.

And this country certainly hasn't.

The problem isn't always what goes on at the working level of the intelligence community. There's more and more evidence that virtually no one at the top levels, and I include Congress, reads or believes things unless they agree with their own preconceptions.

There's enough open literature discussion to see how the intelligence people are trying to figure out the right balance between being accurate and being read. Some of the policymaker complaints, from people I believe are trying to do a good job, are that they get excessively long analytic reports, through which they have to dig to find the things important to them. I don't have the link immediately at hand, but, from memory, someone at the assistant secretary of state level was prepping for a state visit from the leadership of Germany. He was the main contact to his counterparts. He complained that he did not need a CIA document that went through pages of why the Germans were coming, since he and his counterpart had set the agenda. What he needed was insight on those agenda points -- which, in fairness, CIA hadn't seen.

Setting aside the top-level cherry pickers, there is a delicate dance going on about the old model that "intelligence never recommends policy" changing to a model where the policymakers give major choices and intelligence works out the probabilities, expected responses, etc.

There is secrecy, and there is secrecy. The classic example is when a spy or codebreaking is your source -- as soon as the other side knows, the source dries up and the spy gets a bullet. How do you deal with that in a no-secrecy environment?

I can give a number of technical collection systems that worked as long as the opponent didn't know about their existence. Here's an example that was used on us. The Soviets presented the Moscow embassy with a beautiful Great Seal of the United States plaque, which got put on the wall in the Ambassador's office. It turned out that part of the design had a thin, flat, flexible metal plate that formed one side of a precisely sized metal cube set into the wood of the seal. When the Soviets sent a microwave beam at the Seal, it reflected back as long as no one was talking in the room. If someone was talking, the metal plate changed the shape of the resonant frequency of the cube, and the reflected microwaves changed in a manner that would let the Soviets hear everything said in that room.

There is less of a need for secrecy, but not necessarily none, when you get into the analysis and estimates (trade speak; basically analysis is best evaluation of likely things and estimates are informed predictions).

Soviet Military Power had a mixture of truth and exaggerations. A lot of the distortion was that the Soviets really had those weapons, but they were so unreliable as to be almost no threat.

If you want to start reading through my series, the top level starting point will take you down to the levels of managing collection, analysis, dissemination and security. Subordinate to each of those, especially on the collection side, are the various techniques, sometimes branching down further. There are multinational examples of failures and successes scattered throughout.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

Howard, do you have a timeframe for Operation Hide and Seek, above?
This is not a happy-making story.

The Israeli journos et al know but can't tell their truths, however they see them. Any information based on details from their knowledgable/reliable sources is verboten.

For now.

I don't understand your answer. You said orininally:

Iran is that it is becoming more and more of an influential player in the region.

I'm just asking what's the Iran influence?
I'm not saying that Iran has or has not at least as much right as Israel & Saudi Arabia to have a say in what happens. What's so irrational to ask for clarification? More important question what role Iran will play after "great Bargain"?

There's more and more evidence that virtually no one at the top levels, and I include Congress, reads or believes things unless they agree with their own preconceptions.
Surprise! Most of the people (including tpm readers) only read or believe things that agree with their own preconceptions.

Every time I see something, it's less consistent. I have long been of the opinion that tight Israeli censorship is one of the worst things Israel could do for itself on the world stage, which adds some credence to the idea that the IDF isn't fully under the control of the Cabinet. Certainy in Lebanon, I'm open to the idea that there were some non-obvious reasons for their use of particular American weapons against Soviet-bloc rockets of well-known characteristics. If the IDF won't tell its rationale, however, all we have to go on is commercial satellite imagery, knowledge of equipment capabilities, evolution of US doctrine on its use, and knowledge of the opposing rockets.

In no particular order, several things. If anyone used a tactical nuclear weapon on a target, there would be radioactive by-products in the air, and seismic effects of the blast. Too many places in Europe, and probably the Middle East, would have detected those in hours to days. If conventional explosives were used on a fueled reactor, there might not be the seismic effects, but there would be airborne radioisotopes. By now, they would have reached Russia. I am not sure if Russia has an equivalent of our IONDS nuclear burst detectors on satellites, but, all in all, it would be impossible to hide an atmospheric nuclear explosion, or a reactor with the radioactive parts open to air.

One thing that crossed my mind, although it doesn't make political sense if the Syrians were negotiating, but some variant on Operation Bolo from Vietnam, where what the North Vietnamese thought was a stream of bomb-laden aircraft with a screwed-up fighter escort, just the thing for their fighters to jump. Once their fighters got in range, they found out, the hard way, that what looked like fighter-bombers with a heavy bombload were all fighters configued for air-to-air: an ambush. I don't have any good explanation why the Israelis, right now, would want to lure the Syrians into a fighter trap. The description sounded like a reverse on Bolo -- send in F-16's first, which are normally the attack birds, and the group hanging back had the more capable F-15 air-to-air versions, who would come in if the Syrians came out to play. The F-16's might have been carrying anti-radar missiles; without looking it up, I don't know if Israel has the US HARM, or a locally produced anti-radiation missile.

I can't make any sense out of the information available, but I'm also not a qualified photo-interpreter who might see things that I wouldn't in that imagery. Don't forget that there are multiple kinds of commercial satellites; some take visible light pictures, but others are multispectral that could detect heat signatures and other things that would need to be merged.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

Negotiations with the EU dragged on for 2 years over this issue and got nowhere, despite the fact the EU and the US offered Iran a very generous package of carrots to give up enrichment to include assistance building a light water reactor, economic aid and investment, and support for WTO membership. So, in essence Iran would have what they say they want (nuclear power) and the int'l community would be satisfied with their inability to divert uranium to bomb-making. All the blame for the breakdown in negotiations lies with Tehran, who have proved to be intransigent. When you have radicals running a nation, it's very difficult to get any kind of compromise out of them.

what about Turkey? They are becoming much more influential in the region as well -- even if it's reluctant. Events are forcing them to take a more active role, so it's not just Iran that is rising, and the int'l community has no problem with Turkey "exerting influence".

What makes Iran more ominous is the desire of the racial factions to export their ideology. What this translates into is murkey, but Tehran has been quietly making alliances with Shia leaders across the region in Sunni-dominated countries, and that could prove to be a destablilizing element. We're still hearing some Iranian MP's saying that Bahrain is a part of Iran. The unknown intentions of Iran make them more threatening.

I agree engagement is the right direction to go in regards to relationships with Iran. Unfortunately our present regime cannot admit they want to talk, because they need to maintain their posturing as tough and in charge, not weak, which talking and negotiating are to them. Again, I and many of the comment-ors on this article think the present government is making logical types of decisions based on the facts that exist. I'm afraid that they are driven by their agenda which includes feeding the military industrial complex any way they can. Hopefully there are some saner minds that can stay their hands in attacking Iran. What a catastrophe that would be.

This is main question. What's Iran intent?
It seems that Steve Clemons thinks that Iran leadership really want Iran to be a next Turkey, more or less. Anoter posibility is that Iran leadership wants to take over ME using Shia minorities. In this case no bargain is possible.

