If you look closely at the recent confrontation between the U.S. forces in Iraq and the Mahdi Army—you see the elements of a whole new approach to the Iraqi crisis, one based on sociological analysis rather than political fantasies. The Mahdi Army was providing satisfactory security for an important Shia segment of Baghdad, Sadr City. However, the U.S. maintained that to show to Sunni politicians and their followers among the insurrectionists that its law and order enforcement is even handed, the U.S. must take control of Sadr City. Initially the Mahdi Army made way, but then it relented. The result? Bombing in this part of town increased and so did revenge killing. Indeed, it now seems that this clash will endanger the very political balance the U.S. sought to promote, as Shias are withdrawing from the coalition government.

If you look closely at the recent confrontation between the U.S. forces in Iraq and the Mahdi Army—you see the elements of a whole new approach to the Iraqi crisis, one based on sociological analysis rather than political fantasies. The Mahdi Army was providing satisfactory security for an important Shia segment of Baghdad, Sadr City. However, the U.S. maintained that to show to Sunni politicians and their followers among the insurrectionists that its law and order enforcement is even handed, the U.S. must take control of Sadr City. Initially the Mahdi Army made way, but then it relented. The result? Bombing in this part of town increased and so did revenge killing. Indeed, it now seems that this clash will endanger the very political balance the U.S. sought to promote, as Shias are withdrawing from the coalition government.

The issue behind this limited conflict is writ much larger if one views Iraq through sociological, communitarian lens. Security can largely be provided by various ethnic and confessional communities for their own members in their already largely segregated areas. Such communal security entails granting a high level of autonomy to regional governments, such as the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south.. This approach would seek to tailor state institutions to fit the sociological reality on the ground—a society composed of strong communities and a very weak state, rather than to try to force the sociological reality of Iraq to suit an imported, alien national state model. This idea has been previously promoted by Leslie Gelb and Senator Biden, among others. It will be discussed in a meeting – open to the public – on June 18, 2007 to take place on the Hill in Washington, DC. To read the position paper that will be discussed at the meeting, please go to http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/documents/1035PlanZ.doc; and for further information on the meeting or to RSVP, please email kmak@gwu.edu.

Most discussions about Iraq (and other newly liberated states such as Afghanistan and Kosovo) start with what outsiders consider a preferred end state. Often: a multiethnic, united, democratic, rights-respecting nation state. The question then is asked: how can the United States and its allies bring about these desiderata? Typically, despite considerable human and economic sacrifices caused by such hyper ambitious designs, the foreign powers persist in the pursuit of their utopian goals.

A key example of this highly unrealistic approach is the continuous attempt to convert the militias (in Iraq) and warlord armies (in Afghanistan) into one national force. This is highlighted by the folly of deliberately positioning Shia militias as security units in Sunni areas and vice versa—ostensibly to build up their national identification and loyalty. The fact, though, is that the first and foremost loyalty of most Iraqis (as well as Afghans, Kosovars, and many others), is to their ethno-religious community, and not to their nation.

As part of letting Iraqis develop the state that suits their societal structure, and one that can command their loyalty, Iraqis should best be allowed a very high level of latitude in governing themselves in their respective provinces. The benefits of this approach are evident in Kurdistan. In a February 2007 interview, Major General Benjamin Mixon, the commanding officer of U.S. forces in northern Iraq and Kurdistan, told 60 Minutes that of 20,000 troops under his command, a mere 60 or 70 are stationed in Kurdistan. Because Kurdish areas are patrolled by Kurdish troops, “there’s no need,” for an American presence in Kurdistan. The number of American casualties in the area over the last four years? Zero.

This kind of self-governance can be achieved not merely in the relatively homogenous ethnic regions such as the Kurdish Dahuk or the Shia Maysan provinces, but even in mixed cities, in which neighborhoods – such as the overwhelmingly Shia Sadr City or the Sunni Adhamiya neighborhood in Baghdad – are relatively homogenous and becoming increasingly so. As much as 70% of Baghdad is already ethnically segregated.

Such a separation of the vying parties into their respective corners will not prevent them from working out nation-wide differences, such as the distribution of oil revenues. In effect if it leads to a decrease in hostilities among the groups involved, it will make settlement of differences more attainable.

It is essential that each community be allowed to control its borders. Checkpoints (which are already common) could be set up, at which identification cards must be presented (and which Iraqis already carry) in order to enter a given area, like in our gated communities. In this way, sectarian conflicts could be minimized as each ethno-religious community would control its own area—and keeps out members of other groups. Also terrorism would be hindered by the reduce presence and visibility of foreign troops. Moreover, there would be few, if any, “national” forces (in effect, militias of the other ethnic groups) present in a given region—another favorite target of terrors

Critics and Reponses
“Various nations such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran will oppose such a development and interfere, leading to a much larger, regional war,” fear the critics. Note that we call for community security, not a three-way partition. Turkey may not favor a highly autonomous Kurdish region, but it has put up with it since 1992. And it may well prefer it over an independent Kurdish state. There is no sign that Turkey would invade Iraq to prevent communal security, and if it showed signs of leaning in that direction, the United States and its allies could pressure it to avoid such an intervention. Iranian ties to the Shia areas of Iraq are particularly troubling, yet a closer examination shows that on many issues Iraqi and Iranian Shias do not see eye-to-eye.

The Saudis might well realize that communal security is the best way to protect Sunnis in Iraq. Saudi Arabia may well have a special role to play in bringing about such a security. One of the key issues involved in establishing such a new regime is the distribution of oil revenue. The Sunni may be induced to be more accepting of communal security if Saudi Arabia made up their revenue shortfall.

More generally, it is true that Iraqi problems ought to be viewed within the context of the regional dynamic. There are those, for instance, who argue that the road to Baghdad runs via Jerusalem (meaning that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will have to be first settled) or via Tehran (suggesting that Iran must be first defanged). Still others argue that the road to Beirut and Damascus goes via Baghdad. While it is true of course that all these regional challenges are linked, they are not so closely related that one cannot make significant progress in one without solving the others. Here, the focus is on the least worst option for Iraq in the near future. It would benefit if other regional problems are treated appropriately at the same time, but moving toward communal security is not dependent on resolving these other conflicts.

Even if some of the regional powers objected to this plan, there is no obvious reason why say Iran or Turkey should be given veto power over the development of communal security. The main question is whether the US and its allies should continue to fight it, in the name of a national utopian endpoint, or accelerate the process and benefit from the reduction in hostilities, to result from separating the warring parties.

This text draws on Amitai Etzioni’s Security First, to be published shortly by Yale University Press (www.securityfirstbook.com).