Empiricism Makes the Difference
This has been a very constructive conversation, thought-provoking to say the least. I won't join in the contest to quote from Keynes, but do happen to have been reading at the same time Thomas McCraw's biography of Joseph Schumpeter, and came across the following quotation in it (from the preface to his first book, 'The Nature and Content of Theoretical Economics'): "People can have opinions on the value of general discussions of questions of method.....but to work on problems, not so many methodological principles are needed as there might seem. Rather, discussions of them are a sign of unfruitfulness concerning concrete achievements."
Although there are people who might regard this assertion as value-laden in itself, it speaks to me about why economists of all types have so much to contribute to policy debate and business decisions, namely the empiricism which has been at the heart of the subject since its origin in the Enlightenment philosophy of Hume and Smith. Indeed, Hume for me summarized the essence of economics (in 'A Treatise of Human Nature'): "It is at least worthwhile to try whether the science of man will not admit of the same accuracy which several parts of natural philosophy are found susceptible of." His aim was to apply the same sceptical empiricism to the ordering of human activity as scientists were applying to the natural world.
Certainly, economists are not in a position where we can end many controversies (although we can rest solidly on the validity of some results), but our passion for data means our hypotheses not only can be falsified but are confronted with that possibility all the time. I'm delighted that much that was on the fringes of economics has become mainstream during the past 20 years although I do wish heterodox economists could be a bit more upbeat about this undoubted change. The explanation for this change lies, I believe, firmly in the availability of data sets and computer power which have made possible the kind of applied economics we do today. As econometrics improved for these reasons during the 1980s and 90s, mainstream economists changed their models as a result of the evidence. All is not perfect in the profession, as will be evident from the discussion here. But economics is these days in an impressively vibrant and healthy state, generating a profusion of important empirical results.















~
In lieu of Diane Coyle's Sex, Drugs and Economics ... my personal preference is Sex, Drugs and Rock & Roll... wink wink
~OGD~
June 3, 2007 9:17 AM | Reply | Permalink
Is there a trend to re-brand economics as decidedly un-dismal? How about More Sex Is Safer Sex: The Unconventional Wisdom of Economics by Steven E. Landsburg?
Seems the issue is not the math, although there are some intriguingly subtle relationships one could analyse a la John Nash; it's more the question of what is data? Is an expense that doesn't occur a credit? Is a cost one doesn't have to pay perhaps someone else's expense?
These questions don't need complex math, but deciding what is to be measured is the hard part.
June 3, 2007 11:49 AM | Reply | Permalink
I would add that the flaw in most economic models is not found in the math---the operations, the structure, etc.---it is in the values that are assigned to the variables that are plugged into the equations. That is to say, the significance of certain variables is often exaggerated/misconceived to such an extent, they do not actually reflect the reality we experience in the real world.
One major error of this type that I find especially annoying is the assumption by most macroeconomists (even those who think of themselves as Democrats) that the interest rate is determined by a 'market' for loanable funds, the supply of which is provided by savers. Based on this assumption, the interest rate is assumed to be an endogenous variable, one that is dependent for its value on the changes that occur in other variables within the model (like the savings habits of households).
In actual fact, America's central bank exercises ultimate control of the supply of loanable funds, injecting loanable reserves into bank balance sheets that were not saved by any saver whenever it wants to keep the interest rate lower than the market would otherwise determine [if the Fed had not interfered with its total control of money supply]. It does this by simply buying paper assets with money it creates with a keystroke.
This reality should be reflected in macro models by 'assuming' that the interest rate is an exogenous variable, but it typically is not. Nothing wrong with the math, per se, but if the assumptions you make about the variables you are plugging into your model are flawed, then its predictive value will suffer.
Mathematics is a wonderful tool, but unless the theorist accurately deduces the correct weighting of the variables she uses---and their proper inter-relationships---then the tool only produces flawed outcomes. Ask any of these professional economists about the track record of econometric models in terms of their predictive value...
June 3, 2007 1:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
It appears that Coyle she is a bit misinformed about what falsification involves.
Let T be some theory and m1, m2, m3 be models based on this theory.
Mainstream economics does lots of testing to select among, say, m1, m2, and m3. And many of these m's do get rejected along the way.
But this is NOT falsification. This is not what is required by falsification (as this term is designed to require).
Falsification would involve mainstream economists actually subjecting T, the mainstream theory itself, to potential falsification.
Yet one characteristic of mainstream economics is that it has show little interest in subjecting their theory to rejection. Indeed, it is possible that no observation can lead to the rejection of the mainstream theory (as opposed to models based on this theory) as mainstream theory is so flexible that it can explain anything.
Therefore, according to the real standards of falsification, mainstream economics must be classified as a non-science.
A huge difference exists between empirical testing and falsification.
June 3, 2007 1:19 PM | Reply | Permalink
~
No wonder I stick with Rock & Roll...
... "I-IV-V"
~OGD~
June 3, 2007 2:33 PM | Reply | Permalink
Really? To me economics has always seemed to simply be assumptions plus numbers. What empiricism are you talking about? Economics is supposed to be a social science but it has always seemed to me that, more than any other social science, economics is dominated by ideology and not empiricism.
but what the hell do I know?
