CURVEBALL: Spies, Lies and the Con Man who Caused a War
Thank you for inviting me to blog on TPM Cafe. My name is Bob Drogin, and I am honored to share my new book, CURVEBALL: Spies, Lies, and the Con Man who Caused a War.
I will be happy to answer your questions or respond to your thoughts over the coming week. They can range from the nature of my reporting on intelligence and national security, the bizarre story of ineptitude and fraud that I found in Curveball, and even what it's like to appear as a guest on The Colbert Report, as I did last Tuesday. (hint - he's a wild man.) So let's begin...
CURVEBALL is the story of a low level Iraqi engineer who played a unique and crucial role in the flawed decision making that led to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In many ways, I think he is the defining story of the worst intelligence failure in U.S. history, and the start of a war that has become a tragedy of epic proportions.
After the 9/11 attacks, we heard frequently that U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies "failed to connect the dots" of evidence that might have prevented the attack. But in Curveball, the CIA and other U.S. agencies literally made up the dots. They piled mistakes upon misjudgments, and miscommunications upon misperceptions, to conjure up a terrifying threat that did not exist - and never had existed. Curveball's story was a hoax, a con, and fraud, with the most understandable of goals. He wasn't trying to overthrow Saddam Hussein or start a war. He just wanted to live in Germany. He wanted a Mercedes. He wanted freedom.
He was a nobody, a schlub, a former taxi driver who told a few lies to get a visa - and instead wound up as the crucial center of the Bush administration's case for war. His is a classic story of a simple man who gets caught up in events outside his control, and winds up having an extraordinary impact on history.
So who was he? And what really happened?
Curveball was a young chemical engineer who fled Saddam's Iraq in early 1999 and made his way to Munich, where he applied for political asylum. At first, he said he had embezzled money and couldn't go back to Baghdad. But after a few weeks, he sat down with a special team of interviewers from the BND, the German equivilent of the CIA. And he began talking about what German files referred to as Biowaffen. It translates as germ weapons.
His story was simple. Curveball said he was hired out of the University of Baghdad in 1994 to work on a secret weapons program. His job, he said, was to design and install sophisticated laboratory equipment on the back of a fleet of large tractor-trailer trucks. The Iraqis would use this equipment, he said, to brew deadly microbes and toxins that they could use to build an arsenal of horrific biological weapons. Since the Iraqis could drive the trucks from place to place, he said, the rolling germ factories were easy to hide from satellites or U.N. inspectors. The early reports suggested the Iraqis had mastered the science and technology, and could produce vast quantities of dried anthrax and other deadly pathogens.
According to the Germans, Curveball said his first truck began operating in 1997 at his workplace south of Baghdad, a small warehouse compound called Djerf al Nadaf. He said similar trucks were built or hidden in six other locations. The Germans provided his story to U.S. intelligence from the start, and ultimately, the CIA and the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency filed over 100 intelligence reports based on Curveball's information.
His information largely fit expectations at the CIA. During the 1990s, several U.N. inspectors had speculated about these so-called mobile labs. They launched raid after raid to search for them, but never found any evidence. The failure to find any proof only convinced the CIA that the trucks must be so vital that Saddam had gone to the utmost lengths to hide them. Bioweaons analysts at the CIA were absolutely convinced that mobile germ production facilities were Saddam's most important weapon. Curveball's account only confirmed what they already believed.
Partly as a result, no one in U.S. or German intelligence sought to confirm or verify Curveball's story. It was, frankly, too good to check.
I'll pick up the outline tomorrow. In the meantime, I hope to hear from you.
Bob Drogin
www.curveballbook.com
















I just bought the book Thurs at B&N and am looking forward to reading it. I do have one question - was "Curveball" interviewed on 60 Minutes? I remember an interview with Iraqi "political refugees" in which all sorts of extravagent claims were made about Hussein's weapons systems.
October 22, 2007 1:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
I guess I should go out and buy the book and read it first, but a quibble with the title. Curveball was used as a means to an end; the die was already cast, only excuses were needed, any real attempt at intellligence was impeded, and there's no way I'm blaming him for the war.
I know. The publisher dictated the title. Just saying.
October 22, 2007 2:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
Do you know if anyone was assuming they were a slurry preparation system, along the lines of a more flexible version of what the US first weaponized, a slurry with limited shelf life? The US version was Franciscella tularensis, but, in principle, a slurry is easier than a solid aerosol.
