Excerpts from Security First
From the Preface:
Rarely have more profound changes in American foreign policy been called for than today. Democratization as the rallying cry of America's mission in the world has essentially failed, and global respect for American power has dwindled. This book, however, is not one more lengthy criticism of past policies--whether those of the Bush administration or of its predecessors, or of the conflicting Democratic agendas. I file here a brief for the future, about that which must next be done on the international front.
My argument is that there are strong principled and pragmatic reasons to turn U.S. foreign policy 180 degrees: instead of assuming that democratizing nations such as Iraq and Afghanistan will turn them into guardians of the peace and reliable friends, we must aim first to ensure basic security, both for its own sake and for the sake of the democracy that might gradually grow in these faraway places. Moreover, I show that not only in these two nations, but also in many other parts of the world, security drives democracy, while democracy does not beget security.
Instead of threatening nations such as North Korea and Iran with "regime change," we must understand that rogue states will not surrender their nuclear weapons and the means to produce them--until we pledge not to topple their governments. Leverage used against Russia and China to pressure them to democratize should instead first be deployed to encourage them to contain the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies. And instead of taking us into nations such as Grenada, Panama, or Haiti, the "Security First" approach to foreign policy would have taken us into Rwanda and Darfur--where millions of lives were and still are threatened.
The book has a subplot: an examination of the psychological factors that deeply affect the ways many Americans view and deal with the world. Evidence presented in the following pages indicates that American foreign policy suffers from a "Multiple Realism Deficiency Disorder" (MRDD), or a "realism deficiency," for short.
From Part I:
To digress briefly: prior to Israeli independence in 1948, the Jewish community in British Palestine was engaged in a war of national liberation. Its diplomatic representatives and underground forces sought to make the British cede control of the area to the Jewish community, and thus accord it an opportunity to invest the Jewish people, as an ethnoreligious community, in a state. The underground forces were politically divided. One, called the Palmach, in which I served, was close to the social-democratic labor party, Mapai, to which David Ben-Gurion and Golda Meier belonged. The other, Irgun, was close to the right-wing Heruit, predecessor to Likud. The Palmach's strategy was to destroy the bridges and police stations and other assets that the British used, but often only after they were warned to leave. The Irgun, on the other hand, directly attacked British personnel; in one of its major operations it blew up part of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, which served as a British headquarters.
Soon after the founding of the State of Israel, Ben-Gurion feared that these political factions would follow their own agendas. He therefore decided--in the midst of a war against seven invading Arab armies, during which casualties were very high and the survival of Israel was far from assured--to send my unit to surround the main contingent of the Irgun, demanding that they disarm and join the newly formed Israeli Defense Force. The Irgun very reluctantly disbanded. Next the Palmach was dissolved, leaving only one Israeli armed force--one loyal to the national, democratically elected, government.
All the conditions that made this kind of nation-building possible in Israel are lacking in Iraq and Afghanistan. The members of the different political factions in Israel had a strong, shared commitment to Israeli nationhood, and they saw the danger of the invading Arab armies as vastly exceeding in importance their domestic rivalries. Ben-Gurion was a highly charismatic and effective statesman; no one claimed that he was a puppet manipulated by a foreign government or that foreign influence implications for newly liberated nations was shaping the institutions of the new Israeli state. In short, both the Irgun and the Palmach were hard-pressed to find legitimate reasons to refuse to disband. The United States probably expected similar developments in the wake of the fall of Saddam and the Taliban, but by all indications such national unity remains very elusive. Here the Ben-Gurion strategy, of rapid nation-building under fire, cannot be followed.
From Part I, pp. 3-4:
It is often ignored by politicians who make grand promises that cannot be realized, and by many individuals?especially can-do, positive-thinking, optimistic Americans?who shy away from hard choices. To highlight this point here are the results of an informal survey I conducted. When I asked fellow Americans for their reaction to a news item that someone was in a car accident, his leg was pinned down, and it had to be amputated so that he could be evacuated, the first response of practically all those I queried was, "Was there no way to save the leg?!" This was said often with considerable anger or dismay. I grant that this is a decent, humane response. One empathizes with the victim and wishes him, well, a leg. However, if such sentiments cause one to delay making the tough choices, causing the victim to bleed out, what has started as a well-meaning, good-hearted reluctance to act turns into a death sentence. It is my thesis that this is approximately what is happening in most places when foreign powers seek to impose regime change in the name of spreading their own, arguably preferable, political institutions and corollary values.
From Part III, Chapter A:
Since 9/11 the U.S. government (and some influential public intellectuals, long before that pivotal date) have grossly exaggerated the size of our opposition and mischaracterized its nature, and in the process they have come to view many potential allies as enemies. It is as if during the Cold War the United States had viewed France and Italy as part of the Soviet empire, 86 the true fault line because they had large communist parties. To sort out who is "in," who is "out," and who is neither--so far--will take several steps.
First, I briefly review several belief systems (four religious and two secular) in order to show that the major fault line runs not between "us" and "them," but through each belief system; that each contains elements that can be employed to justify violence, as well as elements that can be employed to oppose violence; that in all these "civilizations" there are those who draw on extreme beliefs to justify their violent actions, to whom I refer as "Warriors," but also those who draw on moderate beliefs to justify their efforts at peaceful persuasion--"Preachers" in this book.
Second, I point out that Islam is no different in this respect from the other civilizations and belief systems reviewed herein. I draw on textual analysis, public opinion polls, and reports by observers to support this claim. Finally, I try to show that major segments of the Muslim world are neither pro-liberal democracy nor pro-violence. Call them "Illiberal Moderates." I ask about the major implications for our security in particular and foreign policy in general of this finding.