Yes! Isn't it curious that there are multiple stories of persons providing false information to intelligence officers and even though those stories were disproved, they still managed to work their way into the administration's decision-making process about the war and into the media stories that supported it. There are three such persons that come to mind:

  1. Curveball (mobile biolabs)
  2. Rocco Martino (yellowcake forgeries)
  3. Adnan Ihsan Saeed al-Haideri (biological, chemical and nuclear weapons)

In the latter case, an article by James Bamford about al-Haideri says that al-Haideri was coached by members of Chalabi's Iraqi National Congress, which in turn had been set up by the Rendon Group:

The fabrication might have ended there, the tale of another political refugee trying to scheme his way to a better life. But just because the story wasn't true didn't mean it couldn't be put to good use. Al-Haideri, in fact, was the product of a clandestine operation -- part espionage, part PR campaign -- that had been set up and funded by the CIA and the Pentagon for the express purpose of selling the world a war. And the man who had long been in charge of the marketing was a secretive and mysterious creature of the Washington establishment named John Rendon.

Rendon is a man who fills a need that few people even know exists. Two months before al-Haideri took the lie-detector test, the Pentagon had secretly awarded him a $16 million contract to target Iraq and other adversaries with propaganda. One of the most powerful people in Washington, Rendon is a leader in the strategic field known as "perception management," manipulating information -- and, by extension, the news media -- to achieve the desired result. His firm, the Rendon Group, has made millions off government contracts since 1991, when it was hired by the CIA to help "create the conditions for the removal of Hussein from power." Working under this extraordinary transfer of secret authority, Rendon assembled a group of anti-Saddam militants, personally gave them their name -- the Iraqi National Congress -- and served as their media guru and "senior adviser" as they set out to engineer an uprising against Saddam. It was as if President John F. Kennedy had outsourced the Bay of Pigs operation to the advertising and public-relations firm of J. Walter Thompson.

There is a pattern here, and it seems it is being repeated in the buildup to our new war against Iran. How many of the many claims about the Iranian threat can we believe at this point?

The PR firm that's pushing for a war with Iran is Benador Associates. Elena Benador, the firm's owner, has admitted to planting a false story about a new Iranian law requiring Jews in Iran to wear yellow insignia, reminiscent of Nazi Germany. The story was completely made up, but rightwing news media ran with it. Both Jim Lobe at Asia Times (The Andean condor among the hawks) and Larry Cohler-Esses at the Nation (Bunkum From Benador) have written articles about Benador, exposing their lies. They're worth reading. 

“The healthy man does not torture others — generally it is the tortured who turn into torturers.” ~~ C. G. Jung

You make an interesting point, if you will forgive a slight digression into intelligence procedures. Unfortunately, there's relevant information on what would be the raw reports and preliminary analyses, which could help understand when questionable interpretations got into the process. I would not expect to see this documentation made public but, for example, review by qualified staff of a Congressional committee makes sense.

I refer here to the general process of source and report rating, discussed in my article intelligence collection management. This link may just take you to the main article; if it does, scan down to "Ratings by the Collection Department".

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

The real reason why the US can't offer any grand bargains to Iran is because of the influence-peddling of the Pro-Israeli Lobby (link):

The real threat that Iran poses to Israel is that Iran and the US may start to get along, thus undermining Israel's strategic value to the US and creating an obstacle to Israel's regional ambitions. Promoting emnity between the US and Iran also gives the pro-Israeli lobby a reason to exist, even though it is contrary to broader US interests.

And so we'll "shock and awe" (aka terrorize) them into being "free" by sending them to Gitmo where we'll waterboard them.

Utter Nonsense.

The "generous package" that the EU-3 offered to Iran was laughed at by independent analysts and other EU-3 diplomats as "a lot of gift wrapping around a pretty empty box" (link) Giving up enrichment means that Iran would forever be reliant on the good graces of others to power its economy.

The US deliberately torpedoed the EU3-Iran talks (link):


Clearly incapable of compelling the US to budge, the European strategy has ever since been to procrastinate on the talks in the hope that Iran would fail to call the EU’s bluff, while searching for an exit strategy that would enable the EU to pass the blame on to Iran.

Note that during the Iran-Eu3 talks, Iran suspended enrichment and allowed more stringent IAEA inspections that it was legally obligated to permit - and still no evidence of a nuclear weapons program was found. Iran only withdrew from the negotiations after the EU-3 violated the terms of the negotiations by moving the goalposts (link) when it demanding that Iran's "voluntary, non-legally binding" suspension of enrichment become permanent and obligatory.

In short, Iran already tried suspending its enrichment program and negotiating - and was cheated. Since then, the Iranians are the ones who have made generous offers (such as placing additional limits on their nuclear progra to ensure that it can't even theoretically be used to make bombs, or their 2003 peace offer) that the US has refused to even acknowledge.

Mightn't it help if Iran stopped threatening Israel's existence as a Jewish state?

I suppose that depends on the credibility of the threat. When Khruschev told the US "we will bury you", a rhetorical threat using a Russian idiom of which a better translation would be "Our system will outlive yours. We will be at your funeral." He first said this in 1956, which was hardly the most dangerous part of the Cold War, but the USSR of the time was a credible threat to the US, with demonstrated nuclear weapons on bombers (and possibly submarines) that could reach the US.

We did not immediately demand that the Soviets disarm. When there was a proxy war in Hungary, we did nothing.

Now, Israel receives a rhetorical threat from a man who, as opposed to Khruschev, does not directly command his country's armed forces, which says, much as Khruschev, "Out system will outlive yours. Yours will disappear from the pages of history", the response from Israel and the US is to treat this as an existential and immediate threat to Israel. Iran has no current capability to attack Israel in any serious way. In perhaps 5-10 years, if they aggressively pursue nuclear weapons, they might have a limited number of weapons, certainly far less than the stockpile of Israel, which is estimated to have the third or fourth largest number of nuclear weapons (kind of a tossup with Britain, which has more if it could sortie all of its missile subs, rather than the one usually on patrol.

Further, the Supreme Leader of Iran, who does have operational control of their military, issued a fatwa including the phrase, "Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued the fatwa that the production, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam".

Now, how much of the threatening is rhetoric and how immediate is that threat, by Cold War standards? I don't know how old you are, but I remember "ducking and covering" during the Cuban Missile Crisis, on the edge of a primary target. As a result of documents declassified around 1990 (I can dig up the link but don't have it at hand), nuclear war was much closer then than the US realized. Among the military options under active consideration was a large amphibious invasion. The Soviet commander on the island had several tactical nuclear weapons, mounted on FROG artillery rockets, and he had predelegated release authority to use them against invading US troops.


--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

(Zionist-talk decoding: "Existence as a Jewish state" = ethnically cleansing non-Jews to create an apartheid state.)

Mightn't it help if Israel stopped expropriating Palestinians lands, formally gave up on creating "Greater Israel", acknowledged the internationally-recognized Right of Return of millions of Palestians driven from their homes, called off their warmongering lobbyists in Washington DC, and stopped threatening the Mideast with the nukes?

Who is a threat to whom? WHo has the real nuclear missiles pointed at whom?

Mightn't it help if Iran stopped threatening Israel's existence as a Jewish state?
The issue is not what Iran is doing now, the issue is what changes in Iran behavior are expected as the result of the Grand Bargain.

