“Home Prices Are Falling Like Almost Never Before”
Those are the words of Angelo R. Mozila, the chairman and chief executive of Countrywide Financial, the country’s largest mortgage lender. After all those assurances, from all those housing experts, that nationwide house prices never fall, it now looks like house prices are falling.
The basic story is that we are looking at a downward cascading price path. Increasing defaults lead to more desperation sales, which puts further downward pressure on prices. Further declines in prices, lead to more defaults. The soaring default rate also constricts mortgage loans as investors become less anxious to give away money for people to buy overpriced homes. When buyers have more difficulty getting mortgages, many get shut out of the market, which puts more downward pressure on prices. It ain’t pretty, as Mr. Mozila and others are now recognizing.
The painful part of this story is that it was all predictable and preventable. According to government data, nationwide house prices have tracked the overall rate of inflation throughout the post-war period. Yale economist Robert Shiller has constructed a data set showing that house prices have tracked inflation going to 1895. Suddenly in 1995 house prices began to rise substantially more rapidly than the overall rate of inflation. In the period from 1995 to 2006, house prices rose by more than 70 percent, after adjusting for inflation.
What explained this sudden departure from the housing price path of the last hundred years? Some economists claimed that strong income growth was pushing up house prices. Indeed, income growth was good in the last four years in the 90s, but no better than the in the first quarter century of the post-war era, a period which saw no run-up in real house prices. And since 2000, income growth has been weak.
Some economists (including Alan Greenspan) attributed the run-up to immigration. Well the impact of immigration on the growth in the number of households was dwarfed by the impact of the baby boomers forming their own households in the 70s and 80s, a phenomenon that also did not lead to a run-up in house sale prices. Furthermore, not many immigrants can afford the median home, which costs more than $400,000 in Boston, San Francisco, and many other bubble areas.
On the supply side, we had stories about environmental restrictions limiting construction. This one also didn’t seem to fit. The Gingrich tsunami, which also swept in Republicans at the state level, did not produce a wave of new environmental regulation. Besides, housing starts were soaring, hitting near record highs at the start of the current decade.
Some economists also boldly pointed out that land is in fixed supply. Of course, this did not first become true in 1995.
In short, there was no explanation for this sudden run-up in house sale prices based on fundamentals. Furthermore, if the run-up in prices was explained by fundamentals, then it should also show up in the rental market. Rents did modestly outpace inflation from 1995 to 2003, but in the last three years, rents have been falling in real terms. Not much of a story here.
Enterprising economists might have taken note of the fact that 1995 was the beginning of the stock bubble, when prices really started to diverge from fundamentals in a big way. It is easy to tell a story of a housing bubble growing side by side with a stock bubble; we had just seen it in Japan in the 1980s.
While some of us did try to warn of the risks of a housing bubble, these warnings were largely ignored. Alan Greenspan dismissed the idea that there was a housing bubble and insisted that even if there is a bubble, it is better to deal with the fallout after it bursts than to try to reign in the bubble directly. I suppose that we will have the opportunity to test this claim.
As the extent of the problem becomes clearer over the next six months, we should be especially attentive towards efforts to rewrite history. It is common for people to now say that everyone recognized the stock bubble in the 90s. This is not true, which can be easily shown by reading what economists said at the time (note the prediction of 1640 for the S&P 500 by the end of 2002). The vast majority of the economics profession either missed the housing bubble altogether or dismissed its importance at the time. This should not be forgotten.













There are lots of Harry Truman's one-armed economists are there? :-)
The speculative price increases vary widely over the country. We had something other than a bubble when the local AF Base closed.
Unlike stocks, most people buy houses to live in rather than for speculative purposes. Undoubtedly even we dummies are not unaware of price fluctuations.
Any thoughts on how this might end and when or do you have two arms? :-)
Best, Terry
July 25, 2007 6:35 AM | Reply | Permalink
Greenspan dismissing the bubble is laughable. He created it. And he created it on purpose in order to stimulate debt driven consumer spending so as to keep the 2001 recession both relatively mild and short.