Since the UN teams had found missiles of prohibited range, it struck me that Saddam's priority, if he had any program at all, was the delivery systems -- yet there was this tunnel vision about the payloads.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
October 22, 2007 2:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
"... the con man who caused the war"
compares with
"... the whore that caused Johny to loose his virginity".
And shocking news
"... the whore did not truly love Johny, she did it for the money".
To sane people, bioweapon laboratories on wheels we always preposterous. Hard to design, run and avoid accidence, but damn easy to explain why they were not found. Even though we claimed to be able to track the trucks from satelites.
October 22, 2007 2:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
Greatest intelligence failure? Baloney!
The CIA is a bureaucracy. It's primary purpose is to find ways to stay in business and to generate annual bonuses for its upper management. And it does this by providing the President with whatever information or actions the sitting President, at any particular time, may demand, or desire.
"Curveball" was a godsend.
Since the BND won't talk to anyone but the CIA, the Company had an exclusive. And because the CIA was able to get the BND to agree that Curveball wouldn't be interviewed by the CIA, the Company had ultimate deniability.
"Curveball" was a coup -- one of the CIA's greatest.
October 22, 2007 2:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
If you look at the detailed history of actual bioweapons, it is not absurd. The first weaponized US system involved preparing a liquid slurry of the agent at Ft. Detrick in Maryland, where it would then be flown to an advanced bomber base, and used within the 48 hour limit of the preparation staying viable. This may seem clumsy, but if one actually considers how difficult aerosol powder delivery can be, it's not so absurd.
Since this development was during the Korean War, I was always amused that the North Korean "evidence" included everything except the quite distinctive bomblet of the only BW then in the US inventory. The North Koreans did exhibit some things that would have been consistent with Japanese weapons used in China.
Does "sane" exclude people with an actual knowledge of weaponization? I find a truck-mounted preparation far saner than what the US was doing in the early fifties. That doesn't mean that I thought Saddam had biological weapons or could deliver them.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
October 22, 2007 3:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
Curveball -as Voltaire said about God - if he does not exist it would be necessary to invent him. Having a goof like Curveball available made the WHIG's marketing campaign for war that much easier.
October 22, 2007 3:26 PM | Reply | Permalink
Hey guys, the title is almost right; it should be
"The Con Men Who Caused the War ...and Their (Now Absurdly and Disgustingly Wealthy) Helpers"
The Con Men: Cheney and Bush (in that order)
Their helpers: The list is endless, but Curveball is on it (not even at the top, however)
Jan
October 22, 2007 3:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
Hi Bob,
Got a lot of questions, but will limit it to just a few.
Was Curveball an actual chemical engineer or simply a cab driver with an active imagination?
Had he actually worked at the site that he said had the mobile labs?
Who did the initial screening of Curveball?
They cranked out 100 IIRs which is impressive, from a guy that didn't really know what he was talking about? Is their any indication that he was coached?
October 22, 2007 3:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
No, Curveball has never appeared on television. I think you are referring to the 60 Minutes interview with Maj. Harith, who was furnished to the media by Ahmed Chalabi's group. It turned out that Harith already was listed in U.S. intelligence files as a fabricator, and 60 Minutes later broadcast an apology. Others who used Harith's information included the New York Times and Vanity Fair.
October 22, 2007 3:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
It's a fair point, but the title is meant to be provocative. I assume that everyone knows that George Bush made the flawed decision to go to war. He alone bears that responsibility. I have tried to unravel what I think is the defining story of the faulty intelligence that was used to justify that decision.
I don't "blame" Curveball for the war. My book makes clear that he told minor lies and others twisted and magnified them to create a pretext for war.
I don't believe that any "real attempt at intelligence was impeded." The problem was quite the opposite. Virtually all the "real intelligence" produced by the CIA and other U.S. agencies on Saddam's WMD was fundamentally wrong. Curveball wasn't an anomaly, something cooked up by a handful of people. It was the product of years of screw-ups, bureaucratic rivalries and craven leadership.
Please let me know what you think after you read my book!
October 22, 2007 4:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
Howard:
It's a bit complicated. According to U.S. intelligence reports, Curveball indicated that the Iraqis had mastered the ability to dry and grind anthrax spores and other pathogens into an aerosol spray. The Iraqis had sought that ability before the 1991 war but failed. In this case, a single German report noting that Curveball said they had moved beyond wet, unconcentrated slurry was seen as a nightmarish development. Colin Powell, as you may remember, specifically warned the U.N. that Iraq had mastered the ability to produce dried bio-agent.