To get the full context of Leverett's testimony, one might read this month's Esquire article about he and his wife, both of whom worked within the Bush administration and who found no willingness to cooperate with Iran post 9/11. In fact, Iran was bending over backwards to assist the US in going after AQ; efforts that were rebuffed with an arrogant dismissal. Cheney and Rummy always vetoed any such offers of assistance. Leverett and Mann are currently under threat by their own government for exposing this.

Whatever theological or political differences the US & Iran may have, it seems to me that - despite all rhetoric to the contrary - the Bushies are more interested in keeping the American public in fear (including those who were once on their team,) than reducing the temperature in the Middle East.

If anyone can come up with a logical reason for a policy that dismisses help in tackling what we're told is "the number one threat against America," please tell me. I'm all ears.

Iran is already dependent on free trade for the fuel it needs for it's economy, and nuclear energy will not change this dynamic. We live in an interdependent world, and Iran is far more energy independent than most other nations. That argument is bogus. The package was significant despite your cynicism.

it all comes down to trust, abdul. Here is a government that only ackonwledged their clandestine program after they were outed by political opponents. They also denied they were arming Hezbollah all the way up to the Israeli war, then did a 180 and admitted they were arming Hezbollah, when they figured it was in their interests. Do you want to see nukes in the hands of Iranian radicals and then proliferated to God knows who else? This is the central question, because that is exactly where the mullahs are going, and the int'l community (including Russia and China) are not fooled at all.

was there any indication of what Iran wanted in return for their help? That could be a factor.

Pure clarification: to what clandestine program do you refer?

As far as nuclear weapons being in the hand of Iranian radicals, first, I want to see solid evidence that Iran is not only working on legitimate nuclear programs, but on a weapons program. I'd certainly like to hear how that relates to their Leader's fatwa against it.

If they were developing nuclear weapons, which I am not convinced they are doing, I am not convinced they will proliferate. I certainly am not happy to see a massive and undeclared nuclear arsenal in the hands of an increasingly militant Israeli government, and might actually see MAD stability developing. Nevertheless, I haven't yet seen any technical evidence that suggests Iran is actively pursuing a credible nuclear weapons capability.

If you have technical specifics, please bring them up. A relatively small uranium enrichment capability is not a bomb factory. I'd actually be more concerned with what they are doing with plutonium, but that also doesn't seem close to weaponization.

--
Howard

*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

getting intelligence out of police states is very difficult as you know, although we do have a lot of defectors making these claims. Unless you've got access to highly classified intel you have to make indirect assumptions. Russias refusal to finish their joint project, and as it has recently been reported extraction of their experts should be carefully studied. Their intel should be presumed to be much better than ours, and despite other ties to Iran, Putin does not want a nuclear-capable Iran.

Other nations like Egypt are already making noises about acquiring nuclear energy. When was this ever an issue, before Iran started down this road? Proliferation will happen in the Middle East, if Iran is allowed to enrich.

Maybe they just want all that enriched uranium for domestic use -- maybe they don't. Their stubborn refusal to suspend the process until a settlement is negotiatied is a red flag. There is no burning need to get these reactors up and running. I'm not willing to bet the security of my family on the good will of radical leaders in Iran.

First, let me speak generally to proliferation, as with Egypt. This is a matter of legitimate concern, not for any specific country.

The mechanisms for verification and for avoiding between the US and Russia are quite good. In addition to the "national means of technical verification", there are liaison teams, 24/7, in one anothers' strategic warning centers, with their own communications back to their national command authorities.

Second, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is showing signs of age, and suffering from the same structural problem as the UN Security Council: the five privileged members reflect the victor of WWII, rather than current strategic balances. Contrast that economically to the G-8. Contrast to the list of powers with significant nuclear arsenals.

Add to those contrasts the reality that after the "Axis of Evil" speech, Iraq, but not North Korea, was threatened. I won't single out the Bush Administration for unwise policies driven by a speech, as FDR's "Unconditional Surrender" policy extended the war with Japan, at least by a few months with a lot of killing.

I propose that the NPT be amended to allow additional states to join as declared nuclear powers: definitely India, Israel and Pakistan, with North Korea a questionable issue. This assumes they start working with nonproliferation and arms reduction, and just might deter states, such as Egypt or Iran, from saying they have to have their own nuclear weapons.

Israel's open secret of nuclear capabilities is, if there is a true nuclear development program in Iran, one of the drivers to the latter. I am not calling on Israel to disarm. I am, however, calling on them to declare. In return, I would have the US offer them several things that could be stabilizing in the area:

  • Mutual liaison in warning centers. A hotline already exists, known as HAMMER RICK.

  • Permissive Action Links, and the other control mechanisms to reduce the probability of an accidental or rogue nuclear release

  • Silo superhardening techniques, and, if necessary, help on SLCMs, to establish an invulnerable second-strike deterrent. I won't say that MAD is a goal for a multipower Middle East, but it could be better than the uncertainties.


  • All of these could certainly be offered to India and Pakistan. I would support amending the NPT to allow those three states to join as declared powers, as part of an overall program of making other states more comfortable about not needing their own nuclear weapons programs.

    To address your specific posting, yes, I know a great deal about getting intelligence, although I wouldn't call Iran a police state compared with many others. This is not to say we have good HUMINT; we don't seem to have much of that anywhere, but there may be ways of developing that through very careful alliances and information exchanges, as seems to be happening for counterterror with the ASEAN states.

    I have not heard anything specific from you to suggest a nuclear weapons program is underway, or, indeed, if there were such an Iranian program, how it could threaten you or your family. Would you mind commenting on what general part of the country in which you live, or major city? I could make some more meaningful observations with that informaiton.

    How familiar are you with the steps that have to happen in order to have deliverable nuclear weapons? Enrichment is not necessarily a red flag. There are other things that are more of a red flag, such as plutonium reprocessing being at least a yellow one, and you aren't being specific about which "reactors" you mean. There are other things they might be doing that would be red flags. It would make for more of a discussion if I knew the level of technical detail at which you are comfortable discussing, rather than generic fear and "red flags".

    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    I favor Russias idea of an int'l enrichment center to supply fuel to new countries wanting nuclear power, under the auspices of the IAEA. This could eliminate a lot of potential catastrophe in 3rd world countries. Living with a nuclear Pakistan is dangerous enough right now.

    If Nejad is correct Iran has 3,000 centrifuges spinning which can produce enough uranium over time to produce weapons, and there are reports of secret sites dug into mountains and below ground. Again, unless you're looking at high level intel, you can't address specific tech details.

    North Korea is a threat, because they have enough conventional missiles to destroy Seoul within 10 minutes. (even without nuclear weapons) This gives them a lot of leverage to make demands, and it has made it impossible to weaken the regime to the point of collapse, which would be of huge benefit to the citizens who suffer under the cruel regime.

    The same would happen to Iran. A nuke would give them a card to play to get what they want -- or else. Not to mention the constant promise to "share" nuclear technology with other Islamic countries. Who can be certain of what that means.

