Although its circumstances are quite different, there is this about Iraq that resembles Yugoslavia---once the social compact breaks down it doesn't spontaneously reassemble. Too much blood gets spilled, too much resentment and desire for revenge ensues.

What upheaval after we withdrew from Vietnam? Our presence was the upheaval, causing collapse of Cambobia's government. The Vietnamese fixed that problem without us. Unfortunately for us and Iraq there is no North Vietnam to stabilize things.

Remember when administration supporters were saying "It's not anything like Vietnam"? Can you say quagmire? 

Please note that Nir Rosen is on the lists of Serious People compiled over the last couple of days.

Some escaping babies and Vietnamese did get "up-heaved".

Logistically, pulling our troops out and protecting our friends is going to be difficult.

Our VERSUS musical political parody website addresses the ongoing deceit of George Bush and his administration regarding the Iraq war in "CIRCLE OF LIES" (to the Elton John/Tim Rice song "Circle of Life"): on VERSUS at  http://versusplus.com/circle.html, and on YouTube at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W4njer6BBgQ.

The Bush gang not only rewrites the past, they rewrite the present.

So, if we all agree with these divisions and these positions and principles, why aren't more people supporting Joe Biden in his campaign to be our president since he is leading the way with these issues? (Most of the other candidates are starting to buy into his plan).

Biden's idea of breaking Iraq up into 3 autonomous regions is silly as he has no way to bring it about.

destor,

heh heh heh :-)

Awww damn. That means I'll have to go back and redraw my GWOT Battle Map/fast food placemat. (It's filled with all sorts of fun-filled terror puzzles and activities to help keep neo-cons entertained during mealtime and not running amok about the place. I'm not sure it works very well tho). They've simply changed the name right? I mean KurdSunniShiiteIstan is still the front line in the GWOT right? I'd like to know before I go ahead and start changing the map.

Thanks.

Ooooo, maybe we can get Gene Simmons and the rest of the band to do a reunion/USO kick-off tour for them. Or at least right them a kick-ass theme song.

You usually hold America's collective feet to the fire to get us to accept responsibility for trashing Iraq, and I can't argue against that. What I also can't do is figure out what the hell to do. Should we annex Iraq? Can we stay and not do more damage?

Carl Levin is missing the point completely when he calls for Maliki to step down. It's not Maliki who can fix this by stepping down. But Bush-Cheney stepping down might make room for some real diplomacy and some reality-based action. Even then, Iraq is an illusion. A shadow. Hard to accept, but the fact is Saddam Hussein was the only thing holding Iraq together as a nation. Now that he's gone, and his brutal rule has come to an end, there's really nothing left to call Iraq.

J. McCutchen

In December 2006, I wrote - here - and elsewhere that by Summer 2007, Iraq would for all intents and purposes have ceased to exist

And now Hillary and other Dems are talking about surge progress!?!??!

What progress?

18% approval - I wonder why

Return of the marmots!

J. McCutchen

Hillary Clinton has called on Iraqis to replace Maliki. Hillary Clinton at her disingenuous, best is dire need of a do-over. Too bad there aren't any in politics

From the NewsHour Panel tonight:

GEORGE PACKER, The New Yorker: the government is, as one official said to me, not dysfunctional, it's nonfunctioning. It is practically collapsed.

"We're not hearing the whole story"

RAY SUAREZ: Well, Laith Kubba, are we now hearing in public things that were already being said in private for weeks, maybe months?

LAITH KUBBA, Former Iraqi Government Spokesman: I think we're not hearing the whole story. I think the frustration with Maliki and his government is real, and it's understandable, and Iraqis have been frustrated for awhile.

I think what we're not hearing is that the problem is not with the person. If you replace Maliki with any other person, those problems will not go. They're more rooted in a dysfunctional political system that needs serious attention.

J. McCutchen

Idiot George is having a flashback ...to the Texas ANG

Back to the Future - The Fixin to Die Rag

Also agree.

