I am coming late to this interesting discussion and have had a chance to read all the posted comments.

The question of whether China is trying to create an alternative order is an important one. As far as I can tell, if one believes what the Chinese write and say about their intentions, the first order of business is preventing a "Gorbachev" model. The CCP must stay in power. To do so it must be the only group in China seen as "safeguarding the interests of the Chinese people." It must grow its "comprehensive national power" (the Chinese term), reverse the century of humiliation, during which it lost Taiwan, and gradually re-take its position of centrality in Asia. Along the way, Beijing realized that it must engage in good neighborly relations in order to prevent a counter balancing coalition forming out of fear. And, it has become a net oil importer which has been a prime motivator of its presence on the world stage.

As I have written in a review of Josh's book, it is not so much "soft power" that Beijing is exercising in the sense that Joseph Nye defined it. Rather Beijing is exercising traditional, mostly non-military, forms of statecraft. These include economic payoffs and diplomatic protection for countries such as Sudan and Iran that are under pressure from the international community, in return for oil and gas.

China's "model" is not very new at all. It is following the export-led growth model of the Asian tigers. That model will certainly appeal to other countries to the degree it has been successful. The great hope of American policy is that like the Tigers before it (with the exception of Singapore) economic success will lead to democratic reform. The CCP and the some 62 million people in China who have done relatively well will resist this process.

It is hard to see what new norms China is encouraging at all. It is acting on mercantilist impulses with which a 19th century European power would be quite familiar: secure oil and gas deals, protect the supplier. China does not practice the so called norm of non-intervention. It intervenes in others' affairs all the time. Just ask the Australians about China's behavior in the Pacific islands. Ask the Prime Minister of Singapore after he returned from Taiwan. China would prefer that countries did not intervene in its own affairs which would include, in its own definition, Taiwan. It does not have much use for democracy promotion or humanitarian intervention for obvious reasons. It will certainly resist those "norms."

If China continues to succeed economically (and that success is not pre-ordained) and decides to pursue the more ambitious goal of re-taking its place in the sun, having a few anti-American allies around the world would be quite useful.