    The MAD Cold War safeguards do not exist with Iran, nor could they be considered reliable, when you are dealing with a government that does their dirty work through proxy organizations, while denying any involvement. Add to that a very real possiblity of a counter-revolution in that country in the next 20 years. Imagine radicals with nukes faced with being driven from power. What would they do? I don't know, and neither do you. That is the point. When it comes to nukes, if you're wrong once, the consequences can be catatstrophic.

    If Nejad is correct Iran has 3,000 centrifuges spinning which can produce enough uranium over time to produce weapons, and there are reports of secret sites dug into mountains and below ground. Again, unless you're looking at high level intel, you can't address specific tech details.
    There is enough known about centrifuge capability to know their production capability, unless there is a radical breakthrough in what I assume are Zepp centrifuges, that the usual rule of thumb is that the number to produce weapons-grade uranium for "several" bombs is on the order of tens of thousands. I can only say "several" because the efficiency of the bomb design will influence the amount of fissionables needed.
    Iran would need a missile system to deliver the weapons to any plausible target. Plutonium miniaturizes better than uranium, so I'd be much more concerned with their capability in this area rather than uranium enrichment. Further, it is not possible to hide a long-range missile development program, which, rather by definition, has to take place in the open, and will be detected by such things as the staring infrared nonimaging sensors on the DSP satellites.
    North Korea doesn't even need missiles to destroy Seoul; unguided rockets and artillery tubes are sufficient.
    I'm hearing a lot of fear, undertainty and doubt in your arguments, such as
    When it comes to nukes, if you're wrong once, the consequences can be catatstrophic.
    This is equally true with Select Agents in biological research. I've been hands-on in a biocontainment facility. There are agents around that could be catastrophic. We haven't stopped research as a result.
    The MAD Cold War safeguards do not exist with Iran, nor could they be considered reliable, when you are dealing with a government that does their dirty work through proxy organizations, while denying any involvement.
    You're going to have to justify this a lot more specifically before it comes across as plausible. First, the MAD situation would exist vis-a-vis Israel and missile-delivered weapons. Second, the isotopic signature of a nuclear weapon can be tied reasonably well to a particular production design, so I'm not willing to agree that a proxy could use a weapon and Iran, if it produced it, could plausibly deny all responsibility.
    You are still speaking in more generality than is found in open-source literature about nuclear proliferation and risks. Try some specific scenarios rather than fearmongering, and then there's something to discuss.
    "Who can be certain" is fearmongering. What do you propose, then, if Iran won't go for a Russian program? Direct attack?
    You keep speaking of "a nuke". Details, please, to the level of detail that commonly is discussed in arms control circles. General design type (e.g., uranium gun, plutonium implosion: basic compression, linear implosion, levitated pit, beryllium reflector, tungsten-rhenium drivers, etc.). Yield. Weight. Delivery method.
    No one reasonably informed of the technology can comment on anything as vague as "a nuke". Vagueness turns into fear, and I am concerned that this Administration could turn fear into a preventive war. -- Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    According to Mann, the Iranians had no pre-conditions. They wanted to help and had a lot of valuable information and insights. They were concerned about the impact of the 9/11 attacks, and saw it as an opportunity to change the dynamic between the US and Iran for the first time in 25 years. Mann said she believed them.

    Certainly I'll forgive the digression, but I hope you'll forgive me if I don't follow up on it (I guess I want to digress from your digression. :-))

    Rather than the technical aspects of intelligence policy and procedures, what interests me more is the political implications. Yes, I realize there must be policies and procedures in place that aim to prevent political manipulation of intelligence, and I applaud your efforts in that realm, but will any of that really matter in the face of a very definite effort such as that of this administration to cherry-pick the evidence anyway, and/or, what's worse, to have a hand, albeit indirectly perhaps, in planting it?

    I'm curious whether you see the same sort of pattern that I do. Does it not seem curious that we have not one, not two, but three stories of hapless individuals who were completely discredited early on, yet whose information was rehabilitated as it were (I didn't mention earlier that al Haideri failed a polygraph prior to the dissemination of the info he provided in the U.S. media). We know that one of these individuals, rather than being merely a "hapless" applicant for a visa," was in fact recruited and coached by the INC (al Haideri), and that the forgeries provided by another individual (Martino) were augmented by additional information that could only have come from SISMI (Italian intelligence) itself.

    Some of what I cited above is a discussion of the well-funded effort by the first Bush administration to engage in an overseas PR effort to dislodge Saddam. It's illegal for the U.S. to engage in such propaganda efforts domestically, but in our world of global media, this seems to be a way to skirt the law, as stories planted in various international media outlets are almost immediately picked up by the U.S. press. It's not only the things that the administration was saying that led us to war in Iraq, after all, but the media played a significant part, by shaping internal attitudes about the war.

    Do you, Howard, have any knowledge of any of the political aspects of all this? Are you familiar with the activities of the Rendon Group, or of Benador Associates? What do you think about them?

    I'm deeply concerned that a PR effort similar to the one that convinced Americans that the war with Iraq was a terrific idea is now being directed toward a new war with Iran. I wholeheartedly agree with Steve's points about negotiation, but if such a PR effort manages to convince the public that Iran is evil incarnate, it won't much matter, will it?

    “The healthy man does not torture others — generally it is the tortured who turn into torturers.” ~~ C. G. Jung

    Without digressing too far from your digressing from my digression, let me make what I believe to be a pertinent point: Administrations such as this one would be less likely to be able to cherry-pick evidence if there were some level of independent review of intelligence products. I believe that review realistically has to be in the Legislative Branch, and the examples of GAO and CRS suggests that whether or not the Administration and one or both Houses are under the same party, a professionalized review organization can sound some sort of alarm.

    It is, however, an interesting question if, hypothetically, the White House and Congress were all under the same party, and the review shop found that a conclusion was cherry-picked. Let me assume that this shop will not leak, but will provide the alert, at a minimum, to the "Big 8". Would the behavior of Congress be any different if they were not dependent on the executive branch interpreting the need? For a review shop to work, I don't believe even a minority member could release the review report; this is a very different situation than making CRS reports available.

    Would a minority member have the courage to introduce a resolution indicating that there is reason to doubt an Administration proposal, based on independent review? Would this give the Congress, regardless of party, any backbone?

    I've heard of the groups you've mentioned but I can't say I'm that familiar with precisely what they have done. My sense is that enough people are looking at the political side, so I've been spending more of my time on the intelligence side.

    There's some truth, I believe, to the title and premise of William Colby's autobiography, Honorable Men. At some point, one has to trust the intelligence services to be largely composed of honorable men and women -- but in both the White House and Congress, the motto of "trust but verify" also applies.

    If there is no verification of PR efforts, or intelligence that might be used to drive them, I'm afraid for the Republic.

    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    At some point, one has to trust the intelligence services to be largely composed of honorable men and women -- but in both the White House and Congress, the motto of "trust but verify" also applies.

    I have no firsthand knowledge of the intelligence services, and I hope that what I wrote earlier didn't sound like a wholesale indictment of them. That wasn't my intention. My understanding is that there were many very honorable persons in the intelligence services who risked their jobs over some of this stuff. The problem appears to have come primarily from higher, more politicized layers.

    If there is no verification of PR efforts, or intelligence that might be used to drive them, I'm afraid for the Republic.