"All governments lie, but disaster lies in wait for countries whose officials smoke the same hashish they give out." - I.F. Stone

Not equivalent. N. Vietnam was the same clans and families as the south, or at least had lots of overlap, deriving from a previously contiguous territory. Iran is a different culture (Persian) than the southern Shia Arabs, has no connection with the central Iraq Sunnis or the Kurds.

Iran taking over Iraq would be seen by all as annexation. North Vietnam taking over was seen as resolution of a civil war.

Well, I viewed the Vietnam incursion as humanitarian intervention, with strategic value to Vietnam in eliminating a dangerously weird government on its border.

Ethiopia's actions don't seem in the same category. Are you suggesting an unflattering parallel with the US in Iraq being equivalent to the second, not the first example? No argument from me.

Agreed on no rules.

I was arging it's harder than leaving Vietnam because there is no north to take over; Iran is not the same.

It is really very hard to speculate on what happens in Iraq when the Americans leave. The American presence is an artificial distortion of the landscape. It conceals the magnitudes of major players, exagerates the presence of smaller ones, normally invulnerable populations are made vulnerable, no one is too large, and the true following is uncertain.

For the record, my take on how things are likely to shake out:

Option A: Sadr and his Mahdi Army quickly take over the country. The Mahdi Army is the largest Shiite militia in the country and has heavily infiltrated the Police and Army. With the departure of the Americans, the formal Iraqi police and army disintegrate, being divided among the various militias and factions. Sadr plays the nationalist card and forges alliances with neo-Baathist remnants among the Sunnis. Using a base of Shiite/Sunni support he smashes the Badr Brigades of Sciri and Dawa which seem to be concentrated around Basra, backs the neo-Baathists in wiping out Sunni Salafists. With 80% of the country under control, he proceeds north and squashes the latest Kurdish insurrection flat. Basically, short sharp civil war and then everyone gets on with their lives. Best option.

Option B: The Badr brigades, with Iranian assistance and intervention overrun the Mahdi Army. Unlikely in my view. Badr then attempts to extend its control over Sunni sectors without success. Difficulties with Sunni and Kurds lead to a prolongued civil war cleaving along ethnic lines. Iranian puppet state, with varying levels of Iranian committment.

Option C: Mahdi army and Badr brigades conduct a Shiite civil war with no clear victor. Possibly a result of Iranian intervention. The Neo-Baathists consolidate Sunni territories and sweep out the Salafist Jihadi. From there they use their secure base to let the Mahdi and Badr wear themselves out and take them both down. Proceeding north, they settle scores with the Kurds. Outcome, a more prolongued civil war than A, not so prongued as B, considerably bloodier, and with the eventual result being a Pseudo-Baathist strongman regime.

Option D: Saudi Arabia intervenes to fund and support Salafists. Result is a protracted Sunni civil war, region of instability, with Shiites and Kurds making gains at Sunni expense, but unable to pacify the region. Shiites may be united under Badr or Mahdi or still experiencing internal turmoil. Sunni conflict occupies country and prevents Shiite from dealing with Kurds. Probably the worst Sunni outcome, and best Kurdish outcome.

Option E: Neo-Baathists collapse and roll over for Salifi Jihadists. Possible Saudi intervention. Unlikely. Salafists attempt to defend from Shiites, but their real military challenge is the Kurds. The struggle will be over the oil of Kirkuk. The Shiites sit back and watch as that Kurds and Sunni duke it out, preparing to pick up the pieces. A nasty and sharp regionalized conflict.

Option F: The Kurds dreams come true. This will involve territorial expansion and consolidation, ethnic cleansing, mass graves and genocide of minorities like the Assyrians, Yeziday, Turkmen, Armenians etc. Consolidation of control of oil and oil reserves. Expulsion or liquidation of Arab populations. Long term major level American support and intervention required. Sunni and Shia populations are locked in internal civil wars or breakdown and conflicts with each other. Good for Kurds, very bad for everyone else, very bad for America because it means never getting out.