Just not sure what bubble the Fed can try to use now that the consumer is tapped out. Ideally we'd get a Cap-Ex bubble from the corporate sector (which might actually have long term benefits for our infrastructure) but I don't think the suits are going to fall for that. In fact the government tried to stoke this by offering a tax break on repatriated profits. Led to the companies hording cash or using it to buy each other, spiking M&A activity but leaving the economy less diverse than it was before.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 25, 2007 9:30 AM | Reply | Permalink
I used to watch lots of stock picking shows, and what you're missing here is the single minded, blind determination to peddle some stock ... in some cases, any stock ...
"So, would you recommend getting into manufactured housing, as people are squeezed out the bottom of the built-on-site market?"
July 25, 2007 9:55 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm not sure I follow why that would be. I can see why rising interest rates might cause those with ARMs and other variable rate loans to default. But why would the valuation of the home affect the owner's ability to pay back an existing loan? If anything it seems to me it would decrease the owners property tax burden.
I guess its possible the owners equity could get erased and they may suddenly find themselves upside-down in the loan, and the lender may sting them somehow for that.
Could you explain?
July 25, 2007 10:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
It's possible that the decreasing collateral on some home equity lines might cause those terms to change (Higher fees and interest).
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 25, 2007 10:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
Dean you were the first to convincingly call the real estate bubble, in 2002. Good work.
What have you done for us lately?
;-)
July 25, 2007 10:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
I expect a retrenchment at some point-- hey, that's what markets do-- and some folks who borrowed foolishly to get that McMansion will get hurt, but a block from my house, which I rehabed and refinanced about six years ago at a value around $600,000, there are two houses going up at over $2 million. On skinny little Chicago lots.
So I'll believe it's over when those get slashed to $299,000. The relish with which some people want to believe this is a big problem (just in time for the election!) is rather unseemly.
July 25, 2007 10:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
Defaults are usually caused by some setback, an illness, job loss, etc. A decline in home value means that you can't refinance your mortgage to weather the setback.
July 25, 2007 10:28 AM | Reply | Permalink
A declining price increases the default risk for two reasons. As one comment pointed out, it can eliminate the possibility of getting a home equity loan to keep a house if job loss or illness makes it impossible to meet mortgage payments.
The second reason is that if people are struggling to make payments on a home where they owe more than the value, they may make the decision to just turn it over to the bank. Most people will not do this, but if a large share of homeowners have zero equity, then if even a small share of the people in this boat decide to default, it can be a very big deal.
July 25, 2007 10:53 AM | Reply | Permalink
It is a big problem for the securitized mortgage markets and the investors (including pension funds and insurers) who hold the instruments. All home values will suffer when liquidity dries up, but some more than others. There will be fewer qualified buyers. Real estate values will hold up better if there has not been a speculative run up locally and if local circumstances keep up demand. Your part of Chicago may qualify on one or both counts. The same circumstances may not apply to new housing in the exurbs which may be hit by a combination of higher interest rates, fewer qualified buyers and even higher fuel costs.
July 25, 2007 11:06 AM | Reply | Permalink
Dean,
Reign in? Have you been taking spelling lessons from Matt Yglesias?
July 25, 2007 1:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
There are limits to how much new housing can be built in San Francisco, Boston, etc. due to zoning regulations, including those pertaining to multifamily units, minimum lot size, etc. The teardowns in Chicago described by an earlier commenter would be difficult or impossible, at least in Boston.
People also live longer, and homestead and senior citizen property tax breaks reduce the incentive to sell.
July 25, 2007 1:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
"The painful part of this story is that it was all predictable and preventable."
How could it have been prevented?
July 25, 2007 1:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
“Home Prices Are Falling Like Almost Never Before”
EXCEPT: THEY AREN'T
average and median sale prices of existing home sales slumped last year but have been rising steadily and modestly every month since january and as of june were slightly higher (+0.3%) over where they were in june 2006.
July 25, 2007 1:55 PM | Reply | Permalink
If Alan Greenspan had taken advantage of his position as Fed chair to carefully explain the basic facts of the housing bubble, presenting the same sort of data that I have in my papers or Robert Shiller has, it would have received enormous attention from the house buying public. My guess is that it would have been sufficient to prevent many if not most people from buying houses at bubble inflated prices.
Of course, we can't know for sure whether Fed talk would work until it is tried. But, this policy would have no downside. If it didn't work, the only cost is the few charts that the Fed would have made up detailing the divergence of house prices from fundamental values. Talk is cheap.