After the war, a British investigation of the case determined that German intelligence officers had misinterpreted Curveball's comment. Not only was the claim untrue. Curveball never said it.
As for missiles, Saddam gave up his chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs after the 1991 war but continued work on delivery systems. As you probably know, U.N. resolutions allowed Iraq to produce short-range missiles. U.N. inspectors and the Iraq Survey Group determined that his engineers exceeded the allowable limits (150 km range). But the war was about his suspected WMD, not his missiles.
October 22, 2007 4:22 PM | Reply | Permalink
Curveball didn't launch the invasion. George Bush and Tony Blair did that. But Curveball's lies, and those who twisted and magnified them, provided the pretext.
You are absolutely correct. The trucks Curveball described were difficult to design, difficult to operate safely, and easy to explain when they were not found. Unfortunately, too few U.N. inspectors, scientists or intelligence officials made that case convincingly before the war. A few did - but they were ignored.
October 22, 2007 4:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
I believe it's America's worst intelligence failure because we have never before sacrificed so much blood, treasure and prestige chasing an utter delusion.
If you read my book, I go into great depth about the degree of cooperation between the BND and CIA. My reporting suggests the answer is not the kind of conspiracy you suggest. The truth, unfortunately, is much worse.October 22, 2007 4:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
I agree 100%. In this case, however, truth really was stranger than fiction. Time after time, the ineptitude and bureaucratic cowardice was chilling. Within the CIA, skeptics were shunted aside, contrary evidence was ignored, and objections were squelched. It would be a comedy of errors except it helped produce a tragedy.
October 22, 2007 4:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
Once again, Bush made the decision to go to war. Curveball helped provide the pretext.
If you deconstruct the pre-war intelligence, as the Robb Silberman commission and the Senate intelligence committee did, it's clear that Curveball was solely responsible for U.S. claims about Saddam's germ weapons. The investigators also determined, however, that CIA chemical weapons analysts believed the evidence on Saddam's nerve and blister gas production was ambiguous. But they ramped up their conclusions when they saw the "high confidence" bio-weapons reports based on Curveball. So two key areas rested on his shoulders. And by March, the IAEA already had determined that Saddam did not possess a nuclear weapons program.
That's why I consider Curveball so important.
October 22, 2007 4:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
Hi:
He graduated as a chemical engineer from the University of Baghdad, but later lost his job and drove a taxi, among other jobs.
He worked at the site briefly, but was fired for what the files describe as an "unspecified sexual offense."
Curveball was initially screened by a BND team at the refugee center at Zirndorf, outside Nuremberg.
He fed the Germans information from U.N. reports and other information then showing up for the first time on the Internet. Also, you'll see in my book that the Germans "filled in the gaps" in his long, meandering answers, as did others in Washington and London. Several people said his case officer was "in love" with Curveball, meaning he was conned by him, and that the questioning was so hamhanded that he provided the answers they obviously sought.
October 22, 2007 4:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, I was aware of the missile restrictions and what he built. It's not clear if anyone filmed it, but, according to someone I knew on the inspection team, they tried to destroy the missiles with a bulldozer, and they were harder to destroy than they seemed. If the Iraqi engineers had pared off some of the weight that gave them the strength, one wonders what the range would have been.
Freeze-drying and grinding isn't that hard. Taking the electrostatic charge off the dried spores is the challenge, as well as things such as designing the aerosol dispenser, knowing the ID50, the characteristics of the aerosol cloud, etc.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
October 22, 2007 4:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
Curveball didn't launch the invasion. George Bush and Tony Blair did that. But Curveball's lies, and those who twisted and magnified them, provided the pretext.
You are absolutely correct. The trucks Curveball described were difficult to design, difficult to operate safely, and easy to explain when they were not found. Unfortunately, too few U.N. inspectors, scientists or intelligence officials made that case convincingly before the war. A few did - but they were ignored.
October 22, 2007 4:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Agreed. The point is they never got there.
October 22, 2007 5:00 PM | Reply | Permalink
Curveball didn't launch the invasion. George Bush and Tony Blair did that. But Curveball's lies, and those who twisted and magnified them, provided the pretext.
You are absolutely correct. The trucks Curveball described were difficult to design, difficult to operate safely, and easy to explain when they were not found. Unfortunately, too few U.N. inspectors, scientists or intelligence officials made that case convincingly before the war. A few did - but they were ignored.
October 22, 2007 5:01 PM | Reply | Permalink
Bob,
Thanks for taking the time to respond. That doesn't always happen.