From Part IV, Chapter A:
Security cannot merely or even mainly be based on military forces, police, and other means of law enforcement. Some might find it odd, but security is based largely on values, on most people most of time doing what must be done because they believe they ought to. True, a brutal regime can terrorize people into submitting to hated, illegitimate laws, the way, for instance, that the Stasi, the communist East German secret police, did for decades. However, even under such regimes, great efforts are made to generate the perception of legitimacy, because otherwise security is precarious. The failure either to respect to the citizens' values or to change them in the end undid these regimes.
The role of what might be called the "soft underbelly" of security, the moral culture, can be highlighted if one asks: what do Russia, Afghanistan, and Iraq all have in common? In nations where an authoritarian regime has collapsed, or is failing, or where the regime has been toppled by outside forces--irrespective of whether the regime was militantly secular or theocratic, communist or Islamist--liberation is followed by explosive increases in antisocial behavior. This fact is rarely discussed in the West for reasons that are not fully clear. Many seem to presume that antisocial behaviors will go away on their own; that the perturbed condition of society following liberation will correct itself. The champions of democracy are, understandably, not keen to dwell on the ugly--often very ugly--aspects of the transformation. Still others seem to believe that the pain of transformation is the price we must pay for securing liberty, and that the price is well worth paying.
The fact is that antisocial behaviors (detailed below) do not naturally subside by themselves. Indeed, they have remained at a high and damaging level for years on end in liberated and failing states (in Russia for fifteen years and counting). After surveying some telling details I will ask what it takes to curb such conduct. Law enforcement may keep it in check initially. However, in the longer run--and I refer to months and years, not decades--a rather different kind of authority must become the major source of social order. After introducing this source--moral culture--I explore the ways in which it might be fostered, despite the severe limitations of social engineering in general and those working to foster moral cultures in particular.
Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy (Yale University Press, 2007) by Amitai Etzioni. www.securityfirstbook.com













Hmmm, you think we should have troops in Darfur? Now? Even though our military is over-extended?
Darfur's a dangerous place. Everyone we send will not come back. We also risk a proxy war with China.
But, fact is you haven't called for a pullout of Iraq, so we don't have the military capability to do what you want. Even if we did pull out of Iraq, the American people would not be happy to see those troops immediately redeployed to Darfur (Or Rwanda, which you also mention).
For all your talk on morality, I don't see you dealing with two fundamental moral issues: 1) having a foreign policy that reflects the will of the American people (and would thus be less interventionist than you prescribe) and 2) Asking our military for only reasonable sacrifices directly related to our own security (and after the last 7 years, we owe those people).
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 17, 2007 7:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
If we ignore him, will he go away?
July 17, 2007 7:20 AM | Reply | Permalink
There's hope.
July 17, 2007 7:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
Seems like simply a return to realism. It suggests stability is prized above all. I'm OK with that, since it's hard to get a Soros-type democracy movement going in the midst of civil war, but they developed in the former Iron Curtain countries. It also argues that disrupting existing totalitarian regimes has high costs in failed society and anti-social behavior.
Can we go back to sane foreign policy now? Have the crazies been discredited adequately? Or is that strain of imperialism we saw in the previous post still present?
July 17, 2007 8:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
He's not going to go away. He's going to keep pushing this point of view until he can get some one to listen. And then he won't apologize when it leads to all manner of violence and costs in terms of both lives and money.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 17, 2007 8:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
Liberation doesn't result in waves of anti-social behavior in most countries - liberation exposes anti-social behavior in some countries. Russia, for example, has always had a culture of governmental and economic corruption. When the Soviet Union collapsed, there was not a "wave of anti-social behavior or moral corruption" it was always there - the difference is that authoritarian regimes are more adept at hiding those kinds of behaviors than democracies.
Anti-social behaviors do not "naturally subside" - they only subside when a corrupt government, a corrupt economy is replaced with what the people of that perceive as a more fair and honest government. The anti-social behaviors didn't rise in Iraq because they were "liberated" (and we have no way of knowing if there is a rise in anti-social behavior if by anti-social behavior you're referring to corruption, organized crime and political killings) anti-social behavior was a result of the tolerance of the U.S. government for thievery, corruption, corrupt politicians and property destruction (and in most cases participated in it) in other words, they replaced one kind of corruption with another. Iraqis could see quite clearly that nothing had changed for the better, it was just more of the same.
In Iraq, Russia and Afghanistan, "law enforcement" didn't "keep it in check initially", in fact they did nothing to stop it and in some cases not only participated in criminal behavior but encouraged it among the populace. With our invasion of Iraq this administration sent a clear signal that the crude government corruption (with it's message to the populace that corruption was the cultural status quo) of the smoother government corruption of Chalabi. To complain that the Iraqi people are some how anti-social or criminally inclined is the to ignore the glaring fact that in the aftermath of the fall of Hussein's regime, this administration shrugged their shoulders when the wholesale looting and pillaging began. We were the "law enforcement" in Iraq and we did nothing "initially" to hold this kind of behavior in check.
You cannot "encourage" or "foster" a new moral culture among the people if their only way to survive is to participate in the corruption. The success of such revolutons and liberations in Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Finland and other states wasn't because the people were encouraged to be "moral" or have "values", they were successful because corrupt regimes were replaced with fairer and more honest regimes.
Security isn't based on "values". To say so is to say unsecure countries (of which we hear repeatedly the U.S. is one) are without values or morals or ethics. After all, people have different values and behaviors that are considered moral or ethical, which means that security is based on a government's fairness, honesty and equal application of the law to all citizens.
July 17, 2007 8:11 AM | Reply | Permalink
Nations bent on empire building may and often do hide behind democracy-for-all when their real quest is for land, cheap labor, natural resources, markets...There are very few peoples in today's world who do not see through the ruse. (Besides, gone are the days when men arriving on horses are seen as gods.)