July 25, 2007 2:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
That's not to say the situation is the same in South Florida, say, where for some time there seemed to be an endless ability to build more luxury condo units to sell the investors (often just speculators), or in various housing markets characterized by more and more suburban sprawl, with few limits on development.
July 25, 2007 2:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
Hate to be the nitpicker, but his name is spelled Mozilo.
July 25, 2007 2:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
It is true, Dean, if I may use your first name, that you have been on record since at least Aug 2002 that housing prices have been overvalued. However, I don't think you predicted in 2002 that the alleged bubble would pop in 2006-07. Since prices continued to rise for several years after your call, and a lot of bets contrary to the bearish call paid off lucratively, the prophetic aspect of the call should not be overstated.
I also question the use of the term "bubble". I recall looking a couple of years ago at the literature on bubbles and I thought it was not a settled question as to how economists define a bubble and thus it is not self-evident now that the housing price run up was a "bubble" as opposed to a more modestly labeled event. I don't claim the market was perfectly rational the past 10 years but I think there is more to the spectrum than a) perfect rationality and b) bubble.
The indices of housing prices do show the rise in housing prices that you report. Personally I prefer the OFHEO index because it tracks back only to 1975, whereas I reject the use of century-old housing prices in the Shiller graphs as having anything meaningful to contribute to today's analysis. There was a lot more buildable volume a century ago and many fewer people, so the supply (including not only built units but also buildable vacant land and airspace) and demand have changed so meaningfully since then such that I believe data that old are worthless. Pre-mortgage deduction, pre-seoondary mortgage market, that housing market, on a macro basis, seems very different to me than the market of the last 40-50 years.
Further there is the hedonic aspect: people require much more sq ft per person in 2007 than in 1907 or 1957 from their housing stock; indoor plumbing, central air, etc., etc. - all of which either changes the supply demand ratio per unit measured, or changes the value and cost of each unit. But the indices, even though they use repeat data points, by their own admission do not attempt to capture the hedonic aspect of the units whose sale prices are captured. Thus teardowns and rebuilds, or additions, do not flow into the measurement of what is a house. The indices measure dollars paid per house not per square foot which might tell a more conservative story. For example, my own house will sell for double what I paid for it 10 years ago, but I have converted two attics and a basement into bedrooms and an office and added a deck. Since I keep track of my expenses on quicken, I can tell you that I will not make a profit despite the nominal doubling of purchase price that the indices will pick up - any one who buys from me will be buying about 150% of the house I bought in terms of finished square feet. That 50% difference (200% - 150%) over 10 years is in line with inflation, not far in excess of it. Since people on average tend, in my estimation, to improve their housing stock rather than let it degrade, housing prices - measured per housing unit, as opposed to square footage -should, all other things being equal, rise over time as that process plays out. Failure to attend to the hedonic changes means that the indices are limited in the information they convey.
So too, while the indices show price appreciation, they do not purport to explain what caused the price appreciation. And I have not seen analysis that rigorously examines the factors behind it such that one can conclude with confidence that it is a "bubble" -- which to me conveys a sense of demand run amok with no reason behind it other than pure speculation. Demographic factors stimulating second home purchases have provided a substantial impetus to increase demand the past several years and many of the markets where there has been the highest price appreciation are those where second home buyers have been especially active; those buyers in turn create demand for services, retail, etc. that attracts additional demand for residence and so on. There is no model I know of that unpacks all the causes of price appreciation - demographic, hedonic, structural changes in mortgage financing, etc. - and establishes that a purely speculative bubble has occurred.
Due to the limits of the data and analysis to date, I respectfully withhold judgment on the "bubble" characterization and I am skeptical of the doomsday prophesying of Prof. Shiller that a 75% drop in prices will occur between now and 2011-2012.
July 25, 2007 3:38 PM | Reply | Permalink
Re: Increasing defaults lead to more desperation sales, which puts further downward pressure on prices.
Good! Housing prices should be going down-- houses became way too overvalued during the housing bubble. And we ough to be celebrating this as it will take at least some of the pressure off the middle class. If the cost of healthcare or college were declining we'd be celebrating. As for equity-- hey, houses are places to live, not savings vehicles. If you want to invest money put it in stocks, bonds, mutual funds or a good old fashioned savings account.