Tom
October 22, 2007 6:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
Boring comment, but thanks for the informative post and also comments that did more to inform me than to mire yourself in debates.
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
October 22, 2007 6:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm also curious as to how Curveball, a refugee coming out of Iraq where information was strictly censored, could have figured out within a few weeks what German intelligence would want to hear about in terms of Iraqi WMD. I thought of Iraq as a typical totalitarian society; I assume Curveball would have had no access to Western news reports while he was in Iraq, and internet access must have been rare or unheard of in those days. So how did he know what UN inspectors had been looking for? Did he go online as soon as he got to Germany and start looking up UN inspectors' reports? How did he figure this all out?
"All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out." - I.F. Stone
October 22, 2007 10:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
Hi Bob. I've been following your reporting in the LA Times and I'm looking forward to reading your book.
My question is not about Curveball per se but the sources that supposedly corroborated him. According to Colin Powell's UN presentation, there were four sources for mobile BW labs. I understand that Curveball provided the vast majority of the reporting and that one of his corroborating sources was the INC's fabricator, Mohammad Harith. So, I'm wondering, who were the other two? Do you know if they reported specifically 'Curveballian' details? (I mean, did they really corroborate Curveball or was it wishful thing on the CIA's part?)
Also, I noticed that the National Intelligence Estimate listed *three* sources for mobile labs. In the President's SOTU address (the "uranium from Africa" one), President Bush also attributes the mobile labs to *three* defectors. Do you know why Powell's presentation cites *four* sources barely a week or so later?
Thanks very much.
October 22, 2007 10:31 PM | Reply | Permalink
So the following portion of your title is referring to Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, the entire administration and inter-agencies of the US government?
Screw being "provocative"!
Be direct!
~OGD~
October 23, 2007 1:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
Oh really,? America's worst intelligence failure?
Were they ever able to find where all those dominos fell all over Southeast Asia after we pulled our fat out of the fire in 'Nam?
What's the latest number of names on that black granite wall in D.C. ?
~OGD~
October 23, 2007 1:10 AM | Reply | Permalink
It's really fascinating how much the case of Curveball above parallels that of Rocco Martino of Italy, he of the phony Niger uranium story fame (he was the one who peddled the forged documents). To refresh the memory (from the Nur al Cubicle translation of Italy's La Republica investigative series on the issue):
To make this sort of a mistake once is horrible, but to make it twice simply defies belief. You're so right, Mr. Drogin, the only reason these two fools were listened to was because they were selling what others very much wanted to buy.
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." ~~ Abraham Maslow
October 23, 2007 2:05 AM | Reply | Permalink
It's missing the point to call Iraq an intelligence failure. First, because the normal state of affairs is to be in the dark concerning an enemy's capabilities or intentions, and second, because Cheney had given up on CIA after Gulf I, when it became clear Saddam was enthusiastic about weapons programs and we had no info on it.
I think it was unfair of Cheney to make that assumption, that CIA was of no value. But when he moved into the VP mansion his only intention in using the CIA was to get it to say useful things. He had no faith in its product but knew others still did, so if an NIE said the right things Cheney would use it.
Cheney and others in his camp already knew everything they wanted to know---Saddam had tried to build WMD, he was evil, end of story.
It might seem sensible to refrain from acting absent confidence, but there was no doubt, at least in Cheney's mind. Curveball was merely affirmation, wholly expected. If his "information" needed any rephrasing to be more on-point I'm sure that was provided. The certainty present in the WH, and to be fair, among lots of folks at CIA, insured information was only endorsement.
October 23, 2007 5:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
Good question.
The three supposed corroborating sources that Powell cited included, as you correctly surmise, Mohammad Harith of the Iraqi National Congress. In retrospect, Harith's information didn't really confirm Curveball's account. He claimed to have come up with the idea for mobile labs, claimed they were parked in the Republican Palace garage when not in use, and said they operated only between Hilla and Kut. He never claimed that they produced bioagent - simply that they researched them. Most importantly, of course, the DIA had issued a formal burn notice on Harith and declared him a fabricator in May 2002, nine months before Powell's speech.
The second supposed corroborator, an Iraqi civil engineer seeking asylum, told DIA agents in June 2001 that technicians had filled biological warheads from trailers parked in underground bunkers at an armaments factry near Karbala. Workers wore special protective gear and anyone with "open sores was strictly forbidden access to these facilities," he told them.
Again, his unconfirmed information contradicted Curveball's version of events. After the war, the civil engineer recanted his account and claimed that he had been misunderstood.
