Libya: A Foreign Policy Test Case
One of my fine colleagues is Benjamin Barber, who wrote very eloquently about the danger of citizens being turned into passive consumers rather than serving as active participants in the political process. He is the first to tell you that what he really wanted to be in life was not to be a political science professor but an actor. He puts his talents in this department to good use by giving lectures that could be readily be put onstage at any old place Off Broadway. Recently he dropped by to visit with none other than the Libyan leader Moammar Gaddafi. Barber found him a much more attractive figure than the Western media has long depicted as the “implacable despot” from Tripoli.
I could not agree more. I dedicated my book From Empire to Community to Gaddafi—and nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, because he gave up his plan to build weapons of mass destruction and stopped supporting terrorism. (He thus contributed to international security a hell of a lot more than many others who received that prize, such as Yasser Arafat, yet Arafat got the Prize.) Note that Gaddafi did not open his nuclear program to inspection, which is what the West usually seeks and which in my judgment is inherently an unreliable way to promote security. Gaddafi allowed the tools and assets involved to be crated away and sent out of the country in cargo plans and ships. He deserves three cheers. Now the time is ripe to urge him to also democratize. He is the poster child for the security first approach I advocate. Some details of this approach follow, excerpted from Security First.
“In 2003, the United Nations lifted the economic sanctions previously imposed on Libya following its agreement to accept responsibility for the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing and to pay $2.7 billion in damages. Toward the end of the year, Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi dramatically announced that his nation was voluntarily dismantling its nascent nuclear program and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, as well as committing Libya to fight international terror. Indeed, Libya’s centrifuges and mustard gas tanks, as well as some SCUD missiles, were loaded onto a U.S. ship and removed. Sensitive designs of nuclear warheads were transported on a chartered 747 to the United States. Thirteen kilograms of highly enriched uranium were moved to Russia (America has no blending-down facilities for uranium), and chemical weapons shells were destroyed. Tripoli has been credited with helping the United States to shut down a global black market for nuclear weapons technology run by the Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. In short, major contributions to international security were made on two most important fronts: nuclear disarmament and prevention of terrorism.The first strategy is now pursued in dealing with North Korea, in which the nations involved are no longer pushing for regime change, or for the right to inspect facilities that have the wherewithal to make nuclear weapons, but work to replace them with other sources of energy. The second strategy is still being adhered to in dealing with Iran, where the US is openly promoting an uprising, while asking merely for the right to inspect nuclear sites. That is, Iran is expected to show that the enriched uranium and Plutonium it possesses and makes are not deflected to make bombs, rather than follow the Libyan mode—shutting down facilities that are in the gruesome business of producing weapons of mass destruction.If Libya may be said to have earned an A in deproliferation, it earned at best a D in advancing human rights. It remains a crime to criticize the government or ‘‘the Leader,’’ and Law 71 forbids opposing the Revolution, the September 1969 uprising in which Qaddafi seized power. Although the infamous People’s Court and the People’s Prisons were abolished in 2005, this amounts largely to window dressing, as the People’s Prisons inmates were shipped to other prisons. Torture is outlawed, but several allegations of torture remain unresolved, including those concerning a 1996 uprising at the Abu Salim prison. In another troubling case, five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, charged with infecting 426 children with HIV, were tortured until they confessed, and were then sentenced to death. Freedom House, a U.S.-based group, continued to list Libya as one of the five worst nations in stemming the flow of free information. For all these reasons, rather than rewarding Libya for its contributions to global security, human-rights groups demand that the international community continue to limit Libya’s access to the world’s markets and to put off normalizing relations. How the international community responds to Libya’s nuclear disarmament and cessation of support for terrorism—without a shot being fired—is of considerable importance, given that most analysts strongly agree that the world would be much more secure if other nations would follow the same course, especially Iran and North Korea. By recognizing that Libya has met international security standards, other rogue nations will note that if they move in the same direction, efforts to bring down their authoritarian regimes will cease. They will be given full access to various international institutions, all sanctions will be lifted, and investment will be encouraged, although promotion of democratization by nonlethal (educational and cultural) means will continue. That is, if a threatening nation meets the security standards set by the United States and its allies and largely supported by other parts of the international community, without necessarily meeting human-rights standards, it would reap substantial rewards. By contrast, if these rogue nations are told that they will be restored to good standing as members of the international community only if they also replace or drastically alter the form of their regimes, they will be much less likely to consider abandoning their programs of developing weapons of mass destruction and their support for terrorism. The first strategy is in line with the Security First approach; the second—with the Neo-Con notion that democratization drives security.”