Re: average and median sale prices of existing home sales slumped last year but have been rising steadily and modestly every month since january and as of june were slightly higher (+0.3%) over where they were in june 2006.
Is this the sale price of houses or the asking price? I'm not surprised the asking price hasn;t dec;ined: peopel can be stubborn and if they aren't desperate to sell they can sit on their overpriced house for years. And one figure that is declining as a result: fewer house are being sold.
July 25, 2007 4:08 PM | Reply | Permalink
Economist Dean Baker was so worried about a housing bubble that he sold his Washington, D.C., condominium . . . [in 2003] . . . . Now, about two years later, he's still waiting for the bubble to pop. csmonitor 4/4/2005
If it pleaseth thee, Lord, make those insane, irrational home prices fall! Do that Lord and I'll never ask for another thing; I promise.
July 25, 2007 5:24 PM | Reply | Permalink
that would be sale price. and yes, volume is down and inventory is up as a result, thus accounting for the cooler rate at which median and average sale prices have been rising.
July 25, 2007 5:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm not sure why one would prefer an index because it doesn't go back before 1975, but if your intent is to shorten your frame of reference, you're welcome to do so. I just don't see any rationale for it.
As far as the issue of quality improvements on existing homes, a Fed study tried to make this argument a few years back. We actually have good data on spending on quality improvements, it's the wrong order of magnitude and has been falling relative to home sale prices over the last decade (see this CEPR study).
The timing of a bubble is determined by pyschological factors, which I would not claim to be able to predict. I began being concerned about the stock bubble in 1997. For three years it kept rising. I first took note of the housing bubble in 2002. If I was a better economist I would have noticed it two years sooner.
July 25, 2007 9:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
This is a preposterous posting by Baker. He gives not one datum to support the truth of
Mozila's statement that home prices are falling "almost like never before." He just says, hey, housing prices have gone up a lot since 1995, so they MUST crash at some point, an inferential argument not supported by a single fact.
As for housing "bubbles" in Boston, San Francisco, Washington, and New York, these are certainly not the places experiencing the sharpest declines in home sales or the sale prices of homes on the market. Nor are they the places that experienced the sharpest INCREASES in home sale prices. Desirable places to live remain desirable, and the competition for limited existing housing stocks in desirable cities like these have prevented housing price free fall. While 10 to 20 percent annual increases in home values may be over--for now--in Boston, San Fran and New York, the places experiencing the real busts are the newer, speculative communities of the sun belt: places like Florida and Arizona, where housing "values" doubled from one year to the next, driven up by speculation and fad-driven, frenzied buying.
Exaggerated expectations of increasing personal income and ever-increasing prices may have led some investors and even some individuals to make unwise real estate purchases or take out too-burdensome mortgages. But that hardly constitutes a "crash" in markets like Boston, San Francisco, and New York.
July 26, 2007 4:09 AM | Reply | Permalink
I think we have to keep intent in mind here. It's an economist's job to say whether there is or isn't a bubble. Not to give a timing call.
Sometimes, timing matters. If you're predicting where interest rates will be, you're usually doing it on a 12 month timeframe. If you're an analysts making earnings projections you're working 1-3 years out.
But when you're doing this kind of work the idea is to answer "is there right now, or isn't there right now?"
Dean noticed the housing bubble before a lot of people.
It was a description, not a trading call. When it popped is another question entirely.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 26, 2007 6:39 AM | Reply | Permalink
Thanks for your link to the 2004 article Dean. There is a simple gap between us in how we are stating the proposition. I believe that the thesis you set forth errs in being binary. Two factors for price appreciation are considered: inflation and bubble. What is not inflation is bubble. I disagree and assert that there are multiple factors: inflation, speculation, hedonics, and, over the long term, demographics and mortgage market changes.
Your 2004 paper critiquing the Fed's hedonics analysis faults it by saying the hedonics change is too small to explain the price appreciation by itself. I agree but the answer is not to zero it out. I simply contend it is a factor (even your paper, I think, verifies it is accountable for 1/8th of the appreciation) and thus must be added to the formula, along with demographic changes - e.g., a population that is increasing demand for 2nd homes in certain areas, etc. Your 2004 critique does not examine the possiblity that demographic changes, region to region, explain the gap you notice between increased expenditures on home improvement vs home price appreciation within regions. It could easily be, for example, that midwesterners appear to be overspending on home improvement because demand for homes in their region is flagging to begin with.