Option G: Kurds go empire. Same as above, except that tensions and hostilities rise with Turkey and Iran, alternately or simultaneously. America is the trump card. America gets dragged into northern regional war with Iran or Turkey or both. Major risk of destabilization.

Option H: Kurds bite off more than they can chew - Turkey invades full scale.

Option J: Afghanimania! Runaway warlordism, multi-cornered civil war among tribal militias, complete social and political breakdown. Civilian government relocates to neighboring country where its safe. Unlikely, the flood plain geography and large urban structures argue against this sort of centrifugalism. Warlordism in Afghanistan or Somalia is facilitated by the difficult geography of those countries which facilitates local power and makes larger entities more difficult.

Option L: Iraqanistan, Iran invades the whole thing and does peacekeeping. Will it work? Dunno. Israel was not welcomed in Lebanon, but on the other hand, Syria was. Depends on how good they are at getting along with local constituencies. Sciri and Dawa may come to be very important.

Option M: The Pot Stirs - Iran, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Syria and Kuwait, back different factions with open ended supplies of funds, weapons and support. Unlikely. These chickens are all to inclined to come home to roost.

Enjoyed it, understood it, agreed with it.  Hope you get wide distribution for it.

aMike

Boy we were young and beautiful back then.  What happened to us.  Thanks, jexter.  It was good to see that.

aMike

I miss my car keys. It was a more innocent time. An artfully notched piece of metal. Here today, gone together, it was never the same without it.

And looking back, I shouldn't have killed *all* the dinosaurs. That was a mistake. I feel very guilty.

We must stay in Iraq because ping pong balls are round, and until tomatoes are invested in sub prime mortgages.

Speak for yourself. I was always ugly. I may have been young, but I can't remember.

Actually I'm still beautiful, just more modest about it.

aMike

Interesting predictions.

I would disagree with assessments of the Mahdi Army. First, they were able to stand off the United States military twice, so I don't necessarily think they'll fold quickly or easily. Second, it ain't your grandma's Mahdi Army. They've extensively infiltrated the current army and police, and have had the benefit of extensive training up and access to weapons. They'll also be a reservoir of Shiite nationalists from the Army. Remember that Saddam's regime while favouring Sunnis, or particularly favouring his tribal Sunnis was fairly ecumenical.

Sadr and the Mahdi Army's big weakness is that unlike factions among the Sunni, and unlike Sciri and Dawa, he has no outside backers. The obvious Shiite backer, Iran, is behind Sciri and Dawa, Sadr's Shiite rivals. Meanwhile, Sadr presents himself as a nationalist opposed to Iranian influence. His credentials as a nationalist, he hopes, allow him to reach out to Sunni groups.

As for the Sunni, it appears that Saudi Arabia is throwing its weight behind the Salafists and Jihadi, who are friendly towards and supportive of Saudi Arabia's Wahabist religious approach.

The Saudi's have no relationship with the Baathists, and have been generally hostile for ideological, religious and historical reasons.

The only ally the Baathists have is Syria, and even there, its of limited use. Relations were strained in the past, Syria is the weakest and in geographical terms, the most distant of the border players.

Of course, politics makes strange bedfellows. If Neo-Baathists triumphed decisively, the Saudi's might feel forced to support them to block a Shiite domination.

Equally, if Sciri and Dawa fold, then Iran might be inclined to throw its support to Sadr. Would he accept it. Unlikely, unless his back was against the wall. My view is that Sadr would only ally with the Iranians if a major faction backed by Saudi Arabia consolidated power over the Sunni. In a situation like that, Sadr would desperately need the Iranians to counter the Saudi's.

I think, however, that Sadr's real plan would be to try and create some broad Shiite/Sunni front. There are a number of indications that he's doing outreach to portions of the Sunni community, and he's established that he's far less doctrinaire about relations than the other Shiite groups.