It seems to me that inspections are meant to protect a country's right to pursue nuclear power, but not weapons. Since Libya had not even the pretense of an energy program it pretty much had two choices: pursue the weapons at great risk to Ghaddaffi's regime or give up and try to put an end to his pariah status.
But if you have nuclear energy ambitions (separate from weapons ambitions) then you can't just send all the material away, can you? You'd have to have inspections.
All nations should have the right to nuclear reactors and nuclear material, after all. It's the weapons we're trying to keep from being developed.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
August 20, 2007 1:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Lybia had been trying to get in good with the US for years. They had nothing other than some WWI-era mustard gas which was well beyond expiration and usability anyways. This whole thing was a sham, a dog and pony show if you will, which Bush desperately adapted to make it look as if his blustery rhetoric was having some noticeable effect out there in the world.
August 20, 2007 1:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
I note that Libya cooperated after a long period during which it was not threatened in any significant way, only enticed. Bush did not include it in the imaginary "axis".
Can we apply this to Iran? Does Etzoni have a position? Can we agree that the only foreign policy success by this administration was not related to our use of force elsewhere?
August 20, 2007 2:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
Do we support a dictatorship with responsible policies or hold out for a democracy that may have irresponsible policies?
Tolerating dictatorships is pragmatic but often dismissed as realpolitik. However, promoting democracy has not been a successful strategy either, whether in Viet Nam or Iraq or the occupied territories. Idealism can quickly become ideology. Democracy does not automatically lead to good government and almost certainly does not in the absence of a lot of other institutional factors to promote the rule of law. Democratization is a long term strategy and not a short term fix. Security first is the only workable strategy in the shorter term.
August 20, 2007 2:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Let's not kid a kidder here. Some basic statistics on Libya, for the record:
Libya has a territory of 1.8 million square kilometers. Of this, 90% is desert. So the habitable landscape is approximately 180,000 square kilometers, which puts it in about the same ballpark as Tunisia or some smaller European state.
It's population is only 5.6 million, which buts it well below smaller European states like Belgium, and in the population range of marginal Muslim states like Tunisia, Jordan, Kuwait, the UAE.
Despite its small population, the country imports 75% of its food, it has problems providing sufficient potable water. The vast proportion of its wealth comes from the oil industry, which represents perhaps 80% of its GDP. The other 20% is represented by manufacturing, mining and production.
Libya's technological savvy is... to say the least, lacking. They have to import skilled technicians from Italy to keep the elevators running. They import electricians and plumbers.
We're not talking about a country with any kind of established industrial base here. At best, you've got a resource extraction industry which provides most of the wealth, and then a traditional domestic service set of industries that normally wouldn't be too remarkable.
Libyan science and technology is up to building a nice cottage, or maybe an apartment complex. An Olympic swimming pool? They'd have to send out for that. Their technology is up to fixing lawn mowers, but not high performance autos or aircraft. I'm not disparaging the Libyans, I'm just saying.
The point is that its a crime against nature to take a Libyan nuclear program seriously. Let's get real here. When Quaddafi blew the lid, the stuff wasn't even out of the crates. It had cobwebs. It was just a useless extravagant purchase that would have amounted to nothing, by a country with way too much money for useless extravagant purchases.
There was no possibility whatsoever that any hypothetical Libyan nuclear weapons program would have ever amounted to anything.
The country simply lacked the scientific and technological infrastructure to even begin to contemplate wishing for a nuke.
That's completely off the table.
To understand Libya's behaviour and actions, we have to go back and take a careful look at the country and its history.