    Me too. 

    “The healthy man does not torture others — generally it is the tortured who turn into torturers.” ~~ C. G. Jung

    But.... isn't that why all those grandma's from Nebraska get frisked at the airport...? it's also why you have to throw out your hand cream before going through security, and it's why the gov't monitors e-mails and phone calls, and has a list of over 700,000 terrorists. including Cat Stevens....

    Satellite photos don’t lie
    In response, I shall offer my favorite description of statistics, as like a bikini: what they reveal is suggestive, but what they conceal is vital.
    There are quite a few variables in taking a satellite photograph. For some purposes, a straight-down view is most informative. In other cases, a picture from an angle is more informative and gives more three-dimensional perspective. Some of the WWII deception photographs set up to make credible German double agents' reports of damage to a factory exploited the British knowledge of German photographic technique: it would be straight down, so it was quite possible to paint a literal canvas with a blasted factory, spread it over the roof, allow the pictures to be taken, and then removed and everyone went back to work.
    In practice, many satellite photographs cover a wide area, and zoom in on areas of interest in a subsequent pass, perhaps from a different angle.
    Some basic recon photographs are black and white, but let's assume they are in color. Something that is green in visible light might look quite different to an infrared-spectrum sensor, which can differentiate painted green camouflage from chlorphyll.
    The area around the immediate image needs to be examined, in various visible and invisible light spectra. If it's a factory or a reactor, for example, it should be a heat source. If the target is not radiating heat, and the construction does not suggest massive insulation, it may be a decoy.
    Especially if one can fly into the area with an aircraft or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), there are various radar techniques that can effectively look through walls. The images won't be as sharp as a photograph, but by the time some heavy duty computer graphics superimpose visual light photography, thermal sensing, imaging radar, etc., there starts to be much more information than you can get from Google Earth.
    While there are commercial multispectral earth observation satellites, which do take infrared pictures, I don't know of any news organizations that is doing the correlation between their imaging and a photograph.
    Believe me, I'm not a qualified imagery interpreter. I just know enough of the disciplines involved to be able to state the problem fairly well. -- Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    Brook.

    About those 3000 centrifuges and other spinning......Israelis who write commentary are in general freer to write about certain things security related than those in the news sections. Here's an Israeli perspective worth taking note of published in the opinion section of Ynet news:

    "Iran still far from bomb

    Despite optimistic declarations, Iranians facing numerous technical problems

    Ronen Bergman
    Published: 11.08.07, 18:23 / Israel Opinion

    On Wednesday, Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that 3,000 uranium-enrichment centrifuges are now operational, but Israeli intelligence officials have cast great doubt on the veracity of this claim. The officials say that as a result of a wide array of malfunctions, Iran is still a long way away from reaching the point of no return; that is, acquiring very high level uranium enrichment capabilities that would be sufficient to produce nuclear weapons.

    About a year ago, Iran inaugurated its experimental uranium enrichment site at Natanz. This facility is an underground site that houses 3,000 centrifuges. According to Israeli intelligence sources and foreign reports, Iran has encountered technical difficulties in connecting the centrifuges and operating them at high speed – which is required in order to enrich uranium at a high level. Iran is also reportedly facing severe problems related to wear and tear.

    Six months ago, CBS reported on a series of mysterious malfunctions at Natanz that resulted from the supply of flawed components, which exploded upon their installation by foreign companies that in fact worked on behalf of the American intelligence establishment and “its allies.”

    In another area in Natanz, the Iranians started to build another underground enrichment facility expected to comprise 30,000 to 50,000 centrifuges.

    Iran is indeed advancing, all the time, in its uranium enrichment project, but even once the centrifuges work as they should it would take a long time to produce the material needed for a nuclear bomb. Iran is still very far away from the point of no return declared by President Ahmadinejad.

    However, despite of the above, a uniformity of interests has surprisingly emerged among Iran, Israel, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). All of them are interested in presenting the Iranian nuclear project’s technological progress as more advanced than it actually is in reality.

    Israel wishes to warn the world about the danger, enhance the sense of threat, and stress that we are at the eleventh hour. However, we must recall that from as early as 2001, Israel repeatedly warned the US that Teheran is “six months away” from reaching a “technological threshold” that would provide it with sufficient know-how to produce a bomb.

    Provocative and arrogant

    Iran is careful not to cross the line and become a pariah state like North Korea, but it’s unwilling to renounce its aspirations for nuclear weapons. The delay tactics were meant to put off the sanctions, but now that they have been imposed, Tehran shifted to the next phase. It confesses to, provocatively and arrogantly, scientific achievements that have not yet been achieved due to a basic assumption that any agreement to be signed in the future will use the point reached by Iran as a point of reference.

    Therefore, Iran wishes to advance as fast as possible technologically, and start the negotiations from there.

    The IAEA chief, a very unpopular figure in Israel, has been making a series of declarations, some of them contradictory, on the matter. Basically, ElBaradei claims that Iran is three to eight years away from a bomb, and that it is no longer possible to stop its nuclear project. However, he did not find any proof that Tehran is indeed attempting to produce a bomb. He has not ruled that Iran is engaged in prohibited actions, but at the same time he is prompting the world to come up with a quick diplomatic solution.

    According to ElBaradei, Iran has already reached the point of no return, and therefore the American demand to end Iranian uranium enrichment must be relinquished in favor of a compromise between the sides."
    http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3469234,00.html

    There are Israelis who are realists and view the propects for wars in the region a potential existential long-threat to Israel's existance. Many are from a security/defense background who are retired and in private industry, thintanks and the like. Writers such as Ronen Bergman, above, have a career on the security beat and no doubt know some people.

    That info about the bad parts exploding in Natanz centrifuges being a joint operation is interesting. It was pretty clever, but wouldn't it have been even more clever to have continued to have access for as long as possibe, instead of showing your hand so soon?

    Closed THAT little wormhole inside, dincha?

    I certainly hope that the timing wasn't associated in any way with Mrs Wilson's brief instead of someone's eager inability to plan and wait.

    Just imagine what Israel's OFEK7 can do.

    Starting guess when? another regional electronic phenomenon caused customers of Israeli satellite tv co "YES" to go ballistic because their signals were grossly affected by somethingorother and the co. wasn't responding to the growing complaints in a timely manner.

    "YES" got the government involved who discovered that it was the German UNIFL naval blockade's radar causing the problems. They later added the Dutch UNIFL spyship radar as another likely cause and eventually settled on them as the culprit. The Dutch were surprised, did due diligence and had their system(s) checked out: which they did. The Israelis were not impressed and the Dutch are not pleased.

    I'm bemused over author B.Michael acerbic stressing of the lack of physical infrastucture indicating any security/defensive measures taken to serve what some (Syrians and Lebanese?) are calling the "Box on the Euphrates".

    How important are these details, Howard? What difference does it make what kind of nuke Iran has to the minds of regional and global leaders? Was the type of weapon North Korea developed really an issue of debate? No, the issue was they had a nuclear weapon. At that point, even China had had enough. They didn't want to see an arms race in their back yard, which is exactly what would have happened.

    It's not fear-mongering to reach a conclusion that Iran will eventually reach the technological level necessary to produce some kind of bomb. How do we know? Because other regional leaders are already making noises about nuclear programs.