June 3, 2007 3:04 PM | Reply | Permalink
Just as Newtonian physics made claims as to the behavior of all matter, so it would be nice that our economics could make similar precise predictions about human economic behavior.
Second, and this is what is important: Just as physics does not tell you what you should do given the laws of nature, so a descriptive economics will not tell you what to do about (how to shape?) human economic behavior.
And this is what it all amounts to. Smith et al want to merely describe and predict human economic behavior and for some inexplicable reason want to maintain that there should be as little interference as possible in markets.
That's like saying that now that we know that F=ma and that Fg=Gm1m2/d^2, we should do nothing with that knowledge at all. That is: don't utilize that knowledge to meet legitimate human needs and desires. But that's absurd. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of physics is that it allows us to craft nature to our wills.
Why then economists who pine for the descriptive rigor of physics seem phobic about market intervention--claiming that some mysterious "invisible hand" will optimize human utility--is beyond me. It would be as if Newton said "here are the laws of nature, just let them operate unimpeded and some "invisible hand" will make sure that all the useful gadgets that can be contrived will just coalesce on their own"
I really want to know why for example neoclassical and new classical economists think that way.
June 3, 2007 3:45 PM | Reply | Permalink
If I was to compare falsificationism with verificationism Coyle would say, "That verificationism is pretty bogus! It merely seeks to find results consistent with its theory! That is not serious science."
But mainstream economics, in essence, takes a verificationist approach: empirical work is "done and complete" when a mainstream model finally "explains" the observations at hand.
Yes, paraticular models based on the mainstream might be rejected on this path (as "wrong"), but the end result is always the same: develop a neoclassical model that fits the data!
Neoclassical models do not seek to falsify the theory but merely to find a neoclassiccal model that fits the data.
Science? Nope! Self-confirming empirical work? Yep!
Very beneficial to the mainstream economist? You bet!
And these sorts of folks are those who we look to to help us learn about the economy and to rightfully dominate the academic economic world?
June 3, 2007 4:50 PM | Reply | Permalink
I would add that the flaw in most economic models is not found in the math---the operations, the structure, etc.---it is in the values that are assigned to the variables that are plugged into the equations.
even though empiricists claim otherwise, they unconsciously
create philosophies that justify their actions.
their values, I think, show up in those philosophies.
To boldly...
June 3, 2007 7:13 PM | Reply | Permalink
Falsification would involve mainstream economists actually subjecting T, the mainstream theory itself, to potential falsification.
...
Yet one characteristic of mainstream economics is that it has show little interest in subjecting their theory to rejection.
the biggest problem might be knowing T, i.e. the unconcious assumption!
To boldly go...
June 3, 2007 7:17 PM | Reply | Permalink
Seems the issue is not the math, although there are some intriguingly subtle relationships one could analyse a la John Nash; it's more the question of what is data? Is an expense that doesn't occur a credit? Is a cost one doesn't have to pay perhaps someone else's expense?
These questions don't need complex math, but deciding what is to be measured is the hard part.
All these questions are usually answered by one process: Politics! Economics and Politics join together in an incestuous relationship with special interest business to form a complex call and recall musical blues performance leading to a common crescendo of Choral music performance when the public coffers are being drained.
When an economist is chanting the mantra "On the one hand, but on .....) and raising and lowering each hand what is actual happening is a display of free market auctions at work. What is occurring is the economist is trying to bring forth higher auction bids by the opposing sides wanting their answer to be "the answer" for the question. It means government work. If asked in private about his actions he would say that by using the free market brought forth the best answer.
This also can be a problem for the economist if the bidding supplicant begins to feel that the auction actual has no one on the other side bidding against him, but that the economist has only his empty hand to weigh in for the auction.
The problem for the economist is it can lead to a loss of handiness. You would think that the search for a one handed economist then would be a life saver for these unfortunate economists who have this happen to them. It does not help, they cannot participate in the bidding to get new business.
-----------------------------------------------
Today, are we searching for I deals or Ideals?
-Thinking
June 3, 2007 9:15 PM | Reply | Permalink
The "lump-of-labor fallacy"... Is that an empirically confirmed hypothesis? ...our passion for data means our hypotheses not only can be falsified but are confronted with that possibility all the time...
In her book, Professor Coyle cited the debate about immigration as one place "where the economics toolkit comes in handy". Was she talking about mathematical models and sophisticated data analysis? Not really. Instead she offered an argument about a shift in the labor supply curve that could be taken straight from J-B. Say and a claim that opponents of unrestricted immigration commit a lump of labor fallacy in believing that "there is only a fixed amount of work to go around."
Of course if people really did believe there was only a fixed amount of work they would indeed be committing a fallacy. But what evidence did Coyle give for her assertion about their beliefs? What evidence has any economist ever given for such a claim. The claim about a lump of labor fallacy is not neoclassical economics. It is not based on a mathematical model nor is it tested empirically. It is simply a slander that economists have used with impunity over the years. It is a degradation ritual that certain economists use to rope off certain matters of potential dispute as taboo.