Essentially, Libya starts off as a relatively valueless former Ottoman territory and later Italian colony. Apart from being the staging area for picturesque battles in WWII, Libya wasn't amounting to much. Italy ceded its claim to Libya in 1947, a UK/France administration ended in 1951, and Libya was saddled with one of those goofy 'Tame Kings' that the Europeans loved to install in middle eastern countries.
Oil was discovered in 1959, and the King promptly proceeded to line his own and his cronies pockets with oil wealth, much to the displeasure of the rest of the admittedly small population, who were expected to go suck camel droppings.
Bad timing for the King because the winds of change were sweeping through. Nasserism and Baathism, secular, modernist, reforming movements were being felt throughout the Arab world. The corrupt monarchies, beholden to western interests, were not well prepared for these changes, particularly in places of economic change and turmoil. The Saudi Royals who'd always had oil wealth, and the Jordanian Royals who never acquired oil wealth, both weathered. The Libyan royals, joined the gutter of displaced nobility.
Now, monarchical Libya was a backwards feudal state with a repressive social order. So what else is new. The only modernizing force in that state was the army, like most other arab states. You had to keep the Army modern, or some other bastard would eat you. So most of the westernized reformers were coming out of the Army.
This brings us to Colonel Quaddaffi, who took power in 1969, and who has never gotten around to promoting himself. You'd think if he'd kept his nose clean, he's be at least a Brigadier General or something by now.
Instead, he got to be the self styled leader of the revolution, prophet, visionary, what have you.
It's 1969, Nasser has blown his wad in a futile and bungled war, the Syrians look like thugs, and the Iraqi's are no account. Classical secular reformism has had a shit kicking administered.
So, young Quaddaffi comes into power as the next 'bold new thing.' This was an age when good hair and vague platitudes would take you a long way. Quaddaffi immediately saw that 'stick in the mud' westernization just wasn't going to sell. That stuff had the dull plodding sincerity of the old USSR's five year plans, and worse, it was obviously failing, and had taken some big humiliations. These guys were on the way to turning into the the guys they'd kicked out.
Quaddaffi instead glommed onto the notion of social justice as an animating force. Modernization? His whole country were bedouins and crap like that, they didn't want or need to modernize, they liked their culture, they liked their values. They just wanted it to be better. Being better was not walking around in spiffy western suits and ties.
Instead, Quaddaffi found himself a Madonna-like Chameleon. Sometimes he'd be a Colonel in a hyper-modern Libyan state, sometimes he'd be a philosopher king living in a tent wearing traditional clothes and reciting the Koran.
His models were not Stalin or Kruschev, DeGaulle or even Nasser. It was Che Guevera, Fidel Castro, Ho Chi Minh, Abby Hoffman and Jerry Rubin.
Correctly deducing that trying to radically westernize his people would be both unwelcome, destructive and ultimately a failure, he instead offered better services. He spread the wealth around, clinics, hospitals, top o the line stuff, graft, bribes. Oil brought a lot of money into Libya, he correctly assessed that given the nature of the Libyan economy, money that came in would just flush back out, so he circulated it and made people happy.
With his home secure, he turned to larger ambitions - he made a play for leadership in the Muslim world. Nasser, Assad, Saddam, the Shah and Khomeini at one time or another had all largely blown their street cred with futile disasters.
Quaddaffi was going to build his cred by getting behind widows and orphans. He made the palestinian refugees his cause. They were clearly out and out victims. He gave them money, supported their terrorist actions get get attention, provided sanctuary.
It may have made him Asshole Numero Uno in the west, but in the Arab world, he at least had an outsized reputation and genuine credibility. Unlike his freres, his strategy was not confronting Israel, but rather supporting the Palestinians.
This lead to Libya's longstanding support of terrorism and his frictions with the west. And you know what? It worked just fine for him.
And who knows, maybe in the long run, when all the history books are written, Quaddafi's support of the Palestinians, despite his erratic behaviour and flakiness may actually have made a difference.