    An Iranian program, unchecked, is going to result in a response from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and many other cash-rich smaller nations there. This is not a fantasy or irrational fear. It is a reality.

    Your usual rational analysis seems somewhat blind on this issue.

    Well, it's a little hard to answer you, Brook. If the idea is to panic whenever anyone makes noises about nuclear weapons, I suppose it's irrelevant if anyone knows anything about the subject.

    In the case of North Korea, no one wanted an arms race, but North Korea was also one hell of a lot farther along than Iran, was directly saber-rattling at (non-nuclear) Japan and South Korea, and there were specific countermeasures that could be taken. It was relevant that their long range missile exploded, IIRC, before it hit 2 minutes of its flight bath.

    I do consider it fear-mongering when Iran is not showing any smoking-gun equivalents to a serious weapons (i.e., warhead and delivery system) program. As far as your argument that other countries are making noises, show me that they are doing more than making noise, and I might be more concerned. Mark Twain used to tell a story about a man who started a rumor of a gold strike in Hell, and, finally, he saw so many people going there, he decided to go himself.

    Until Israel declares its nuclear arsenal and, along with India and Pakistan, takes part in nuclear arms control, there is going to be noisemaking. An analysis of the correlation of forces, and knowing the actual capability of single-stage nuclear weapons, suggests that the capability of any of these nations would be minimal.

    Rather than trying to ban programs, where the genie is out of the bottle, I'm more concerned about finding ways to make the situation more stable -- and, in some cases, that may involve variants on MAD. It definitely involves being sure countries with nuclear weapons programs get positive control technology. It means revising the NPT so it addresses realities of power, not the WWII Big Five.

    I am personally far more worried about threats from the US either being biological, or deliberate failures being caused in our chemical industry. Credit where credit is due; DHS recently has started being proactive in chemical safety.

    It's rather hard to debate you when you want to talk about noisemaking and I feel it's necessary to talk about capability.

    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    Capability means nothing in terms of the political reality in the Middle East, Howard. You have to think like a political leader in the region, and they are not going to sit around waiting for the most intimate details of Iranian nuclear plans to take action.

    Here are two links of MANY that are out there backing up my point. Iran is pushing a drive for nuclear power across the region.

    http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/11/15/europe/nuke.php
    http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007%5C11%5C04%5Cstory_4-11-2007_pg4_10

    You may be thinking too rationally, which is where the disconnect lies. I'm looking at the big picture, based on analysis of how Middle East leaders will react to a nuclear Iran. It may not matter at this point whether Iran is actively trying to build a bomb or not; they have now made nuclear technology a status symbol in the region. It's interesting that Arab countries have lived with the reality of a nuclear Israel, yet cannot seem to stomach a nuclear Iran. It's become a race to see who is really the most progressive nation to lead the Islamic world.

    Proliferation is only one genie Iran will release from the bottle. There are several others. You seem to want to wait until there is no possibility at all of keeping a lid on this problem. I favor action now as opposed to a great deal of uncertainty later.

    lally my post above addresses the very real concern that Iran is going to spark a regional arms race or at least a regional enrichment race that could lead to arms production.

    This is a very difficult political decision to make. You have some capability at the present time to set back Iran's program for years. Do you use it or do you continue the diplomatic course, knowing Iran is not going to stop enrichment and will eventually have enough material to make a bomb?

    The idea of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and a host of other very upopular governments that can be overthrown at any time in possession of the world's most dangerous weapons has got to keep a lot of analysts up late at night. You're talking about a dozen mini-Pakistans out there.

    Proliferation is only one genie Iran will release from the bottle. There are several others. You seem to want to wait until there is no possibility at all of keeping a lid on this problem. I favor action now as opposed to a great deal of uncertainty later.
    (knuckles brow) Y'r worship, since a rogue and peasant slave such as I cannot get beyond rationalities, would your worship be so good as to:
  • Confirm you are opposed to any Arab country (not that Iran is one, which may be part of the point) getting more nuclear capability, regardless of their rights under the NPT and IAEA protocols, which specifically allow peaceful nuclear power and research
  • Identify the djinn to be released by which events,
  • Specify, in actionable terms, precisely what action you want to be carried out now. You don't need a full Air Tasking Order, just a general idea of what is to be destroyed, by what, when, and what defensive measures are needed elsewhere.
  • Oh -- capability means quite a bit about the actual implementation of nuclear power, but your political insight seems to ignore little things like that. Again, I crave pardon for actually corrupting myself by knowing anything about nuclear engineering.

    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    Don't debase yourself by going down the sarcastic road. My point was you actually are thinking rationally, but when has rationality been a factor in a political decision made in the Middle East the past 50 years? I mean, really -- tell me. We're still talking about countries that don't even have Israel on a map of the region. They've kept Palestinians couped up for generations in refugee camps waiting on Israel to disappear.

    I agree that Iran still faces significant challenges, but it doesn't change the fact that their push forward is prompting a reaction. Regional and int'l consensus is that Iran is not trustworthy, and nobody fully believes their plea of peaceful power. This perception is the reality.

    Every government in that region survives on a patina of stability, including Iran, which is governed by a theocratic click that are resorting to more and more repressive measures to hold onto power. a counter-revolution is very possible there, which could leave a lot of highly radioactive nuclear material beyond the governments power to control. Political leaders have to consider these scenarios.

    We've just spent over $ 100 million taxpayer dollars helping Pakistan secure their nuclear facilities, and only the realtive stability of their army has kept their government from collapsing. We're talking about re-creating that dangerous scenario a dozen times over. Do you want to suggest there is no potential for danger at all under these conditions?

    Having a right to take a particular action and whether it is wise to be allowed to do so are two different things. Yes, Egypt has a right to build 20 nuclear reactors, but Mubarak's successor is far from secured, and the potential for political chaos there is high over time. So, no, I don't want Egypt to start enriching uranium, but if Sweden chose to do so -- no problem. Yes, that is hypocritical. It's also sensible.

    We've got several options short of military vis-a-vis Iran like a blockade to cut off refined gasoline. My problem with Iran is not necessarily what they are doing but who is doing it. These are individuals that believe very much in the clash of civilizations and that Western ideology has failed and should be replaced by theocracy. Nejad makes these remarks over and over, and the levers of power there are cotnrolled by those who think like this.

    I see. I am debasing myself by applying rational analysis based on specific subject matter knowledge, including nuclear weapons and peaceful nucear applications, the technology for producing it, strategic theory for the use of such weapons, and, even, some knowledge of the areas, such as Iranians not being Arab. I am being "sarcastic" because I am not succumbing, with ill-defined proposed actions, to fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD).

    Your analysis, presumably free from debasement, has a good deal of fear, but little content. Ironically, I can easily think of a number of more plausible terror scenarios than the development of deliverable nuclear weapons. Can you? Why don't you suggest a few, in sufficient detail to make it credible that you are doing more than hand-waving. Oh, I forgot, and I apologize. Suggesting analysis rather than FUD is sarcasm and debases me.

    If this be debasement, let us have more of it; half-naked jello wrestlers are optional.


