Why Curveball Matters
I consider the Curveball case the defining story of the pre-war intelligence fiasco. It obviously was not the sole reason that America went to war in Iraq. But if you deconstruct the intelligence given to the White House, the Congress, and the public before the war, it's clear that much of it rested on the shoulders of this one man.
Why do I say that? Because the Robb Silberman Commission concluded after investigating the case that Curveball was the principal source for all the pre-war claims about Saddam's biological weapons. Without him, the administration and its allies had no basis for it's frightening assertions about Saddam's supposed germs, toxins and viruses.
We already knew Saddam had no nuclear weapons, and wasn't close to getting them, despite claims to the contrary from Vice President Cheney and Condi Rice.
The CIA believed, and wrote, that he was years away from a working design, and had no known access to weapons-grade fissile material. More importantly, Mohammed ElBaradei, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, told the U.N. Security Council on March 7, 2003, that IAEA inspectors had found no evidence of the infrastructure, plans or programs needed to develop and build a bomb. Moreover, he disclosed that the documents provided by U.S. intelligence regarding the alleged attempt to secure uranium from Niger were "not authentic," meaning forged.
That left chemical weapons. What Robb Silberman found, and I confirmed, was the chemical weapons analysts at CIA were skeptical of the evidence they had. It was "ambiguous," one said. They were "drifting." But they knew that Saddam had built a large, robust CW program during the 1980s, while he only launched "crash" BW production in the months before the 1991 war. When the chemical analysts at WINPAC discovered that their BW colleagues were using Curveball to cite "high confidence" in Saddam's germ weapons, they shed their doubts and caveats and ramped up their conclusions.
That's why I consider Curveball key to understanding the misjudgments and mistakes that led to war.
Once Curveball's information got into classified U.S. intelligence channels, it steadily grew in importance even though his own account grew steadily weaker back in Germany.
After 9/11, analysts reacted to the growing demand for intelligence on Iraq's WMD. Like much of the country, the CIA was in a state of shock. The leaders, and the rank and file, were determined not to underplay a likely or possible threat. They threw caution aside in their efforts not to miss any of the so-called dots.
At WINPAC, the CIA's weapons intelligence center, one of the analysts literally pulled Curveball's file out of a safe and re-evaluated his claims. His account suddenly was viewed in a new light. It became a nightmarish fantasy that played on U.S. fears.
In the book, I trace how classified reports about Saddam's biowarfare program grew steadily more frightening during this period even though Curveball's information remained what it always had been: unconfirmed. And by the time we get to October 2002, the National Intelligence Estimate prepared for Congress states flatly that Iraq "has" biological weapons and the program is larger and more sophisticated than before the 1991 Gulf War.
The way they reached that conclusion was as follows: They guessed what Curveball's single mobile factory could potentially produce, even though he admitted he never saw it produce anything. They mulitplied that by the six other trucks that he said he had heard about, but told the Germans he never actually saw. They then multiplied all that with the assumption that the trucks could run six months around the clock non-stop. Why six months? It got them to their desired conclusion.
The calculation was utter nonsense - and not only because nothing in Iraq ran non-stop for six months. The supposed design for the trucks required that the fermenters and pipes be cleaned and sterilized after each production run, meaning they couldn't run non-stop. Iraq's experience with bioagent production before the 1991 war was abysmal; the failure rate was uniformly high. Most importantly, Iraq never built any mobile production units. They simply didn't exist.
In the CIA, this kind of calculation is known as a WAG - a wild assed guess. But that's what we got in the guise of intelligence.
As one senior CIA official told me, the leadership was convinced that the war was going to happen and they could "tap dance nude" on Pennsylvania Avenue and it wouldn't stop the invasion. And secondly, they were all convinced that Saddam really had WMD - and that even if Curveball was wrong or a liar, as soon as troops found the first pointy-ended cannister of nerve gas or vial of deadly germs, everyone would forget the intelligence that was wrong.