So what happens to Quaddaffi? Well, in one sense, nothing happens to him. He's been in place since 1969, which makes him one of the most senior Arab leaders and the single most senior revolutionary Arab leader. He's well ensconced in his country, his people are happy with him, he's not going anywhere.
On the other hand, over the years, it became clear that Libya and Quaddaffi were not going to be leading the worldwide Muslim revolution. His effort to position himself on the forefront of Muslim affairs was undermined by events - the Algerian civil war, the Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, the Afghanistan issue, all of which were sufficiently ambiguous and open ended to rely not cater to his swinging 60's black and white, GvsE vibe. Time made his politics irrelevant.
And there was more. He had a falling out and a brief war with Egypt. A military adventure in Chad went tits up in unpleasant ways. He bought all sorts of high tech military hardware which promptly started to rust because the technicans and pilots were lacking.
And he was getting older. It got less and less important to be the great Guru of the Arab Revolution, a revolution no one was paying too, and more important to be comfortable. He had a great gig in Libya, why screw it up the way Saddam had?
And also, he didn't much like these new waves of revolutionaries. Believe it or not, Quaddaffi was among the first to denounce the Jihadist Mujahedeen coming back from Afghanistan. He was the first to see their disruptive potential for harm. He was the first to issue a warrant for the arrest of Osama Bin Laden. He was a modernizing reformer trying to meld east and west. They just wanted back to the middle ages and chopping off the hands of thieves.
Meanwhile the Palestinians were largely grown up. He couldn't control their movement, at best he could support it. Push too hard, and he'd look stupider than usual.
So he started winding down and mending fences. He's been doing that for a decade now.
But because he's a child of the sixties (half idealist, half drama queen), he knows how to make good theatre.
Correctly perceiving that Americans love 'Road to Damascus' revelations, he carefully arranged things and then announced he was BORN AGAIN.
And it worked. America fell for it hook line and sinker. It was perceived the way he wanted it to be perceived.
No one stopped to think "hey, this nuclear program is junk", or to wonder why anyone would bother to store mustard gas under a chicken coop, or to pay attention and notice all the signs of patient bridge building and reform which had been going on with the Europeans.
The moral of the story is that if a guy like Quaddaffi can play America's intellectuals like a fiddle, and make you sit up and roll over like a dog hoping for a bone... what are you all going to do when someone serious comes along to play?
August 20, 2007 3:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
Professor Etzioni,
I generally support your Security First approach, at least insofar as I currently understand it. But what I don't understand is why you are so opposed to the inspections approach to nuclear security. In discussing the Libyan case, you say:
By recognizing that Libya has met international security standards, other rogue nations will note that if they move in the same direction, efforts to bring down their authoritarian regimes will cease. They will be given full access to various international institutions, all sanctions will be lifted, and investment will be encouraged, although promotion of democratization by nonlethal (educational and cultural) means will continue.
So shouldn't the same principles be applied to other cases? That would mean ceasing efforts to end regimes so long as those regimes meet international security standards.
Nations have the right under the NPT to a domestic nuclear power program. We thus cannot articulate a principled set of security standards and requirements without allowing for the possibility that a nation may legally choose to have a nuclear program. What we can demand is that nations take certain steps to provide confident assurance to the world that nuclear fuel generated for nuclear power plants is not being diverted to a weapons program. There are various possible mechanisms that have been proposed, but they all involve inspections of some kind or other.
Libya had only a nuclear weapons program, not a domestic nuclear power program. Thus there was no basis for establishing an inspections regime, or for accepting less than a full dismantlement of the program. Iran, by all accounts, does have an active domestic nuclear power program. The only question is whether it is using that program to hide a nuclear weapons program. The approach used with Libya is not applicable here.
There is a further global security issue that must be weighed in this matter, and that is the global climate change issue. While nuclear power is far from an ideal solution to this problem, raising the the troubling problems of nuclear waste and potential accidents, it is probably an important part of what is, hopefully temporarily, the best current global solution. The shift from fossil fuel burning the nuclear should probably be encouraged in general.
August 20, 2007 3:32 PM | Reply | Permalink
Etzioni writes:
Yeah, right there that kind of puts the finger on the American problem.