    Having a right to take a particular action and whether it is wise to be allowed to do so are two different things. Yes, Egypt has a right to build 20 nuclear reactors, but Mubarak's successor is far from secured, and the potential for political chaos there is high over time. So, no, I don't want Egypt to start enriching uranium, but if Sweden chose to do so -- no problem. Yes, that is hypocritical. It's also sensible.

    Ever heard of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which the US has ratified? Interfering with the inspected, presumably peaceful, nuclear development program of Egypt, not Sweden, is a violation of the NPT, in which the declaratory powers promise to assist nondeclaratory ones with peaceful development. That development will be under IAEA supervision, and there is quite a respectable range of technologies for tamper-resistant monitoring.

    You do realize that you are suggesting, by the US stopping Egyptian ambitions, that you are proposing to abrogate the NPT? I simply wanted to confirm that you intended that, and expect the US to police the world again.

    Sorry, I'll start paying attention to you when you get more specific than fearmongering. Until then, I'll tune into George W. Bush press releases, which, clearly by occasional accident, may even contain a specific or two.

    You may consider my actions debasing, and I consider yours irrational. Fair trade? Shall we let other posters express their opinions on which is more realistic?

    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    I already said your position is the rational one. I didn't appreciate the sarcastic tone you used. It was unnecessary. You're not reading my post, and you're completely ignoring the links I've sent you to back up my position. If you want a monologue, just say so.

    My position could be construed as irrational -- because that is the way political leaders react to situations. Vladimir Putin, for example, ordering Cold War-style bomber patrols resumed, when the US announces plans to put up a shield in Europe. Is that rational? No, not if you examine all the actual technological facts re: the shield. (not to mention it's not even in place) These facts have no bearing on the reactions of political leaders.

    We flew cap patrol over NY post-9/11 for days, even though all air traffic was grounded. Was that rational?

    For that matter we kept a SAC bomber in the air 24/7 for the entire duration of the Cold War, even when there was limited threat of nuclear holocaust. Was that rational?

    You cannot discount the significance of fear (rational or not) in political decision-making. Politicians and military planners have to consider worst-case scenarios.

    You also cannot ignore the very real possiblity of radicals gaining control of any one of the governments in the Middle East. This is a political reality in that region. That kind of political instability makes the current NPT structure and IAEA authority irrelevant, in the event of a coup.

    There is an interesting article today about Nejad discussing the possiblity of enrichment in Switzerland with Arab leaders. It's interesting. If it's true, then that means Iran is shifting from their hard line -- a good thing. Stay tuned.

    For now, the proliferation of nuclear technology in the Middle East is reality, and Iran is the principle reason behind it. I've sent you links to back up this claim, and you've not responded with anything that disproves what I am saying.

    I didn't appreciate the sarcastic tone you used. It was unnecessary. You're not reading my post, and you're completely ignoring the links I've sent you to back up my position. If you want a monologue, just say so.
    I don't appreciate fearmongering from you or the Bush White House. I am reading your post, and I am reading your links. Both leave me completely unconvinced of a serious threat of a new nuclear power, versus, for example, the reality of known weapons and instability in Pakistan.
    Let me be quite explicit: I spent many years of my life under a very real threat of a major Soviet nuclear strike. The US muddled by without becoming a state with every activity governed by unilateral "security" decisions. I am specifically willing to risk what I consider to be a very low probability of a rogue nuclear attack, versus the abandonment of civil liberties and international cooperation.
    A rogue state might, with a quite efficient bomb and delivery system, be able to deliver less damage than did Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans is slowly recovering, as well as less well known parts of the Gulf Coast. I am absolutely distrustful of the Bush Administration's ability to create realistic deterrents or disaster mitigation systems, so I feel no safer by abrogating the NPT.
    I do support amending the NPT to allow India, Israel, and Pakistan to come "into the tent" as declaratory powers, with incentives to do so. I believe that Israel's secrecy about its nuclear deterrent is destabilizing the Middle East.
    We flew cap patrol over NY post-9/11 for days, even though all air traffic was grounded. Was that rational?
    Yes. If for no other reason, it provided a means of dealing with a copycat operation, without the terribly difficult problem of intercepting a specific aircraft in a busy airstream. Obviously, there were psychological benefits.
    For that matter we kept a SAC bomber in the air 24/7 for the entire duration of the Cold War, even when there was limited threat of nuclear holocaust. Was that rational?
    In general, yes. Both the US and Russia still have ballistic missile submarines on combat patrol. The basic rule of deterrence is "trust, but verify", and having an invulnerable second strike force is stabilizing.
    Bomber alert became obsolete for second strike, as submarines and land-based missiles became more reliable. The Palomares incident indicated that the risk of bomber patrols were greater than the deterrent value. Before the early sixties, bombers on continual airborne alert were the only way to ensure a survivable deterrent.
    Bombers rarely can have a role in signaling situations, which are generally obsolete. Both major nuclear powers go to great lengths to keep the other side informed.
    You also cannot ignore the very real possiblity of radicals gaining control of any one of the governments in the Middle East. This is a political reality in that region. That kind of political instability makes the current NPT structure and IAEA authority irrelevant, in the event of a coup.
    If a side were overthrown, and had IAEA-approved reactors, they require complete redesign -- easier to build from scratch -- to produce weapons-grade fissionable materials. It is not reasonable to assume that any serious bomb program could be achieved in less than several years.
    I've sent you links to back up this claim, and you've not responded with anything that disproves what I am saying.
    I have yet to see a link that contains other than FUD. Specifics, please. Oh -- they do exist, but you haven't cited any.
    I am not going to respond to nonspecific links. Produce some links with engineering detail and risk assessment, and I will respond in like manner. Irrationality exists, but, as Commander Scott used to say on the original Star Trek, "You canna disobey the laws of physics." -- Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    wait a minute. you said you wanted more proof that arab governments were doing more than just making noise about nuclear technology. i delivered.

    The issue was nuclear weapons, not nuclear technology that the Arab governments are legally entitled to do under the NPT. Show some clear evidence that they are doing weapons programs, and be aware that a conventional reactor can't be switched to making weapons-grade materials -- and a lot of other things have to happen to have a weapons program.

    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    the types of reactors to be constructed are not available yet, but it's more than co-incidental that there wasn't much talk among Arabs about nuclear technology 2 years ago, and now everybody suddenly has to have it. It is cheap on the back end, but requires enormous investment on the front end, plus you have the waste disposal problem we've yet to solve and the constant fear of another Chernobyl, if something goes wrong. Nuclear reactors would be my last choice, especially in Iran. Does it really make sense in a (fossil-fuel rich) nation criss-crossed with earthquake faults to go the nuclear route? If they wanted to be cutting edge, it seems they would be working on fusion or hydrogen power plants. I don't buy the peaceful power line for a second and neither do any of the Arab governments. If they want the option of the bomb in the future, they have to have some type of program.

    Here's a blurb from a website re: Iran's program.

    Fissile material alone does not constitute a bomb. The next steps in the process are technically demanding and costly. In the 1980s, the father of the Pakistan bomb, A. Q. Khan, cashed in on his experience by establishing an international nuclear black market. When the Libyan nuclear program was dismantled two years ago, evidence was found that he had sold Iran detailed instructions with diagrams on how to manufacture a nuclear device and build nuclear warheads for missiles. Some of these documents were released last week to the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Continued below, although the width of the margins reflect the narrowmindedness of the FUD.