The third supposed source was an Iraqi official who secretly spied for British intelligence under the code name Red River. Traveling outside Iraq in September 2002, he told his MI6 case officer that Iraq had developed fermentors for trucks or railway cars to produce animal feed. Red River admitted that he was quoting a hearsay account from a "new subsource" with links to opposition groups. "The informant was suspicious about the true nature of the systems," MI6 reported. The British wouldn't let the CIA meet Red River and the case became a sore point between the two services.
Red River's information, again, did not corroborate Curveball's account. He didn't even claim the systems produced pathogenic agents. After the war, the British reported that Red River failed a polygraph test and that they were withdrawing his file.
I'm not sure why President Bush and the NIE cited three sources total (including Curveball), while Powell cited Curveball plus three.
October 23, 2007 5:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, Iraqi state media provided extensive coverage of the U.N. inspections in Iraq during the 1990s, although it clearly was from the regime's perspective. But Iraqis could listen to BBC, VOA, Deutche Welle, and other foreign-based radio broadcasts. So I don't think they were as cut off from information as you assume.
The post-war investigation showed that Curveball traveled to Jordan and Turkey between 1995 and 1998, so would have had access to Western media there. More importantly, when he showed up Germany in 1999, he was able to access the Internet. Investigators concluded that he repeatedly fed German intelligence information that he had gleaned by reading official reports posted on-line by the U.N. weapons inspectors. Many of the key details appeared in a report written in March 1999.
The other problem was that German intelligence officers "filled in the gaps" in his knowledge, as a senior BND officer told me. Curveball trained as a chemical engineer, so the BND helped him when he said he didn't know much about biological weapons. When you add that to the numerous mistranslations, misjudgments and misperceptions in the case, Curveball's account grew steadily more terrifying.
October 23, 2007 6:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
Even before the Inspectors entered the idea of truck mounted bio-weapons labs seemed far fetched. First the notion that fleets of trucks moving from place to place would be somehow invisible to satellites was a little strange, a little pattern recognition goes a long way. Second though I am the last thing from an expert it would seem that control of vibration, heat and dust might be a little difficult on a typical mideastern highway. Three you have the issue of storage of the finished agents. I recall Scott Ritter pointing out that the high water table typical of Iraq made underground facilities to be difficult to impossible, not because it couldn't be done technically but because the combination of pumping facilities and the visible effects of dumping the water combine to make such a facility a "Look at Me!!" effect when viewed from telemetry.
And of course all of these problems were magnified once Inspector's were in and the US was trying to promote the idea that you could culture bio-weapons in a canvas sided truck in an Iraqi summer (I wouldn't attempt a freshman chemistry experiment in that environment). I don't even know that I have a question here but the notion that Powell's UN testimony was thought to be powerful and persuasive just baffles me, mobile bio-labs being just about as plausible as the science of the "In like Flint" movies of the sixties.
October 23, 2007 7:21 AM | Reply | Permalink
The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, the so-called gold standard of the U.S. intelligence community, the most highly vetted product of U.S. intelligence, was wrong on virtually every line of its assessment of Saddam's biological, chemical and nuclear weapons stockpiles and programs. By definition, that's an intelligence failure.
That faulty NIE formed the template for Colin Powell's historic address to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003 to press the case for war. As a result, his claims and warnings based on what he called solid intelligence were wrong. That's a travesty.
You're absolutely right that it's difficult to asses an enemy's capabilities or intentions. That wasn't the case here. The intelligence claimed, with "high confidence," that Saddam "has" stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons larger and more dangerous than before the 1991 war. In my book, I explore the many reasons to believe that. But it doesn't make it true, or justify the myriad mistakes.
My book is not about politics or policy. It's a non-fiction spy story about how intelligence was collected and processed. President Bush made the decision to go to war. But the CIA gave him the pretext - and much of it came from Curveball.
October 23, 2007 7:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
I couldn't agree more. I write quite a bit about precisely those concerns - and how they were ignored.
Unfortunately, the "experts" in U.S. intelligence kept finding excuses instead of answers. Saddam's scientists had jerry rigged weapons and equipment in the past, and the CIA figured the Iraqis didn't care if the trucks had accidents, or might leak.
Ironically, the failure to ever uncover hard evidence of mobile germ factories (not surprising, since they never existed) was viewed as proof that Saddam hid them because they were so vital. So the lack of evidence became proof. Put another way, they made up the dots to explain the inconsistencies in the analysis.