When the real motives are economic supremacy, it is a bit naive to believe that the natives won't be hell-bent on hanging on to what they have or joining in the fray to perhaps get what their neighbors have. Picture sales' tables in Macy's basement the day after Xmas - hardly democracy in action.
July 17, 2007 9:08 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'm sorry, I read through this a few times, and I just don't find anything substantive here.
I find Mr. Etzioni's analysis of current American foreign policy to be unrealistic in the extreme. This substantially undercuts the 'realism' of his nostrums.
I'm just not sure that there's anything here worth a bona fide discussion.
July 17, 2007 9:45 AM | Reply | Permalink
Well, his claim that insecurity causes crime is somewhat unusual...
July 17, 2007 9:50 AM | Reply | Permalink
On the other hand, at least we won't have to worry that he'll post anything original here. I hope he at least did the excerpting himself.
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
July 17, 2007 10:37 AM | Reply | Permalink
Here's something funny -Etzioni cites this in his bio:
"In 2000 Etzioni was named among the top 100 American intellectuals as measured by academic citations in Richard Posner's book, "Public Intellectuals, A Decline".
Personally, I wouldn't add that to my resume, would you?
July 17, 2007 11:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
I know I'm shouting into the wind here but the problem with the way professor Etzioni has his material posted here (it's largely disjointed) is that we haven't really discussed his main theme at all.
What do you all think? Security first, or not?
This has implications not just for nation building but for how we make and pass laws in the US. If I'm understanding Etzioni correctly, every new law would be subject first to the question of whether it increases or decreases security in a general way. By this, he seems to mean negative rights like the right not to be killed or tortured by either one's own government or by people from other countries.
Questions of individual rights like the right to free speech, freedom to choose a religion (or not) or the right to privacy would be secondary concerns in just about any Etzioni-style debate.
I tend to view things from the opposite perspective, but it's not the opposition that Etzioni cites. He says the opposite is the Bush perspective which is that installing western style democratic governments creates allied countries. That's one way of having the debate.
I'd suggest, though that all of our domestic laws should first pass the "rights" test -- security should come second and the amount of security we can have is in some sense limited by our respect for individual rights. I'd then apply that to our foreign policy. We shouldn't do anything to other people that we wouldn't allow done to Americans.
Start with rights, build security around that. That's not Bush's opinion at all. But it is an opposing view to Etzioni's, one that he ignores.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 17, 2007 12:12 PM | Reply | Permalink
No, not really. His underlying core message is that those Russians/Iraqi's/etc., are simply primitive savages at heart and can't handle the responsibilities of freedom and democracy. They're just too backwards.
Give them a colour TV and they'll just hitch it to an ox and start trying to plow with it.
Thus, they need a firm and loving hand in the form of an appropriate despot who will act as a benevolent enlightened dictator and enforce peace, order and good government for the benefit of all.
Of course, couched in such naked terms, the book wouldn't sell at all. So he sugar coats the sentiment and wraps it in so many layers of cotton batting that its hard to really tell what lays at the core.
What comes out is some vague flatulence about security and insecurity and how it seems that democracy only promotes insecurity as a natural state in people who aren't ready for it, so maybe we shouldn't be so eager to give it to them.
Essentially, it's cuddly fuzzy fascism, although Etzioni has so attenuated his message it's difficult to discern any meaning at all. He's reduced himself to the level of vague generality that goes:
"Hmmm, mothers are great, don't you think so? I'm going to go out on a limb, I don't care how controversial it is, motherhood as a broad and general principle is on the balance of the whole a good thing for the most part."
It's hard to beat a guy up for that. It's hard to come up with anything substantive in response to that, except perhaps 'sure dude, whatever.'
Having reduced his thesis to mush, Etzioni must back up to his significant ideas.
He does this by recasting past and current foreign policy as an unrealistic idealistic quest to spread democracy like pollen around the world.
Of course, most of the actions he refers to have more to do with realpolitik than democracy, but he's perfectly willing to adopt the usual windy speechifying as credible motives.
Thus the Iraq action was not motivated by oil, regional oil/resource issues, need to dominate the persian gulf, or even wmd's. Instead, it was motivated by the desire to bring the gift of Democracy.
Etzioni would have us believe that the Bush administration is nothing but a bunch of pot smoking bare footed hippies, wandering from country to country not taking baths, growing their hair long and twaddling to irritated locals and cynical opportunists about 'peace and lurve.'
All this while at the same time cautioning us not to spend too much time blaming or dissecting current and past policy mistakes.
No, better to ignore it and simply accept Etzioni's glib and facile misrepresentations of foreign policy.
Because here lies his true message. What he's really saying can be found as the opposite mirror image of the misrepresentations.
In short. Etzioni says that the real problem is a failed hippy policy of peace and love. The obvious solution, the working response is a new riot cop policy of chewing gum and kicking ass.
No more 'un-realism' and sentimental affection for democracy for everyone. It turns out that most of them just couldn't handle it, one way or the other. So now, democracy only for the deserving (obedient) and firm guidance (control) for the rest.
Honestly, it's just such a waste of time to deconstruct this empty headed booshwah.
I used to love cryptozoology, fortean phenomena, conspiracy theories, new age whiffery. I found it amazing that people could construct and believe in such immense but entirely unsupported intellectual edifices. Too much exposure to this stuff spoils that harmless pleasure.
People like Etzioni are just tiresome. It's like watching a Dung beetle rolling its ball along.
July 17, 2007 12:44 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, he is a communitarian, you know. He believes that the individual should be sublimated to the community...gee, where have we heard that before?
July 17, 2007 12:49 PM | Reply | Permalink
Destor and Valdron make good attempts to characterize what's being said, and they come out at almost opposite extremes. That's a validation of Valdron's fine characterization of the mushy rhetoric, which is almost as disturbing as the message. I'm not sure I can split the difference on the message, but I see it something like this.
