Any way you slice it, thirteen posts in three days--almost six thousand words altogether--is a lot to read. Some people call it a dissertation chapter. Others call it a back-and-forth on the policies and influence of a near-superpower. But just like that volume in the university library, it's none too easy to start reading somewhere in the middle.

That's why we have put together this summary of the Book Club discussion thus far, in case you have just come across it, and don't know where to begin--at a tenth the size, no less.

Josh Kurlantzick opens the discussion with a précis of his new book, Charm Offensive. As he points out, in recent years China has gone from a country with seemingly little interaction with the outside world to one with growing influence. By pursuing a sustained strategy of public diplomacy, investment, aid, and other tools of "soft power," China has been able to build alliances and prod countries to make decisions in China's interests--interests that are not always in agreement with America's.

Naazneen Barma adds that not only is China pursuing greater power on the world stage, it is doing so to entrench a "new world order"--one based on illiberalism and national sovereignty. This system, Barma points out, stands in direct contrast to the democratic liberal order America and the west have pursued since the end of the Cold War.

Devin Stewart wants us to remember that China's ability to use soft power is hampered by its own moral standing. While its economic model is appealing to failed states, other nations may be more reluctant to throw in with a country that tolerates slave labor, human rights abuses, and stands firm behind the Sudanese government. Josh, for his part, reminds everyone that it is still debatable whether China is deliberately constructing an alternative model, or whether it serves as an example of one simply by the allure of its impressive economic growth.

Ely Ratner goes beyond the world-order dichotomy, pointing out that China and other countries are building a "World Without the West"--one that does not require conflict or assimilation with the American order, but instead makes it increasingly irrelevant. Josh then asks, if such a world is created without one leading nation, among many, "trying to enforce trade rules, mediate disputes, deal with natural and manmade disasters, police shipping lanes," and so on, can China step in to fulfill the same role, considering its low level of trust among other nations?

Daniel Drezner highlights just this sort of distrust in Africa, where citizens in Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have recently chafed at China's attempt to flex its soft power there. While its economic investment is hard to turn down, some see its encroachment as "colonialism all over again." Echoing that sentiment, Dan Blumenthal says we've seen such expansion before: China is growing on exports and intervening to protect its fossil fuel sources, like the Asian Tigers of yore--and "acting on mercantilist impulses with which a 19th century European power would be quite familiar."

Naazneen says these considerations limit China's ability to seize the mantle of world power, and says America could exploit these limitations by calling on China to take on the costs of great power responsibility: contributing to the global public good. John Feffer weighs in to say that China is reluctant to provide public goods because so far, it hasn't needed to in order to grow its economy and its power. What's more, it is only pursing the same sort of power plays that America has long engaged in.

In the meantime, Josh says, China is working to export its economic model to the world, if not its ideological model. But Mauro De Lorenzo says that's not all that's happening. China is pursuing a strategy in the Third World, one based not simply on economic or ideological grounds, but on influence, which is driven by cash for infrastructure, and which has largely been relinquished by American aid policy.

These realities, Ely points out, are what bolster China's power now, even if its moral standing may diminish that power in the long run. While some may complain about China's policies, it is important to remember those who are not complaining: the regimes that thrive on China's support.