When China's Charm Wears Off
Several of the preceding posts have made the important point that, rather that being wooed by China’s ‘charm’, a number of countries in the developing world will begin, if they have not already begun, to backlash against China’s foreign policies. The argument goes that as China becomes increasingly entangled overseas, it will use its growing power to push, prod, and coerce foreign governments. And to the extent that those governments are relatively oppressive and their people deprived, affected populations will blowback against the Chinese.
It is worth thinking a little further about the consequences of an erosion of China’s ‘soft power’.
Let me make the simple point that international intervention can take on a number of faces. To date, China’s policy of noninterference is largely a reaction to the very particular brand of liberal internationalism that the United States has advocated for decades, which posits that states have the right and responsibility to protect the political and economic freedoms of individuals around the world. Given the combination of China’s natural resource needs, its own domestic authoritarianism, and the singular importance of its claims to Taiwan and Tibet, it is extremely unlikely that it will begin to brandish this form of internationalism any time soon.
That being said, this does not mean that China will not become an interventionist state. In fact, it may very well use its power and influence to affect domestic political environments, but it will do so in a way that privileges the state, emboldens incumbent regimes, and favors stability over freedom. The end result will be to solidify even widely unpopular regimes. US relationships with friendly governments in the Muslim world give a flavor of what this type of intervention would look like: A combination of economic and security assistance that perpetuates grossly illiberal regimes.
So yes, China’s rise may very well lead towards increasing interference in the affairs of other states, and that interference may lead to the deterioration of public attitudes towards China. But, given the statist nature of that intervention, growing unpopularity may not affect China’s ability to achieve its foreign policy goals. Dan cites a “rebel-turned-pastor” who was dispirited by China’s influence and behavior in the Sudan, but you’d be hard pressed to find similar complaints from the halls of Khartoum.
An important question of course is if, when, and how China will begin to face the long-term consequences of supporting authoritarian regimes, including terrorism and the occasional Iranian-style blowback. In the short-term, however, a precipitous drop in China’s ‘soft power’, particularly in non-democratic countries, may do little to alter the exigencies of domestic and international politics that are supporting China’s foreign policies in Africa and elsewhere.
China is playing a very old form of power politics, which as you wrote geared entirely towards the ruling elites. There are few situations, if any, in the world where the human condition is going to be advanced by China's rise.
June 27, 2007 6:24 AM | Reply | Permalink
To date, China’s policy of noninterference is largely a reaction to the very particular brand of liberal internationalism that the United States has advocated for decades, which posits that states have the right and responsibility to protect the political and economic freedoms of individuals around the world.
That's part of the motive for the reaction. But depending on which part of the world you are from, it could be that two other sets of supposed rights and responsibilities are more salient and aggravating: first, that it is the right and responsibility of creditors to mandate structural changes in the way of life, and distribution of wealth, of their borrowers; and second, that it is the right and responsibility of states to use a combination of covert and overt means to push aside leaders and activists who threaten the economic interests of that state's nationals conducting business abroad.
That being said, this does not mean that China will not become an interventionist state. In fact, it may very well use its power and influence to affect domestic political environments, but it will do so in a way that privileges the state, emboldens incumbent regimes, and favors stability over freedom.
While I suspect that is very generally true, at least in the near term, surely it won't escape China's notice that regimes do change from time to time, whether through coup, revolt or reform, and that too cozy a relationship with the old bosses typically leads to bad feelings with the new bosses. The long-term security of Chinese interests abroad requires the development of a positive relationship with the people of the countries in which they wish to have a permanent presence and business relationship. And that requires at least some sort of public diplomatic effort to convince people that their country's relationship with China is producing benefits for everyone, not just the country's ruling elite, and should be preserved even if the rulers have changed. China appears to have adopted this approach at home, and can't fail to see its relevance abroad.
For now, though, it is notable that most western complaints about Chinese foreign policy focus on China's not doing enough in the way of intervention, at least in a cooperative way, in the internal affairs of other countries. Whatever justice there may be in this complaint, we should only be so lucky to have all emerging powers share the Chinese aversion to transgressing the sovereignty of other states.
To put it in a more homely context, perhaps a person who sticks to himself, is only minimally civic-minded, and doesn't do much to help others is not the best sort of citizen. But he is a far better citizen than the criminal who shakes down, robs, threatens and abuses his neighbors.
June 27, 2007 7:32 AM | Reply | Permalink
How do you know China's policy of non-intervention isn't a result of their own experience with the intervention of the west in China's own domestic affairs? Why do you assume that their foreign policy is reactionary?
It is possible that the Chinese policy of non-intervention is a truly held belief, as sacred to them as democracy is to the U.S.
Quite frankly, we seem to have more projection of our own faults and failings than we have an understanding of the Chinese.
June 27, 2007 10:26 AM | Reply | Permalink
You mean China's non-intervention in Tibet, their continual threatening of Taiwan, and their wars with India? This notion that China has some sacre view of non-intervention when they happily jail and kill their own people raises a lot of questions.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
June 27, 2007 2:54 PM | Reply | Permalink
J. McCutchen
Tonight's PBS Newshour includes an interview with Andrew Kohut concerning the most recent Intl attitudes survey. Germane to this topic - Kohut's conclusion that at least among the populations of its developed competitors China's becoming increasingly mistrusted
June 27, 2007 7:42 PM | Reply | Permalink
For all the faults and misguided philanthropy that comes with American and Western foreign policy, I really do not think that we can call Chinese "non-intervention" an admirable core belief if one studies the core tenets of Marxism and Leninist/Maoist socialist theory that they purport as being their core beliefs.
The methods currently in use by China abroad are incredibly one-sided and very self-serving in that the only thing the people in power are interested in is building the economic giant that is modern China. Again this is only for personal gain. If you so not believe this please check into the current child-slavery rings that are being investigated in Shanxi. China is not a country that thinks of human rights or citizen's rights in the way that western countries do. They are an Imperial system that will take centuries to be able to stand up to anything like a democratic form of government seen in Taiwan or HK.
Beyond that they have discarded all the socialist dogma in a capitalist free-for-all where state-owned and govt official owned enterprises are only investing for monetary gain. They care not about the slaughter of innocent children or of corruption that eats away at the aid they give.
You might ask how that differs from the US or other western powers. I would say that most western democracies are not populated with ideologues that have no freedom of press to speak out or call attention to the transactions of their country or it's leaders.
That makes a big difference and that is how China can get away with it's "non-interventionist" policy. Their people are cowed into submission by their leaders and dare not speak out about what is going on abroad, because that would be suicide.
Although the western/US policy is flawed in many ways, it is far better than the Chinese one that funds any dictator that sees Taiwan as Chinese and the Dalai Lama as a criminal, for these are the only two prerequisites for Chinese friendship.
And don't get them wrong, the Chinese are only friends with the people that can do something for them, just like every other country in the world.
June 29, 2007 11:22 PM | Reply | Permalink