Like Destor, I see him as putting security first. If that seems amoral, it should not seem all that unfamiliar. Basically he's simply reasserting the Realist case against the Neocons. The Realists are scary as they were under Kissinger, and some like one of the many Kagans used it to press for Bush's war in The Atlantic. Some sense of how loony the Neocon case is comes from the war's being initially sold on security grounds. And the looniness allows Etzioni to sound sensible in decrying the idealist aspirations.
However, he's obviously not quite comfortable with this amorality, especially as it, too, was used to march to the present war, which every so-called expert now has to distance himself from. And as Valdron notes, the Neocon position had a lot of "realist" self-interest in it. To qualify it, then, he switches as Valdron notes to a language of superior Western values after all. The reason we can't always take a swat at people is that they're not capable of appreciating being swatted it.
Now personally I don't agree the war was primarily about oil. They had a cushy supply as long as their best friends were Saudis and they'd put industry connections first in their dealings with Saddam Hussein. They now have less reliable connections. The Neocon dream was more a kind of Realism without the reality, a way not just to pursue our interests, which might involve things like containment, as to control the world, the kind who, like Goldwater, were not content unless they could roll back Soviet power. (And don't even get me started on whether there's a love conservativism with ingegrity they betrayed, so I don't talk about Goldwater and race, say.) So they took a swat against what they saw as the easiest target from which they could branch out to surround Syria or Iran, say. The first Bush, they figured, had just been too cowardly to take that target out.
So in this sense, Etzioni's mix of Realism and intense vision of national destiny may offer some sops to humity, but it's very close to the Neocons in basic moral framework. Of course, if I have him wrong, I would not be surprised. We're pinning down the proverbial blob of rhetorical jello.
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
July 17, 2007 1:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
Security First: For a Muscular, Moral Foreign Policy
Muscular...
So sexy. I'm getting hot.
"Thank God George Bush is our president." -Rudy Giuliani
July 17, 2007 2:46 PM | Reply | Permalink
I could agree that security is first on some hierarchy of needs but I could not more totally reject his concept of security. Security to me is a safe environment - at home, health care - at home, a living wage - at home, financial security in old age - at home and the Minnesota National Guard - at home.
July 17, 2007 3:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
"Leverage used against Russia and China to pressure them to democratize should instead first be deployed to encourage them to contain the spread of nuclear weapons and related technologies."
Of course, if we stopped being hypocrital by not developing new generations of nuclear weapons to pour more money into the coffers of the military-industrial complex it might help.
Tom
July 17, 2007 4:07 PM | Reply | Permalink
I couldn't read much further than this. I skimmed a bit, and then gave it up altogether. What Etzioni poses as the solution...what has it really solved in that part of the world as we look at it sixty years later? Do the Israelis feel secure? Does anyone?
aMike
July 17, 2007 5:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
I really did not know what to make of this. So, Etzioni claims to have been an 'honourable' terrorist. A 'kinder' 'gentler' terrorist who didn't harm bystanders, but simply passed polite notes?
Uh huh. Right. Sure, I believe that. Didn't that woman who was the last survivor of of the terrorist cell that blew up the King David Hotel say the same thing.
"We warned them that there was a bomb, we gave them the opportunity to leave, we don't know why they didn't, so I'm not responsible for killing all those people."
Isn't it cute when geriatric war criminals lie?
Of course, maybe Etzioni's playing it straight, and his group really was more moral than all those homicidal Irgun. But I think I'd want independent confirmation from the Referees.
In any case, although its visceral and numbing, it doesn't bring us any closer to what passes for Etzioni's thought processes, whatever they might be.
July 17, 2007 5:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm amazed that we are all putting so much effort into a subject so undeserving.
I suppose one of us might buy his entire book just to see if there is anything in it which isn't a mushy right wing cliche.
July 17, 2007 6:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
It's hard to take seriously a man who chooses as his first excerpt, one that begins:
"To digress briefly . . ."
Not an auspicious beginning . . . and, as it turns out, only a half truth.
July 17, 2007 6:16 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'd answer, but I digress...
John
http://www.haberarts.com/
July 17, 2007 6:28 PM | Reply | Permalink
I am beginning to come around to the idea that this gentleman is having us on. Since I have offered serious responses to his posts all I can do is brace myself in case the moment comes when he says "Smile, your on candid camera."
July 17, 2007 6:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
this is actually informative in many ways -- if you don't read it from a biased point of view.
He's been proven wrong in his assertion that you first have to guarantee there will be no regime change before disarmament by North Korea. In a stunning turnaround, they actually have shut down their reactors, and Bush certainly has given them no guarantees of any kind.
The difference here was China. They forced North Korea into a corner, and they had no choice. In the case of Iran, China is waffling and so is Russia, so Iran will be able to escape tough sanctions.
So, the real-world lesson is when you have all 5 permanant UNSC members solidly behind an agenda, they can resolve the toughest problems through diplomacy. If we had the same resolve vis-a-vis Iran, there would be no need to even mention a military threat. Iran would have to submit or face the collapse of their economy.
July 17, 2007 7:51 PM | Reply | Permalink
I can always count on you, bluebell.
I didn't realize it until you wrote it but, you're right... the major flaw here is the guy's very concept of what "security" means.
Indeed, a lot of my own rebuttal could be termed "security" style since individual rights are themselves security issues -- the whole concept of a right could be defined as the security to live in a free manner.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 17, 2007 8:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
Dr. Etzioni makes several points with which I agree, in some cases strongly. But life is short, and it is always more interesting to debate areas of disagreement than to utter tedious strings of responsorial “amen”s over the spaces of agreement.