October 23, 2007 7:39 AM | Reply | Permalink
Ha! I knew he was a British source! I've been calling him the "Fourth Source" or sometimes "Redaction Man" on account of all his redactions in the Senate Report. I guess I'll call him "Red River" from now on. A cool code name if ever there was one.
Anyway, thanks for taking the time to respond. I'm writing my thesis on the pre-war intelligence and this is excellent stuff.
A few things. I suspect that Red River's subsource was INC. In the run up to the war, Chalabi's guys laundered a lot of dubious intel through subsources and subsubsources. Most of their sexiest WMD stories show up around late-August/early-September, 2002, which, as it happens, was right in time for for the Bush admin's propaganda push for war (the basic gist of my thesis, btw). Red River was just before the JIC's Sept. 9 assessment, right?
Also, a couple of details in the subsource's story are interesting. One, he doesn't just say "mobile labs in trucks", he says "mobile labs in trucks and railcars." So did Curveball. Two, "animal feed" (or, specifically, "single-cell protein") was a known Iraqi cover story for BW production. INC defectors tend to show this kind of progression towards greater specificity. I suspect that whoever coached Red River's guy knew what he was doing.
I don't mean to suggest Curveball was part of this 'conspiracy'. You're right, he was just a schlub. But you've gotta admit, when fake intel seems to confirm weak-but-real intel just in time for a propaganda campaign, something is up.
October 23, 2007 8:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
Yes and no.
I'm fairly sure Red River's subsource was from the Iraqi National Accord, not the INC. The CIA secretly sponsored the INC in the early 1990s, while the British backed the INA. They also sent out defectors, but none developed the notoriety of Chalabi's group.
Curveball never spoke of railway cars. I'm quite certain of that. Red River was the only source for that. Bush and Powell suggest that all the supposed sources had the same information, including railway cars, but in fact, all four gave conflicting accounts. And the CIA acknowledged to Robb-Silberman that without Curveball, the other three meant nothing. Red River specifically said the railcars were built at a rail yard in Tikrit. U.N. weapons inspectors tore the place apart at least twice, as did the Iraq Survey Group. They found nothing to support the story.
You're absolutely correct on the single-cell protein. The subsource indicated that the fermenters produced single-cell protein for animal feed, and that of course was the cover story the Iraqis used at Al Hakim and other fixed bio-warfare factories after the 1991 war. So the new claim fit into the CIA mindset - even though it made no sense to produce animal feed or germ weapons on a train. Unlike trucks, they're not difficult to track, so to speak.
Lots more details on all this in my book!
October 23, 2007 9:52 AM | Reply | Permalink
The NIE is like all formal statements---it is very political, with tension between the agenda of lower-level staffers, their bosses, and the client---the executive branch. Caveats that analysts argued for were dropped, mostly due to pressure from Cheney or in anticipation of such pressure.
This is my understanding of the case. I said it was not so much an intelligence failure because we had essentially no intelligence, only certainty. Yes, the NIE was all wrong. But no country should start a war on an intellligence estimate. The crucial failure was acting on faith, instead of proven necessity. There was lots of talk at the time of prevention, of preventing crimes like Stalin's or Hitler's. This was an act of faith, or better put, wishful thinking.
The word was out to deliver what the WH wanted. Everyone knew where their salary was coming from.
October 23, 2007 10:44 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm with you on this point, Tom. "Intelligence failure" implies that the perps actuallly believed their fictions to be true. But it gets back to the motive argument - if the motive was to control Iraqi oil and gas, and make sure it was traded in dollars, then I would think that "Intelligence success" is more appropriate. Or perhaps "Disintelligence success" is a better way to put it. Poor Gertrude Stein must be rolling over in her grave: a lie is a spin is a truth - or something like that.
I just can't imagine that the principles weren't fully cognizant of the fact that those bioweapons trailers were actually ballonmobiles purchased from Marconi Command & Control in Britain by Iraq in 1987.
Neoboho
October 23, 2007 11:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
Looks like I'll have to buy your book.
Anyway, the Brits thought that Curveballl reported railcars.
"By March 2002, the JIC was recording that the source [Curveball] had described seven such facilities in total, six road-based and one *rail-based*. The JIC continued to note that the intelligence was uncorroborated but did record that it was technically credible." (Butler Report, p. 118)
A quote from JIC's March 15, 2002 assessment:
"We judge that Iraq could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days of a decision to do so. There is no intelligence on any BW agent production facilities, but one source indicates that Iraq may have developed mobile production facilities. A liaison source reports that:
the transportable production programme began in 1995;
6 road based facilities, on trailers, and 1 *rail based* facility, on *railway* carriages, were constructed and by March 1999; three were operational;" (Butler p. 169)
I don't know what to tell you, Bob. The Brits seem pretty certain.