I don't assert that speculation is having a zero impact but I don't believe there is a scientific basis to state that all appreciation in excess of inflation is solely due to speculation.
Sorry I was not clear enough re why I devalue the prewar part of the Shiller index that goes back to 1898 - to state it simply, imo, Americans' consumption of housing and housing finance have both changed so radically, prewar to postwar, that I don't believe prewar housing transactions are sufficiently comparable to postwar transactions for prewar data to be instructive going forward.
Thanks for the debate.
July 26, 2007 8:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
You refer to "the housing bubble" as an observed fact - but what exactly is a "bubble" - is it any thing more than what Potter Stewart said about pornography - "I know it when I see it"? Your comment assumes as a fact what is actually in dispute - the existence of a bubble across the entire housing market of the United States, which is a multitrillion dollar market. I don't believe the data support such a broad conclusion.
July 26, 2007 8:36 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Baker gives not one datum to support the truth of Mozila's statement that home prices are falling "almost like never before."
Do you have reason to doubt this statement? Mozilo is certainly in the position to know.
July 26, 2007 8:43 AM | Reply | Permalink
BIG TROUBLE AHEAD...
Historically, housing prices have increased by the rate of inflation PLUS 3%. This rule still exists, the problem is that the Government is lying about the inflation number. If you use the CPI equation from the Reagan years, you would end up with an inflation rate of 9% to 11% over the past 5 years. Housing went up accordingly. The Federal Reserve dropped rates and kept them low due to "low inflation" BECAUSE they don't include house prices in the equation. Your house may have doubled, but our currency has been halved. GOLD and HOUSES went up together, the dollar dropped.
The Bush administation has turned the dollar into a peso. IT is great for Wall Street since multinational companies are getting paid in strong foreign currencies. Half the earnings on the S&P were due to currency exchange. It is all a mirage and as Bob Rubin has said "the day of reckoning" is coming.
July 26, 2007 12:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
mozilo has a self-interest in explaining countrywide's woes (anticipated or actual). that alone is reason to be skeptical of anything he says on the matter without any actual supporting data. and i would say that the national association of realtors is in a much better position to know what's going on with home prices and their data flatly refutes mozilo's claims.
July 26, 2007 12:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
For evidence of falling houise prices, you can look to the realtors metro area indices. These show extraordinary year over year (YOY) price declines in a large number of metro areas. The data only runs through the first quarter. It's a safe bet the second quarter data will look considerably worse.
Also, it's important to keep in mind that this data does not adjust for changes in the mix of homes sold. With the collapse of subprime lending, undoubtedly sales of low priced homes have fallen off more than higher priced homes. This will skew the median upward. Also, it is a common practice in many markets for sellers to give kickbacks at closing in the range of 2-3 percent of the sale price. This also will not be picked up in these measures, which rely on contracted prices.
Another source is the new homes sales data which shows a 2.2 percent nominal decline YOY. The Case-Shiller index, which tracks resales of the same home also shows declines for many of the 10 cities for which it exists.
As far as the credibility of Mr. Mozilo in saying that he had never seen price declines of this magnitude, this is not a self-serving statement. It is Mr. Mozilo's job to know the housing market. That is what he gets paid tens of millions of dollars to do. When he expresses surprise at a sudden plunge in house prices, as he appears to be doing, it is effectively saying "I am a complete idiot." It does not get him off the hook with his board and shareholders.
July 26, 2007 2:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
Doesn't sound like his board's all that tough.
July 26, 2007 5:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
A 2.2% nominal decline in new home prices, after years of larger than average increases, could easily be interpreted as a market correction, rather than a free-fall that is "almost" without precedent.
As for the Case-Schiller index, between the last quarter of 2001 and mid-2006 (18 quarters), it has increased every quarter by an average per quarter increase of 4.09--a total of 73.68 points, from 116.23 to 189.91 in mid-2006. Over the past three quarters it has declined by 0.93, 1.63, and 1.36, to 185.99. Some free-fall!
July 28, 2007 9:49 AM | Reply | Permalink