In the event of a Sunni domination, however, don't expect semi-autonomous Kurds and Shiites. Kurdish aspirations have directly conflicted with the Sunni and the Kurds have been nasty. If the Sunni win decisively, they'll come after the Kurds hard. Meanwhile, strongmen dictators generally do not allow regional power bases outside themselves.

I do agree that without the American presence, Iraq factions will start consolidating and growing up into formal armies.

This would have happened long ago, except that the American presence has essentially maintained Iraq in a state of indeterminacy. The United States has prevented any group from emerging or expanding to the level of a national threat. The biggest groups have provoked 'pruning' reactions.

The result is that we've got a lot of growth below the level of pruning. A lot of militias, a lot of local groups that would otherwise have been consolidated or would have been turfed out, have been preserved, allowed to survive and put down roots. The recipe is for a more intense civil war and period of consolidation, and it makes it more unpredictable to determine how and who the real players will be when they finally emerge.

Among the Shiites, the contenders seem to be the Mahdi army and Badr brigades. But even there, we have signs of the Mahdi Army fractionating all over. There's a rival Sadrist movement which may or may not consolidate. Then there's the split between the Sciri and Dawa parties which may or may not open up. Allawi may be a complete nonentity in this contest, or he might become a wild card, throwing crucial support to one faction or the other. Certainly he has no chance to be a major player.

As for the Sunni? Anyone's guess as to who and what is going to come out of that pot. There are four major Baathist splinter groups vieing for political dominance. There's an unknown number and unknown structure of Jihadists beyond Al Quaeda in Iraq. There's an unknown number and unknown organization of local militia and resistance groups. And finally, there are the tribes. It is impossible to tell in the current environment how they'll all shake out, what alliances will be made, who will be crushed, and who will rule.

Based on past organization and professionalism, I'd tend to give it to the Baathists. But which Baathists. And what about the tribes? The Jihadists seem to be wearing out their welcome. But a Jihadi/Tribal alliance, if it happens fast and cleanly enough might consolidate power and overwhelm scattered Baathist remnants.

Hard to figure.

Hard to figure indeed.

My sense is that Saudi Arabia ultimately favors neither radical Salafist jihadists nor Baathists in the Sunni lands, but would prefer the sort of conservative tribe-based rule-by-sheikh that predominates in the Arabian peninsula. Those tribal leaders have been asking for, and likely receiving, Saudi support militias fighting the Shia and resisting the government, but are also ultimately opposed to the al-Qaedist-style radicals.

Of course, these divisions are by no means fixed and clear-cut, and Saudi Arabia seems to have had a history of exporting its jihadists to let them blow off steam abroad. In the event of a full-out war, a bunch of eager young Sunni men will want to go to Iraq to fight, and the Saudis will probably open up the gates and let them go. And who can say how that shakes out politically.

With the Kurds, it seems to me that even during the Saddam era, Baghdad knew there were areas of Iraqi Kurdistan it effectively could not control. Just based on the pattern of Sunni fighting so far, it looks like the main concerns are waterways and pipelines and some major mixed cities, but no effort to do anything inside the Kurdish strongholds which remain the most peaceful areas of the country. And there will be about 400,000 peshmerga to defend those stongholds, and probably US military bases somewhere in al-Sulaimaniya, Arbil and Dahuk at least. So I'm guessing that there would be a lot of fighting up and down the Tigris, and for Kirkuk, but that the fighting would ultimately be over how big the Kurdish region ends up being, rather than over the very existence of that region.

The more of these discussions I have, the more one striking fact stands out. Here are just some of the various overlapping groups that get talked about in discussions of the violence in Iraq:

Turkmen
Salafists
Kurds
Sadrists
Badr Corps
Da'wa
Sheikhs
Iranians
Sunni
Americans
Baathists
Saudis
Assyrians
al-Qaeda

One of these things is not like the others. One of these things is not the same.

One of the problems with figuring how the Sunni are going to sort themselves out is to try and guess which factions the Saudi's will back.