First, I would dispute the notion that the foreign policy Dr. Etzioni is recommending amounts to a “180 degree turn”. I’m not sure exactly why he says that. He seems to suggest that an emphasis on security first, as opposed to democracy promotion first, would amount to a radical shift in US foreign policy. There are at least are two problems with looking at matters this way.
First, while there are certainly tensions between promoting democracy and promoting security, and while there are clearly many occasions in which the promotion of one could be destructive of the other, the two are hardly polar opposites, lying 180 degrees apart. Surely not even communitarians, with their heightened appreciation for social order and respect for the sources of moral authority and tradition, endorse such a radically antidemocratic philosophy, and recognize that there are many situations in which democracy and security are mutually supportive. So choosing to emphasize security would not require turning the ship of state 180 degrees away from the goals of democracy, especially when we understand “democracy” to include all of the forms of participation in self-government.
But the other problem with this formulation is what it seems to presume about the actual past practice of US foreign policy. Dr. Etzioni says:
And instead of taking us into nations such as Grenada, Panama, or Haiti, the "Security First" approach to foreign policy would have taken us into Rwanda and Darfur--where millions of lives were and still are threatened.
This gives far too much credit to the influence of the propagandists for democracy promotion on US foreign policy practice, whether those propagandists have been sincere or cynical. One would have to be extremely naïve to believe that the primary motivation for US interventions in Grenada, Haiti and Panama was the promotion of democracy. These interventions are part of a long history of US assertiveness in the Western Hemisphere that has been only tangentially or adventitiously connected with democracy promotion. Just as often, these interventions have been connected with security concerns, though not so much security in the grand systematic sense, as with the security of US commercial and financial interests, the security of US political control over Latin American satellites and client regimes, the security of US military basing rights privileges, the security of the US homeland and “way of life” in the face of perceived threats in the form of the drug trade, revolutionary agitation, potentially aggressive foreign powers, etc. In short, these interventions are generally about control, and are not substantially different in motivation from the interventions throughout history of other large powers, democratic or not, in their neighbors’ affairs.
Dr. Etzioni speaks at the end of his post about fostering moral culture. But for one country to foster moral culture inside a very different one is just as challenging as promoting democracy – actually much more challenging, since democracy partly involves legal institutions and formal social practices that can be established by deliberate decision-making. Moral culture is based on the collective internal dispositions of millions of people, dispositions which are the fruit of centuries of historical evolution and development, and contingent formational experiences. It’s really a fool’s errand to attempt to effect deep cultural changes in another society.
What we can do more easily is work with the governments of other countries on clearly identifiable common challenges like preventing war and minimizing the chances of violent conflict; managing the global energy economy; attending to global public health and basic human economic needs, and protecting the environment. We’ll have to leave it to the people of those countries however, to work out their own cultural future and moral outlook.
July 17, 2007 9:06 PM | Reply | Permalink
Excellent post, Dan K. Especially when you warn that trying to impose a moral framework on another society is messier in practice than in actuality.
You said that Etzioni put his vision on a 180 degree opposite to the current "democratization" policy and you showed it wasn't at such odds.
That was just Etzioni's rhetorical trick, though. Not only are his ideas not at odds with current policy, they're supportive of it. But he doesn't want to have to say so.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 17, 2007 9:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Phelicity's point is well taken. Amitai Etzioni has not really presented much here that is substantial in and of itself but he has spoken of "democratization" as if had actually been an ideal we were striving towards when we invaded Iraq.
It is a telling fact that among our first great acts of "democratization" in the country was Paul Bremmer's imposition of Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 3, described here in a piece in the Washington Post:
The flat-tax has not seemed definitively democratic to the overwhelming majorities of Americans who refused to vote for presidential candidates who campaigned upon it. Grover Norquist admitted as much in his comments from the same Washington Post piece:
I can't believe that I was the only one wondering, at the time, just which population Order Number 3 was intended to "democratize".
In a still more bizarre twist, it would seem that the order was one of the few aspects of the peace that the Bush Administration successfully managed to plan ahead for:
But then, to the victor go the spoils and the Republican right had won...
Among our last acts of democratization, it would seem, we intend to have oil sharing legislation, from the Iraqi parliament, which will leave US interests in control of 50% of the country's oil resources.
As the Bush Administration has failed more and more miserably to gain greater control over mideast oil, via spoils and cowed regional governments, or the installation of favorable regional governments, and the price of oil has risen to $74+ per barrell, it has tried to redirect attention to policy aims that began as tertiary considerations at best. "Democratization" never was a consideration in anything but the Ayn Rand-ian sense that is the foundation of the Neocon version of democracy.
Even now, the struggle to include the Sunnis in the Iraqi government is no more democratic than any desperate attempt to avoid the collapse of an entire region due to acts one has unwisely committed in the name of "national security." A collapse of the region, encouraged by an Iran greatly empowered by our own greed and incompetence, could easily arrive at $100+ per barrell oil. At the very least, the administration is desperate that this eventuality should be ascribed to the Democratic Party. Thus the President's unwaivering determination.
Etzioni could have written a smashing book about this dynamic but appears to have chosen to do otherwise. There's too little info in his post to be sure. His acceptance of the "democratization" myth, however, does not bode well. It's difficult to see how he can have untangled himself enough from it, in his book, to have presented a vital line of reasoning.
July 17, 2007 9:30 PM | Reply | Permalink
I don't think that is really true destor. For one thing, Etzioni is definitely on record as supporting a broad negotiated settlement with Iran which includes a US nonaggression commitment, and a removal of some nearby US military bases. Personally, I think such a bargain should involve more than Etzioni considers, and that it should be possible to negotiate strong verification measures to assure the world that Iran is not violating its NPT requirements not to develop nuclear weapons, without requiring that Iran cease uranium enrichment - something which it has every right to do under international law. But I don't think there is any doubt that his is a very different approach than the hardline approach favored by Bush/Cheney, which aims at permanent brinkmanship and regime change.