The story about the arrival of immigrants shifting the supply curve out is itself based on a number of unrealistic fixed assumptions. That doesn't mean it isn't a good story. Any economic analysis requires some variables to be assumed constant. Otherwise there are too many things changing all at once. That is what is meant by making a problem "tractable". But this business of both (implicitly) denying one's own hidden assumptions and at the same time attributing to one's opponent assumptions that can't be proven to be necessary to the opponent's argument reeks of sophistry.
June 3, 2007 9:59 PM | Reply | Permalink
But T isn't an unconscious assumption. It's the explicit economic theory--the one the economist advances in his or her writings; the one that they say explains the world of economic events.
June 3, 2007 10:14 PM | Reply | Permalink
"One major error of this type that I find especially annoying is the assumption by most macroeconomists (even those who think of themselves as Democrats) that the interest rate is determined by a 'market' for loanable funds, the supply of which is provided by savers."
In mainstream Keynesian economics, the interest rate in the short-run is determined by the supply and demand for money, but in the long run it is determined by the supply and demand for loanable funds. That is, for example, what such Keynesian economists as Mankiw and Krugman teach in their respective macro principles texts.
June 3, 2007 10:21 PM | Reply | Permalink
You can put lipstick on a pig, but it still wants to roll around in the mud, to wit:
"The existence of some pockets of high unemployment -- among blacks in inner cities, for example -- is not caused primarily by competition from immigrant workers, but by the too-high expectations and too-low skills of the people in those groups." -- Diane Coyle, "Sex, Drugs and Economics."
Black folks don't work because they want too much money for the use of their limited skills. If this is the soulful science, I'm the Duke of Marlboro. (More here.)
June 4, 2007 4:31 AM | Reply | Permalink
man isn't omniscent, so believing that T is omniscent is an assumption.
Empiricism has the same limits, in my mind, because of the correlation/causation problem-- so empiricism can't be a science because the problem might have N dimensions and the empiricist can only look at M dimensions and must, necessarily, use interpolation.
To boldly go...
June 4, 2007 8:15 AM | Reply | Permalink
Whoa, MCS, I don't know where you got any of that or how it applies. Empiricism isn't a science. It is a form of reasoning. Empiricism is based on the claim that in order for reasoning to be correct, it must be checked against the real world. This put empiricism in opposition to rationalism which holds that truths can be discovered without reference to the actual world.
In that way, empiricism is the basis for science, but it is not science in itself. What the above poster was discussing was the scientific method, specifically a form of naive falsification wherein a scientific theory is tested against the real world.
This test operates simply by modus tollens: If P, then Q. Not Q, therefore not P. In other words it relies on determining logical consequences of a theory and then observing the world to see if the consequences occur as expected. If the consequences don't occur, then the theory is falsified.
Thus, a scientist or economist will propose a theory T, determine what would occur in the world if the theory were true, and then look for evidence.
T can be any hypothesis such as evolution, Newton's laws of motion, or even social scientific claims such as the economic hypothesis of comparative advantage or the psychoanalytic hypotheses of Freud.
What the above poster is saying then is that economists develop theories (hypotheses) but then don't subject them to actual real world testing. Instead, through their particular methods, they search only for evidence that would support the theory not that which could prove it to be wrong.
June 4, 2007 12:09 PM | Reply | Permalink
And yet, in using non-empirical criteria to rule out of bounds theories that have a better fit to some of that data, and accepting as credible, publishable theoretical work models that fly in the face of well known empirical relationships in a field ... the fact that "rational addiction theory" is ever published is a case in point here ... orthodox marginalist economists are far less empirical than they pretend to be.
June 4, 2007 1:23 PM | Reply | Permalink
Empiricism isn't a science. It is a form of reasoning.
right, and science is science because of the scientific method, "a form of reasoning."
what I find philosophically interesting is the question, "does science (intelligent design, reasoning) produce better results than evolution (unconcious design)?"
In the economic space, this question seems similar to the debate of "active funds" versus "index funds."
Most people seem to think that empiricism (active fund management) only outperforms index funds in the short term.
While you are making this into a scientific issue, I don't see a "crystal ball" here.
That said, I think that empiricism is a good way for academics to understand the world. i.e. Math Ed programs push the notion that "number sense" is important, so people don't instinctively think that they'll get back $1,000,000 (what their calculator says) if they invest $100 at 5% interest for 5 years.
The Lesh Model is based on this and encourages teachers to have students apply the same operations in different domains.
So, you can add dollars (adding integers) or play two keys on the piano (adding two sine waves), etc... to better understand the concept of addition.
I think that empiricism will certainly engage economists and therefore their own thinking will be stimulated towards better metaphysical arguments.
I'm mostly excited by the Internet because it's allowing massive parallel computations/collaborations.
In this environment, empiricism seems to simply be the diplomatic/democratic way of selecting which computations (answers) win (are more right) and lose (more incorrect).
Despite all of this, "science is self-correcting," but how long does it take?
i.e. If economists don't value the environment in their metrics, it could be billions of years before things are restored!
To boldly go...
June 4, 2007 5:16 PM | Reply | Permalink