    I'm not going to continue playing FUD with you. Produce some evidence of weapons programs, or I am no longer discussing this, unless you offer technical arguments -- yourself, not random links -- to support your position.


    If they wanted to be cutting edge, it seems they would be working on fusion or hydrogen power plants.

    Gee, I hope they do that soon. The US and Russia have been trying to make them work for 50 years or so. A target technical date is 2030 or so.

    I apologize for injecting rational technical data into an argument. Would you care to discuss the design and operational problems that went into Chernobyl, and the likelihood anyone is again going to use that flawed approach?

    Here's a blurb from a website re: Iran's program.

    Oh gee. An unnamed website. How reliable! Still, it actually does have some relevant data.

    Fissile material alone does not constitute a bomb.

    I believe this is a point I have been making, qualified by U-235 not lending itself to missile-sized warheads. Refined Pu-239 is needed, and a Pu-239 breeder reactor and reprocessing line is different from a power reactor.

    The next steps in the process are technically demanding and costly.

    DOH!

    In the 1980s, the father of the Pakistan bomb, A. Q. Khan, cashed in on his experience by establishing an international nuclear black market. When the Libyan nuclear program was dismantled two years ago, evidence was found that he had sold Iran detailed instructions with diagrams on how to manufacture a nuclear device and build nuclear warheads for missiles. Some of these documents were released last week to the International Atomic Energy Agency

    Diagrams are very threatening indeed. You can get paper cuts from them.

    I repeat: you need different reactors and ancillary equipment for a bomb program. Such reactors take years to build, and the construction detail is quite obvious from even commercial satellite imagery.

    Produce some imagery of such equipment under construction. Produce some evidence of bomb-specific technology, such as a hydrodynamic or hydronuclear test facility.

    Otherwise, more FUD.

    This reply brought to you by a poster placing his faith in a brutal, jack-booted regime that has lined tens of thousands of their own people up against a wall and shot them in the head. One of them who happened to be a friend of mine. If you want to construe my mistrust of the Iranian regime as narrow-mindedness, I plead guilty. You won't find many on your side of the aisle, my friend.

    Thank you, for proving better than I could express, that your objections are emotional and, as you have said, not rational.

    The Wikpedia info on AQ Khan gives you enough to ascertain that Iran is more advanced than Pakistan was when they developed their bomb -- in secret i might add. And Libya -- in secret as well, despite intelligence agencies crawling all over the Middle East.

    Dr. Goldschmidt the head of IAEA inspection team "Our experience with Libya shows that it is almost impossible for the agency to decide whether a country's nuclear intentions are peaceful or otherwise,"

    you're not arguing with me -- you're arguing with yourself, Howard. You were being stubborn for the sake of it back at post # 2. You have the intellect and rational capacity to figure out that the decisions being made in Tehran are not rational at all -- given the circumstances. Nobody is opposing Iran's "peaceful nuclear rights". The latest offer by the GCC to provide enriched uranium to Iran has been met with silence.

    You're spot on most of the time. In this case, is it possible you've let your extreme dislike of Bush cloud some judgement? Iran is not a responsible government nor a stable one, and foreign enrichment in exchange for some economic aid and financial investment in their country seems fair to me.

    I try to put myself in the very different decisionmaking shoes of the Iranians, including their loudmouth. You may or may not have seen a quantitative analysis I did some months ago, assessing an aggressive Iranian program against a conservative Israeli program, and seeing no especially sane --- which can include irrational -- Iranian program for attacking anyone.

    What's the alternative, even taking Goldschmidt at face value? Preventive, not preemptive war at anyone who seems a remote possibility? What really scares me, because I have a hell of a lot more experience in BW, is that some bunch of loons, with money and some competent people, decide nuclear weapons are not more work than they are worth, and go biologiacal.

    Tonight, I was reading some declassified CIA studies on interactions in the Middle East, mostly Arab but some Persian. There are parallels to dealing with the Japanese and to a lesser extent the Chinese, where visible criticism causes a loss of face they will die over rather than accept.

    As for rationality, I see no evidence that Iran is capable of developing, without any warnings catching it, a serious nuclear weapons program -- much less implement it. MAD is a bad analogy that has some relevance, as does CW in WWII -- everybody had at least some chemical weapons, but with the exception of Japan against China, no one used it.

    I write for Wikipedia myself -- just finished an article on "clandestine HUMINT operational techniques". I know that there is good material on Wiki, and also stuff that comes out of comic books. I've been an OSINT consultant, and, long ago, I had internal access. I'm not as convinced that it's all that possible to build a credible WMD program in complete secrecy.

    It's not just Bush and the Axis of Evil -- although I can give you very specific examples on how FDR's off-the-cuff Unconditional Surrender demand probably prolonged the war. It's Israel's aggressiveness (e.g., Lebanon), their refusal even to declare their nuclear weapons and take any stabililizing steps (second-strike deterrent can be stabilizing), and the apparent abandonment of their active SRBM/IRBM/counter rocket program.

    If I put myself, where I don't want to be, in Iranian and Palestinian shoes, I'd feel intense pressure to have a WMD program, yet my gut doesn't tell me, based on anything more than supposition, that they have a serious program. Above all, they don't seem to making any real strides to a Pu-239 production capability, a prerequisite for a real nuclear program.


    Iran is not a responsible government nor a stable one, and foreign enrichment in exchange for some economic aid and financial investment in their country seems fair to me.

    Assume this is true. It might be a fair deal by our standards, but not theirs. They don't trust the US, for good reason. Some proactive US steps, not demanding they abandon nuclear programs before sitting down, might be a pragmatic start. Pressuring Israel to declare, not disarm, would be a big help, especially if Israel could then participate in multiparty talks.
    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

    we still have some blind spots in that the IAEA has not had access to all the scientists they want to interview, nor have they had access to sensitive military sites. So, the full picture of Iran's capability is still not known, and as you say, a plutonium program would be much easier to hide.

    If reports are to be believed, Syria had some type of plutonium facility that Israel took out a few weeks ago in an air strike. One could assume Iran could have the same technology or have even been instrumental in providing it to Syria.

    Iran may not trust the US, but when the GCC and the Russians offer to supply nuclear fuel, with America totally out of the picture, this sort of mitigates that argument and forces them to come up with some other excuse.

    We've had 3 "peaceful nuclear programs" turn into atomic bombs in Pakistan and India, and a very serious effort to acquire in Libya. One has to assume the code words mean the same for Iran.

    I never said a plutonium program would be easy to hide. A plutonium breeder requires frequent material change plus chemical reprocessing. That's fairly distinctive on IMINT, and I'd hate to try to shield the reactor against thermal imagers.

    Iran has rather good reasons for considering itself an ancient culture, rather than a supplicant. I personally don't think they are actively working on a nuclear program, but, if I were in their government and Israel kept up its secrecy about its program, I might very well recommend developing nuclear weapons, probably as underwater weapons in the Med.

    --
    Howard

    *equal opportunity offense to both extremes*

    "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]

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