Openly attempting to overthrow the government on one hand, and on the other 'merely' asking for inspection sites.
It's one of those 'Gee Granpa, what a big willy you have there' requests, don't you think.
A sensible person might not have that compartmented approach. Rather, if they were the victim of open and ongoing regime change attempts which appear to be near and dear to the adversaries heart and not closely connected to any measures that could be taken to placate... well, that sensible person might be forgiven for doubting the sincerity or triviality of 'inspection requests' and might even be forgiven for imagining that there might be more malignant motives... like gathering targeting intelligence, or preparing the way for a pre-emptive invasion... You know, the exact same things America did to Saddam.
August 20, 2007 3:39 PM | Reply | Permalink
I guess the statute of limitations for blowing 200 American kids out of the sky at Lockerbie has past. Call me a rightwinger, but, for me, the cold blooded murder of innocent Americans flying home for the Christmas/Hanukah holiday renders the perpetrator banned from gushy tributes from Americans forever. I won't even mention the US soldiers at that night club in Germany. Any others? How much American blood does this little dictator have on his hands? Oh yeah. He has oil. I forgot.
August 20, 2007 4:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
And how many young Americans and Vietnamese died because of Richard Nixon? What about the Nicaraguans, the Guatemalans, the El Salvadorans, the Iraq's and Iranians who died for Ronald Reagan's schemes. Factor in the body count for Panama and the Gulf War. Bosnia. How many people has America killed, MJ?
How many innocent little Palestinian or Lebanese tots are pushing up daisies because of Israel. Remember that family that was having a picnic on the beach at Gaza when IDF decided to do a little target practice.
The whole world runs on blood of the innocent, MJ. Fact of life.
I don't lionize Quaddafi, as Etzioni does. But it does no good to demonize him either.
August 20, 2007 4:25 PM | Reply | Permalink
Nice exchange between MJ and Valdron here. I almost posted something like what MJ did but I didn't because of how Valdron responded.
What I don't know is this -- how can despot redeem him or herself?
I suspect that professor Etzioni likes this example because it's one where he can argue for a move towards democracy without military intervention after a security issue has been somewhat settled.
I don't think it's a perfect example, though. I also don't think that we should be so quick to revise opinions about Ghadafi, but we also shouldn't judge him by standards harsher than we hold ourselves to.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
August 20, 2007 4:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
I was scrolling down in anticipation of reading your take on the 1986 attack on Libya by the US in response to terrorist attacks on US military in Europe. Call me disappointed, but if you can recite all the rest of this off the top of your head, what's the significance of the raid and why was it ommited? I have always subscribed to the theory that this was a pivotal moment in the Kadaffi regime.
August 20, 2007 5:48 PM | Reply | Permalink
I guess what I'd say is that Quaddaffi has not redeemed himself. He hasn't had any miraculous conversion. He hasn't seen the light on the road to Damascus.
Rather, he's still just exactly the same guy he's always been. Quaddaffi has not changed. He's still the guy who attended an international summit on a white charger, and who was attended by a staff of martial arts trained female bodyguards. He's still a creature the the theatrical gesture.
The only thing that's changed is... well, nothing's changed. He's still a player of political theatrics, but this time, they were for our benefit.
August 20, 2007 5:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
I don't know that it was all that pivotal. He went on to have the adventure in Chad, as I recall, and the Lockerbie bombing and a few other things took place after that time.
My view is that having survived the attack and suffered the loss of a daughter, Quadaffi bought a certain amount of street cred, and he ran some direct operations in revenge. But I don't think it made for a direct change, it only intensified certain trends, that eventually peaked out on their own and reversed. So personally, off the top of my head, I don't attribute much to it.
But I could stand to be wrong. What's your analysis.
August 20, 2007 8:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
Moved
August 21, 2007 7:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
Some of Etzioni's personal-level discussion of Gaddafi also left me perplexed. For example this:
Recently he [Barber] dropped by to visit with none other than the Libyan leader Mohammar Gaddafi. Barber found him a much more attractive figure than the Western media has long depicted as the “implacable despot” from Tripoli.