July 17, 2007 9:43 PM | Reply | Permalink
Fair enough, but I could see neocons using Etzioni's language and reasoning instead of their own and coming to the same ends. One of the problems is he seems to buy the right's rhetoric that they're "spreading democracy." But what if that's not the right's strategy at all and is just language used to tart up what would otherwise be unpopular? The right could just as easily claim they're trying to spread "security" around the world. Though, they'd look silly saying that, given how bad they are at it.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 18, 2007 7:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
I strongly support nonproliferation, as much as it has been screwed up by the NPT generally and US policy specifically. Still, I'm rather puzzled why "new generations" of nuclear weapons is automatically bad.
If it is a policy to have nuclear weapons at all, there has to be development at least at the reliability level. For assorted technical reasons, nuclear weapons cannot sit indefinitely; they have components that wear out. One can replace tritium, but anything that, for example, is subject to radiation embrittlement has to be remanufactured.
Some of the "new generation" deals with reliability and safeguards. Other parts are more controversial, such as any level of continuation on the robust nuclear earth penetrator, under a new name.
What is your suggestion about nuclear weapons surety, which is essentially a continued reliability program?
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 18, 2007 7:42 AM | Reply | Permalink
Really smart observation.
I support NPT too.
But the technology exists. And, it's a natural technology, based on the manipulation of a fundamental particle. It can't be stopped or even contained. At best, it can be guided.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 18, 2007 8:02 AM | Reply | Permalink
We'll never give up the family atomics.
July 18, 2007 8:14 AM | Reply | Permalink
Care for some spice coffee, or does your garden need Worm droppings?
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 18, 2007 8:27 AM | Reply | Permalink
Unfortunately, NPT is set up in a way that absolutely inhibits a state that decides it needs nuclear weapons from coming under any guidance. Much as the UN Security Council was set up around the victors of WWII rather than any currently realistic set of powers (and perhaps continental interests), if you weren't a declared nuclear power at the time of the NPT's creation, you can't join it and have nuclear weapons.
That immediately removes any desirable guidance from India, Israel, and Pakistan. Who can predict North Korea?
I tend not to think that Iran is actively pushing a weapons program, but I certainly can't rule it out. If a NPT member state feels threatened regionally or from powers that can project force worldwide, what incentives exist for it not to abrogate the treaty and then become a target of preemption?
I'd like to see a discussion of both the feasibility of allowing additional declared powers into the NPT, and what incentives they could be offered. If all realistic declared and capable powers were under the NPT, then there would be at least a framework for reduction and verification.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 18, 2007 8:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
I've never understood why NPT in addition to our current foreign policy, wouldn't actually foster proliferation. It really is meant to be an agreement that says "we'll always be more powerful than you" and since it was made up at a time when we and Russia and a few others had the power, people had to accept. But that's exactly the kind of agreement that is made to be broken.
Especially when we know North Korea is developing and do very little about it but think Iraq might be and we invade the place. One lesson other leaders have probably learned is that to be called out for developing nuclear weapons is a dangerous thing but that to actually have them is a deterrent.
thosethingswesay.blogspot.com
July 18, 2007 8:40 AM | Reply | Permalink
I agree with you. The question is what an NPT II might look like--if looking at a changed environment makes any sense. Clearly, part of any serious revision has to deal with the non-signatory powers with declared or essentially known capabilities.
Nuclear-free zones? Verification data available to all participants? Guarantees?
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 18, 2007 8:51 AM | Reply | Permalink
Might be interesting to couple proven PAL and other confidence measures with Security Council membership. Since the Council is pretty much the publicly nuclear crowd, (which makes sense since the members can do the most damage), new nuclear powers should be brought in.
July 18, 2007 9:07 AM | Reply | Permalink
It's an interesting challenge. By any standard: size, democracy, nuclear status, economy, etc., India belongs on the SC and in the NPT. Of course, if they were allowed on, Pakistan is going to clamor.
By PAL technology, may I assume that you include the overall positive control system from the NCA release on down, not just the Permissive Action Links on the weapons themselves? Remember that the US and Russia now have liaison teams in each others' strategic warning centers, which is a major addition to the Hotline.
There are a lot of positive measures between the US and Russia, many of which started with the fUSSR. Both sides have augmented the traditional "National Means of Technical Verification", which were hidden from the public, with some on-site and aircraft overflight verification.
Would Israel declare if offered greater status? What would be the Arab reaction? Would they demand a balancing seat?
There's still the idea of a rotating member from each continent, said rotating member having veto power--this doesn't depend on nuclear status. AFAIK, the penguins aren't demanding a seat, even though they clearly are threatened by seals.
The existence of the EU as a more and more distinct economy should be considered. Is economic status a consideration? From that standpoint, Japan is certainly a Great Power, and India isn't to be sneezed at.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 18, 2007 10:16 AM | Reply | Permalink
Oh yeah, baby, baby!!
Bomb me, bomb me hard!!
You know how I like it!!
Beat me, whip me, f*ck me!!
Oh, oh, yeah!! War porn!!
Is it good for you too?
July 18, 2007 10:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
I'll have the coffee.
One lump please.
(psst!! has it gone away yet?)
July 18, 2007 10:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
Hermann Kahn once said to a military planning group: "Gentlemen, you do not have a war plan. You have a wargasm."
That was, perhaps, a dose of reality that started some of the movement to the Plan that Formerly Was SIOP.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 18, 2007 10:34 AM | Reply | Permalink
We're digressing merely by posting in this thread...
(sorry if I seem a bit trollish but it seems I cannot justify an actual response to this hogwash)
July 18, 2007 10:35 AM | Reply | Permalink
Yes, I used the phrase "PAL and other confidence measures", meaning all C3 and Hotline systems.