Also, the ISG checked out the Mosul Rail Yards, which, according to them, "reportedly was the location of the single rail mounted BW agent production unit." (ISG, Vol. 3, p. 76) If your certain Red River was Tikrit, then Curveball was probably Mosul.
Anyway, I didn't mean to imply there was anything to the story. There wasn't. We know that now. What I'm suggesting is that there's a few coincidences here that are suspicious. Red River seemed to confirm elements of mobile program that did not exist.
INC defectors have a modus operandi. They feed reporters and debriefers leading details, but they never come right out and say "Iraq has WMDs" or "Iraq is training al-Qaeda". The Salman Pak defectors for example. A couple of weeks after 9/11, the INC's Salman Pak defectors show up. They never say specifically that Iraq is training al-Qaeda but they imply it pretty hard. Instead, they're like, "Iraq is training guys in teams of five to hijack airplanes in with box cutters. I don't know who they are, but they kept saying Allah Ackbar and wore t-shirts that said I heart Bin Laden. They could be al-Qaeda, I don't know."
Haideri, the civil engineer, is another example. He never said Iraq had WMD plants. He said, "I helped build underground labs with ventilation systems and I had to wear a rubber suit and get hosed down when I was done. Another room was lined with lead, but I don't know if it was a nuclear site, maybe, coulda been. Why else would there be lead?"
You're familiar with Harith. He pulled the same stunt. "I bought these trucks. I don't know what they were for. But they had microscopes and cooling units and all this laboratory equipment in them. Maybe they were for bio research. I don't know."
See what I'm getting at? It's the same modus operandi. Red River's guy, maybe he's INA, maybe he's INC, maybe both, is laying on the leading details just as thick as the INC's guys. He's not going to come out and say, yeah, they're bio-weapons labs. He'll give a cover story that he knows the the MI6/CIA will connect with Iraqi BW production. He drops in railcars to seal the deal. Then, hey presto, Curveball is confirmed and Rumsfeld can cite mobile labs on Sept. 17 and Blair can do the same on Sept. 24.
Well, that's my theory anyway.
October 23, 2007 11:36 AM | Reply | Permalink
To preface, see:
Cooked Intel: So the 'Stovepipe' Stops Where? TPM Cafe | Feb 9, 2007
Gee Bob, if this story that you've conceived is actually, as you say, "...a non-fiction spy story about how intelligence was collected and processed." -- Then, in this book did you fictionally speculate and elaborate on the chance that that Cheney and his minions were pressuring for the inclusion of info they wished to hear into the 2002 NIE and having that info stovepiped into the WHIG through (his) Cheney's office, ya' no what I mean?
I hope that isn't to convoluted for you.
I await your reply and answer.
~OGD~
October 23, 2007 11:57 AM | Reply | Permalink
~
Hi Tom:
Don't overlook my comment directly below.
~OGD~
October 23, 2007 12:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
I think you lost me.
I wrote a non-fiction book about how intelligence works - and in this case, utterly failed. I report and write the facts as best I could find and confirm them. I'm happy to let others deal with speculation, fictional or otherwise.
October 23, 2007 5:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, you trumped me. You went back to the source documents while I was responding from memory. I had forgotten the reference in the JIC assessment. Given your degree of knowledge, I think you'll find some important other details in my book!
October 23, 2007 5:40 PM | Reply | Permalink
The 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq, . . . the most highly vetted product of U.S. intelligence . . . . Bob Drogin
Jeez.
And all this time I thought the 2002 NIE was cobbled together by Paul Pillar and his buds in a matter of weeks, because some astute Senators thought they should have something/someone to take the fall when the war they were determined to vote for blew up in their faces. Better though than those savvy Brits who simply plagerized their "intelligence" off the internet, eh wot?
October 23, 2007 5:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
Of course. As the intellectually challenged Rumsfeld said, "Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence."
October 24, 2007 9:13 AM | Reply | Permalink
Dude, you're fighting a losing battle with these guys. Just changed the title to "Bush lied people died" and they'll love it. It actually sounds like an interesting read.
October 24, 2007 10:29 AM | Reply | Permalink
~
My my my ...