This sort of irrelevant personal observation comes off as rather naive, and even disturbing. All sorts of monsters throughout history have been absolute charmers in person. I'm reminded of the passage in the Bothers Karamazov in which Ivan describes a string of Turkish atrocities, before ironically concluding "the Turks are very fond of sweets, you know".
Exactly how is it that one would expect an implacable despot to behave in an audience? Bad men do not all have horns, wear a permanent scowl, and pull the wings off of insects. They don't wear an "implacable despot" tee shirt to all of their meetings. Some of them are affable, have a good sense of humor, enjoy poetry and music, are kind to the little children they meet, and shed tears when their puppies die, or when they listen to "Puff, the Magic Dragon". But they also murder lots of people. What does a leader's personal "attractiveness" have to do with his moral responsibilities, and with balanced international decisions about how to treat the state he governs?
I'm all for the practical policy of treating states in accordance with their international behavior. If a state meets its international obligations, and contributes in a positive way - or at least a non-negative way - to the international security environment, then they should not be ostracized and should be regarded as members in good standing of the international community. If they were formerly roguish, outlaw states under various sanctions, and then they demonstrably change their ways, they should be brought in from the cold.
But we're just talking politics here. It's not an state leader beauty contest. Good state behavior should be rewarded with good international relations. But that doesn't require singing glowing encomiums about their leaders and giving those leaders roses, teddy bears and other special prizes. If some international organization awards a "Not as Much of a Wacked-Out Prick as He Used to Be" certificate and merit badge, then they can give one to Gaddafi. But we don't need to go building statues to him.
I hope the US is able to repair its international image during the next administration by changing its behavior across several fronts. But I certainly wouldn't expect rational states to change their policies and attitudes toward the US simply because they find our next leader more personally "attractive." And if George Bush happens to get through his term without attacking Iran, I don't think he thereby merits laudatory books dedications such as: "To George W. Bush, Attractive Statesman and Heroic Non-Nuker of Persians."
August 21, 2007 7:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
I concur on the bizarre Gaddafi-is-a-reasonable-guy narrative... Gaddafi has had several decades to hone his image as a benevolent dictator, with particular attention to showing hospitality to foreigners. But it doesn't mean that he is any less of a thug whenever he chooses.
I don't think it's any great surprise that the much-vaunted disarmament in 2003 was the culmination of a long and complicated process of moving Libya out of isolation. My take is that there was an acceleration from the moment Nelson Mandela, who had access to Gaddafi from the support Libya had provided to the ANC, stepped in to broker progress over Lockerbie. The give-up of the nuclear materials was the blue riband event to mark Gaddafi's return from the cold, and a helpful dog-and-pony show for Bush and Blair against the backdrop of the Iraqi WMD nonsense.
But I guess the key issue here is how to prioritize our interests, where we put nuclear proliferation on the list of global problems we want to solve.
Professor Etzioni's view seems to be that non-proliferation should be at the very top, and truth be told, I'd probably have it there too. The specific question, however, is whether disarmament per se is worthy of a Nobel Prize, or whether taking actions to make disarmament more likely (or re-armament less likely) are what should be rewarded. (though this goes into the wider debate of whether the Nobel prize should be awarded pre-emptively)
Because as far as I could tell, Gaddafi used his nuclear capability as a bargaining chip, a very big one, to extract maximal concessions around ending Libyan isolation. There's been no privatization of the Libyan oil industry, and a stony silence on Libyan human rights. In fact, can anyone tell us how Gaddafi is much changed since he gave up his pile of nuclear contraband? Or should we care that he is not much changed now he is non-nuclear?
I think I can see Etzioni's point, but ultimately all we'd be doing is patting Gaddafi on the back for finally complying with existing NPT obligations. Also, you'd think the ending of Libyan isolation might sufficiently incentivize others to disarm if they were already that way inclined. And finally, the desire to possess nuclear weapons is often only a symptom of deeper problems. Rewarding disarmament - especially the stage-managed Libyan variety - might only exascerbate the underlying tension that causes armament in the first place.