In any case, both the NPT and the makeup of Security Council are asking for irrelevance, not that I buy most of Condi's facile assertions. The way to upgrade them is not to walk away.
July 18, 2007 10:37 AM | Reply | Permalink
"Spreading democracy" means very little. Under Saddam Iraquis had the vote. What the neocons mean is freedom for entrepreneurs to make a lot of money without being regulated or paying taxes.
On the other hand, the EU requires that members meet certain regulatory guidelines, this has been effective. This sort of carrot-stick pressure can also be abused, though, as we have seen with the World Bank's draconian policies.
July 18, 2007 11:19 AM | Reply | Permalink
This may be a good blog or Discussion Table subject. I haven't ever seen a discussion linking the NPT and the UNSC, much less PAL technology.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 18, 2007 11:22 AM | Reply | Permalink
When a building is on fire, the first task is to secure neighboring buildings.
The only possible base for addressing Darfur problem is Chad, an unstable autocracy with the government dominated by a single tribe, if I recall. If one could somehow bribe and cajole leaders of Chad faction into cobbling a broad based (dare we say, democratic) government, Chad would not be that vulnerable to Sudan's counter-action by proxy. Remember also the danger of reverse ethnic cleansing, as Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities were squeezed from almost entire Kosovo. In Darfur, it would be bloody mess.
Would that be achieved, the threat of intervention by proxy, by arming Darfur separatists, could be sufficient to modify Sudan's behavor. Or to secure the Furs from attacks by Arab tribal militias and Sudanese aircraft.
If we cannot achieve internal settlement in Chad, I think we have to concede that we are powerless and we can only appeal to the better nature of Khartoum rulers.
As far as direct intervention is concerned, I see big difficulties in crafting the mission, what it would have to do, exactly.
July 18, 2007 12:36 PM | Reply | Permalink
Foreign-policy theories always run into reality. Here's more reality, thanks to Boston University geologists. A huge underground lake has been found in Darfur. Things will be very different soon.
HCB has pointed out the head geologist, Farouk El-Baz, was also head for NASA, and every prediction for the Moon was correct.
July 18, 2007 3:02 PM | Reply | Permalink
Corruption means decay, so a Communist government may be deemed corrupt by dint of being anti-democratic, arbitrary in administration of laws etc. However, in an officially egalitarian state big-time cleptocracy is quite difficult to accomplish. Russia, with its enormous mineral wealth, witnessed monumental cleptocracy in the aftermath of glasnost, with freshly-minted billionaires becoming "oligarchs". Poland, after the fall of Communism, was affected be a lot of systemic corruption, but on much lesser scales, so no oligarchy was created. There was enough corruption, however, to prevent every single government in the last 15 years from being re-elected.
July 18, 2007 4:20 PM | Reply | Permalink
I couldn't disagree more. Most (if not all) communist countries were kleptocracies. Some of them got rid of that after the fall of communism better than others.
Russia was an extremely corrupt country in tsarist times, it was corrupt under communists and it's corrupt now. Nothing new there.
But communist system of government did promote corruption everywhere. The system was thoroughly undemocratic and unelected officials wielded tremendous power with zero oversight. There is no better recipe for corruption.
It is true that with no tabloid press and no celebrity-obsessed media, the wealth and power of communist upper class was not very visible, and perhaps not so openly flaunted. That doesn't mean it wasn't there.
July 19, 2007 5:54 AM | Reply | Permalink
Spreading Democracy: "An Opinion Piece"
"What happened in northern Lebanon, according to the simplest interpretation, is that the Hariri/Saudi group and its allies in the Bush administration, which had previously supported a salafi group called Fatah al-Islam, decided to pull the plug, with Hariri abruptly ending monthly payments to group-members. This was followed by expressions of displeasure including a bank-robbery, and then a couple of months of reports about the heroism of the Lebanese Army in reducing the Nahr al-Bared Palestinian refugee camp to rubble. The result is a new strategic importance for the Lebanese Army, previously considered an institution with a nationalist core, now part of the Hariri- and US-led alliance. This simplifies and escalates the "moderate versus extremist" road-map for the Americans and their allies. Having groups like Fatah al-Islam put pressure on Hizbullah was one stratgegy, but using the Lebanese Army for that is a much simpler and more powerful one for the long haul.
In Gaza, where Fatah leaders fled rather than defend the Dahlan organization, we are asked to believe in a David versus Goliath miracle-victory for Hamas against the US-armed Dahlan group, when a much more plausible explanation would be that the US decided to pull the plug on that corrupt former cats-paw as well. The result here is also a new strategic configuration, isolating Hamas in Gaza, and thus escalating and simplifying the pressure on the "extremists". Having groups like the Dahlan gangs put pressure on Hamas was one strategy, but isolating Hamas in Gaza and using an overt Fatah-Israel coalition to do that seems to be much simpler and more powerful in the long haul.
In both cases, the facts we know are more consistent with the hypothesis of this kind of a strategy-development in Washington than they are with the kind of freakish and unexplainable sequence of events that have been reported in this weirdly unquestioning way by the media."
it goes on, keep reading
July 19, 2007 7:57 AM | Reply | Permalink
Quite interesting, and potentially plausible. But then again, almost anything is plausible in the labyrinthine world of 'spooks R us' which relies on deception, misinformation, third party agencies and black flag operations.
However, assuming that this is true or partially true, some thoughts.
First, the Saudi's have to be recognized as separate actors from the United States. So is it the Saudi's who were funding the freelancers alone, and if so, what does their change of pace mean? Are they shifting into the American orbit, or are they investing in different clients?
Were the Saudi's funding freelancers with the approval or at the urging of the US? If so, then does this mean that the US is shifting its policy? Or are the Saudi's breaking from American policy.
If the Americans were funding freelancers, how long were they doing so? Is this a major shift of policy, or proof of erratic and uncoordinated policy?