Will wonders never cease. Things must be real slow over at the freerepublic site. Look who's returned just shy of a year's absence to spew his normal mindless comments into the middle of an adult type conversation.
Well this input of this particular individual must be given his due for the crappy input and sent to the latrine. You'll find him warmly ensconced over at The "TPM Two-Holer" at the Café ...
~OGD~
October 24, 2007 11:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
~
Golly artappraiser -- you've been countered in your rating of a "1" ...
Nanny nanny nanny . . .
Bwahahahaha
~OGD~
October 25, 2007 3:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
If you're writing your thesis on pre-war intelligence, you probably won't want to miss this analysis of the Niger claims at the LeftCoaster.
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." ~~ Abraham Maslow
October 25, 2007 5:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
Nah, the 5 rating was already there when I put mine. Apparently, that person likes to see personal baiting and personal attacks and they are free to vote in support of that, I guess. But I am equally free to show my disapproval. I just happen to like the Cafe metaphor over the Barroom Brawl metaphor and don't like to see people try to pick fights over past posting records. Just not the kind of "discussion" I prefer as a user of the site. I was pleased to see that he did not take your bait of trying to anger him. If he had I probably would have downrated that, too.
October 25, 2007 10:37 PM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks wordie, but I'm way ahead of ya. eRiposte and I are friends. I think he even cites me in there somewhere. :)
The gist of my thesis is that during the run up to the war, weak-but-real intelligence that suggested Iraq's WMDs suddenly started getting corroborated by intelligence we now know is fake. About week before the start of the admin's propaganda campaign for war, Red River's subsource confirmed Curveball for MI6. The same thing happened with the Niger Documents. The week before the propaganda campaign, MI6 learns of a 'second source' that says Iraq was trying to buy uranium from Niger.
October 25, 2007 11:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
Ahh, well, I sincerely hope that my comment didn't give you the impression that I wasn't aware that you are way, way ahead of me anyway. :) I'm just an anonymous poster delving into a lot of this material through google searches. I'm bright enough, I think, to see a pattern that rouses my suspicions, but I'm hardly a historian, nor capable of marshalling the facts the way that you and eRiposte have. eRiposte's analysis of the Niger claims seemed to me - how can I describe it? Almost surgical in it's precision and depth. I'm impressed that you know him. I'm also more than a little curious about eRiposte's background. Does he have legal training? Or?
As for the propaganda campaign that ultimately led to war, it almost seems to me it started much earlier, in fact, right after the end of the Gulf War, with the first President Bush:
The additional information that you've outlined, about how the two questionable sources that we now know to have been fabricating their info, both received confirmation from another source, seems to be consistent with my sense that there are parallels, as yet perhaps inadequately explored, between the Curveball story and the Rocco Martino story.
"If the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail." ~~ Abraham Maslow
October 26, 2007 8:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
No, "that person" (me) has listened to enough of SFC Wallace's personal attacks on people over the last few years (look at his old comments) to know what he's like.
October 26, 2007 9:19 AM | Reply | Permalink
Actually, eRiposte is a little bit guarded about his background. (He isn't a lawyer though.) I can't say I blame him. I guess it's just the times we live in, but I'm considering publishing my work anonymously on the web too once it's done. Don't get me wrong, I'd like some recognition for the three years I've put into this thing. But at the same time, if it turns out I'm right (and I think I am) and if I start getting some attention, I'm not sure I want Michelle Malkin going through my garbage. I think eRiposte is the same way. We want our work out there but we don't want to be Little Green Football'd.
But, yeah, eRiposte is a good guy. Very meticulous though. I know what you mean. Precision surgey.
Your instincts are right about Martino (at least, I think they are). Martino started hawking the Niger Documents literally the *same week* Red River confirms Curveball and MI6 gets its second Niger source. But the thing about that is, after Red River, the CIA let the Bush admin cite mobile bio-weapons labs in the case for war (Rummy on Sept 17, Bush on Oct 7). But the CIA still wouldn't budge on Niger. The White House puts 'uranium from Africa' in a speech on Sept 12, CIA takes it out. The White House puts in in Bush's Oct 7 speech, CIA takes it out. The CIA lets the Bush admin cite Curveball and no more sources show up to corroborate his reports. The CIA won't budge on Niger and guess what? Three more 'independent' sources show up to confirm a uranium deal that did not exist. The last one turned up on Jan 27, 2003. The next day, Bush delivered his infamous 'uranium from Africa' State of the Union address. Pretty blatant, huh?
October 26, 2007 9:55 AM | Reply | Permalink