August 21, 2007 7:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
Drawing any sort of parallel between North Korea and Libya with Iran is false.
Iran HAS opened its program to IAEA inspections - MORE inspections that it is required to permit - and there has been no evidence of a weapons program:
IAEA Update Brief January 30 2006And rather than withdrawing from the NonProliferation Treaty as N. Korea did, Iran has even offered to impose additional restrictions on its nuclear program beyond what it is legally obliged to permit.
All Iran asks in return is that its right to enrichment be recognized - and the US has refused to do so.
August 21, 2007 8:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
I have always viewed the attacks as a force that ratcheted up the level of Libyan state sponsored terrorism to world class levels including the bombings of PA-103 and UTA-772. It wasn't until the US invasion of Iraq that he really reversed course.
August 21, 2007 8:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
Debateable on both points I think.
If you look at Quaddaffi's history, he was already aligning himself with 'terrorist' or 'social struggle' groups from shortly after his accession to power. As noted elsewhere, he funded Nelson Mandela and the South African ANC. He also supported the Palestinians, the Basques, etc. He was already establishing his history and pattern before the attacks.
I will agree that it probably ratcheted up the level of Libyan state sponsored terrorism, and it probably inspired Libya to take a more direct hand.
As for reversing course, I'd place that reversal in the period of the 1990's. Go take a second look at Libyan relations with Europe during that period, there was considerably more nuance and evolution going on.
The American Invasion of Iraq was a 'false marker' for Libya. It didn't truly represent a period of change of policy for the Libyans.
August 21, 2007 8:51 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for sharing your insight.
August 21, 2007 9:11 AM | Reply | Permalink
You left off the words "you prick." at the end of your sentence. Not to worry.
I'm sorry if I invited you to extend your views and then negatived them. That must seem passive aggressive of me. I certainly did not mean to be harsh upon you.
It may well be correct that the incidents you cite were transformative turning points in Libyah politics, as opposed to my view that there were simply milestones on directions that were already being travelled.
I think that the best approach to sorting it out is to spend some time studying Libyan politics and actions before and after the milestones or turning points, to see if Libya really did turn, or if this was just a marker of existing progress. It may be that the truth lies somewhere in between for us.
In my own experience, I tend to be skeptical of the notion of radical changes. States like Libya with long term stable governments tend to carry a lot of inertia.
You get the same guys in power, decade after decade, they've got the same sets of interests acting on them, their world view changes only slowly, if at all. Their entire world is geared to stability, stability of them on the top, stability of the arrangement of their country in an orderly fashion with them on the top, stability of perspectives, views, ideologies. Their policies change slowly if at all, and even beneath the level of leadership, there is resistance to change.
Consider Syria. Old man Assad was a thug who ruled the country with an iron fist. When designated heir #1 died, he pulled in his second son... an optomotrist. Younger Assad attempted various sorts of liberalization efforts. Has Syria blossomed into a democracy? No. The dictatorial machinery that old Assad built proved to have a great deal of inertia, it was resistant to young Assads efforts to open up. Change and progress in Syria happens slowly, if at all.
It's not just Libya and Syria. Look at Saudi Arabia, look at Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq under Saddam, Egypt under Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak. Stable governments make for stable policies, lots of inertia, and very little flexibility. There are very few dramatic 'about faces.' (the most notable, and most astonishing being Sadat's visit to Israel).
Living in Democracies, which can experience radical shifts of government and of policy, we get spoiled.
August 21, 2007 9:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
“The first strategy is in line with the Security First approach; the second—with the Neo-Con notion that democratization drives security.”
I am confused by this belief that democracy would drive security and even more surprised that the US would be pushing for it. Democracy will put in power a party of any ideological stripe that the enfranchised feel reflects their views.