Is this policy sensible? Mind you, getting in bed with a radical salafist group is not sensible. Ditching such a group is sensible. But is it a viable strategy to build the Lebanese Army as the counterweight to Hezbollah? Or as the challenge to Hezbollah? Can the Lebanese Army do to Hezbollah what Israel has failed at in two wars and a long bloody occupation? Or will a revitalized Lebanese Army simply incorporate Hezbollah and pose a radical threat to Israel? How likely is it that the Lebanese Army, no matter how its constituted will be either (a) effective, and (b) a tool of American/Israeli/Saudi interests.
With respect to Gaza it is hard to see Hamas victory as anything but a strategic disaster for Israel and America, and one which materially undermines the political process in the West Bank.
With respect to Iraq, it's Baghdadi and the ISI are self evidently a sideshow.
So the picture of 'Spooks R Us' is once again blundering and incompetence.
July 19, 2007 11:33 AM | Reply | Permalink
edit
July 19, 2007 12:52 PM | Reply | Permalink
A little information goes a long way.
"With respect to Gaza it is hard to see Hamas victory as anything but a strategic disaster for Israel and America, and one which materially undermines the political process in the West Bank."
"It's hard to see..." anything if you don't pay attention.
Recently someone on this site wrote "I'm still trying to learn about Iran" and then proceeded to state an opinion. I responded that it really wasn't that hard to learn about Iran and gave a list of things to read or look up. He responded "yeah, I just already have a stack of books to read and I don't even have the time to read them right now. Basically, reading and posting here is a stress reliever for me."
How can anyone respond to that?
Hamas’s number 2, Abu Marzook, writes an Op Ed in the LA Times
July 19, 2007 12:58 PM | Reply | Permalink
Okay, so let's take this creative chaos apart and examine its gears and cogs.
In particular, Gaza.
Dahlan we are to assume are free lance mercenaries, nominally loyal to Fatah and supplied and armed by the United States and Israel to look out for, directly or indirectly, their interests.
Clearly, they haven't done so well, what with the kidnappings, and all those little missiles popping across the border. They certainly haven't done well in terms of providing for the people of Gaza in terms of keeping a functioning economy and infrastructure going. This might be America's and Israel's fault, but it do seem counterproductive. Why strangle your own puppets?
Now, the next move on the part of the American/Israeli svengali's is to cut loose the free lancers, and let Hamas mop up Dahlan and Fatah. Right?
Well, I could see that from a 'so screwed you got to cut your losses' point of view. Their catspaws have been notoriously ineffective from any standpoint.
On the other hand, one can argue that the catspaws failures are the failures of the puppet masters.
That said, what is the tactical advantage to giving Hamas the playing field in Gaza?
So that Israel can act without restraint? I see no signs of restraint so far.
So that Hamas will be weakened in Gaza? Sorry, but the've got another full crew in the West Bank. It's not as if there's only a specific number of Hamas members and they all moved to Gaza for the caper. Most or all of the West Bank Hamas member remained in the West bank. If anything, they're emboldened by success in Gaza.
So that Fatah can crack down in the west bank, throw out the illusion of democracy, declare military rule and start purging? Perhaps that simply plays into Hamas' hand. Fatah's got some legitimacy problems and this only makes it worse.
It's entirely possible to see the whole thing as 'spooks R us'. But I don't think we're seeing a master plan. I think we're looking at erratic blundering. It's the throw panties at the wall until one of them sticks approach.
If anything it suggests that intelligence and covert ops are as incoherent and rudderless as the formal military operations.
July 19, 2007 4:10 PM | Reply | Permalink
Well, I just feel it's obvious that Donald Rumsfeld, Frank Gaffney, battlefield nukes, nukes in space, etc. are not helpful when it comes to convincing other countries of the importance of nonproliferation.
Tom
July 19, 2007 4:41 PM | Reply | Permalink
I'm a little puzzled. Tactical/battlefield nukes have very little role in US doctrine. While the B61 gravity bomb is still considered tactical, the nuclear short-range missiles, artillery shells, depth charges, and assorted other hardware have long been displaced by precision-guided munitions with non-nuclear warheads. I know of no current space-based nuclear weapon or even a rationale for one.
Invading Iraq but not North Korea is one very strong argument against nonproliferation.
There's also the reality that the NPT is obsolete in terms of getting any control over non-signatory states that have nuclear weapons. Either the NPT gets modified so those countries don't have to disarm, or there have to be very strong incentives and guarantees for them to do so.
In other words, I don't see what is obvious about your points with respect to nonproliferation.
Gaffney's description of EMP weapons, much less the relationship of such a program to what Iran might be doing on its most belligerent day, would get laughed out of Mystery Science Fiction Theater. Either he doesn't understand the basics of EMP, or he's using a Goebbels technique without the charisma.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 19, 2007 6:56 PM | Reply | Permalink
I think the common worry here is that simply walking away from existing treaties is the wrong way to achieve any improvement. A new concept or policy that can do the job of regularizing at least some nuclear activities beats the alternative of no rules.
When Condi says a treaty is obsolete, it means we're glad to be free of it, instead of meaning the treaty needs improving. I prefer mend it, don't end it.
July 19, 2007 7:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Is anyone, however, suggesting that the NPT be updated? Further, is anyone in the Administration pressuring Israel to declare? Are either or both desirable? If so, how?
Trying to put myself in an Iranian position, I would wonder about the credibility of a country that threatens what, at best, is an early development program with preemptive war, when a generally accepted major program gets wink wink nudge nudge. Wink wink nudge nudge works for Monty Python, but not for nonproliferation in the Middle East.
--
Howard
*equal opportunity offense to both extremes*
"Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it" [George Santayana]
July 19, 2007 7:36 PM | Reply | Permalink