The Algerian Angle
Congratulations, Steven on an excellent book. I've enjoyed following the dicussion thus far and thought I'd weigh in from the perspective of the Algerian case. While I certainly wouldn't argue with the thrust of commentary underscoring the stability of Middle Eastern regimes and the critical role played by the military and security services towards insuring stability, I think a further examination of the Algerian case illuminates some deeper complexities and raises the question of how durable such arrangements are in the long run. Here, I think I disagree with Steven's initial post that "Hosni Mubarak's Egypt is looking pretty good" Perhaps, yes, when compared to Iraq, but what are the long-term implications?
In the Algerian case, the military, threatened by the implications of the ascendance of a legal Islamist party, opted to abort the political process in a coup and seize outright control. Of course, the situation was extremely complicated, and it will never be known what would have happened had the elections been allowed to proceed. Steven rightly points out that "though the FIS may have been able to secure an outright majority in parliament, it would not necessarily have led to constitutional changes." [i.e., the imposition of Shari'a law]. Could the regime have arrived at a "cohabitation" with the Islamists that may have moved Algeria closer toward becoming the Arab world's first true democracy? Not at all clear, but the resulting decade of civil war, with an estimated 150,000 lives lost and billions of dollars in damage to Algeria's infrastructure, was far from a "stable" or "democratic" solution.
Today, the roots of Algeria's conflict remain largely unaddressed. The recent spate of terrorist attacks by the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat -- newly re-named Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb--stands as an ominous sign for Algeria's long-term stability. While I'm not suggesting a resumption of civil war or a fatal threat to the regime's survival is imminent, I would underscore the degree to which the military and security services will obstruct movement toward democratic opening that threatens their perquisites and dominance in the power equation. How stable such an arrangement is in the long run is still open to question.
From disucssions with my cousin an Arabic speaking professor of Middle Eastern politics I would not assume anything is fine. She has interviewed countless Islamists in numerous countries. Many of them favor elections on the theory that once in power it will be the last elections their countries will have. The advantage the Islamists have is the various regimes have neutered virtually all secular opposition driving many to the Islamists. Secondly the Islamists have a very constricted world.
As my counsin pointed out in a talk she gave to a foreign policy group here in New York it is possible for an Islamists to fly from Egypt to London and still only deal with fellow Muslim extremists no matter how long their stay in England. This is not a formula for the long term well being of a stable Middle East let alone a liberal one.
Daniel A. Greenbaum
May 23, 2007 10:28 AM | Reply | Permalink
Is Hosni looking good for the long-term? I share Mona's doubts. Hosni's formula has worked (to a degree) for three decades, but it is showing signs of terminal decay.
As I commented on Jason's post: Egypt is the country that:
• Liberalizes the economy just enough to get by;
• Democratizes its institutions just enough to get by; and
• Provides just enough public education, public health and other public goods to get by.
While at the same time Egypt manages to:
• Try just enough activists in military courts to keep them in check;
• break just enough heads amongst street demonstrators to instill caution;
• censor and occasionally jail just enough journalists and bloggers to remind folks who is in charge.
For a citizenry that has long thought of itself as the “mother of the universe”, Egyptians have been learning to get along with “just enough” for the past six decades. A little participation, a little politics, and a good deal of repression (albeit sometimes with a velvet glove and only infrequently with an iron fist) has taught Egyptians to expect very little from their leaders and the institutions of governance.
This works in part because of a tradition of servility and compliance. Egypt is not a culture of hot-headed-ness. It is a culture of acceptance and mild perseverance.
Set in an Old Testament neighborhood, Egypt is in some ways a New Testament society. The meek may not be first, but they get by. Mubarak’s party, his security services, and his inner circle understand this very well.
Mona's question remains, however, whether the old formula will work forever.
As more and more Egyptians get their news from Al Arabiyya and Al Jezira rather than from the staid, government dominated media, will they remain passive and accepting forever? One would not expect a rapid transformation in this very old society where time is measured in pharaonic epochs.
The old social science mantra of “the revolution of rising expectations” is probably not just around the corner. Mubarak’s son may not, however, be able to count upon the entropic weight of low expectations to ensure him a stable 40 year reign.
He knows a bit more about the wider world than his father, and he may well be called upon to make some use of that worldliness.
Professor John Stuart Blackton
May 24, 2007 6:54 AM | Reply | Permalink