Looking down Valdron’s partial list of US attempts at regime change the one thing that is clear is that US has spent the post WWII period trying to remove democratically elected governments and replace them with something the US administration of the day prefers. In the latter half of the 20th century that would be anyone who could be tarred Socialist or Communist and latterly Islamist or in some way detrimental to US business interests. The result of unfettered democracy in most of the countries with a Muslim majority would be an American nightmare. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, Afghanistan, Pakistan (and all the ex-Soviet –stans), the only thing holding these states from being openly hostile are repressive regimes who are much more amenable to the US wishes than their populations as a whole.
Dan K said
“Good state behavior should be rewarded with good international relations.” This puts us in a sticky position and probably explains why international opinion polls show us as being so unpopular. We are going to have to work hard for a long time to re-establish squandered trust.
Nuclear inspection seems sensible and necessary the problem is the blatant asymmetry in the way some in the west seem to interpret the NPT. As I watched The US President on a stage with his Indian counterpart to sign a nuclear exchange treaty use that stage to attack Iran’s enrichment program with a straight face I had to wonder what message the world would take from this image. Develop a bomb outside the NTP and we will reward you (if you are on our Christmas card list), sign up for IAEA & NTP, disavow nuclear weapons, agree to inspection of your enrichment levels and we will vilify you.
This is my first post here and I am sorry it has ended up being a bit of a US bash but some these policies are so bizarre and counter-productive I could not let them pass without comment.
August 21, 2007 10:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
Good first post JJackson. Welcome.
August 21, 2007 10:29 AM | Reply | Permalink
I think Dan K and others have been helpful in complaining about the nice guy thing. I'd like to look behind it, though, at why it's important to Etzioni's framing of things.
We tend to believe in leaning hard on our friends and negotiating with our enemies. Obama basically formulated just that, and hawks have chastised him for it. Etzioni is prepared to deal with Libya but can't abandon his militarism. The solution: cool guy! Let's bomb someone else instead, I guess.
Sure, we need to deal with Libya rather than rely on isolating it and tossing in a few vague threats. It's the right way of going about foreign policy in general, as Bush had to concede silently facing North Korea. And sure, we need, as Etzioni says, also to push for liberalization and human rights. It's in our practical interest to support the political aspirations of others, and it's also in the interest of justice. Let's just not create illusions in order to sustain a lousy foreign policy that denies both needs more generally.
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
August 21, 2007 10:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
Certainly Qaddafi noticed our invasion of Iraq, but he likely also noted we didn't have any remaining forces capable of more than delivering ordinance. He had already taken hits and survived. I doubt he lost much sleep about Iraq, except maybe in celebrating our expected embarrassment.
It's fair to say we have had differences with Libya, but it's not fair to demonize a leader for using proxies and supporting insurgencies when we do the same. We can complain about the choice of friends but not the tactics, although I except Lockerbie as outside the pale. And that crime was prosecuted.
August 21, 2007 11:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
Perhaps Etzioni is merely pointing out that Quaddaffi has always been our ally against Eastasia, whom we have always been at war with.
August 21, 2007 12:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Sheesh, I didn't consider your response as negative. You said my belief of the impact of certain historical events vis a vis Libya was debatable and then gave a reasoned explanation for that statement. As you obviously have a far better command of the topic than I, I simply voiced my appreciation for your time taken to respond.
August 21, 2007 12:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
Oh, sorry about that then. My problem is that sometimes I'm a bit too rough with people. If I feel that I might have stepped on someone's head without meaning too, then I try to apologize. No harm done.
August 21, 2007 1:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
Agreed.
August 21, 2007 4:35 PM | Reply | Permalink
This is going to sound meaner than I intend but...
It's a little odd to me that Professor Etzioni is willing to find a way to forgive and work with Ghadaffi, but that just a few posts ago he was harshly criticizing average people who didn't heroically save somebody from a mugging attempt in a convenience store.
Maybe the comparison between the two posts isn't perfect but I am left with the feeling that Professor Etzioni has more regard for world leaders than for people just trying to get through their lives.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
August 21, 2007 5:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
Adds to the feeling of an agenda being pursued. Consider that the last two are pretty tangential (on the surface) to the major situations eing discussed here. Why bring them up? Qui bono?
August 21, 2007 8:11 PM | Reply | Permalink