Unlike the Iranians who have had their favourites (basically Sciri, Dawa, Chalabi and Allawai) and their opponents (Sadr) designated from the start among the Shia, there's no clear pick for the Saudi's.

This is because the Sunni's are in opposition to the US, and the Saudi's are nominal American allies. The Saudi's have to maintain a low profile. I suspect that there are a lot of Iraqi's treating informally with the Saudi Arabians right now on behalf of one faction or another.

As of this point, I don't believe that the Saudi's have picked a favourite.

One interesting possibility is a Saudi-Iranian axis. Not out of the question as there have been a lot of Saudi/Iranian contacts and negotiations going on lately.

How this would shape out is anyone's guess. But my assumption is either that the Saudi's and Iranians would either go with a federated Iraq, and the Saudi's would pick a centrifugal faction that would be most prepared to rule locally in the Sunni area... in which case, best guess would be the Jihadis. The Baathists would never go for it, and the Tribes would have their own oxes gored.

Alternately, a Saudi-Iranian Axis might surprise everyone by jumping on the Sadr bandwagon. Why? Two reasons, he's got that outreach thing to the Sunni's happening, so he might be the acceptable compromise candidate. He might be unstoppable, in which case, they throw in with the winner, rather than go dog in the manger.

Of course, there's always the possibility of them linking up on a Stop Sadr movement.

Finally, if the Saudi's figure there's a chance to re-establish Sunni rule over the whole country, such as the Shiite being locked in a civil war that leaves them vulnerable, then in that case, the Saudi's might back the Baathists.

Wild cards all over.

With the Kurds, it seems to me that even during the Saddam era, Baghdad knew there were areas of Iraqi Kurdistan it effectively could not control.

I think you're confusing the Saddam era overall with the Sanctions/No Fly Zones era. It was only with no fly zones that Saddam lost control of Kurdish areas.

Just based on the pattern of Sunni fighting so far, it looks like the main concerns are waterways and pipelines and some major mixed cities, but no effort to do anything inside the Kurdish strongholds which remain the most peaceful areas of the country.

Unless you're Turkmen or Yeziday, in which case, you're kind of in trouble.

Don't rely too much on the pattern of Sunni fighting. Fighting in Iraq is intensely local, and the issues are essentially: Sunni's vs Americans in predominantly Sunni areas; flare ups of Shiites vs Americans in predominantly Shiite areas, but only occasionally and very locally; conflicts between Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds and ethnic minorities in borderland areas. Once the United States leaves, the picture will change.

And there will be about 400,000 peshmerga to defend those stongholds,

The Kurds are only about 15% of the Iraqi population. They simply won't stand up.

and probably US military bases somewhere in al-Sulaimaniya, Arbil and Dahuk at least.

As I keep mentioning, Kurdish strategy involves Americans dying on their behalf in great numbers. It requires the Americans to stay. If the Americans leave, the Kurds are screwed. The US can't maintain military bases in a landlocked territory without overflight rights and transit rights. Neither Turkey nor Iran nor Syria are inclined to grant such rights. Which means that the United States, in order to support and supply bases, would need to cross through the rest of Iraq. The Iraqi government is not going to grant the US transit rights through its territory to support Kurdish autonomy.

So I'm guessing that there would be a lot of fighting up and down the Tigris, and for Kirkuk, but that the fighting would ultimately be over how big the Kurdish region ends up being, rather than over the very existence of that region.

The existence of the region is not in question. There's millions of Kurds with nowhere to go.

The two big questions is who will control the oil and the borderland regions, and what will the government of the Kurdish region be.

My guess is that the Sunni will take the oil, and Sunni and other smaller minorities will eventually push the Kurds out of borderlands or overlapping regions.

The other big issue is government. The present Kurdish level of autonomy is unsustainable. They're betwixt and between. They have to go for full independence, or their autonomy is going to get crushed. My read is crushed. Their level of autonomy will either be sharply reduced or utterly eliminated in the civil wars.