They weren't alone. The head of intelligence for the U.N. weapons inspectors then in Iraq, a Canadian, told me he was convinced Saddam had WMD. He said he knew some of the intelligence the U.N. teams were given probably was wrong; it's the nature of the business. But he said "if only five percent" was right, then they'd find the WMD. The Germans, French, Russians and other services were all feeding intel on Saddam's suspected WMD to the U.N. during that time. He said they never considered that ALL the intelligence was wrong.
In the end, however, the President and his top aides repeatedly exaggerated or mischaracterized Curveball's information. President Bush announced before the war that Iraq had built at least seven mobile factories to brew biological poisons. Again, Curveball claimed he saw only one. Colin Powell told the U.N. Security Council that an "eyewitness" described a biological accident that killed 12 people. What Powell didn't say - to be fair, what Powell insists he didn't know - was Curveball told the Germans that he had heard about the accident third hand. It was a rumor, and he had no idea if it was true.
More importantly, Powell said he didn't know at the time that the CIA had never interviewed Curveball and didn't even know his name.
Comments (14)
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~OGD~
October 25, 2007 8:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Without him, the administration and its allies had no basis for it's frightening assertions about Saddam's supposed germs, toxins and viruses."
Without Curveball, the administration and its allies would have come up with something else bogus to railroad our traumatized post-9/11 country into a war with Iraq. The Niger thing was bogus and may well have been initiated by the US. Josh is the expert on this. They would have just cooked up some other BS.
October 25, 2007 12:05 PM | Reply | Permalink
In 2004 "Curveball" was interesting, even important. But today, as tless2 implies, we're into meta-analysis. We've moved on. For the writer such a response to his efforts from potential readers must be depressing. But then again --
In his role as citizen, the reporter who "owns" a story owes a duty to his fellow citizens (and to historians) to follow up on that story and to flesh it out. Mr. Drogin has fulfilled that duty, admirably.
We can all thank him for writing the book and for appearing, here, this week.
October 25, 2007 12:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
It's really a fascinating story, and it's great to watch Bob Drogin following the twists and turn without losing the sense of what got him so excited in the first place. I keep wondering, too, how the administration would have got away with its plans (which tlees is absolutely right to say had nothing to do with any of this) without WMD. You could see them floating all at once a half dozen reasons (the horrible tyrant, the supposed link to 9/11, etc., etc.) before deciding that this is what would go over best. It was a tricky line to walk for them, too. The American people had both to be motivated by revenge and fear after 9/11 and yet be shifted over to WMD. Hard to imagine a media campaign like that succeeding without, well, the media.
So while I'm not totally in accord with tlees that they'd have moved on and sold us the war anyhow, it's of course worth his saying that they weren't motivated by this and didn't wish to be constrained by it. But it's also worth reiterating the obvious: the case for WMD should not have been a case for war, good intelligence or not. Many rational people figured that Iraq could have chemical weapons left around from years before, and the UN conscientiously investigated the possibility. But years of the familiar wasn't a case for an imminent threat; to then interrupt the UN's work contradicted the whole case; and WMD should have scared some people into opposing war, on the grounds that chemicals would then fall into the hands of others or be turned immediately against invaders and the Iraqi people themselves.
Obliging intelligence to come up with the desired answers was only part of the administration's duplicity. And yet they got away with it. Scaring Congress into backing a threat of force disguised as "helping" Blix, especially in the face of a rabid public, was the easy part. Having the entire public debate descend to the necessary level took more. It's still frightening to me how easy it was to rouse the rabble and shape the media light show fed to Americans.
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
October 25, 2007 12:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is VERY important to document exactly what was done, in terms of cooking the intel, leading up to the Iraq War and praise Mr. Drogin for his fine work. Because the administration is trying to do it again in making their case for attacking Iran. The Congress and the press needs to ask to see verification for every claim made about Iran's nuclear program. This time there needs to be proof. The Iranians are nowhere close to having a nuclear weapon and if they do it won't be until well north of 2010. We are being fed the same misinformation and lies as we were leading up to 2003.
October 25, 2007 1:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
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This appears to wrap the whole sorid Curveball affair up in a nice little tight package with a big bow on top with a card that reads, Plausible Deniability.
~OGD~
October 25, 2007 2:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
That's not entirely true. There were others. It would be more accurate to say that without Curveball, the administration would have found someone else to say the same things that the Administration wanted to hear.
October 25, 2007 2:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
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Thank you Wordie!
~OGD~
October 25, 2007 2:53 PM | Reply | Permalink
To be clear, I appreciate Bob Drogin's work. He helps us understand in more depth the runup to the war. My complaint is with Cheney/Bush and their lack of morality. It is that belief that makes me sure that the Cheney/Bush would have perpretrated another fraud. That is a criticism of them - not of Bob or his book, which I will add to my list.
October 25, 2007 2:59 PM | Reply | Permalink
Mr. Drogin: I responded quite late in one of your other threads, and later realized that since you aren't a regular poster here, there's a likelihood that you'll never see what I wrote, so let me repost it here:
You wrote:
Two questions: First, if Curveball was genuinely as hapless as he seems, doesn't it seem curious that he would tell the Germans the very thing that would make them less likely to share information with the CIA: that the equipment was German? Why would Curveball say that the equipment was German, since the existance of the mobile labs was a fantasy anyway? It just seems odd that he would add that detail; it seems to indicate a higher level of duplicity than you've elsewhere described him as having.
Second, if there was such animosity between the CIA and the BND, and a belief by the U.S. administration that the Germans had basically flubbed it by failing to catch Atta, that the information the Germans were providing would be elevated to such importance still seems to be extremely puzzling, even in light of some of the information you've provided in this thread. Yes, everyone was traumatized by 9/11, but somehow that just doesn't seem to be a sufficient explanation. Again, this seems especially questionable since a similar tale of a hapless individual (Rocco Martino, who also provided faulty information) appears at the center of the Niger documents forgeries story. (In the case of Martino, it appears likely that there was someone in SISMI (Italian intelligence) who was pushing the phony data.)
I'm also curious about where Curveball is now (and Rocco Martino as well). Have you, or any other reporter, had a chance to interview him directly?
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." ~~ Abraham Maslow
October 25, 2007 7:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks.
I don't quite follow your argument. Curveball didn't care if his story made the Germans less likely to share intelligence with the CIA. That wasn't his intention. As my book makes clear, he wasn't trying to start a war. He was trying to get political asylum.
Second, his claim that the trucks carried German equipment didn't make the Germans annoyed. It made them more interested - and worried.
Most importantly, I found that Curveball didn't lie about that. He worked with three trailers that carried German equipment. I've seen photographs of them, read the files, and interviewed the U.N. inspectors who first found them. They were not designed to churn out deadly bioagent, however. They were part of a seed improvement program. U.S. intelligence assumed seed improvement was just a cover story, but the Iraq Survey Group determined that it was real.
The truth behind the lies here really is fascinating.
As for your second question, Curveball lives in southern Germany with his wife and son. He remains in the BND defector protection, and the BND threatened to kick him out of the program - cut off his salary, toss him out of his house, cut his insurance, remove his physical protection, etc., if he goes public. I don't know Rocco Martino's current whereabouts, but he has talked to several reporters.
October 25, 2007 8:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
...on the CIA/Cheney warbench of liars, hucksters and psychos were others, fastball, slider, sinkerball, and, a real lulu, knuckleball. Oh, and Bob..... lose the ballcap.
October 25, 2007 8:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
It must have been a sickening feeling among those analysts as they began to realize the war was on and they were still the designated fall guy. In the end they ended up dancing nude on Penn Ave anyway. Well that is what happens when you abandon professionalism for political expediency.
October 26, 2007 6:29 AM | Reply | Permalink
I guess I'm not entirely convinced by your assessment of Curveball's intentions. There are other curious things I've noticed, such as how the reason given as to why the CIA was not allowed to interview Curveball was that he hated Americans, yet your LAT article mentions that when Curveball's parents were interviewed, they said he loved Americans. I'm uneasy with the idea that Curveball was just a hapless individual whose need for asylum just happened to fit in with the need of the Bush administration and others in positions of power to justify the war.
I'd be interested in hearing whether you see any parallels between the case of Curveball and that of Rocco Martino.
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." ~~ Abraham Maslow
October 26, 2007 8:17 AM | Reply | Permalink